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Environmental Conflict in Alaska
Praise for 
by Ken Ross
“over the past forty years, some of the most emotive 
and spectacular American environmental struggles 
have taken place in Alaska: disputes over the hunt-
ing of polar bears and wolves, various nuclear and 
dam-building enterprises, the Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line and the ongoing strife over oil exploitation in 
the Arctic national Wildlife Refuge, logging in the 
Tongass national Forest, and the Alaska national 
Interest lands Conservation Act. In Environmental 
Conflict in Alaska, seventeen short, self-contained 
chapters cover all this familiar ground and more. . . . 
This book will undoubtedly serve as a reliable basic 
manual for courses in Alaskan history and environ-
mental and northern studies.”
—Alaska History
“Ross gives fair exposure to many of the heroes and 
villains of the political history of Alaska. Whether 
you side with edward Teller and his grandiose plan 
for nuclear-powered progress, or with the Green-
peace opposition that was born as a result of nuclear 
testing in the Aleutians, the book will help you un-
derstand most points of view on this and other en-
vironmental conflicts of the times.”
—Natural Areas Journal
Photo credits. Front: Hubbard coll. VTS 29-03, Santa Clara 
University Archives. Back, top to bottom: Powell coll. 64-43-
213, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions 
Archives; Core coll. 01-3891, Alaska State Library; by Edward 
Curtis, Harriman coll. RBD 0201-118, University of Alaska Fair-
banks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives; from C.R.E. Radclyffe, 
Big Game shooting in Alaska, London: Rowland Ward, 1904; 
from Edward M. Scull, Hunting in the Arctic and Alaska, Phila-



















A companion volume to Environmental 
Conflict in Alaska, Ken Ross’s Pioneering 
Conservation in Alaska chronicles the key 
land and wildlife issues and the growth 
of environmental conservation in Alaska 
during its Russian and territorial eras.
The Alaskan frontier tempted 
fur traders, whalers, salmon fishers, 
gold miners, hunters, and oilmen to 
take what they could without regard 
for long-term consequences. Wildlife 
species, ecosystems, and native cultures 
suffered, sometimes irreparably. Threats 
to wildlife and lands drew the attention 
of environmentalists—including John 
Muir—who applied their influence to 
enact wildlife protection laws and set 
aside lands for conservation. Alaska 
served as a testing ground for emergent 
national resource policy in the United 
states, as environmental values of species 
and ecosystem sustainability replaced the 
unrestrained exploitation of Alaska’s early 
frontier days.   
efforts of conservation leaders and 
the territory’s isolation, small human 
population, and late development 
prevented widespread destruction and 
gave Americans a unique opportunity to 
protect some of the world’s most pristine 
wilderness.
enhanced by more than 100 
photographs, Pioneering Conservation in 
Alaska illustrates the historical precedents 
for current natural resource disputes in 
Alaska and will fascinate readers interested 
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For 250 yearS alaSKa lured Fortune SeeKerS and eSCaPeeS FroM tHe boredoM 
and social confi nes of modernizing society. A theater of quest to try the hardiest 
of souls, it promised fabulous riches for the taking. isolated, vast, open, en-
dowed, and dramatically beautiful, it called out to the most primitive urges—
greed, excitement, lust for power, freedom. Adventure awaited all who came; 
riches only a few. No matter, though; the illusions outweighed the reality. And 
pioneers pursued them in a state of near-religious fervor.
A few early visitors chose to settle in Alaska, especially after the gold rushes 
of the late 19th Century and the fi rst two decades of the 20th Century. they 
wanted to be where they could control their own lives and their achievements 
could be clearly seen; where folks knew a person as an individual, tolerated 
idiosyncracies, clearly defi ned manhood and womanhood, and valued honor; 
where all could tell right from wrong; where people trusted and helped one 
another; where one could recognize sources of danger and everyone took hard-
ship for granted; where boredom would be rare, adventure common, rules and 
crowds few; where people and things were what they appeared to be—a realm 
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of wholesome earth, pure water, and bracing air. And a place where one could 
wrest a living from the land.
in the Alaskan experience of Europeans and Euro-Americans, three com-
peting land ethics emerged. Combining desire for freedom and lust for wealth 
and power, one urged exploitation and conquest in the name of individual 
benefit and economic progress. Sweeping relentlessly through the territory, it 
devastated wildlife populations and Native cultures alike. Only physical barriers 
could contain it throughout most of its temporal and spatial reign. it threat-
ened, and still threatens, to subdue one of the last great wild places on earth.
A competing idea, utilitarian conservation, sought to bring the free-
booting ethic to bay. it envisioned moderate, measured use of natural resources 
for the long-term well-being of humans and the nation, in contrast to the 
short-term, self-centered quest for profit that had wreaked so much destruc-
tion on the West. if properly regulated by government, forests, minerals, and 
wild species populations and their numerous benefits could be harvested indef-
initely. they would provide a foundation for a gradually modernizing, stable 
society.
A third contending view drew strength from the experiences of pre-statehood 
Alaska. in its most advanced form it nurtured a vision of Alaska as a realm of 
unspoiled Nature. in this conception, like that of its rivals, Nature symbolized 
freedom. But Nature meant more than freedom; it represented beauty, truth. 
One felt freedom in closeness to Nature and in the knowledge that Nature 
existed free. Power and personal gain inhered not in conquest and material 
acquisition but in observation and contemplation. Humankind would be in-
tegral to, not owner of or mere actor upon, the pageant of wild life. Conquest 
seemed unnecessary, self-destructive, immoral. Far less prevalent than the ex-
ploitation and utilitarian notions, the preservation ideal nevertheless consti-
tuted a compelling force for those who experienced it. For more than a century 
it strove tenaciously and won gathering success in creating a public constitu-
ency. the story of Alaska is in large part an ongoing struggle among the ethics 
of conquest, utilitarian conservation, and preservation. it continues unabated 
into the 21st Century.
Alaska enticed adventurers and exploiters from around the world as long 
ago as the mid-1700s. Conflicts over its resources informed signal events—the 
abandonment of Russian empire in North America, the sale of Alaska to the 
United States, the elections of at least three U.S. presidents, and appointments 
and removals of cabinet members. in the territorial era, as now, commercial-
ization of natural resources ranked first among the motives. Euro-American 
visitors aggressively exploited resources in hopes of making fortunes that would 
allow them to return to the States and live in luxury. Most of the relatively few 
who stayed in Alaska endeavored to replicate the pattern of Western settlement 
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by converting the wealth of natural resources into increasingly comfortable 
modern communities.
yet pre-statehood Alaska contributed mightily to the growth of Ameri-
can environmentalism. it nurtured early leaders of the national environmen-
tal movement who shared, and acted upon, the public fascination concerning 
Alaska. through their endeavors to conserve habitat and wildlife these leaders 
fostered values that evolved into principles of modern environmentalism. Eth-
ics of natural resource use in Alaska evolved from untrammeled exploitation 
to utilitarian conservation and elements of species and ecosystem preservation. 
Wildlife management passed from private entrepreneurs into the hands of gov-
ernment professionals employing emerging biological sciences.
Some of the conservation pioneers, by their knowledge and standing, direct-
ly molded opinion in Alaska. Most augmented environmentalism in the States, 
in turn ultimately forcing a shift in Alaskan behavior. Alaska’s pre-statehood 
environmental record is a story of physical endeavor and political conflict in a 
vast and wild land. it is also a vital chapter in the evolution of American envi-
ronmental values. this book, a companion volume to Environmental Conflict 
in Alaska (University Press of Colorado, 2000), traces the evolution of environ-
mental values through the outstanding land and wildlife issues of pre-statehood 
Alaska and the leaders who shaped their outcomes. While values have advanced 
and conditions have changed, many of the issues remain in force to this day.
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11000– First recorded humans in Alaska
 9000 b.C.
1725 Peter the Great orders expedition to America
1741 Captain vitus Bering lands in Alaska, stimulating sea otter trade
1778 Captain James Cook reaches Alaska, begins British/American fur 
trade
1784 Gregorii Shelikov creates fi rst Russian settlement, on Kodiak island
1786– Gerassim Pribylof fi nds Pribilof islands, begins fur seal industry
 1787
1808 Russian-American Company moves to New Archangel (Sitka) as 
part of plan to extend Russian control down West Coast of North 
America
1835 Commercial whalers discover right whales in Gulf of Alaska, begin 
century-long period of commercial whaling
1847 Hudson’s Bay Company builds trading post at Fort yukon, weaken-
ing Russian control of Alaska
1848 Whalers Superior and Ocmulgee enter Arctic Ocean
1865 Western Union telegraph Expedition prepares to connect North 
America and Europe by way of Siberia
Chronology
Fur Seal’S Friend: Henry W. elliott
xxii
1866 Commercial pelagic fur sealing begins, leading to international 
conflict over seals
1867 United States purchases Alaska
1869 Pribilof islands designated first U.S. wildlife reserve to conserve fur 
seals
1871 U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries created to manage offshore 
and Alaska fisheries
1872 Henry W. Elliott assigned to Pribilofs as treasury agent
1877 Edward W. Nelson assigned to St. Michael as meteorologist
1878 First salmon canneries opened at Sitka and Klawock
1879 George Bird Grinnell becomes publisher of Forest and Stream, a 
leading voice in the conservation movement
1879 John Muir first visits Alaska
1880 Gold discovered at Juneau sets off first major gold rush
1884 Organic Act ends military rule, installs appointed governors
1885 Forerunner of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service created in USdA
1886 George Bird Grinnell organizes first national Audubon Society
1887 Boone and Crockett Club, of elite hunter-conservationists, 
organized
1891 Reindeer introduced by Sheldon Jackson to stabilize Eskimo 
economy
1891 Forest Reserves Act empowers president to protect public lands
1892 Afognak Forest and Fish Culture Reserve protects salmon and bears
1892 Sierra Club organized to promote hiking and conservation
1896 Gold discovered at Bonanza Creek, yukon
1897– Last reported muskoxen killed in Alaska
 1898
1898 Nome gold rush begins
1899 Harriman Alaska Expedition of scientists and wealthy easterners
1900 Game and Wild Birds Preservation (“Lacey”) Act bans interstate 
sale of game; first major federal wildlife protection law
1902 Gold discovered near Fairbanks, expands interior development
1902 First Alaska game law limits killing of game species
1902 First commercially viable oil discovery at Katalla
1902– Roosevelt creates reserves including Chugach and tongass national
 1909 forests to conserve coal, timber, wildlife
1905 National Audubon Society organized for bird and nature protection
1905 U.S. Forest Service, department of Agriculture, assumes control of 
forest reserves, emphasizes utilitarian conservation
1906 Roald Amundsen completes first navigation of Northwest Passage
1906 American Antiquities Act permits creation of national monuments
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1908 Second Alaska game law further protects game, establishes wardens
1910– Wolves and caribou exterminated on Kenai Peninsula
 1915
1911 Cordova Railway completed to Bonanza copper mine
1911 North Pacific Sealing Convention protects fur seals and sea otters
1912 Katmai volcano erupts, leading to national monument status
1912 Alaska a territory; legislature elected, governors appointed
1913 taft creates reserves including Aleutian islands
1913 Migratory Bird (McLean-Weeks) Act gives national government 
jurisdiction over all migratory birds
1915 Wolf bounty instituted by territorial legislature
1916 Migratory Bird treaty ratified; coordinates U.S.-Canada policy
1916 National Park Service created for land and wildlife preservation
1917 Bald eagle bounty instituted by territorial legislature
1917 Mt. McKinley National Park created for game protection and 
tourism
1918 Migratory Bird treaty Act gives enforcement power to Bureau of 
Biological Survey
1918 Katmai National Monument created
1919 National Parks and Conservation Association founded to support 
parks
1920 Olaus Murie assigned to Fairbanks to study caribou
1923 Alaska Railroad completed; intended to promote interior 
development
1924 White Act attempts to conserve salmon fisheries
1924– National Conference on Outdoor Recreation, a successful federal-
 1929  private effort to promote wildlife and habitat conservation
1925 Glacier Bay National Monument created for scientific 
study/tourism
1925 Alaska Game Law creates federal-local body to manage wildlife
1929 Migratory Bird Conservation Act authorizes national wildlife 
refuges
1929 Bob Marshall assigned to Brooks Range
1930 Muskoxen imported from Greenland to reestablish species in Alaska
1934 Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act provides funds for refuges
1935 Wilderness Society organized by Bob Marshall for land preservation
1935 Alaska Sportsman, voice for outdoor sportsmen, begins publication
1936 National Wildlife Federation organized
1937 Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration (Pittman-Robertson) Act funds 
wildland acquisition and research
1939 Last Alaskan whaling station closes at Akutan
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1940 Fish and Wildlife Service created within interior department; for-
merly Bureau of Biological Survey, USdA
1941 Kenai National Moose Range and Kodiak National Wildlife Range 
created
1942 Japanese occupy Attu and Kiska
1943 Alcan (Alaska) Highway opened to military
1946 Bureau of Land Management created; promotes mining and oil
1946 indian Claims Act permits Natives to sue United States for land 
claims
1947 tongass timber Sales Act authorizes large-scale logging contracts; 
sidesteps Native land claims
1948 Federal Predator Control Branch established in Alaska, primarily to 
control wolves and coyotes
1948 Alaska Highway opened to public; escalates tourism
1949 territorial department of Fisheries created to supplement and 
eventually replace federal management
1953 North Pacific Fisheries Convention regulates ocean salmon fishing 
by Japan, Canada, United States
1954 Ketchikan Pulp Company mill opens
1954 Alaska Sportsmen’s Council, most prominent in territory, organized
1957 Alaska department of Fish and Game created
1957 Oil discovered on Kenai Peninsula; initiates oil era
1958– Alaska Statehood Act; statehood; guarantees state 104 million acres
 1959
1959 Alaska Pulp Company mill opens at Sitka
1960 Alaska assumes control of fish and game
1960 Alaska Conservation Society organized; founds environmental 
movement
1960 Arctic, izembek, and Kuskokwim national wildlife ranges created
1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) allots 44 million 
acres to Native village and regional corporations
1980 Alaska National interest Lands Conservation Act (ANiLCA) creates 
parks, refuges, national forests, BLM lands, wilderness areas
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Part I: Early Naturalists and Wildlife Exploitation
1
Early Naturalists and Wildlife Exploitation
alasKa’s EarlIEst CoNtaCts WItH WEstErN CIVIlIZatIoN aNd tHE rEsultING 
environmental crises occurred mainly on the seacoast. There acquisitive nations 
found valuable fi sh stocks and the fur, oil, baleen, and ivory of sea mammals. 
Later, during the gold rushes, the focus of attention shifted inland. Gold seeking 
introduced unpleasant side effects of forest fi res and depletion of fur and game 
mammals. Physical and psychological separation from centers of civilization 
made rational resource management diffi cult and encouraged destructive be-
havior by Russians and Americans as well as seafarers and explorers from other 
nations. Disease, liquor, cultural infl uences, and modern technology weakened 
Alaska Native societies, and many Natives participated in irresponsible killing 
of wildlife. Conservation measures ordered by the Russian government, while 
effecting gains, did not inspire similar behavior by Americans. Repeating the 
pattern of conquest of the American West, weak and poorly enforced laws gov-
erned the disposal of Alaska’s natural resources between the purchase of Alaska 
in 1867 and the 190s. Such an assault on Nature bore a high potential for 
ecological damage.
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Owing to its wealth of resources and its status as the new American frontier, 
Alaska attracted numerous government and private scientists, hunters, and ad-
venturers. Some possessed little or no higher education; others held doctorates 
in science. Their tenures in Alaska ranged from summer trips to decades of resi-
dence. Some became prominent government officials, others museum directors 
or academics. Of those concerned about natural resource policy, most worked 
out of Washington or New York City. Many wrote for wide audiences, and 
several founded or led environmental organizations. Some influenced Alaskan 
environmental issues directly, others indirectly.
Among the pioneer naturalists, private citizens led the way in Alaskan envi-
ronmental protection. Having come as hunters, adventurers, or young govern-
ment officials, they fell in love with the scenery and wildlife, especially some of 
the more visible species of mammals, and did not want to see them disappear. 
Mainly from privileged backgrounds, they possessed the means to travel, sound 
education and communication skills, and access to high-level government deci-
sion makers. A dozen or more knew and dealt with each other as a social and 
political elite. In an age when mass public opinion played a relatively minor 
role, they belonged to a small number of individuals in a position to prod the 
government into conservation action. Their most influential period extended 
from about 1890 to 1930. It drew strength from the Progressive movement, a 
rebellion against the unbridled exploitative behavior of powerful corporations.
Conservationists acted within the context of an upsurge of national inter-
est in Nature, a reaction to rapid urbanization and the loss of natural areas 
and wildlife. Some, notably John Muir, perceived Nature in spiritual terms and 
viewed its destruction as a transgression against humankind’s proper place in 
life. They placed a high value on preservation of wildlife habitat and species. 
Academic scientists and nature enthusiasts worked to set aside unique sites for 
study of glaciology, vulcanology, or ecology. Others thought it best to manage 
Nature intelligently for the sustained benefit of humans. Of these utilitarians, 
outdoor sportsmen tended to focus on maintaining stocks of favorite fish and 
game species. Government leaders in the conservation movement advocated 
the controlled use of all natural resources—including water, wood, minerals, 
soil, and wildlife—to advance human society as a whole. Many activists held 
elements of both utilitarian and preservationist perspectives, often becoming 
more preservationist as they advanced in age.
The wholesale slaughter of Western animals, the buffalo in particular, en-
gendered the conservationist conviction that such behavior must not be repeat-
ed in Alaska. The presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, a personal acquaintance 
of several early “Alaskan” conservationists, conferred power and legitimacy on 
their efforts. Roosevelt espoused a heavily utilitarian variety of conservation that 
called for scientifically grounded management of natural resources by federal 
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government experts to maximize efficient application of those resources to the 
needs of the nation. Yet he appreciated birds and other wildlife and responded 
to preservationist appeals when they did not threaten more frankly utilitarian 
values. He set aside Alaska lands, and the momentum generated during his 
presidential terms carried forward for decades, undergirding a broad range of 
measures to conserve lands and wildlife nationwide.
Through writings and political action supported by sympathetic federal of-
ficials, the early private naturalists established legal and administrative founda-
tions for sound management of American, and thus Alaskan, natural resources. 
They pushed successfully for the first Alaska game laws. They moved the gov-
ernment to set aside special tracts of land for posterity, presaging the world’s 
largest complex of wild parks and refuges, and awakened American elites to the 
need for conservation of the remaining frontier. Collectively they pioneered 
modern environmental values of ecosystem sustainability, sustainable utilitari-
anism, nonconsumptive resource use, science-based management, public partici-
pation, and government and corporate accountability. They served as founding 
environmentalists for Alaska and for the nation.
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Sea Otters and Scientists
alaSKa’S natiVeS and WildliFe FirSt encOUntered WeStern ciViliZatiOn bY 
way of Asia. An aquatic mammal, the sea otter, took center stage in the events 
that followed. For the better part of three centuries, treatment of the otter 
marked the tragedies and triumphs of wildlife management and evolving envi-
ronmental values.
Toward the end of the 100s Russia’s fur trade reached across Siberia to the 
Bering Sea. An expedition led by explorers F.A. Popov and Semyon Dezhnev 
rounded the northeastern extremity of Siberia in 148, followed by others in 
the late 100s. They knew, based on reports from Natives, that northwestern 
North America could not be far to the east. The Russian government sought to 
enlarge its territorial control and realize economic gain through expanded fur 
trade and exacting of tribute from Natives. Shortly before his death in 1725, 
Czar Peter the Great ordered his Kamchatka expedition to send a ship to search 
for northwest North America. The resultant 1728 sortie under Captain Vitus 
Bering, a Danish offi cer serving in the Russian Navy as commander of the 
expedition, failed to reach the American mainland. Four years later a ship com-
1
Sea Otters and Scientists
5
1
manded by land surveyor Mikhail S. Gvozdev approached the coast at the pres-
ent Cape Prince of Wales, following it southward for two days close enough 
to see Eskimos and their settlements. Unfavorable winds and shallow water 
prevented a landing, and the crew returned to Kamchatka.1 They related stories 
from Siberian Natives of a Russian settlement in “The Big Land” to the east, 
heard before and to be heard long afterward. Although efforts to confi rm the 
stories never uncovered tangible proof, the consistency and detail of Native ac-
counts suggested that Russians may have settled on the mainland. If so, they 
probably arrived on some of the four ships lost during the Popov-Dezhnev 
expedition or from another launched a few years later.2 Whatever the case, they 
did not survive to infl uence subsequent events.
BERING’S ALASKA VOYAGE
The Russian government persisted in its intent to clarify the relative place-
ment of eastern Siberia and northwestern North America. Bering had returned 
to Russia in 1730 and expressed the belief that he had rounded the tip of Si-
beria, demonstrating its separation from North America. The government put 
him in charge of a second major effort to explore the region. Intended to be the 
greatest geographic expedition ever undertaken, it required years of preparation. 
As did other such ventures, it called for a wide range of scientifi c observations. 
As it turned out, the effort did not succeed in settling the question of physical 
relationship between the continents. That task lay unfulfi lled until the arrival of 
Captain James Cook who followed the American coast northward to Icy Cape 
on the Arctic Ocean in 1778. But other adventures and opportunities awaited 
the Russians when they launched their expedition in June 1741.
Two vessels left Kamchatka, eventually becoming separated. Under Alexei 
Chirikov, the St. Paul crossed the North Pacifi c and sighted an island near the 
later-named Prince of Wales Island in Southeast Alaska. Two crews sent ashore 
disappeared, possibly captured or killed by Native Americans. Chirikov returned 
westward along the coast without making landfall and arrived at Kamchatka on 
October 10, seven of the crew having died of scurvy. Captain Bering’s St. Peter, 
sailed by Sven Waxell, neared the mainland at Controller Bay and viewed Mt. 
St. Elias on July 1.3 Bering fell seriously ill and feared he might not reach Ka-
mchatka before the fall weather; thus he permitted only a brief stop at Kayak 
Island. On the return trip the St. Peter crossed the Gulf of Alaska and followed 
the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands westward. In the Shumagin Islands 
the crew met and traded with Native Americans. In November the ship, its crew 
sick and dying of scurvy, foundered on the shores of an uninhabited island to 
be named for the captain. Its crew placed the immobile Bering in an enlarged 
and unheated fox hole in the bank where a month later he died. Thirty of his 
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shipmates also succumbed that winter. Survivors stayed alive in part by eating 
the flesh of sea otters, which spent much of their time on land and, at first, 
trustingly approached the visitors.4
Bering’s crew included the first person to scientifically examine the sea ot-
ter and other Alaskan fauna: Georg Wilhelm Steller (1709–174). A jay, an 
eider, a sea eagle, a sea lion, and a sea cow bear the name of this scientist. Also 
named for Steller are mountains in the Chugach Range and at Katmai National 
Park and a cove and river on Attu.5 Of the birds and mammals he studied, the 
sea cow may have contributed most to Steller’s place in history. Unknown to 
the outside world prior to 1741 and by far the largest of the world’s manatees, 
it attained as much as 42 feet in length and at least 7,000 pounds. It had the 
misfortune of being born without fear of humans, tasting like beef, and resid-
ing directly in the path of fur seekers. A large one could feed a 33-man crew 
for a month, and its skin could cover a baidara, or freighting boat, or be made 
into boots. Hunters killed them using pikes tipped by long blades, pulled them 
to shore, and butchered them in shallow water at low tide. Steller biographer 
Leonhard Stejneger related that
already in 1743–4 we find Bassoff and his crew wintering on Bering Island, 
and from that year until 173 hardly a winter passed without one or more 
parties spending eight or nine months in hunting fur-animals there, during 
which time the crews lived almost exclusively on the meat of the sea-cow. 
But that is not all, for more than half of the expeditions which wintered 
there did so for the express purpose of laying in stores of sea-cow meat for 
their farther journey, which usually lasted two to three years or more.7
The last reliable sighting of a northern sea cow entered the record in 178. 
The spectacled cormorant, also observed at Bering Island by Steller, suffered a 
similar fate. Flightless and nesting along the fur trade route, it helped fill the 
stewpots. It disappeared around 1852.8 Sea cows did not occur in Alaska in 
modern times, though scientists found their 130,000-year-old bones on Am-
chitka Island, where they and the spectacled cormorants may have been exter-
minated by aborigines.9 Excavations on Bering Island turned up entire sea cow 
skeletons. By bribing Russian workers, Stejneger obtained a skeleton for the 
Smithsonian in 1882 or 1883.10
Not only did Steller hold the distinction of first natural scientist to visit 
Alaska, he also became one of the renowned botanists of his era. Son of a church 
cantor in Windsheim, Germany, he acquired a strong interest in natural phe-
nomena at an early age. A bright and diligent student, he won a public scholar-
ship to study theology at Wittenberg. After a fire destroyed most of his home-
town and ended his scholarship he enrolled in medical school at the University 
of Halle, completing the work in 1734. He qualified as a physician but showed 
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more interest in other natural sciences and had already become an expert in 
botany.
Peter the Great’s awakening of Russia and drive eastward attracted young 
scientists and adventurers, as would the American West and Alaska in the 19th 
Century. Hearing of Russian expeditions to Siberia, Steller traveled to Russia 
bent on joining one. He received a commission in St. Petersburg and crossed 
Siberia to meet Bering. Illness of the ship’s surgeon prompted Bering to sign 
Steller on as a physician and mineral assayer, a disappointment to Steller who 
had hoped to research and classify wildlife. Arrogant yet brilliant and compe-
tent, Steller alienated the crew and received poor cooperation from them.
Steller experienced extreme frustration when Bering, resentful of Steller’s 
demeanor, nearly prevented him from going ashore at Kayak Island. While on 
the island he collected a bird that, because of its similarity to the blue jay known 
to science, he correctly interpreted as proof that the party had reached North 
America. Bering’s anxiety about returning to Siberia restricted the landing party 
to ten hours ashore over two days, and only Bering’s illness and the shipwreck 
enabled Steller to investigate the sea otter and other life on Bering Island. 
Steller’s discipline and medical expertise proved helpful to the survival of the 
ship’s crew during the winter of 1741–1742 on Bering Island. However, on the 
return to Kamchatka, space limitations precluded Steller’s bringing most of his 
collection. He left behind the only skin of a sea cow ever to be collected.
Steller’s international reputation rested largely on his collections from Kam-
chatka and the Kurile Islands, where he explored following the return trip from 
Bering Island. Steller never returned to Alaska or to Europe. Exhaustion and ill-
ness overtook him on his way to St. Petersburg and he died in Tyumen, Siberia, 
at age 37, unaware of the fame that awaited him.11
Steller felt sympathy for wild animals, especially sea otters and sea cows. As 
a descriptive scientist he expressed little of preservationist attitudes or ecological 
perspectives. Twenty-six years before the final sea cow sighting he speculated, 
“These animals are found at all seasons everywhere around [Bering] island in 
the greatest numbers, so that the whole population of the Eastern shore of 
Kamchatka would always be able to keep itself more than abundantly supplied 
from them with fat and meat.”12
What Steller saw happening to the sea otters on Bering Island, on the other 
hand, turned out to be prophetic for both the otters and Alaska. Crew members 
gambled constantly, first for money and then for otter skins: “Anyone who had 
altogether ruined himself tried to recover through the poor sea otters, which 
were needlessly and thoughtlessly killed merely for their pelts, the meat being 
thrown away. When this was not enough, some began to steal and stole pelts 
from the others, whereby hate, quarrels and strife were spread in all the dwell-
ings.” “Little work got done,” and “on the ship, many necessary materials and 
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objects were ruined, being left in the water—such as compasses and the gen-
eral journal itself.” Otters grew “wary by constant hunting day and night” and 
began to disappear. At first they could be found within a mile of the Russian 
camp; by February, within 15 to 20 miles, and by spring hunters had to travel 
35 miles or more. Scarcity of food threatened the crew’s survival “because we 
killed them [otters] needlessly only on account of their pelts—yes, frequently 
letting pelt and meat lie if they were not black enough—it came to such a point 
that we lost hope of being able to build a ship.”13 Despite Steller’s misgivings 
the crew managed to put together a boat from the remnants of the St. Peter and 
sail it to Kamchatka. They brought back something of great interest to the fur 
traders: several hundred sea otter pelts and reports of their abundance.
News of the otters sparked efforts to exploit them, for they brought high 
rewards in the markets of China. Small companies formed by merchants hired 
crews to build and man vessels to sail from Kamchatka to the Commander 
(Komandorski) and later the Aleutian Islands, taking enough provisions for 
three years. As a means of advancing its territorial and economic goals, the Rus-
sian government gave the companies permits and loans. It reaped large gains by 
taxing the furs sold in Russia and to China through the official trading post of 
Kiakhta, on the Mongolian border south of Lake Baikal, during the mid-18th 
Century.14
SEA OTTER HUNTING UNDER THE RUSSIANS
Promyshlenniki, primarily free peasants and tradesmen who trapped sable 
in Siberia, and Natives or creoles from Kamchatka and Yakutsk, comprised the 
bulk of the 30- to 50-man fur-seeking crews in the early voyages. Aleuts later 
joined the crews. Inexperienced in seamanship, the promyshlenniki had to help 
build their ships and sail them in forbidding weather through uncharted waters. 
Lacking nails, in the 1740s they bound the hulls together with whale baleen 
or willows. Each crew member owned a share in an expedition or worked for 
someone who did. They owed the company for their provisions if they did not 
bring back enough furs, a fate that befell many. Government officials expected 
the crew leaders to conduct exploration, gather information, claim land, col-
lect tribute, and incorporate Natives into the state—tasks they did not relish. A 
cossack representing the government normally accompanied the crew to collect 
tributes and record information.15
Until the mid-1750s expeditions went to the Commander (Bering and 
Copper) Islands to acquire sea otter and fur seal pelts for return to Kamchatka 
or to gather meat and skins and over-winter for the voyage to the Aleutians. On 
the uninhabited Commanders, promyshlenniki did the meat hunting, fox trap-
ping, and sea otter hunting. In the western and central Aleutians, containing no 
continued on next page
Sea Otters and Scientists
9
indigenous foxes and few fur seals, the men attempted to harvest sea otters by 
shooting and netting them. They lacked experience in skin boats and frightened 
off the otters by gunfire; thus they quickly became reliant on the Aleuts. Lack-
ing sufficient trade goods to barter for otter skins, they eventually resorted to 
coercion to mobilize the Aleut hunters. When the local otter supply gave out, 
they forced Aleuts to move to new hunting territory.1
Natives, primarily Aleuts and Koniag (Alutiiq) Eskimos, carried out sea ot-
ter hunts in baidarkas (kayaks) carrying one or two persons. About 21 feet long, 
18–20 inches wide, and weighing 30 pounds, baidarkas consisted of driftwood 
frames tied together by baleen and covered tightly by sea lion skin. Hunters sat 
low in their crafts, feet straight forward, wearing seal-gut raincoats tied around 
the opening to keep out water. They used stone-tipped spears mounted on 
throwing handles. Harold McCracken, who knew some of the hunters in their 
old age, described the chase:
Sea otters, Amchitka Island, 1949. By Robert D. Jones. FWS 1092, Alaska Resources Li-
brary and Information Services. Sea otters constituted the main attraction for early Russians 
in Alaska.
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A party of anywhere from six to twenty or even a hundred or more skin 
baidarkas would take to sea together for the hunt. . . . Invariably two men 
went in each little craft, the one in the front hatch using the spear and the 
one in the back principally concerned with maneuvering the baidarka with 
his long, double-bladed paddle. Spread out in a line, they would all move 
out until a sea otter was seen. The hunter who first sighted the animal would 
raise his paddle into the air as a signal and his canoe would dart forward as 
quickly as possible to where the animal went down, remaining on the spot 
while the other baidarkas quickly formed a wide circle around him. Every 
eye was now alert to catch the reappearance, which would take place eventu-
ally. As soon as this happened, the canoe nearest darted forward in the same 
manner as the first, while everyone shouted to make the animal dive again, 
giving it the least possible time to fill its lungs with fresh air. The process 
was repeated; the sea otter’s dives becoming increasingly shorter as the circle 
gradually closed in. Finally a hunter was sure to be close enough to throw his 
spear, and these natives were so expert that a sea otter seldom escaped.17
Hunters also caught otters by means of sinew nets stretched over kelp beds and 
across entrances to coastal caves. They paddled up to otters sleeping in seaweed 
during heavy seas and clubbed them. After catching an otter at sea they skinned 
it and stowed the pelt inside the boat. Killer whales occasionally took the dead 
otters and, according to legend, even the hunters.18
Tlingit Indians in the Southeast also speared otters and sometimes sur-
prised otters on land and clubbed them. Only partially conquered by the Rus-
Aleut sea otter hunters, Unalaska, 1891 or 1892. Revenue cutter Bear coll. 89-193-57, 
University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Employing baidarkas, 
lances, and guns, Aleuts and Koniag Eskimos conducted most sea otter hunting.
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sians, the Tlingits hunted otters for their own use or for trade to the highest bid-
ders, usually the British or Americans. They resented and frequently opposed 
Russians and their Aleut and Koniag hunters. In the Southeast, hunting parties 
organized by Russians used rifles to shoot otters at sea and to protect themselves 
from the Tlingits. Russians issued rifles only for use south of the fort at Yakutat 
for fear that their own hunters would turn the guns on the Russians.19
Treatment of the Natives
Recurring violence between Russians and Alaska Natives marked Russia’s 
North American adventure. It sprang from many sources: misunderstandings, 
abuse of women, forced work requirements and tribute payments, resentment 
of Russian intrusion, rivalries among trading companies, and a history of war-
fare and slavery among Natives themselves. Either side might initiate an en-
counter and, within days or weeks, relations might again be peaceful and ami-
able. Conflict began upon one of the first landings on Attu in 1745. Confusion 
led to shooting; and, in a separate incident, the abduction of Aleut women by 
an exploration team culminated in the shooting of about 15 more Aleuts. The 
surviving guilty parties—a shipwreck on the return trip claimed the cargo and 
32 men—received keelhauling as punishment.20 More extreme Russian behav-
ior followed Native attacks that claimed the lives of numerous Russians and 
sometimes destroyed their ships. In retaliation Russians killed dozens, probably 
hundreds, of Aleuts and Koniags. The reprisals pacified the Aleuts and Koniags, 
ending their internecine wars but facilitating Russian domination.
Some Russians behaved kindly toward the Natives, rescuing and educating 
orphans and slaves. But orders from Empress Catherine and the Siberian gover-
nors to treat Natives fairly tended to be ignored in practice. Tribute payments, 
banned in 1788, continued until 1794.21 Promyshlenniki baptized Natives to 
gain exclusive access to their furs through the status of godfather. Russian clergy, 
on the other hand, counseled humane treatment of the Natives. First arriving in 
the mid-1780s, they operated schools, hospitals, and other social services. Both 
promyshlenniki and clergy tolerated indigenous beliefs and did not actively 
proselytize. A large percentage of Natives voluntarily converted to Russian Or-
thodoxy, even before the arrival of the clergy.22
As they eliminated otters on the islands nearest Kamchatka, the fur seekers 
moved progressively eastward through the Aleutians to mainland Alaska. After 
nearly 40 years of expeditions, a few large corporations, more able to finance 
bigger ships and crews for greater time spans and distances, replaced the small 
temporary companies. Merchants Gregorii Shelikov and Ivan Golikov organized 
the most successful company in 1781.23 An empire builder, Shelikov wanted 
to create permanent settlements and strengthen Russian territorial claims in 
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America as far south as California. Most government leaders approved of land 
claims but did not encourage large population transfers to what they saw as fur-
trading outposts. Nevertheless, Shelikov organized a three-ship expedition to 
Kodiak Island in 1783 to create a settlement from which trading and expansion 
inland and along the coast could be facilitated. Upon arrival and in violation 
of imperial prohibition of violence against Natives, Shelikov’s forces attacked 
and defeated the Koniags. They built a fort and proceeded to establish outposts 
westward and eastward.
Shelikov pressed Aleuts and Koniags into service while issuing orders to 
treat them fairly and provide social benefits. He built a school for orphans and 
sent for more settlers after returning to Siberia in 178. The deepening en-
slavement of serfs in Russia made them less available for service in Alaska. A 
resulting labor shortage caused the company to further impress the Aleuts and 
Koniags as hunters and fighters while maintaining social services.24
On the eastern Aleutians and Kodiak Island during the 1780s and 1790s, 
exploitation of Natives grew more systematic. Alexander Baranov, aggressive di-
rector of the Shelikov-Golikhov Company beginning in 1790, organized them 
for large-scale fur acquisition. In contrast to small groups of single-hatch kayaks 
employed earlier, fleets of up to 00 double-hatched kayaks traveled hundreds 
of miles in search of sea otters. Hunters left home from May until September or 
later. Upon return they had to trap foxes and land otters or supply meat for the 
Russians. Women, children, and elderly men remained as hostages, required to 
gather provisions, make clothing, and perform other chores. Pay for the Natives 
consisted of small portions of the fruits of their own labor. Women also served as 
concubines. Given scant opportunity to lay in winter storage for themselves, Na-
tives often starved. Aleut and Koniag hunters endured dangerous seas and attacks 
by other Natives, particularly Tlingits in the Southeast. Between 1792 and 1805, 
751 Koniags died in service to the Russians; 350 Koniags and Aleuts drowned 
in 1805. Disease, accidents, and other misfortunes reduced the Kodiak Island 
population from 5,700 in 1792 to 1,500 in 1834.25 Similarly, an unknown but 
high percentage of the Aleut population disappeared during the Russian era.2
G.I. Dayvidov, a Russian naval officer who visited posts from Kodiak Is-
land to California between 1802 and 180, recorded the hunting operations 
of the Russian-American Company. It maintained small posts along the coasts 
manned by drafted Native hunters directed by one or two Russians. They gath-
ered birds, seals, foxes, and other wildlife for food, clothing, or barter. Kodiak 
Island had four posts; Afognak two; Ukamok Island, Katmai, and Sutkum one 
each; Kenai Peninsula two; and Resurrection Bay one. Natives had destroyed 
the post at Iliamna, as well as the trading post at Yakutat and the main fort at 
Sitka. Russians had so decimated and intimidated the Aleuts that no such threat 
remained in the Aleutians.
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Russians controlled the Aleuts and Koniag Eskimos and, to some extent, 
the Chugach Eskimos and Kenaitze Indians, forcing them to do a wide variety 
of tasks. In 1803 they sent a party of about 1,000 Aleuts, Koniags, Chugaches, 
and Kenaitzes southward as far as Yakutat to hunt sea otters and return in Au-
gust. About 400 more went to Tugidak and Ukamok islands for sea otters and 
fish. Another 100 or so hunted otters and sea lions in Cook Inlet. A similar 
party went to Katmai village and Sutkum Island. Aged and weak men, about 
80 in all, had to hunt birds for their skins. Not infrequently they died by falling 
off the nesting cliffs in attempts to fill their quotas of 200 to 300 skins each. 
In September the company allowed them to return to Kodiak and put them to 
work carrying supplies or trapping foxes. If a man turned in five black or eight 
red foxes he received a parka made from the bird skins. Old men were also as-
signed to catch cod, halibut, and salmon. Whale hunters, if successful, received 
tobacco and beads.
Koniag women spent the year preparing fish, sewing clothing, digging sa-
rana and lily roots, and picking berries for the company. Alaska Peninsula Na-
tives, in addition to hunting sea otters, caught land mammals and gathered roots 
and berries. The company took the older children to be employed as sailors or 
workers. Kenaitze Indians similarly gathered food, hunted wildlife, and car-
ried beads and other trade goods into the interior to acquire furs, all to benefit 
the company. Chugach women and girls gathered roots, berries, and bird eggs. 
During the winter the company levied a quota of five mountain sheep or three 
marmots for each Chugach. Natives on the north coast of the Alaska Peninsula 
had formerly hunted sea otters but had disappeared, abandoning their relatives 
held hostage by the company.27
Competition in the Fur Trade
Effective in 1799, the Russian government granted a fur-trading monopoly 
to the Russian-American Company, creating a mechanism of imperial power 
similar to the British East India Company. Unable to project military force to 
North America, the Russians hoped a powerful trading company would reduce 
conflict among Russian traders and perpetuate Russian influence.28 Baranov, 
manager of the Shelikov-Golikov Company and its successor, the Russian-
American Company, from 1799 until 1818, sought to extend Russian control 
southward along the coast. Progressive depletion of sea otters in the Aleutians 
and the northern Gulf of Alaska added urgency to the drive. He established 
forts at Yakutat Bay in 179 and Novo-Arkangelsk (Sitka) in 1799 but en-
countered multiple barriers. Native depopulation and resistance worsened the 
chronic labor shortage. Foreign ships cut deeply into the fur trade. Tlingit Indi-
ans in Southeast Alaska not only refused to be dominated but actively made war 
Sea OtterS and ScientiStS
14
on the Russians, destroying the Yakutat and Sitka forts. They killed large num-
bers of Aleut and Koniag hunters who threatened to deplete the sea otters in 
their waters. Apparently glad to weaken Russian territorial and trading control, 
British and American traders gave the Tlingits ample supplies of guns and am-
munition in exchange for furs. Moreover, the difficulty of importing food from 
the Russian colonies in eastern Siberia made the Russian-American Company 
heavily dependent on foreign traders and Native hunters and gatherers.29
Baranov and his company superiors resolved to spread their operations 
southward to California. Sea otters provided the means to this goal and, in 
1808, Baranov established a headquarters at Sitka, recaptured from the Tlin-
gits in 1804. From 1803 to 1812 he engaged Yankee captains to carry out the 
operation—they furnished supplies and transportation, he rounded up Native 
hunters, and each contracting party received half the otter skins. Beginning in 
1809 he sent his own vessels, preferring not to divide the catch. Both ventures 
reaped profits: tens of thousands of otters. But Spanish authorities in California 
refused permission for hunting and took measures to stop it, occasionally im-
prisoning or killing the hunters. After Mexico gained independence, Russians 
and Mexicans signed otter-hunting contracts between 1823 and 1841. Soon 
the Russians found themselves junior partners as Mexicans won more control 
of the industry.30
To maintain their presence in California, acquire supplies, and pursue the 
fur trade, Russians built bases north of Bodega Bay (the Russian Colony, later 
called Fort Ross) and the Farallon Islands, both in 1812. Disappearance of the 
sea otters, competition from American hunters, and resistance by Spanish and 
Mexican officials dried up their fur trade profits. In the Farallons, Russians 
decimated the otters and exterminated the fur seals before vacating the islands 
about 1833.31 At Fort Ross, attempts to produce ships, grain, and livestock 
failed economically for reasons of climate, cost of supply, and lack of trained 
personnel. During the 1830s the colony lost an average of 10,000 rubles an-
nually. Mexican hostility and growing British and American influence to the 
north forced the realization that Fort Ross could not be sustained. The Russians 
abandoned it in 1842.32
Most California sea otter pelts left the hunting grounds in non-Russian ves-
sels. Reports of Alaskan sea otters had reached Boston from Cook’s 177–1780 
voyage. British, French, Spanish, and American ships advanced up the North-
west coast in the 1780s to make territorial claims, partly in response to Russian 
movement into North America. Traders followed them, operating in Alaska 
after the mid-1780s.33 British and, increasingly, American seamen plied the 
waters of Southeast Alaska and Prince William Sound, undercutting Russian 
trade by bartering goods for sea otter skins and setting sail for China. Baranov 
estimated that between the end of the 18th Century and the early 19th Cen-
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tury these ships carried away 120,000 sea otter skins. Only two known French 
expeditions engaged in the trade. Jean Francois La Perouse and his men visited 
in 1788 and died in a shipwreck in the South Seas. A second expedition by 
explorer Camille de Roquefeuil contracted with Baranof in 1818. Part of the 
agreement called for payment of $200 Mexican to the company for each Aleut 
life lost. A harvest of fewer than 200 otters and the killing of 2 Aleuts by Haida 
Indians put an end to French interest in the trade.34
Sea otters formed an integral part of the newly established China trade of 
the United States. New England vessels carried goods to the Northwest coast 
to be traded for furs worth five or six times their cost and exchanged the furs in 
China for goods to be sold in Boston. Profits for such a three-way trip might 
reach 500 percent. Between 1788 and 182 at least 127 ships made the journey. 
The trade peaked in the two decades after 1790 and fell off sharply as the otters 
died out.
Sea otters’ characteristics abetted their collapse. The hunting season never 
ended because the animals needed year-round insulation from the cold water, 
and their pelts remained prime. Mothers refused to abandon their babies, as-
suring the deaths of both and a disproportionate harvest of females. From 1799 
to 1818 about 300,000 sea otter skins went to China ports, not counting those 
the Russians took to Kiakhta.35
Despite a rule against conveying furs to foreign traders, the Russian-Ameri-
can Company traded furs to Americans because they needed foodstuffs and 
supplies not otherwise available. In 1805 a Yankee shipment of meat, bread, 
rice, flour, molasses, and sugar warded off starvation at New Archangel. In ex-
change for food, utensils, guns, blankets, and other supplies, the Americans 
preferred to take furs. They could sell the sea otter pelts in China more cheaply 
than the Russians could, in part because the Russians conducted their trade 
through distant Kiakhta. In return for furs, Russians and Americans got tea, 
silk fabrics, and porcelain. American ships, predominantly New Englanders, 
acquired most sea otters directly from Indians in Southeast Alaska. The ag-
gressive sailors ignored Russian attempts to deter them. Indians received guns 
and ammunition, utensils, metals, nails, hatchets and knives, beads, rum, and 
molasses. As the sea otters dwindled and Hudson’s Bay Company gained con-
trol over the land fur trade in the Northwest, Americans withdrew from the 
Alaska-China fur trade.3
Well-provisioned American traders and, later, whalers remained active for 
several decades, competing effectively against the Russians. Hudson’s Bay Com-
pany, also able to offer the Natives higher prices and better-quality trade goods 
for furs than the Russians could, leased most of Southeast Alaska from the Rus-
sian-American Company for its trading operations. Hudson’s Bay had begun 
construction of a trading post on the Stikine River, and in 1834 the Russian 
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Navy fired on a British vessel attempting to provision it. As part of a settlement 
Hudson’s Bay rented the Southeast for 2,000 river otter and lynx skins per 
year for ten years. The parties renewed the agreement until the United States 
acquired Alaska in 187.37
In addition to the sea otter trade, Russians bought mink, river otter, and 
beaver skins from the Tlingits, but they had to pay three to five times what they 
paid Aleuts and other Natives for furs of similar value. Tanaina Indians of the 
Kenai Peninsula gathered marten, lynx, bear, river otter, wolverine, beaver, and 
muskrat skins for the Russians. Koniags, more fully subjugated, trapped on Ko-
diak Island, and Aleuts in the eastern Aleutians. Russian efforts to set up a fur 
trade in western Alaska and the lower Yukon valley beginning in 1819 ran into 
strong competition from Hudson’s Bay Company in the upper Yukon Valley.38
Low wages, harsh working conditions, and cruel treatment by superiors 
discouraged young Russian men from going to North America, a cause of the 
labor shortage. Moreover, most Russians’ experience and interests lay in ag-
riculture. Work quality suffered in North America: promyshlenniki, creoles, 
and most Natives did not produce efficiently and commonly took to alcohol.39 
Russian clergyman Hieromonk Gideon portrayed the acculturation of 150 or 
so Aleuts who over-wintered at Sitka during the 1820s:
[T]hey have become accustomed to the Russian way of life, to drinking 
tea and, more especially, to drinking strong liquor which they like passion-
ately and to which they have become so wantonly addicted, they use every 
means they can, even illicit means, to satisfy these new needs. Following the 
example of her husband, who changes his parka of birds’ skin, which was 
so comfortable and so practical, for an overcoat made of dreadnought or 
cloth or even for a dress coat—an item of clothing already so ridiculous in 
Europe—the Aleut wife scorns her [skin clothing] and absolutely must have 
an Indian dress, and a shawl, etc. which she acquires in ways not difficult to 
guess. The results of these disturbing changes are sickness and a new genera-
tion, weak and corrupted from birth.40
Baranov’s managerial excesses provoked investigations resulting in his replace-
ment and 1819 regulations, again forbidding abduction and other forms of 
mistreatment of employees and Natives. The 1821 Russian-American Com-
pany rules called for a lengthy list of benefits and fair treatment of Russians, 
creoles, and Natives. They also mandated three-year service by all able-bodied 
Native men at a minimum of one-fifth the pay of Russians. Notwithstanding 
the appointment of more enlightened managers, especially Naval officers, the 
condition of Aleuts and Koniags improved only gradually.41 Numbering 823 at 
their high point in 1839,42 Russians in North America lacked the strength to re-
sist British and American incursions. Their strategic weakness would ultimately 
bring about the demise of their enterprise in North America.
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Indians on the Northwest coast suffered from the fur trade as a whole, 
partly as a result of their own shortcomings. Traditionally, Indians of Southeast 
Alaska and coastal Canada actively engaged in a slave trade, typically featuring 
captives from southern tribes being sold into the interior. Most warfare had the 
objective of taking slaves. Primarily women and children, the slaves sold for 
high prices in trade goods; in 1834 Tlingits paid 2 sea otter or 25 beaver skins 
for each. Wealthy men might own 20 to 40 slaves who performed a variety 
of tasks including hunting. When trading vessels arrived, the Indians offered 
their slaves as prostitutes in return for trade items. Some Euro-American traders 
took up the slave trade to obtain furs, transporting women from as far away as 
California and Hawaii. Nonslave Indian women also became prostitutes, and 
venereal diseases spread. Tobacco, alcohol, and violence by guns added to the 
degradation and death toll. Smallpox killed nearly half of the approximately 
800 Tlingits at Sitka in 1835–183 and similar numbers elsewhere. Measles 
further reduced and dispirited the Natives, ending their resistance to Euro-
American incursions.43
Diminishing catches of sea otters had persuaded the Russian government to 
put conservation measures into effect in 1821, including harvest quotas for dis-
tricts, bans on hunting in depleted areas, attempts to avoid killing females, and 
rules for reducing unnecessary disturbance of the otters. The measures lasted 
until the sale of Alaska in 187. Conservation worked in the Aleutians and the 
Pribilofs but not along the mainland where non-Russian traders pursued the 
otters to near-extermination. Between 1842 and 182 the Russian total catch 
averaged 1,347 annually, of which Koniag and Chugach hunters caught about 
one-fourth in the Kurile Islands north of Japan. Many came from other parts of 
the Siberian coast and, after the 1840s, virtually none from Southeast Alaska.44
A compilation of sales records (Table 1.1) indicated that Russians delivered 
at least 200,839 sea otters to market in about 129 vessels between 1743 and 
1823. Russian, British, American, and French fur seekers took an overall toll of 
00,000 to 800,000 sea otters.45
SEA OTTER HUNTING UNDER AMERICAN RULE
By the time Russian domination ended, few, if any, full-blooded Aleuts 
existed and their aboriginal subsistence culture had been altered considerably. 
To purchase Western clothing and other goods and to construct and maintain 
their Russian Orthodox churches, they needed cash income. Those not harvest-
ing fur seals in the Pribilofs had to rely on sea otter hunting. Otters survived 
in substantial numbers in the vicinity of Sanak Island in the eastern Aleutians. 
Parties of 40 to 50 hunters traveled up to 150 miles from Unalaska Island 
in two-man baidarkas to pursue them. Hunters camped on Sanak Island and 
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paddled out 15 to 20 miles in all directions to look for otters. Lest they alert 
the animals, the men had to avoid making fires and leaving food scraps on the 
beaches. An observer noted that “the sufferings to which the Natives subject 
themselves every winter on the island, going for many weeks without fires, even 
for cooking, with the thermometer down to zero in a northerly gale of wind, 
are better imagined than described.” Of the sea otter he added that “this animal, 
of all wild animals, seems to be possessed of the greatest aversion to or dread 
of the presence, or even the proximity, of man.”4 Otter hunting succeeded 
best immediately before, during, or after storms, which drove otters near or 
onto the shore. Young Aleuts using rifles acquired from traders patrolled the 
shores year-round, firing at any otter near enough to hit. Otters seemed unable 
to disentangle themselves from the nets western Aleuts threw over seaweed or 
stretched across cave openings. In the fury of storms, otters landed and pushed 
their heads under seaweed for shelter. Two Aleut brothers clubbed 78 such ot-
ters in 1½ hours. A writer who knew them commented that the money from 
the otters “would have clothed and fed them for the rest of their natural lives; 
but, like our own coal-oil Johnny, they quickly squandered their wealth, and are 
poorer now than ever.”47
American regulations restricted the taking of otters to Natives and, after 
1878, to whites married to Natives. Nevertheless, in territorial waters whites 
commonly hunted illegally and seldom got caught. In the 1870s and 1880s 
hunters employed a wasteful practice of shooting otters at sea. Captain Michael 
Healy of the U.S. Treasury Department’s revenue cutter Corwin reported that 
as of 1884, “unprincipled white hunters, tempted by the great value of otter 
skins, come here and marry the simple girls, force them to accompany them on 
their hunting trips and do their cooking and work for them, bring two or three 
children into the world, and then leave their families to get their living as best 
table 1.1. Russian Fur Cargoes From North America, 1743–1823
Fur seals 2,324,34 Marten 18,121
Sea otters 200,839 Mink 5,349
Blue foxes 108,85 White foxes 5,130
Red foxes 57,38 Bears 2,50
Beavers 58,729 Lynx 1,819
Cross foxes 44,904 Wolverines 1,234
Black & brown foxes 30,158 Walrus ivory 99,700lb
Otters 22,807 Whalebone (baleen) 107,89lb
Source: Berkh, V.N., A Chronological History of the Discovery of the Aleutian Islands or the Exploits of Russian Merchants 
(Kingston: Limestone, 1974), 93.
Note: Figures include otters from Commander Islands but exclude about 17 vessels lacking records of voyage or 
cargo, in addition to those lost at sea.
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they can, while they themselves return to enjoy their earnings with other wives 
in civilization.” Healy noted that the hunters illegally used breech-loading rifles 
and set numerous nets along the shore. He warned of the impending extermi-
nation of the otters, adding that “as the Aleuts live almost entirely upon the 
profits derived from the sale of skins, extreme poverty, if not actual starvation, 
must follow.”48 In the 1880s, white crews using guns increasingly searched for 
otters offshore in international waters. Ships carried up to 0 pursuit boats, 
some driven by steam, permitting longer ranges and periods of hunting.49
Compared to a sustainable-yield annual catch of 1,000–2,000 by the 
Russians between the 1840s and 187, Americans harvested 12,208 otters in 
their first four years. The kill rose to nearly 5,000 per year between 1881 and 
1890 and by 1909 totaled 107,372.50 Captain C.L. Hooper, commander of 
the Revenue Marine Bering Sea Patrol, complained in the 1890s that despite 
regulations, lack of resources made it impossible for agents to protect the sea 
otter:
Being constantly harassed, clubbed and shot on shore, caught in nets by 
white men, their hauling-grounds made uninhabitable by the camp fires of 
the hunters and defiled by fisheries and the decaying bodies of their compan-
ions, the sea otter of the Aleutian Islands has not only decreased in numbers, 
but has actually changed its habits. It no longer comes out on the land to 
feed, rest, or give birth to its young. A floating raft of kelp serves as its only 
resting-place, and banks of 30 fathoms of water are its feeding-grounds. 
Even there it is hunted and harassed by hunting schooners from March until 
August.51
Natives willingly engaged in the slaughter. Freed from the oppression of the 
Russian era, Aleut hunters had a new incentive—cash—to kill as many otters 
as possible. In 1880 they received $80–$100 per skin from traders. The annual 
catch peaked in the mid-1880s and sank to 724 in 189. As otters grew scarce, 
the price of a pelt rose, reaching $1,200 in London. Of this amount, the few 
successful hunters got up to $400. Money enabled the Natives to buy guns that 
hastened the decline of otter populations, despite the fact that the law forbade 
shooting otters. The relatively vast influx of cash disrupted Native lifestyles and 
left them more deeply impoverished when the money dried up.52
Alcoholic beverages, or the makings thereof, ranked high among the com-
modities acquired by cash or trade. Through most of its tenure the Russian-
American Company prohibited trade in liquor. Moreover, Tlingits in the 
Southeast refused alcohol lest it weaken them. Late in the 19th Century impor-
tation increased despite an 1873 ban by the U.S. government and the initiation 
of revenue patrols.53 Based on his inspection tour in the mid-1890s, Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury Charles Hamlin commented that
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the smuggling of liquor into Alaska and its illegal sale to whites and Indi-
ans continues flagrantly and defiantly. . . . Complaint is also made that it is 
impossible to secure conviction of offenders against the liquor laws by jury 
trial because of sympathy with the accused. . . . The natives are passionately 
fond of liquor, and will do anything to secure it. Many murders are directly 
traceable to liquor obtained in this way; these cases are rarely brought to the 
attention of the authorities. Much cruelty, such as wife beating and other 
crimes, is also caused by the use of liquor.
Hamlin recommended strict licensing and control of substances imported for 
use in making alcoholic beverages.54
Samuel Applegate, Aleutian Treasury agent and early recorder of Alaskan 
wildlife, reflected on the human costs of the fur-seeking era:
Hundreds, yes thousands of lives lost in the raging sea under lowering 
northern skies; hundreds of deaths amid swirling snows and chilling blasts; 
thousands more caused by the hardships and privations inseparable from the 
hunter’s and sailor’s life in those high latitudes; hundreds slain in conflicts 
between native tribes or rival Russians; hundreds more of daring mariners 
lost in those latter days in reckless pursuit of the precious otter—all these 
have been sacrificed in addition to money spent and risked, to make up a 
sum that in these extravagant times does not exceed the wealth of several 
individuals in the United States.55
Sea otter skins drying, Aleutian Islands, ca. 1890s. By Samuel Applegate. Core coll. 01-
2682, Alaska State Library. For Russians and other fur traders, sea otter skins ranked as the 
most valuable resource.
Sea Otters and Scientists
21
Applegate might have added reference to the thousands of Natives who lost 
their freedom and died from forced labor, violence, or introduced diseases.
Treasury agents and other government officials had long protested the un-
sustainable killing of sea otters. But the international controversy over the fur 
seal (Chapter 2) overshadowed the sea otter issue and forestalled action. In 
1887 and again in 1897 the Japanese, joined in 1897 by the Russians and 
Americans, urged a treaty to protect both sea otters and fur seals. British inter-
ests in freedom of the seas and Canadian interests in pelagic sealing prevented 
an agreement.5 Ongoing attempts at resolution of the fur seal dispute lasted 
from 1887 well past the turn of the century.
SEA OTTER PROTECTION AND RECOVERY
By 1910 sea otters taken in Alaskan waters had fallen to 34. In the 188–
1911 period, Americans harvested a recorded 107,372 otters. Of an estimated 
original population of 100,000–150,000, only scattered pockets remained. Al-
most vanished from the earth, sea otters gained firm protection by the 1910 
Fur Seal Act and the North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911. Only Alaska 
Natives could hunt sea otters, and few did. Further safeguards resulted from the 
creation of the Aleutian Islands Reserve by William Howard Taft’s last-minute 
executive order on March 3, 1913.57 In that same year California gave legal 
protection to the sea otters known to survive there, mostly in the waters near 
Monterey. Gradually, otters began to recover in the Aleutians, yet they did not 
go unmolested. A San Francisco trader made annual trips on the mail boat to 
Attu during at least the period 191 through 1928, buying poached otter and 
fur seal skins to be sold in London, Paris, and Berlin. He bought otters for 
about $300; they sold in Europe for up to $1,500.58
American botanist Walter Eyerdam sighted otters off Afognak Island in 
1922 and, ten years later, found them fairly common near Atka and Adak is-
lands in the western Aleutians. Aleuts told him that Japanese poaching vessels, 
normally commanded by Europeans, visited the islands in search of otters. Ey-
erdam met the English captain of one such vessel in 1930. Eyerdam suggested 
that otters be reinstated in the Pribilofs or other favorable localities.59
Jurisdiction over the sea otters shifted from the Department of Commerce 
to the Department of Agriculture in 1915. For the next quarter-century a vari-
ety of commercial activities took place in the Aleutians: cod fishing extending 
from mid-19th-Century Russian operations, accelerated fox farming fostered 
by the Bureau of Biological Survey (BBS), shore-based whaling out of Aku-
tan, sulfur mining at Akun between 1914 and 1922, stocking of reindeer on 
Unalaska and Unimak islands in 1913, and sheep ranching on Unalaska and 
Umnak. None of these directly affected the sea otters, but requests by Governor 
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Walter Clark, interested in economic development, resulted in withdrawal of 
several large islands from refuge status.
Restoration of sea otter populations remained a high priority for the BBS 
and its successor, the Fish and Wildlife Service, supervising the renamed Aleu-
tians National Wildlife Refuge in 1940. The BBS undertook several scientific 
expeditions including one led by Olaus J. Murie and Victor B. Scheffer in 193–
1938 that sighted otters off several islands. Based on reports of otter poaching 
by Japanese, BBS stationed agents on Amchitka from 1937 to 1940. Amchitka, 
populated by over 1,000 Aleuts in prehistoric times, had been abandoned in 
1849 except for temporary visits by fox trappers. It served as a recovery zone for 
otters.0 American poachers took some otters in the 1940s; Alaska Game Com-
mission agents seized three pelts and part of another in 1943–1944.1
World War II arrived at the Aleutians in June 1942 when the Japanese 
seized Attu, Agattu, and Kiska, in part to divert American forces from more 
strategically vital sectors in the Pacific. Americans launched bombing missions 
from Dutch Harbor and Umnak but needed more forward positions to reduce 
the dangers of long flights in bad weather unaided by adequate navigation and 
communication facilities. They built a field at Adak, landed on Amchitka in 
January 1943, and laid down a flight strip only 80 miles from Kiska. Army 
forces recaptured Attu in May at a cost of 549 dead and 1,148 wounded Ameri-
cans and the deaths of nearly all 2,500 Japanese defenders. Unaware that the 
Japanese had evacuated Kiska in July, U.S. and Canadian troops invaded in Au-
gust and suffered 28 dead and 50 wounded by their own firing. Bombers from 
Amchitka flew about 100 missions to the Kurile Islands, and the U.S. Army 
prepared runways at Amchitka, Adak, and Shemya for B-29 attacks against 
Japan, a plan found unnecessary.2
The war changed the Aleutians, if not the sea otters. Attu’s population of 
42 Aleuts went to Japan to be kept as prisoners at Otaru, Hokkaido. Despite ra-
tions that starved several to death, 25 survived. Most eventually settled on Atka, 
and none returned to Attu because the Alaska Indian Service did not want to 
rebuild the village and maintain services on the remote island 550 miles west 
of Atka. Officials also declined to pay for the rebuilding of Biorka, Kashega, 
and Makushin, towns whose combined populations totaled 71. Aleuts from 
all villages except Attu had been moved to temporary shelters in the Southeast 
during the war. Loss of their homes and cultural artifacts, and acquisition of 
new wants and values, dissuaded many Aleuts from returning to their former 
lifestyles after the war.3
GIs on Amchitka dug into all accessible archaeological sites and removed 
the artifacts, seldom following proper procedures. Some materials found their 
way into museums; others were dispersed. Accommodation of about 1,000 
men on the island necessitated nearly 2,000 Quonset huts and many other 
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buildings, all left behind. The Navy stayed at Adak, but the military abandoned 
nearly all other sites. Concretized runways and numerous other facilities re-
mained on several islands, and many unexploded bombs lay on Kiska. Vehicles, 
other equipment, and large piles of junk remained on several islands. Private 
firms salvaged vehicles in 1951–1952 and nonferrous metals in 1953.4 War-
time activities apparently had little, if any, significant effect on the sea otters.
Rats brought in on supply ships survived and preyed on bird eggs. The mil-
itary had no interest in wildlife protection, but Navy pilot Gil Joynt, a biologist, 
carried out sea otter surveys while on patrol. After the war the War and Navy 
departments attempted to gain control of some of the main Aleutian Islands. 
They won expanded use rights, but the islands remained within the refuge.5
By the early 1950s Amchitka’s otter population had reached its upper lim-
its, and small groups existed elsewhere along the Alaskan coasts. Employing 
scuba diving for the first time there, refuge manager Bob Jones found the key 
limiting factor in local otter abundance: when the otters consumed the available 
supply of rock oysters and sea urchins, their numbers dropped off and the oys-
ters and urchins rebounded as part of a natural cycle. Otters in other locations 
relied on a wide variety of foods including clams, chitons, crabs, octopi, snails, 
mussels, and, sometimes, fish. Bald eagles, killer whales, and perhaps sharks are 
the otters’ natural predators.7
Apparent overpopulation of Amchitka otters led the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice to try reintroducing them to former habitat, including the Pribilof Islands. 
But successful movement of otters proved difficult. In March 1951 a team led 
by Jones captured at least 35 otters on tidal rocks and held them temporarily in 
shallow mud-bottomed lakes. Within a few days they all died. A second attempt 
in 1954 compared holding otters in a large wooden tank and on dry grass in 
a building. All those in the tank died; 3 others survived. In March and April 
1955, agents caught 31 and kept them on beds of straw on the way to the Pribi-
lof Islands for release. Of the 19 survivors freed, some died immediately and 
none appeared subsequently. During 1955 through 1957, experimenters tried 
to determine the optimal combination of bedding and water access for caged 
otters, as well as drugs that would reduce stress. Five animals released at Attu in 
195 did not reappear, and an airline flight delay caused the deaths of  of the 8 
otters taken to the Pribilofs. Experimentation demonstrated the need for clean 
water and resting places to prevent contaminants from reducing the insulating 
quality of the fur. Agents applied these lessons in May 1959 and released 7 ot-
ters at Polovina Point in the Pribilofs. Three months later fishermen sighted 5 in 
the vicinity. Funding from the Atomic Energy Commission as part of the 195–
1971 Amchitka nuclear test program enabled much larger translocations.8
In 1958 the 10,400-acre Simeonof Island in the Shumagins became a na-
tional wildlife refuge for sea otters.9 Shortly after statehood the Alaska sea otter 
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population rebounded from perhaps 2,000 in 1911 to 30,000.70 The state held 
management jurisdiction over the otters between 190 and 1972. Based in part 
on reports of large-scale starvation of otters caused by overpopulation in the Rat 
and Andreanof Island groups, the state instituted an experimental, biologically 
sustainable harvest. Between 192 and 1971 the program took 2,55 otters 
from Amchitka, Tanaga, Kanaga, Adak, and Delarof islands. Efforts stemming 
from nuclear tests at Amchitka Island resulted in the successful transplant be-
tween 195 and 1972 of 708 otters to locations from the Kenai Peninsula to 
Oregon. Another 341 died in the moving operations, and the 1971 Cannikin 
hydrogen bomb test killed an estimated 1,000 to 1,350.71 The 1972 Marine 
Mammal Protection Act ended state control and prohibited all but Native sub-
sistence use of the otters. Within a quarter-century after statehood, aided by 
translocation and legal protection, the sea otter recovered most of its original 
numbers and range in the North Pacific.
Robert D. “Sea Otter” Jones, Aleutian Islands National Wildlife Refuge, mid-1950s. By J. 
Malcolm Greany. Alaska Game Commission, 18th Annual Report, July 1, 1956 Thru June 
30, 1957. Refuge manager Jones advanced knowledge of sea otter ecology by underwater 
study.
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Toward the end of the 20th Century four significant problems confronted 
Alaska sea otters. Pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, some Alaska 
Natives hunted the otters. Regulations prohibited sale of whole pelts but per-
mitted parts to be sold as craft items. Natives hoped to develop an industry sell-
ing items incorporating otter fur.72 A second issue, oil spills, found expression 
in the 1989 Exxon Valdez incident that killed an estimated 3,500–5,500 sea ot-
ters.73 Neither of these threats appeared capable of endangering sea otter popu-
lations. A third issue, conflict between otters and commercial fishers over food 
such as clams and crabs, began to manifest itself in Alaska in the 1980s. While 
far less pronounced than the California dispute over abalone, it might grow 
in proportion to human demands or otter population increase.74 The fourth 
phenomenon eliminated at least 95 percent of otters over a 500-mile stretch of 
the western Aleutians during the 1980s and 1990s. Marine scientists suspected 
that a small number of killer whales, possibly as few as four, had eaten the ot-
ters. The predation appeared to result from the precipitous decline of sea lions 
and seals, a normal food supply for the whales. The loss of sea lions and seals, in 
turn, seemed to be related to one or more of three conditions: predation, over-
fishing, and climatic warming.
Further investigation indicated that as few as 27–40 killer whales could 
have caused the decline of sea lions and as few as 5 could prevent recovery. The 
loss of great whales to commercial hunting could have forced the killer whales 
to turn to harbor seals, sea lions, and, finally, sea otters.75 At the onset of the 
21st Century Aleutian sea otters may have become, at least temporarily, victims 
of an ecological collapse.
Sea otter rehabilitation ranks as a noteworthy environmental success for 
at least two reasons. First, a mammal species inherently attractive and interest-
ing to humans escaped extinction. It became a subject of nonconsumptive use 
values, including scientific study and direct and indirect viewing. Millions of 
people have enjoyed watching video presentations of the engaging creature, 
and many have sought to encounter it through ecotourism. Nearly all, if asked, 
would consider its extermination unthinkable and would oppose human activi-
ties that threatened its well-being.
Second, sea otters in some locations are a keystone species in their ecosys-
tems. They consume large numbers of sea urchins, which in turn feed upon 
kelp. The kelp beds, essentially undersea forests, provide food and shelter for 
a vast complex of marine species.7 Removal of sea otters in the 19th Century 
might have caused disruption in the coastal North Pacific Ocean. Recovery of 
the otters may have helped to right natural balances.
The sea otter’s hours of peril and salvation in Alaska long pre-dated public 
awareness of its ecological significance, as well as the existence of video mass 
media. Far removed from visibility, it lacked the high level of public recognition 
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needed for protective law enforcement. Unmitigated exploitation had reigned 
until the species nearly disappeared; utilitarian conservation had not been given 
a chance. Opposition to the otter’s overexploitation, expressed by a small num-
ber of scientists and government officials, stemmed in part from appreciation of 
the species. More important, most parties agreed that an economically valuable 
resource should not be destroyed. Therefore, when the Senate approved the 
1910 law and 1911 treaty to conserve the fur seal, it added vital if belated mea-
sures for the sea otter. In doing so, it acknowledged the goal of selected species 
protection and the management objective of sustainable resource use.
Absence of industrial uses for the Aleutians made possible their designation 
as a wildlife reserve and enhanced the otter’s chances for survival. Decades after 
it had passed the danger point, movies and television magnified public support 
for the animal and transformed it into a beloved creature. Nonconsumptive use 
values and public participation entered the equation that would determine the 
future of the sea otter. Preservation of the species became the main concern. Yet 
the cumulative pressures of human population growth and alteration of the en-
vironment, manifested partly in over-fishing and climate warming, cast doubt 
on the fate of the sea otter and other marine mammals of the North Pacific.
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one oF tHe FirSt Great international WildliFe ControVerSieS beGan iMMe-
diately after the United States acquired Alaska. In various forms, it lasted more 
than a century. It gave birth to a prototype environmental campaign and an 
international treaty centered on a North Pacifi c sea mammal: the fur seal.
Biologically related to the fur seals of the southern oceans, the northern fur 
seal gathered on a few subarctic islands each spring and summer for breeding 
and birth of pups. During the fall and winter the females and young migrated 
southward in the open ocean while most older males remained in the Bering 
Sea. On the North American side the herd ranged to the latitude of southern 
California, swung eastward toward the coast, and followed it northward in the 
late winter and spring on the way back to the rookeries.
While the sea otter grew harder to fi nd, the fur seal took its place as a main-
stay of the Russian fur-trading enterprise in Alaska, furnishing the bulk of prof-
its. Only the superb pelts of the sea otter and black and silver foxes exceeded that 
of the fur seal in value. Shortly after the mid-18th Century, hunters exhausted 
the seal rookeries on Bering Island where Steller had encountered them and on 
2
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nearby Copper Island. Then in 1786 and 1787 navigator Gavriil Pribylov and 
his crew found the islands that later bore his name. There they discovered by far 
the largest breeding grounds of the northern fur seal, as well as sea otters and 
other mammals.1 Pribilof rookeries hosted about 80 percent of the northern fur 
seals. Smaller populations bred at the Commander Islands in Siberia, the Ku-
rile Islands and Robben Island controlled by Japan, and San Miguel Island and 
Castle Rock off California.2
FUR SEALING IN THE RUSSIAN ERA
Massive exploitation immediately followed Pribylof ’s arrival. He returned 
to Kamchatka in 1788 carrying the hides of 40,000 fur seals, 2,000 sea otters, 
and 6,000 blue-phase Arctic foxes. For decades thereafter, expeditions tallied 
similar or greater hauls. The Russians settled Aleuts on the previously uninhab-
ited islands (named St. George and St. Paul) to do the work of sealing, drift-
wood gathering, and hunting of foxes, birds, and sea lions. They organized an 
efficient means of harvesting fur seals, as outlined by Russian captain Frederick 
Litke in the 1820s:
The hunters form a human chain along the shore and cut off any possible 
retreat of animals to the sea. They then push them all, without distinc-
tion, inland. Then they separate the first and third class males as well as the 
females and drive them back to the sea. As to the young ones which they 
intend to kill, they chase them as far as to the settlements—a distance of two 
or three leagues—but without hurrying them and letting them rest often, 
for without this precaution the animals could die of exhaustion, especially at 
a hot and windless time. Once they arrive at the settlement, the hunters kill 
the animals by blows. On the Island of Saint Paul herds of 3,000 to 4,000 
seals can be driven inland this way, and on the Island of Saint George herds 
of 500 to 2,000.
Occasional signs of empathy for the seals could be seen. Litke observed that “the 
hunters themselves, hardened as they are to this form of murder, confess that 
often they can hardly raise their clubs to strike this innocent creature which, 
lying on its back with its paws in the air and crying plaintively like a baby seems 
to be imploring mercy.”3
As soon as feasible, within a few days of the kill, Aleuts removed and cleaned 
the skins. Women stretched the skins on wooden frames and placed them in 
drying houses, warmed by heated stones. Workers tied the dry skins in bundles 
of 50 for shipment. They dried some of the meat for food and stored the re-
mainder of the fat-laden carcasses in a pile to be burned as fuel.4
Russians took the fur seal pelts to Kiakhta for trade or sale to the Chinese. 
British and New England traders, primarily interested in sea otters, also traded 
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or sold fur seal pelts in China. Following the discoveries of the Cook expe-
dition, British merchant ships outnumbered the Yankees from 1785 into the 
1790s. New Englanders, who first carried Falkland Island fur seal pelts to China 
in 1786, quickly surpassed the British in the Northwest fur trade. It formed a 
vital part of their China trade and helped establish the new nation as a viable 
economic unit and an important seafaring power.
Many of the fur seals taken to China came from islands off southern South 
America and, later, off Mexico and California. Sailors went ashore and clubbed 
them by the tens of thousands, likely exterminating some of the herds. Approxi-
mately 150,000 fur seals at the Galapagos, Guadalupe Island, and Baja Cali-
fornia, and a similar number on the Farallons off California, fell to the sealers. 
On Mas Afuera Island alone, sealers killed 3.5 million. The total for Southern 
waters, Mexico, and California stood at 5 million.5
At both Sitka and the Pribilofs the Yankees traded their goods for northern 
fur seals. Russians needed the rice, tea, sugar, flour, rum, tobacco, and other 
Fur seal herd, Zapadni rookery, St. Paul Island. By Victor B. Scheffer. FWS 1102, Alaska 
Resources Library and Information Services. Fur seals replaced sea otters as the mainstay of 
the Alaska fur trade.
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high-quality supplies brought by the Americans but did not want to pay in 
valuable sea otter pelts. Over a 30-year period beginning in 1799, Americans 
and other traders acquired at least 700,000 fur seal skins from the Russians.6
Pribilof Islands. Courtesy Jason Geck
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Until the 1820s no significant market existed for fur seals in Europe or the 
United States; nearly all skins went to Canton. Limited uses in the United States 
and Europe included caps, gloves, carriage rugs, trunk covers, and “beaver” 
hats. Between 1825 and 1870, improved processing, especially in dyeing and 
guard hair removal, enhanced the quality of pelts. London enterprises handled 
nearly all fur seal skins by 1870 when fashion began to drive up prices. People 
now prized seal fur for coats, muffs, and trim. An average pelt sold for less than 
$5 in the late 1860s and for $40 by 1900. Pribilof seals ranked second-best in 
quality to those of the South Shetland Islands–Cape Horn. Another, smaller 
population of southern fur seals bred at the Lobos Islands off Uruguay.7
Uncontrolled taking of the Pribilof seals sharply reduced their numbers. 
In 1802, in an attempt to speed up the drying process, workers spoiled near-
ly 800,000 skins. Between 1810 and 1813 the Russian-American Company 
burned at least 100,000 more pelts, apparently to keep the market price high.8
Declining seal populations induced conservation measures. Nikolai Rezanof, 
inspecting for the Russian government in 1805–1806, called an immediate halt 
to the killing, resulting in transfer of the crews to Unalaska. Sealing resumed 
on St. George in 1808 and on St. Paul in 1810. Regulations brought additional 
harvest cessations in 1822–1824 on St. Paul, 1826–1827 on St. George, and 
1836–1837 on St. Paul. Notwithstanding a cap of 50,000 per year, the take fell 
to 7,000 or fewer during the 1830s to early 1850s. Protection of females begin-
ning in 1847–1848 assisted recovery, and the harvest reached 30,000 to 40,000 
in the late 1850s and 1860s. By the time of sale to the United States in 1867, 
the Pribilof herd had rebounded to an approximation of its natural strength of 
more than two million. During the Russian era, including the Commander Is-
lands, fur seekers had killed about four million fur seals in the North Pacific.9
A number of considerations combined to persuade Russian leaders to leave 
North America, despite the sound financial condition of the Russian-American 
Company before its lease ended in 1862. British vessels, visiting and map-
ping the Arctic and subarctic while searching for the lost Franklin Expedition, 
raised questions about their motives. Russia’s military weakness revealed in the 
Crimean War exposed its inability to deploy defensive forces halfway around 
the world, and consolidation of the empire in Asia warranted first priority. The 
British Navy had attacked Russian bases in eastern Siberia and established a 
base at Esquimault on Vancouver Island. Britain created the crown colony of 
British Columbia in 1858 and remained an adversary after the war. By contrast, 
the United States and Russia maintained friendly relations.10 Discovery of gold 
in the Stikine River Valley in 1862 set off a gold rush, attracting more Ameri-
cans. Advances by Britain through the Hudson’s Bay Company could not be 
reversed. Hoping the United States would help balance their geopolitical rival 
Great Britain, Russians opted to sell Alaska to the Americans.11
continued on next page
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THE INTERNATIONAL SEALING CONTROVERSY
Americans did not eagerly take possession of Alaska, mainly because they 
could see little economic benefit. Unlike the contiguous Western territories, set-
tlers could not easily move to Alaska. If they did, they might find no agricultural 
potential. Hardly any information existed about the mainland. The oceans, by 
contrast, contained a recognizable store of wealth in the form of sea creatures. 
Most could be harvested at sea without much reliance on the land. But one 
valuable exception, the fur seal, came ashore where it could be exploited by 
whoever owned the land. A fur seal industry might repay the United States in 
large part for the cost of acquiring Alaska. Eventually it benefited the industry 
but not the public treasury, and not without 44 years of conflict among nations 
over who had rights to take the seals.
Management of Pribilof Sealing
In their first year on the Pribilofs, Americans behaved worse than the Rus-
sians—introducing liquor and making love to the women while the Aleut men 
did the work. They showed far less concern for conservation of the seals. For 
years prior to 1867 the Russians had limited themselves to ensure a sustained 
yield. American companies, four or more operating in 1868, took an estimated 
240,000.12 Publicity about the high kill rate and pressure from interested inves-
tors triggered a congressional investigation, an 1868 ban on commercial sealing, 
and a March 1869 resolution declaring the Pribilofs a preserve. The Treasury 
Department announced that only enough seals to feed the Aleut population of 
371 would be harvested in 1869, but two commercial companies reaped a total 
of 85,901 skins. One of the companies, Hutchinson and Kohl of San Francisco, 
organized the Alaska Commercial Company consortium and won a twenty-
year contract for exclusive sealing rights and a monopoly on all fur trading in 
Alaska between 1871 and 1890. Rules permitted an annual kill of 100,000 fur 
seals.13 The company also secured from Russia a monopoly on land sealing at 
the Commander Islands.14
Under the terms of the 1871–1890 lease the Alaska Commercial Company 
supplied the Pribilof Aleuts with food, firewood, housing, medical care, and 
schooling for children, and the company discouraged alcohol. It voluntarily 
paid into a support fund for Aleuts a stipend based on the number of seals 
harvested, as had the Russians, and it aided widows and orphans. The lease 
required payment to the U.S. government of a $55,000 annual fee and $2.625 
per sealskin. On-site agents of the Treasury Department’s Fur Seal Service had 
responsibility to oversee the operation. In practice the agents exercised substan-
tial power over the lives of the Aleuts, and most adopted a solicitous attitude 
toward the company.15
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Ruled by the Russians, the Pribilof Aleuts endured a state of semi-slavery 
similar to that practiced in Russia. Yet for years before the transition to U.S. 
rule, they had been paid for their sealing work. Moreover, they retained their 
traditional chiefs who held considerable influence in village administration. 
Americans divided administrative duties on the Pribilofs between the Alaska 
Commercial Company and the U.S. government. At first Treasury agents tried 
to work through the chiefs chosen by the people. Finding that inconvenient, 
they resorted to removing and installing chiefs. Rather than paying wages into 
a community fund to be distributed by the chiefs, as the Russians had, agents 
took control of the money flow. They tried to stop alcohol consumption and 
other forms of behavior they considered immoral or unproductive. Offend-
ers paid through fines, imprisonment, forced work assignments, restrictions on 
their movements, and, sometimes, exile. When an Aleut father refused to send 
his son to school, “Mr. McIntyre took him from his house, put handcuffs on, 
and lodged him in the cellar of the company’s house, a very cold, damp place, 
and during all this time the son had been confined in a dark closet in the 
company’s house and kept on bread and water.”16
Aleuts had readily taken to the schools at first, but they lost interest because 
they could not study Russian and other aspects of their culture. Treasury De-
partment superiors condoned the actions of their agents, apparently assuming 
they would improve the Aleuts’ behavior and ensure a more productive sealing 
enterprise.17 Company managers and Treasury agents got along well. Dr. H.H. 
McIntyre, the first Treasury agent in the Pribilofs, had helped the Alaska Com-
mercial Company win the 1871–1890 lease and a high annual harvest quota. 
The company hired him as its superintendent for the Pribilof operation, a post 
he held for the duration of the lease.18
The U.S. ownership of the Pribilofs and their easily accessible breeding 
colonies permitted the entire harvest to be carried out on land. To help main-
tain the population, no females could legally be taken. But the harvest plan 
encountered obstacles in the migration pattern of the seals and in competing 
claims on them. Native hunters, primarily Indians on Queen Charlotte and 
Vancouver islands, had long been aware that the seals migrated southward in 
the fall and north in the spring. They intercepted the mainly female seal herds 
and speared them for their fur, meat, and oil. Schooner captains from Victoria 
began trading for the furs in the 1850s. Commercial pelagic sealing began off 
the British Columbia coast in 1866 and achieved the status of an industry by 
1879 as fashion boosted the value of seal pelts. Schooners from the United 
States and Canada began carrying white and Indian hunters and their canoes 
to sea to do the hunting. The Alaska Commercial Company’s lease kept most 
vessels away from the Pribilofs, so the schooners hunted along the migration 
routes. Compared to land-based harvest on the Pribilofs, hunting at sea wasted 
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large numbers of seals: females because they could not be distinguished from 
males, pelts damaged by bullets and spears, and more lost by sinking or wound-
ing than captured. Commercial sealing vessels numbered a known 34 in 1883 
and 115 in 1889.19
Sealing vessels sailed out of San Francisco, Victoria, and a few other ports. 
They started in late winter or early spring, intercepted the migrating seals, and 
followed them up the coast. Some Indians preferred to hunt offshore in their 
cedar canoes without schooners. They did well some years but risked being 
caught offshore in bad weather. In 1875 about 100 perished in a storm off the 
Washington coast. Most Indians took their chances on schooners, being paid 
according to the number of seals they killed. Women sometimes accompanied 
their husbands as cooks or canoe steerers. A few Indians owned schooners; the 
Makahs sailed ten out of Neah Bay on the Olympic Peninsula in 1893.20
As soon as they understood the migration pattern of fur seals in the eastern 
Pacific, sealers realized they could kill greater numbers near the Pribilof rooker-
ies. And it would be even easier to kill the seals onshore if Alaska Commercial 
Company personnel could be avoided. In 1874 Martin Kimberley sailed the 
Cygnet from San Francisco to the Pribilofs, carrying Indian hunters. They sealed 
on or near Otter Island and company officials boarded them. They gave up 
some skins but took home 135 plus 20 sea otter pelts. The next year Kimberley 
went to St. George Island and brought back 569 sealskins.21 In 1876 the Ocean 
Spray raided the Pribilofs, followed by others despite the danger of being fired 
on by rookery guards. Exploits of pirate sealing captains at the Russian and 
American rookeries set examples for later American, Canadian, and Japanese 
raiders and inspired romantic novels by Kipling and London.22
Raiding continued on the Pribilofs despite patrols by revenue cutters. In 
1884, Lieutenant John E. Lutz of the Corwin, detailed to guard St. Paul Island, 
encountered three poaching vessels. He captured one, engaged the second in a 
running gun battle, and could not reach the third. The captured Adele had Ger-
man registry, a Scandinavian captain, a Japanese crew, and clearance to hunt in 
the Kuriles. Lutz left most of the prisoners in the custody of the St. Paul Trea-
sury agent and sailed the Adele to Unalaska. Unable to make port, he continued 
to San Francisco.23
Seal poachers operated offshore or on the Pribilof beaches. Usually they 
came at night or on foggy days to avoid being seen by guards. A journal entry 
by St. George Island agent A.W. Lavender for June 22, 1885, related: “On 
the arrival of Mr. Morgan and myself on the ground we found the marauders 
gone, but their work left on the beach, 120 seal skins and evidence enough to 
satisfy the Government agent that between 600 and 700 seals had been killed, 
nearly all females.” Lavender frequently made such entries between 1884 and 
1889.24
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During the 1880s critics voiced concern over the extent of seal killing, 
both onshore and at sea. Treasury agent Charles Goff complained that Aleuts 
took the initiative to hunt seals at sea: “[M]any thousands are killed by them as 
they pass through the passes to and from the islands, only for the skins, which 
are sold and traded for whiskey to poaching vessels.” Goff also objected to the 
regulation permitting the Aleuts to kill 5,000 pups annually at the Pribilofs for 
food. They did not need them for food or clothing, said Goff; they made the 
skins into blankets, caps, gloves, and trinkets to be sold to visiting ships.25
Pelagic sealers and poachers increasingly contributed to shrinkage of the 
fur seal herd. An expert on the seals, Henry Wood Elliott, had suggested in his 
1881 and 1887 books that no problem existed in the seal population or the ac-
tions of the Alaska Commercial Company.26 Officially the herd in 1886 stood 
at a robust 4.7 million. But seal counts had been carried out by unscientific 
methods, if at all. Agent Goff challenged the complacent assumptions in 1889, 
reporting a sharp drop-off. The Treasury Department sent Elliott and Goff back 
in 1890 to investigate. What Elliott saw and heard shocked him. His July 1890 
report differed dramatically from his earlier assessments; it set the seal count at 
one million. The Treasury Department decided not to release the document 
to the public for the time being lest it influence U.S.-British negotiations over 
rights to pelagic sealing.27
Any estimate of seal numbers invited dispute because of its economic and 
political implications and because no easy method of counting the seals existed. 
Also, seal totals varied greatly from the post-winter period to the pupping stage. 
Elliott received vigorous criticism for the 1890 estimate, as he had in the 1870s 
when he claimed 4.7 million. Yet his had not been the highest 1870s estimate, 
and other counts in the 1890s confirmed a steep downward trend.28
Henry W. Elliott
Widely considered the nation’s leading authority on the northern fur seal, 
Elliott (1846–1930) had been raised in Ohio. He dropped out of high school 
for a year because of ill health and trained himself in art and science. His father, 
Franklin, who illustrated his own books on horticulture, encouraged Henry. 
He took his son to Washington in 1861 and introduced him to Joseph Henry, 
secretary of the Smithsonian. Impressed by the boy’s ability, Henry invited him 
to work there in an unpaid capacity as a clerk and illustrator. Among other 
projects, Elliott sketched birds for Spencer F. Baird’s volumes on land and water 
birds of North America.29
Meanwhile, interest in Alaska grew rapidly. No telegraph link extended to 
Russia, diplomatically friendly toward the United States at that time. West-
ern Union devised a plan to route one through Alaska. It arranged for the 
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Smithsonian to staff an exploratory venture. Elliott signed on as a member and 
illustrator. The expedition departed in 1865, its scientific section led by Robert 
Kennicott of Chicago. It visited parts of coastal British Columbia and Southeast 
Alaska, including Sitka. A transatlantic cable laid in 1866 eliminated the need 
for an Alaskan route, but the scientific expedition carried on the following sum-
mer. Its data and vivid descriptions of Alaskan nature reached Senator Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and prime 
mover of the effort to purchase Alaska. This and similar information enabled 
Sumner to counter the “Seward’s Folly” and “Walrussia” arguments and reassure 
the Senate.30 The treaty approved, Alaska became part of the United States in 
1867.
Kennicott (1835–1867), born in New Orleans and raised in Northfield, 
Illinois, learned to love natural science as he worked in the family horticulture 
business. His early work in fauna led to study under Baird at the Smithsonian. 
Poor health prevented his attending university, but the quality of his scientific 
work put him in charge of a statewide survey of natural science in Illinois at 
age twenty. He founded the Museum of Natural History at Northwestern Uni-
versity and provided its initial collections. On an 1859–1862 expedition to 
Canada, funded by the Smithsonian and the Chicago Audubon Society and 
fully supported by Hudson’s Bay Company, he traveled to northern Canada 
and into Russian territory to Fort Yukon. He ranged widely by boat, dogsled, 
and on foot, collecting for the museums. After his return in 1862, Hudson’s 
Bay officers continued to send bird and mammal specimens to Chicago and to 
the Smithsonian.
When the telegraph project got under way in 1865, Kennicott, now cura-
tor of the Chicago Academy of Sciences, accepted a position as chief of scien-
tific explorations. In the second year of the expedition he and six assistants left 
San Francisco in July 1866 and sailed to St. Michael on the Yukon Delta where 
two parties separated to explore toward Bering Strait and up the Yukon. A third 
unit, including Elliott, debarked in British Columbia to do preparatory work 
for the telegraph line along the Fraser River. Kennicott led the Yukon team, 
and both northern contingents wintered at Unalakleet. Having suffered a heart 
attack in San Francisco, Kennicott died at Nulato in May 1867. His colleagues 
ascended the river to Fort Yukon, completing the first exploration of the river 
by non-Natives.31
After Kennicott died on the Yukon, a young Bostonian geographer named 
William Healey Dall became expedition leader. Dall (1845–1927) pursued a 
long career in the U.S. Coast Survey and U.S. Geological Survey, completing 
at least fourteen study trips to Alaska. After retirement he continued to collect 
material for the Smithsonian and wrote widely into the 20th Century: hun-
dreds of articles and books on mollusks, Alaskan nature, and Native life, the 
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best-known being Alaska and Its Resources (1870). Dall’s porpoise and the Dall 
bighorn sheep bear his name. Historian Morgan Sherwood titled him “Dean of 
Alaska’s Experts.”32
Henry W. Elliott, San Francisco, 1872, prior to leaving for the Pribilofs. Portrait file 01-
3395, Alaska State Library. Devoted to salvation of the fur seals, Elliott conducted a proto-
type environmental campaign.
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William H. Dall, chief of Marine Dept., Scientific Corps, Western Union Telegraph Expedi-
tion, San Francisco, July 1865. Smithsonian Archives. Dall, an early American explorer in 
Alaska, became a leading scientific expert on the territory.
Fur Seal’s Friend: Henry W. Elliott
39
Elliott’s experience on the Kennicott expedition opened the door to oth-
ers. In the summers of 1869–1871 he served as an illustrator on the Hayden 
Yellowstone expeditions that resulted in the world’s first national park. Almost 
certainly Elliott took note of how photographer William Henry Jackson and 
artist Thomas Moran, also members of the 1871 expedition, used their work to 
persuade Congress to pass the park bill.33
Fascinated by Alaska, Elliott secured a position in 1872 as assistant to the 
Treasury agent for the Pribilofs, overseeing the licensed fur sealing operation 
and researching the seals for the Smithsonian. Baird, in his dual role of Smith-
sonian administrator and the first U.S. fish commissioner, wanted information 
on the seals and arranged Elliott’s appointment. Soon after Elliott arrived at the 
Pribilofs he fell in love with the area and married an Aleut woman, Alexandra 
Melovidova. He studied the seals in depth and created hundreds of drawings 
and paintings of the seals and other wildlife, scenery, and Aleut life.
In 1874 reports of pelagic sealing caused the Treasury Department to send 
Elliott back to investigate. He and Lieutenant Washburn Maynard, the latter 
detailed to check on the Alaska Commercial Company, visited the Aleutian, 
Pribilof, Nunivak, St. Matthew, St. Lawrence, and Diomede islands and St. 
Michael on the Yukon Delta. Elliott collected artifacts and did drawings and 
paintings for the Smithsonian. In 1876 he returned to the Pribilofs on his own 
and visited the Kuskokwim Delta. Upon returning to Washington he contin-
ued his work on the seals and, when the need arose, devoted his talents to their 
protection. He wrote The Seal-Islands of Alaska (1881), the first book on the 
fur seals. This well-received work and Our Arctic Province: Alaska and the Seal 
Islands (1887) presented a comprehensive profile of the Pribilofs and covered 
other parts of Alaska. Elliott’s articles and illustrations appeared in popular pub-
lications; the seals began to acquire a public following.34
After leaving his Treasury post in the Pribilofs, Elliott wrote and spoke 
approvingly of the Alaska Commercial Company, whose operations he had 
overseen. He wrote articles and testified before Congress to the effect that de-
velopment funds for Alaska would be a waste of money. Critics believed the 
company wanted to maximize its control over the fur trade, inland as well as 
at the Pribilofs. Governor Alfred P. Swineford considered Elliott’s negation of 
Alaskan development part of a strategy to prevent territorial status lest it hinder 
the company’s operations.35
Political Tension and Scandal
For the 1891–1910 licensed monopoly on Pribilof sealing the Alaska Com-
mercial Company submitted the lowest bid, as it had in 1871. The highest bid-
der, another California-based group named the North American Commercial 
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Company, won the contract. Two men who had great influence in the Harri-
son administration, one (Stephen B. Elkins) to be appointed secretary of war, 
owned most North American Commercial Company stock. The two men op-
posed land killing limits and pressed for restrictions on pelagic sealing by their 
competitors. But the first lessee had killed excessively and depleted the seals. It 
had taken an annual average of 99,081 seals (Table 2.1) and earned $18 million 
for its fourteen stockholders. North American Commercial Company would 
kill an annual average of 16,413 but realize nearly $5 million because of higher 
fur prices. For their part, the Aleuts suffered economically from the harvest re-
duction, and the government lost $12 million over the first twelve years of the 
1891–1910 lease, primarily because of the cost of patrol ships.36
Beyond economics and ecology, the fur seal controversy embodied impor-
tant international dimensions. Beginning in 1886 U.S. Revenue Marine cut-
ters had arrested and confiscated several Canadian and American sealing vessels 
operating in the Bering Sea outside the traditionally recognized three-mile ter-
ritorial limit. Noah L. Jeffries, an Alaska Commercial Company lobbyist, wrote 
articles propounding the theory of U.S. ownership of the Bering Sea. He used 
his influence to bring about the seizures. When Attorney General A.H. Garland 
heard about the seizures he ordered the ships released. But the judge in Sitka, 
table 2.1. Reported Harvest of Pribilof Fur Seals, 1786–1950
Decade St. Paul/St. George Is. At Sea  Total
1786–1790 208,879 — 208,879
1791–1800 420,099 — 420,099
1801–1810 422,440 — 422,440
1811–1820 428,460 — 428,460
1821–1830 271,860 — 271,860
1831–1840 104,615 — 104,615
1841–1850 130,814 — 130,814
1851–1860 186,087 — 186,087
1861–1870 624,766 17,483 642,249
1871–1880 1,042,520 71,926 1,114,446
1881–1890 939,103 238,484 1,177,587
1891–1900 165,252 421,300 586,552
1901–1910 163,111 208,611 371,722
1911–1920 197,411 20,834 218,245
1921–1930 268,576 39,401 307,977
1931–1940 555,900 11,698 567,598
1941–1950 664,036 1,106 665,142
Total  6,793,929 1,030,843 7,824,722
Source: Karl W. Kenyon, Victor B. Scheffer, and Douglas G. Chapman, A Population Study of the Alaskan Fur-Seal 
Herd, Special Scientific Report—Wildlife No. 12, USDOI, Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, DC: June 
1954, 47.
Note: Does not include seals killed and lost at sea. Figures before 1910 are least accurate.
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persuaded by Jeffries’s theory, declined to carry out the order. The legal claim 
became a part of U.S. policy despite its contradiction of previous American 
practice, and seizures continued.
Secretary of State John W. Foster later remarked on how “a great govern-
ment might be betrayed into a line of policy through the machinations of a 
private corporation, influenced by pecuniary motives, which put in peril its 
relations with a powerful neighbor and subjected it to the condemnation of an 
international tribunal for conduct taken unadvisedly and unwisely.”37
Great Britain and the Canadians demanded compensation for the seizures 
and asserted their right to hunt seals at sea. Taking the position that the United 
States owned the seals, in March 1889 Congress passed and President Grover 
Cleveland signed a law declaring the right to police the Bering Sea and direct-
ing the president to send ships to arrest law violators. More seizures took place 
in the summer of 1889. President Benjamin Harrison ordered revenue cutters 
again in 1890 to prepare to apprehend pelagic sealers. British foreign secretary 
Lord Salisbury warned that Britain would be forced to act if more seizures oc-
curred. Five Royal Navy warships at Esquimault, British Columbia, prepared 
for action, suggesting the possibility of armed conflict.38 Diplomacy prevented 
a military clash and the United States arrested no ships, but pelagic sealing 
proceeded.
Spring 1891 again tested Harrison’s administration. The fur seals in the 
Pribilofs faced the prospect of extinction by hunting—on land by the Ameri-
can licensees and at sea by Canadian sealers. A much greater force of sealing 
ships prepared for the 1891 season. The disturbing though still-undisclosed 
study conducted by Elliott for the Treasury Department waited in the wings. 
It claimed an 80 percent decline in the number of Pribilof seals and recom-
mended a five-year halt on land killing and a permanent cessation of pelagic 
sealing.
Added to a great power confrontation, administration officials had the 
1892 elections to worry about. They dared not be seen as backing down from 
the British. They needed their powerful friends in the North American Com-
mercial Company but did not wish to be viewed as tools of Big Business. And 
should Elliott’s fur seal report be uncovered, public opinion would demand 
protection for the seals. The administration chose to leak the study to North 
American officials, who tried to publicly discredit Elliott. The administration 
transferred Treasury agent Charles Goff, who at Elliott’s urging had recom-
mended prohibition of further killing, away from the Pribilofs. In his place 
they appointed an inexperienced man. Secretary of State James G. Blaine, hav-
ing reached a verbal agreement with the British ambassador to stop both pe-
lagic and on-land seal harvest for the 1891 season, nevertheless arranged to give 
North American a permit for 60,000 kills.
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In short order the administration’s scheme began to unravel. A woman at-
tending a party in Washington overheard North American’s lawyer boasting 
about the secret deal. She alerted Elliott. Receiving a less than honest response 
from the official who made the deal, Elliott wrote to the New York Evening Post 
revealing the arrangement and the conclusions of his seal population survey. 
The New York Times picked up the story and called for an investigation of the 
“sealing scandal.”39 Elliott, a consultant to the State Department, lost his job 
the day after his letter appeared. Harrison found himself in an embarrassing 
position and ordered cancellation of the secret agreement between Blaine and 
North American.
Negotiations resulted in a joint U.S.-British Bering Sea Patrol of revenue 
cutters and warships to intercept pelagic sealing vessels entering the Bering Sea 
beginning in 1891. Of the 49-ship fleet leaving Victoria, the patrol fleet stopped 
41. Next the two powers signed a treaty, ratified in 1892, instituting a Bering Sea 
Tribunal to arbitrate the dispute. Harrison lost in the fall election, but the diplo-
matic process went on. The tribunal convened in Paris in February 1893.40
At the tribunal the United States contended that the seals, spending one-
third of their lives ashore in the Pribilofs, thereby became American property 
and needed protection from pelagic sealing. No nation had the moral right, it 
argued, to destroy the resource at sea. It also claimed jurisdiction over the Ber-
ing Sea based on a supposed similar claim by Russia. The U.S. case had been 
weakened by the reports of Elliott and others documenting wasteful killing by 
the licensed American company. The tribunal ruled in August 1893 that the 
United States had no jurisdiction over or ownership of the seals beyond the 3-
mile limit. Tribunal guidelines called for both British and American legislation 
protecting the seals by restricting pelagic hunting in the Bering Sea to licensed, 
nonmotorized vessels without firearms. No vessel could hunt between May and 
July or within 60 miles of the Pribilofs. Both parties passed laws by April 1894 
incorporating the regulations. The United States paid $423,000 in compensa-
tion for seized Canadian vessels.41
Height of the Pelagic Sealing Industry
Pelagic sealing continued to exact a high toll despite the regulations. In the 
1893 and 1894 seasons, according to London records, pelagic sealers from the 
northeast Pacific turned in the pelts of nearly 194,000 fur seals.42 Spears wield-
ed by Natives proved as effective as guns, and the seals breeding at the Pribilofs 
swam far beyond the 60-mile limit in search of food. Females, pregnant and 
returning to suckle pups at the rookeries, comprised up to 80 percent of the 
seals feeding at sea. Killing a female at sea meant the death of a pup as well. 
One visitor counted 16,000 starving pups at the Pribilof rookeries in 1896. As 
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many as one million breeding females may have been killed during the pelagic 
sealing era (Table 2.1).43
Fisheries expert Charles H. Townsend described the machine-like efficiency 
of a pelagic sealing fleet, all but six of whose vessels employed Indians wielding 
spears:
The sealing fleet consisted of 38 schooners, carrying 6 to 20 boats or canoes 
apiece—the average number being about 12. The boats hunted in all 
directions, frequently going 10 miles away from the vessels to which they 
belonged. . . . Pursuing seals in this systematic way, 38 vessels carrying some-
what more than 450 boats, took 31,542 skins in six weeks.44
Seals typically slept on their backs, their heads protruding. Indians threw 
12- to 14-foot double-pronged spears tipped by detachable spearheads tied by a 
30-yard line to the boat. They struck seals at distances of 30 to 35 feet in fairly 
smooth water. The hunter pulled the seal to the boat and clubbed it. Townsend 
added that “seals fight vigorously at such times and seldom fail to leave perma-
nent marks of their sharp teeth on boats and canoes, while large bulls are very 
dangerous to handle.”45
Indians hunted in two-man canoes and white hunters in threes—one to 
row, one to steer, and one to shoot. Until banned, a rifle or, more commonly, a 
Indian hunter and sealing gear on schooner Favorite, 1894. In U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury, Seal and Salmon Fisheries and General Resources of Alaska, Vol. 4, Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1898, p. 473. Skilled coastal Indians and white hunters greatly reduced fur seal 
herds by hunting at sea. The Favorite began a long sealing career out of Victoria in 1873.
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shotgun dispatched the seals. Hunters received pay based on the number of seals 
they took and, to some extent, the condition of the pelts. Bullets usually did 
more damage than spears, and seals when shot had to be quickly retrieved be-
fore they sank. Crew members took their catch aboard the schooner, skinned it, 
and packed the pelts in salt. In its most successful years a schooner might gather 
4,000 skins or more. Between 1887 and 1892, hunter Oscar Scarf chalked up 
2,788 seals, including a possible record of 683 in one season. The industry, for 
a time the most important seafaring pursuit on the Northwest coast, attracted 
ships from as far away as Newfoundland.46
Fur seals, mostly from Robben and the Commander Islands, also migrated 
down the western Pacific coast to Japan. American hunters decimated the sea 
otters in the Kurile Islands beginning in 1872 and then discovered small fur 
seal rookeries on the islands and eradicated them. Following the C.S. White 
in 1890, 82 American and Canadian pelagic sealing vessels arrived off Japan 
by 1894. The Japanese learned to hunt seals at sea, giving the westerners stiff 
competition. Seal populations shrank and the price of seal pelts fell in London. 
An 1897 American law forbade importation of sea otters or fur seals and pelagic 
hunting under the U.S. flag. Nearly all foreign sealers had left Japanese waters 
by 1900.47
Danger added to the costs of pelagic sealing. In 1894 alone, nearly 10 per-
cent of boats and their crews in northwest Pacific waters went down.48 A storm 
off Alaska in 1895 engulfed the Canadian schooner Walter A. Earle and its crew 
of 32. It drove the C.S. White onto a snowy shore; 11 drowned or froze and 5 
survivors had frozen limbs amputated.49
No longer plagued by competition in the northwest Pacific, an active and 
burgeoning Japanese fleet soon thinned out the seals in nearby waters. Ranging 
northward, it depleted the seals off the Robben Island rookery, which Japan later 
gained in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War. It hunted off the Russian-owned 
Commander Islands and, to a lesser extent, off the Pribilofs. Not a party to the 
1893 tribunal, Japan had no legal obligation to respect the 60-mile limit around 
the Pribilofs. By 1910, 53 Japanese sealing vessels plied the northern waters.50
Subsidized by the Japanese government until 1909, and its boats often cap-
tained by North Americans, the fleet adopted aggressive tactics. Two schooners 
erected facsimiles of funnels to disguise themselves as revenue cutters. A line of 
schooners would rest three miles off the Pribilofs to intercept females passing 
by. Boats approached the shore, hunters fired shotguns to frighten the herd off 
the rookery, and the boats retreated and killed the seals in the water. Some men 
went ashore to club seals. Five American revenue cutters patrolled the islands 
and made arrests and confiscations but could not stop the raiders. Thirty or 
more sealing vessels, bad weather, and sixteen large rookeries on St. Paul and six 
on St. George made full protection impossible.51
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Several men died in encounters between poachers and rookery guards. In 
the most dramatic incident, in 1906 Pribilof rookery guards killed five Japanese 
poachers, wounded two, and captured twelve. American seizure of Japanese 
ships and shooting of poachers raised the political stakes of the dispute.52 Na-
tions could not afford to risk wider conflict over such an issue; it called for 
international diplomacy.
Resolution of the Conflict
Britain and the United States had agreed in 1891 to send a joint commis-
sion of four scientists to the Pribilofs to investigate and make recommendations. 
C. Hart Merriam and Thomas Mendenhall represented the United States. Un-
able to agree in the short time allotted, the two teams wrote separate reports. 
The British-Canadian team downplayed pelagic sealing as a cause of seal de-
cline, and the Americans placed primary blame on pelagic hunting. Unlike 
Elliott they advocated on-land harvest of young males not necessary for breed-
ing. This position aggravated the split between Elliott and nearly all of the few 
scientists knowledgeable about fur seals.
Again in 1896 Britain and the United States sent scientists to gather data, 
and again Elliott did not find himself among those chosen. David Starr Jordan 
(1851–1931), an ichthyologist who had become president of Stanford Uni-
versity, headed the American team. The rest included Leonhard Stejneger and 
Frederick Lucas of the Smithsonian and Charles H. Townsend of the U.S. Fish 
Commission. As had the 1891 team, they condemned pelagic sealing but ad-
vocated harvest of surplus males.53 In a summary document Jordan wrote a 
critique of Elliott’s 1890 report not well engineered to win the heart of its au-
thor. While conceding the “general excellence” of the portrayal of the fur seal’s 
life history, Jordan labeled Elliott’s 1872–1874 fur seal herd estimates as “gross 
exaggerations.” Citing Elliott’s 1870s assertions that government management 
protected the seal herd, Jordan commented, “This is the only conclusion of his 
earlier work which he calls into question, and to its undoing his whole 1890 
report is dedicated. It is, however, perfectly correct.” Whereas Elliott placed 
little blame on pelagic sealing for the herd reduction, Jordan described it as “the 
sole cause of the decline.” Jordan accused Elliott of “deliberate misrepresenta-
tion” of facts: “Whenever any statement made by Mr. Elliott is tried by the 
records it is found wanting.” Jordan’s summary judgment on the 1890 report: 
“We must again express our regret that it was ever printed. It adds absolutely no 
knowledge to the subject, while it is the source of needless error and confusion. 
It is wholly lacking in both the methods and spirit of scientific investigation. 
. . . Its methods and results cannot be too strongly condemned.”54 Jordan and 
Elliott, the latter of whom considered himself the foremost expert, engaged in a 
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sixteen-year battle over fur seal science and policy. Elliott painted the scientists 
as tools of a government beholden to sealing interests. They in turn portrayed 
him as an irrational and unreliable pseudo-scientist.
The United States, Russia, and Japan met in late 1897 and agreed on a 
temporary pelagic sealing ban pending approval by Canada and Britain. In the 
1898 meetings of Canada, Britain, and the United States, Canada attempted 
to tie the seal issue to settlement of the U.S.-Canada boundary. Canada’s 
proposal would give the Yukon Territory direct access to the sea. The United 
States refused and the talks failed. But the United States had proposed a new 
idea: to give Canada a share of the Pribilof harvests in exchange for cessation 
of pelagic sealing. This proposal would be a crucial element of the ultimate 
solution.55
Studies by Jordan, among others, did not convince the Canadians of the 
role of pelagic sealing in fur seal decline. Estimates of 20,000 dead pups in 
1894 and 16,000 in 1903, allegedly because their mothers had been killed at 
sea, stimulated the debates. A visit to the Pribilofs by U.S. senators in 1903 
determined that the illegal on-land killing of females and yearlings might be as 
damaging as that done at sea. Congress had entertained, the House passed, and 
President Theodore Roosevelt suggested a proposal that, absent an agreement, 
the United States should kill off nearly all the fur seals. However sincerely in-
tended, such a move would put the pelagic sealers out of business and save the 
cost of revenue cutter patrols.56
Disputes among claimants to knowledge of the seals added confusion to 
the debate and divided conservationists into factions emphasizing preserva-
tion and sustainable use. Jordan distrusted Elliott’s census figures and his habit 
of identifying himself as “Prof. Elliott, of the Smithsonian.” Elliott possessed 
neither a professorial appointment nor employment at the Smithsonian, and 
Secretary Samuel Langley asked him to stop making the claim. Jordan and 
Elliott campaigned separately for the seals. Jordan published seventeen works 
on the sealing issue, including a children’s book, Matka and Kotik, about the 
life of a seal and her pup. Added to the fictional works of Kipling, London, and 
Poe, Jordan and Elliott created wide public awareness of Alaska and the North 
Pacific sealing story.57
Elliott had established himself earlier than the others as a writer and an 
expert on the seals. His illustrations, moreover, may have been more important 
than the texts. He presented the seals in a highly sympathetic manner, reflecting 
his own feelings. He drew maps showing the drastic reduction in rookery land 
area occupied by the seals in 1890 as compared to 1872. When they became 
available to the press and other interested parties, the maps seemed convincing 
evidence of excessive killing of the seals. Elliott distributed his pictures and 
writings to key players in the seal debate, including the British ambassador. 
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And he drew humorous and biting cartoons of his enemies. The artwork added 
a telling dimension to his campaign.58
Jordan held the respect of the scientific community and most government 
officials, but Elliott appealed to the press, much of the public, and many in 
Congress. After the breakdown of great-power talks in 1899 and the accession 
David Starr Jordan. Smithsonian Archives. Jordan, a government-appointed expert and 
rival of Henry W. Elliott, also worked for protection of fur seals.
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Killing fur seals. By Henry W. Elliott. RG 22 HE, National Archives at College Park. El-
liott’s paintings helped generate public support for the seals.
of conservation-oriented Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency in 1901, Elliott 
tried to reinstate himself as the government’s top fur seal expert. He criticized 
Jordan’s thesis, arguing that it exaggerated the impact of pelagic sealing and 
minimized the effect of land harvest. He proposed a treaty to Secretary of State 
John Hay that included a ten-year moratorium on harvest at the Pribilofs and a 
25 percent share of profits for Canada. He met Roosevelt in the White House 
in 1904 and offered to go to Canada and negotiate on behalf of the United 
States. Roosevelt, who admired Elliott’s spunk, nevertheless wisely declined the 
offer. After Hay died in 1905, Roosevelt chose fellow Boone and Crockett Club 
member Elihu Root to replace him. To Elliott’s dismay, Root brought Jordan 
back as the administration’s fur seal adviser. Even though Root offered Canada 
an agreement similar to Elliott’s proposal, Elliott blamed Root when Canada 
turned it down. He returned to his mode of attack on government fur seal 
policy.59
Elliott found an ally in William T. Hornaday, director of the New York Zo-
ological Park. Like Elliott, Hornaday tended to be egotistical, arrogant, unpre-
dictable, and a preservationist and, therefore, disliked by other prominent con-
servationists. Also, like Elliott, he displayed extreme tenacity. And he had long 
since proved his ability to influence the press, public opinion, and Congress. 
At Elliott’s request he set to work on the fur seal issue in 1907. Elliott agreed to 
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remain in the background. Through the Camp Fire Club of America (a group 
of sportsmen and outdoorsmen he had organized in 1897) and the support 
of Senator Joseph M. Dixon and President William Howard Taft, Hornaday 
labored successfully for a 1910 law protecting the fur seals. Henceforth the 
government would manage the seal herd through the Department of Labor 
and Commerce in a manner calculated to preserve the herd.60
A Fur Seal Advisory Board appointed in 1909 had backed the 1910 legisla-
tion, as had Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel. Jordan headed 
the board, and Merriam, Stejneger, and Townsend sat on it. As before, they 
staunchly opposed pelagic sealing but advocated harvest of males. When Nagel 
authorized a kill of 12,000 males in the spring of 1910, Hornaday and Elliott 
went on the offensive. They charged that the kill violated the law and under-
mined the treaty negotiations. Hornaday argued that no scientific basis existed 
for killing the males. He questioned the integrity of both Nagel and Jordan. 
Meanwhile, continuing reports of seal herd decline lent urgency to the negotia-
tions. Various estimates in 1908 and 1909 placed the Pribilof fur seal total at 
50,000 to 200,000.61
International politics and economics intertwined to bring about the North 
Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911, the first major international agreement on 
wildlife. None of the parties wanted armed conflict. Americans wished to avoid 
extinction of the seals and to maintain the principal share of profits. Russia 
wanted to safeguard its seal herds, especially from Japanese predation. London 
had long been a processing point for the furs and stood to lose if extinction oc-
curred. Britain also wanted stable relations with the United States. The Canadi-
ans no longer held a significant stake in sealing. Japan still maintained an active 
sealing fleet as well as its own fur seal herd on Robben Island and stood to gain 
economically and diplomatically from an accord. The July 1911 agreement, 
renewed in 1926, compensated the Japanese and Canadians for the loss of their 
pelagic sealing industries by guaranteeing each of them 15 percent of the skins 
from Russian and American harvests. Japan in turn agreed to give 10 percent of 
its pelts to each of the other signatories. The treaty sharply reduced the practice 
of pelagic sealing. Beyond economics and geopolitics, both the convention and 
the 1893 tribunal decision set valuable precedents in international cooperation 
for natural resource protection.62
Signing of the treaty did not end the domestic squabble over the seals. Con-
gress held hearings about alleged violations of the law by the North American 
Commercial Company. Given a more accessible battlefield than treaty negotia-
tions, Elliott and Hornaday carried on the fight to limit seal killing. They and 
their adversaries, including Jordan and Fisheries commissioner George Bowers, 
exchanged malicious charges. A congressional committee chairman brought 
in a trained seal (presumably a California sea lion) during hearings. On the 
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cue “Professor Elliott” it barked and waved its flippers, and at “Commissioner 
Bowers” it tried to hide beneath a chair.
Both houses of Congress had to approve the treaty because it involved al-
location of funds. The House passed the enabling bill in the form desired by the 
administration. In the Senate, Hornaday and Elliott persuaded Senator Gilbert 
Hitchcock of Nebraska to attach an amendment to halt all seal killing for ten 
years. Administration officials could not easily overcome what seemed to be a 
conservation measure or the argument that the seals ought to know what to 
do with their young males without human intervention. Congress passed a 
compromise bill containing a five-year moratorium.63 The preservationists had 
prevailed over the utilitarian conservationists.
A New York Times article, its rhetoric highly reminiscent of Hornaday’s, 
celebrated the “victory.” It left no doubt as to the villainy of
the people who enjoy killing mothers so that their litter may starve to death, 
the people who want to wear “furs” without regard as to how their “furs” 
are got, and the people who see their way clear to make money out of that 
last desire. These are the three classes that for the last forty years have made 
organized seal murder under the American flag a profitable industry.
And there are two subsidiary classes. One consists of the so-called ex-
perts, headed by Dr. David Starr Jordan, who have supplied the seal murder-
ers with a semblance of argument for their bad cause, and the other consists 
of the government officials . . . who want to make a commercial record and 
show they did a big volume of business in this or that fiscal year. These five 
classes combined to hoodwink that good easy man, Secretary Charles Nagel, 
and commit the United States Government to the seal slaughtering policy.
At the center of the article stood Elliott in a commanding pose, flanked by 
an 1872 painting of a rookery full of fur seals and another from 1890 nearly 
empty.64
Even after the treaty ratification, congressional hearings continued on 
the alleged past mismanagement of the fur seals. A House committee sent El-
liott back to the Pribilofs in 1913 for more investigation. He participated in 
the hearings, carrying on the struggle against his scientific and administrative 
opponents.65
FUR SEALS UNDER FEDERAL MANAGEMENT
Pelagic sealing and the contraction of the fur seal herd worked a hard-
ship on the Aleuts. During the first lease, despite severe restrictions on their 
freedoms they had prospered economically. Their earnings approximated those 
of the average American worker. When harvests declined in the 1890s, so did 
their income. Treasury agents pleaded for subsidies and Congress eventually 
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responded. As Aleut sustenance shifted from seal pelt earnings to donated ne-
cessities managed by the agents, the latter increasingly treated the Aleuts as 
wards rather than employees and took even more control over their everyday 
lives. A 1909 directive from the Department of Commerce and Labor’s Bureau 
of Fisheries, which had assumed jurisdiction in 1903, specifically authorized 
agents to (1) draft Aleuts for unpaid labor when needed, (2) remove or install 
chiefs when necessary, (3) ban sugar to discourage alcohol production, and (4) 
banish people from the islands when necessary. The orders forbade divulging 
information on seals or the seal islands. For the next 40 years or more, Pribilof 
Aleuts lived in a state of dependency and subservience.66
The 1910 Fur Seal Act had ended the leasing system, putting the U.S. gov-
ernment directly in control of the Pribilof herd. After the five-year moratorium 
on commercial sealing at the islands, the Department of Commerce engaged 
the Fouke Fur Company to conduct a controlled harvest of the herd begin-
ning in 1918. To make use of the meat, fat, and bones, the government built 
a reduction plant. An observation facility constructed in 1920 accommodated 
tourists who had been coming to see the seals.67 During World War I the gov-
ernment tested uses of seal parts for leather, oil, and fertilizer but had difficulty 
finding economically viable products. Plants operated in 1919–1924, 1928, 
1935–1941, and after 1942. They produced oil for tanning leather and meal 
for feeding foxes, hatchery fish, and poultry. Beginning in 1962 a private firm 
contracted to supply frozen meat for mink raising.68
Indians made relatively modest and declining catches at sea (Table 2.1). 
The treaty exempted Native Americans from the pelagic sealing ban as long 
as they hunted without firearms or assistance from motorized vessels.69 Tlingit 
Indians had begun commercial sealing in the 1890s, operating from schooners. 
Between 1897 and the 1920s they used specially designed “Sitka sealers,” 25-
foot wooden canoes rowed and steered by six-man crews. Unable to legally 
shoot seals, some kept a gun in a hollowed-out cedar log, plugged at the open 
end. If approached by a patrol vessel they could toss the log overboard and re-
cover it later. A fur trader confided that nearly all the pelts he bought displayed 
bullet holes.70
U.S.-Japan Tensions
Officially, the Japanese government lived up to the terms of the agreement. 
But surreptitiously it condoned the continuation of pelagic sealing. Japanese 
sealers raided the Commander Islands rookeries while the revolution distracted 
the Russians. They caught seals in Japanese waters for their army to sell in 
Manchuria. Deteriorating relations between Japan and the United States caused 
Japan to withdraw from the treaty effective October 1941, terminating it as 
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such, and Japan’s pelagic sealing increased.71 Canada and the United States co-
operated through a bilateral agreement from 1941 to 1957.72
Wartime tensions bred speculation that Japan might attack the Pribilof 
herd. Frank Thorne suggested in Science News Letter that
the little men from the East can do immense damage to a major American 
natural resource. . . . By making even a temporary landing, the enemy could 
practically wipe out the herd with machine guns and rifles. . . . It can be 
anticipated that the Japanese will make such a raid—perhaps they already 
have made it—for they will want all the furs they can steal, in preparation 
for their anticipated attack on the Soviets in Siberia.73
Ben East in Natural History repeated the Siberian campaign thesis, adding that 
the Japanese had held a grudge against the Americans since the killing of their 
sealers in 1906.74
Pribilof sealing had proceeded under Department of Commerce jurisdic-
tion until 1939 when reorganization shifted the responsibility to the Bureau of 
Biological Survey, renamed the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1940. Its Sealing 
Division ran the Pribilof operation from Seattle. In 1940 a sealing agent over-
saw the work of a population of 294 Aleuts on St. Paul, and a second agent 
supervised 183 Aleuts on nearby St. George. Most workers and their families 
lived year-round on the islands as they had since the time of the Russians.
Uncertainty about Japanese intentions, and the desire for military flexibil-
ity, led to evacuation of the Pribilof Aleuts as well as those on other islands soon 
after the Japanese attacks in June 1942. Pribilovians spent the remainder of the 
war at an abandoned cannery and gold mine site at Funter Bay on north Ad-
miralty Island, and other Aleuts stayed elsewhere in Southeast Alaska. Agency 
jurisdictional confusion and lack of preparation and funding contributed to 
disease and many deaths related to inadequate living conditions. In spring 1943 
the Fish and Wildlife Service took 116 men back to the Pribilofs to carry out 
a successful and lucrative sealing operation. The next year a sealing expedition 
went north to stay, and nearly all of the Pribilof population returned as well.75
Postwar Management
Fish and Wildlife Service agents hoped to maintain their control over the 
sealing in the postwar era. But Aleuts had developed skills and experience as 
workers during the war, and they pressed harder for change. Frederika Martin, 
who had lived in the Pribilofs in 1941 and learned their history, wrote a book 
and articles calling for reform of the treatment of Aleuts. Other reformers in 
and out of government added their voices, and Congress held hearings in 1949. 
Laws passed in 1950 and 1962 gave the Aleuts full worker rights. The 1958 
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Alaska Statehood Act retained federal control of the seals but assigned 70 per-
cent of sealing profits to the state. Aleuts took ownership of most of the Pribilof 
Islands through the lands settlement acts of 1971 and 1980. They won an $8.5 
million judgment from the federal government in 1978 and a $20 million trust 
fund in 1983 to help them proceed on their own economically.76
From an estimated pre-commercial high of about 2.5 million and a low of 
215,000 in 1911, the Pribilof fur seal population recovered to about 1.5 million 
in the 1940s and leveled off. The harvest in the 1940s to early 1950s averaged 
66,000 annually. Pelagic sealing, restricted to Natives by the 1911 treaty, ta-
pered off to insignificance by 1950.77 A renewed Fur Seal Convention in 1957 
that included the Soviet Union and Japan retained a profit-sharing arrangement 
among member nations, including Japan. Japan had lost control of its Robben 
Island rookery during the war. The new treaty banned pelagic sealing and pro-
vided for ongoing research.78
In the mid-1950s biologists considered the Pribilof seals to be overpopu-
lated. They believed that by reducing the number of pups born, the rate of pup 
survival would be greater, thereby boosting the annual sustainable harvest to 
65,000–95,000. Accordingly, they reversed an 85-year-old policy and, between 
1956 and 1968, included 321,000 females in the kill. The program did not 
yield the expected result; the sustainable harvest level dropped to 36,000 by 
1960. Speculation about the causes of the reduction included hookworm in-
festation, lessening of food supply by commercial fishing, and entanglement of 
the seals in discarded nets.79
In 1973 the Department of Commerce, now in charge of Pribilof sealing, 
set aside St. George Island for long-term research. Opposition to seal slaugh-
ter by animal rights groups and the advent of synthetic furs contributed to a 
decline in the industry. Commercial harvest ended in 1984. A rising tourist 
industry based largely on fur seal viewing helped sustain the Pribilof economy.80 
More important for economic sustenance, the federal government established a 
trust fund and built port facilities, roads, and other infrastructure, enabling the 
Pribilofs to operate as a service base for the Bering Sea fisheries.81
In the late 20th Century only Pribilof Aleuts purposely harvested fur seals 
in Alaska. They took about 1,600 annually for subsistence purposes, not affect-
ing the population. However, between 1974 and 1983 the herd shrank from 
1.25 million to 877,000, resulting in a 1988 designation of the northern fur 
seal as depleted under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. One probable cause 
of the decline, the use of high seas driftnets by Taiwan and Japan, killed an 
estimated 5,200 seals in 1991. Other fishing gear contributed minimally to 
seal mortality. International pressure brought high seas driftnetting to an end 
after 1991. But industrial development on the Pribilofs appeared to be creating 
disturbances that lowered pup production at some rookeries.82 A precipitous 
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Aleut workers at fur seal processing plant, St. Paul Island, ca. 1980. By Jo Keller. FWS 
2459, Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. After nearly 200 years, commer-
cial exploitation of northern fur seals ended in 1984.
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decline in the fur seal population after 1998 invited speculation and research 
about killer whale predation, loss of food to commercial fishing, global warm-
ing, or a combination of these factors.83
ELLIOTT’S LEGACY
One of the first American artists to work in Alaska, Elliott left a valuable 
record of Aleut life. But he is far better known for his work on the fur seals. 
Throughout most of the years from 1890 to 1926, he tirelessly lobbied Con-
gress and otherwise publicized the seals’ cause. Often neglecting his family, he 
carried on his single-minded crusade. He objected to the harvest monopoly 
held by the Fouke Fur Company and lobbied for a 1926 Senate bill to open 
the market to competitive bidding. After the bill’s defeat he moved to Seattle 
to live with his son John and died three years later at age 80. Some members 
of Congress remarked that they had never seen such a persistent fighter for a 
cause.84
Elliott had made a last visit to the Pribilofs in 1913, during which he re-
ceived word that the five-year killing moratorium he had fought for neared ap-
proval. Never satisfied, he persisted in his singular quest. Frederika Martin paid 
tribute in her book Sea Bears:
No posthumous honors have been paid him; the seals he saved, but his repu-
tation, tarnished by the slanders of powerful foes, has still to be rescued. His 
deeds are permanently recorded in dozens of volumes of Congressional hear-
ings. Few Americans will chance to open even one to chuckle at his barbed 
rejoinders, his searing caustic epithets, or be impressed by his masterly, 
insistent repetition of embarrassing facts and statistics. No one following his 
course through volume after volume of these records will fail to be convinced 
that had there been no Elliott, the fur seal of the North Pacific might today 
be an aquatic wraith, companion to its vanished southern relative and the 
Steller’s sea cow.85
Elliott, his friends, and some of his adversaries had pioneered Alaskan environ-
mental politics and placed it on the national and world stages.
Elliott’s unique background and character helped make possible an envi-
ronmental victory on a subject greatly removed from the experience of the av-
erage person before the age of electronic media. The issue peaked during the 
Progressive Era when the rapacious behavior of corporations and collusion of 
government incited strong resentment and suspicion in the body politic. More-
over, curbs on the sealing industry did not threaten the profits of the major 
natural resource industries of mining, logging, agriculture, or even fishing; nor 
did sealing benefit the average citizen. And unlike the wolf and buffalo, the fur 
seal could not disrupt the lives of ordinary people. Thanks primarily to Elliott, 
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the fur seal appeared an innocent, somewhat lovable creature worthy of protec-
tion from greedy and brutal exploiters.
To justify suppression of pelagic sealing, technically legal under interna-
tional law, the United States needed to show evidence of the threat of fur seal 
extinction and present it as morally offensive. Through its scientists and Elliott 
and Hornaday, though the men fought among themselves, the effort succeeded. 
The morality and economics of natural resource use shifted the focus of the dis-
pute from territorial rights to conservation. Also, the gains and losses from the 
sales of sealskins paled in comparison to the potential costs to the United States 
of conflict involving the other nations operating in the North Pacific—Russia, 
Japan, Great Britain, and Canada.
The fur seal controversy promoted the emergence of the national conserva-
tion movement. Paralleling the story of the buffalo and the less fortunate pas-
senger pigeon, it helped turn public opinion against market hunting, curbed by 
the Lacey Act of 1900 and other federal and state laws.86 Elliott and Hornaday’s 
political campaign, one of the first and most prominent on behalf of wildlife, 
contained elements to be seen in many to come. Walt Disney, using 20th-Cen-
tury technology to achieve what Elliott had attempted to do through words and 
paintings, sent photographers Al and Elma Milotte to the Pribilofs in 1946. 
The film Seal Island appeared in theaters without human actors. To war-weary 
audiences, an innocent and heartwarming drama of Nature came as a welcome 
change. The film won an Academy Award in 1948 and its success inspired other 
nature movies by Disney, laying a foundation of widespread public sentiment 
for nature preservation.87
Far in advance of the modern environmental movement, the fur seal affair 
modeled several of the movement’s key values. Elliott insisted on and ultimately 
won government and corporate accountability. Management by government 
experts replaced favoritism toward exploitative commercial interests, and the 
experts themselves came under closer scrutiny. Through artwork, congressional 
testimony, and citizen groups, Elliott and Hornaday drew the public into the 
debate. They and their rivals employed scientific information, though largely 
in the form of field observation, as a crucial element. Writings and Elliott’s 
paintings of the seals engendered nonconsumptive uses of the seal by a public 
that would probably never see the creatures in the wild. Not least, international 
cooperation on seal conservation presaged the common use of treaties to man-
age natural resources in the post–World War II era.
Under American rule, officials pursued the goal of protecting the fur seal 
from commercial extinction. Management objectives moved from uncontrolled 
exploitation to utilitarian sustainability and somewhat beyond. Ecotourism and 
educational materials testified modestly to the seals’ nonconsumptive use value. 
But nature shows notwithstanding, the seals lacked the sea otters’ charismatic 
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image as cuddly, playful, and devoted parents. Managers treated the fur seal 
herd as a cash crop for the nation until profits fell off in the 1960s; later, the 
nation subsidized the operation for the benefit of the Aleuts. When commercial 
harvest stopped in the 1980s, the seals encountered new hazards in the forms of 
commercial fishing and climatic warming. Their future would depend on the 
quality of scientific research and the level of political commitment to preserve 
the ecological integrity of the North Pacific.
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Wake of the Whalers
DUrING the WhalING era, WheN Whales GreW sCarCe IN relatIVelY aCCessIble 
oceans, commercial hunters invaded distant regions. Alaska inevitably drew 
their attention. Long before the rise of conservation concerns or international 
agreements on ocean resources, whalers took all they could. Only the limits 
of commercial value and the vastness of the seas rescued North Pacifi c whales 
and pinnipeds from extinction. Public sympathy for ocean species awaited 
the emergence of nature fi lms and ecological science, probably too late for the 
North Pacifi c right whale.
In their relentless quest for comforts and profi ts, Americans outdid the 
Russians. Whaling ranked as a prominent commercial venture and a respected 
social institution. Yankee whalers fi rst visited the North Pacifi c in the 1830s; 
they quickly made it their most profi table hunting grounds. Exhausting the 
concentrations of right and sperm whales in the Gulf of Alaska in the 1840s, 
they moved north into the Bering Sea in pursuit of bowhead whales. Spearhead-
ed in 1848 by the bark Superior under command of Captain Thomas Welcome
Roys and the Ocmulgee under Captain Fred Manter, they followed the bow-
3
Wake of the Whalers
59
3
heads into the Arctic Ocean, eventually operating east of the Mackenzie River 
Delta. At their zenith in 1852 an estimated 299 whaleships searched the Bering 
and Chukchi seas.1 New England Yankees dominated Alaska whaling until the 
early 1880s.
Whaling in Alaska originated much earlier. Throwing spears smeared with 
poison from the monkshood root, the Aleuts took orcas, bowheads, grays, 
sperms, fi nbacks, and right whales. Pairs of two-man baidarkas crept up on 
whales; the hunters struck them and retreated to land for three days in hopes 
that the whales would die and drift ashore.2 Koniag Eskimos placed a high pri-
ority on whaling and conducted their hunts in a similar manner.3 Northern Es-
kimos normally killed whales without the use of poison, using harpoons tipped 
by stone, bone, ivory, or native copper. They subdued large whales, principally 
bowheads, by hurling spears attached to sealskin fl oats designed to tire out the 
quarry.4 Eskimos hunted whales at St. Lawrence Island as early as 200 bPe and 
at Point Hope from about a.D. 800.5
In shallower waters, Eskimos pursued belukhas (beluga or white whales). 
Census taker Ivan Petroff described the process he witnessed in 1880:
Sometimes a hundred or more of the natives proceed to sea on a calm sum-
mer day, observing perfect silence and keeping well inshore. As soon as a 
school of belugas is sighted an old man gives a signal, the kaiaks hurry to 
seaward of the school, and a tremendous noise begins, with shrill cries and 
yells, beating of drums and rattles, and splashing of spears and paddles in the 
water. The hunters gradually approach the shore, driving the belugas before 
them, until the latter, in the shallow water, fall easy prey to their spears. In 
former times, when the beluga was more plentiful, from 100 to 200 were 
secured in a single day in this way.6
Koniag Eskimos caught porpoises using spears launched from throwing-boards. 
Sealskin fl oats attached to the bone- and stone-headed spears prevented loss of 
small whales by sinking or escaping. Villagers ate the fl esh, blubber, and skin 
and tanned some hides for boots, kayak coverings, and nets.7
Russians, lacking the necessary traditions and skills and preoccupied by 
the fur business, engaged minimally in whaling. They forced the Aleuts and 
Kodiak-Afognak Eskimos to hunt whales for food to support fur-seeking op-
erations and sold baleen beginning in the late 1700s. At the Pribilof Islands in 
1786–1787, Aleut hunters under Russian control gathered, in addition to fur 
seal and sea otter pelts, “more whalebone [baleen] than the ship could carry.”8
Taking note of the lucrative whaling industry conducted by Americans in 
the 19th Century, Russian-American Company offi cials explored the possibil-
ity of Russian-controlled commercial whaling. In 1841 they complained of 
American whaleships in the Aleutians boiling down blubber in inshore wa-
ters, the smoke driving away sea otters. About 50 New England vessels visited 
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the Bering Sea that year, each capturing ten to fifteen whales. Whalers refused 
orders to move out of Russian waters. Russian-American Company director 
Mikhail Tebenkof proposed to respond by going into the whaling business. The 
czar concurred, but economics and geopolitics plagued the project. A Russian 
Finland Whaling Company incorporated in December 1850. Its first vessel, the 
Finnish-built Suomi, sailed to the Sea of Okhotsk in 1852–1853 and gathered 
an impressive 1,500 barrels of oil and 21,400 pounds of baleen. A second ship 
made a similar catch in Alaskan waters in 1853. War in the Crimea intervened, 
and an English warship captured and burned the third Russian whaler. A few 
more whaling voyages produced mediocre results, and the Russians’ tenuous 
position in Alaska induced the Russian government to consider getting rid of 
its holdings in North America.9 Among other factors, the presence of hundreds 
of American whaling ships in Alaskan waters in the 1840s and 1850s helped 
convince the Russians that the United States would be the region’s dominant 
power, which they preferred to their rival Great Britain.
YANKEE WHALING
Whalers rated the right whale as their top prize for years after they discov-
ered it in large numbers off Kodiak Island. Very similar to the Atlantic right 
whale so familiar to New Bedford seamen, it moved slowly and contained an 
average of 125 barrels of oil and 1,250 pounds of baleen. French captain Nar-
cisse Chaudiere sailed the first commercial whaler into Alaskan waters in 1835. 
His ship Gange brought home oil and baleen from seven right whales. Another 
French whaler arrived in 1836, and at least one American vessel, the Elbe out 
of Poughkeepsie, New York, followed in 1837. As whale stocks in the southern 
Pacific gave out around 1840 and news of the promising new whaling grounds 
spread, Yankee whalers moved north. Baleen for corset stays and skirt hoops 
came into fashion, driving up the price and focusing attention on right whales. 
Rapidly proliferating numbers of vessels (Table 3.1) quickly exhausted the pods 
of right whales in the Gulf of Alaska. By the late 1840s whalers moved through 
the Aleutian passes into Bristol Bay in the Bering Sea.10
Inefficient methods of harvesting hastened the decline of the whales. Fol-
lowing a strike by a harpoon, numerous circumstances could result in loss of 
a whale: the whaleboat being damaged or men injured by flippers or flukes, 
ropes breaking or being cut by harpoons, men cutting the rope to prevent be-
ing pulled down by deep-diving whales or being dragged too far from the ship, 
harpoons breaking or detaching from the whales, and whales sinking. Men cap-
tured well under half the whales they struck, sometimes as few as 20 percent. 
As whales learned to avoid whaleboats, harpooners had to throw from greater 
distances, wounding a higher proportion. A large fleet of vessels, each capturing 
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table 3.1. American Whalers and Harvests in the Pacific North of 50 Degrees, 1835–1913
Year Ships Ave. Bbls Oil Total Bbls Oil Bbls Sperm Oil Lbs Baleen
1835  1 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1836 1 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1837 1 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1838 1 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1839 2 1,400 2,800 n.d. n.d.
1840 3 587 1,760 n.d. n.d.
1841 20 1,412 28,200 n.d. n.d.
1842 29 1,627 47,200 n.d. n.d.
1843 108 1,340 146,800 n.d. n.d.
1844 170 1,528 259,570 n.d. n.d.
1845 263 953 250,600 n.d. n.d.
1846 292 869 253,800 n.d. n.d.
1847 177 1,059 187,443 n.d. n.d.
1848 159 1,164 185,256 n.d. n.d.
1849 155 1,334 206,850 n.d. n.d.
1850 144 1,692 243,648 n.d. n.d.
1851 138 626 86,360 n.d. n.d.
1852 278 1,343 373,450 n.d. n.d.
1853 238 912 217,056 n.d. n.d.
1854 232 794 184,063 n.d. n.d.
1855 217 873 189,579 n.d. n.d.
1856 178 822 146,410 n.d. n.d.
1857 143 796 113,900 n.d. n.d.
1858 196 620 121,650 n.d. n.d.
1859 176 535 94,160 n.d. n.d.
1860 121 518 62,678 n.d. n.d.
1861 76 724 55,024 n.d. n.d.
1862 32 610 19,525 n.d. n.d.
1863 42 857 36,010 n.d. n.d.
1864 68 522 35,490 n.d. n.d.
1865 59 617 36,415 n.d. n.d.
1866 95 598 56,925 n.d. n.d.
1867 90 640 57,620 n.d. n.d.
1868 61 708 43,230 n.d. 627,500
1869 43 890 38,275 n.d. 525,000
1870 46 1,069 49,205 n.d. 659,550
1871 35 n.d. n.d. n.d. 15,000
1872 27 730 19,730 n.d. 258,200
1873 30 676 20,295 n.d. 239,300
1874 23  883 20,380 n.d. 222,100
1875 16 1,355 21,680 n.d. 230,460
1876 18 n.d. 5,250 n.d. 35,200
1877 19 1,096 17,530 n.d. 153,800
1878 21 770 13,080 n.d. 114,200
1879 17 n.d. 18,800 n.d. 200,500
1880 19 1,406 26,700 n.d. 409,000
1881 23 1,206 27,740 n.d. 387,000
1882 32 749 22,975 n.d. 360,500
continued on next page
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1883 38 267 10,155 n.d. 159,400
1884 39 525 20,450 n.d. 318,700
1885 40 533 21,305 635 301,000
1886 53 599 29,950 990 566,301
1887 39 451 17,575 182 367,400
1888 50 273 13,654 280 272,050
1889 46 269 12,395 920 238,100
1890 43 352 15,150 809 314,624
1891 48 352 16,915 1,620 280,400
1892 36 214 7,694 480 317,500
1893 38 204 7,745 3,375 307,940
1894 26 238 6,185 4,605 190,500
1895 14 156 2,185 2,210 111,500
1896 15 182 2,725 1,930 40,580
1897 20 191 3,820 3,610 268,100
1898 13 181 2,350 2,550 34,820
1899 19 231 4,395 4,255 237,365
1900 15 213 3,190 3,630 97,800
1901 15 116 1,735 6,885 21,950
1902 15 109 1,641 3,935 80,500
1903 20 54 1,075 5,800 96,950
1904 16 119 1,905 375 71,200
1905 14 86 1,200 1,400 71,600
1906 5 80 400 140 8,400
1907 10 n.d. n.d. n.d. 90,500
1908 10 8 75 1,400 30,500
1909 3 n.d. n.d. n.d. 43,000
1910 5 80 400 2,195 10,300
1911 7 143 1,000 2,150 111,000
1912 4 n.d. n.d. 1,520 n.d.
1913 4 45 180 n.d. 23,500
Sources: 1835–1884 figures from A. Howard Clark, “The Whale Fishery,” in George Brown Goode, ed., The Fisheries 
and Fishery Industries of the United States, Sect. 5, Vol.2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1887), 85–86; 1885–1913 data 
from Reginald B. Hegarty, Returns of Whaling Vessels Sailing From American Ports, 1876–1928. New Bedford: Old 
Dartmouth Historical Society and Whaling Museum, 1959.
Note: Does not include foreign vessels, about 10–20 percent of total vessels. Harvest data for 1885–1913 listed in 
year of vessel departure.
table 3.1—continued
Year Ships Ave. Bbls Oil Total Bbls Oil Bbls Sperm Oil Lbs Baleen
whales and leaving many to die of blood loss or infection, soon decimated the 
North Pacific right whale population.11
Whaling Captain Charles Melville Scammon noted that before the whal-
ers laid waste to them, “the right whales are found singly or in pairs; at times, 
scattered about as far as the eye can see from the masthead. At the last of the 
season they are sometimes seen in large numbers, crowded together. . . . Hav-
ing been chased every successive season for years, these animals have become 
very wild, and difficult to get near, especially in calm weather.” Portending the 
ominous future of the North Pacific right whale, he remarked in 1871, “At the 
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present time, but few right whales are taken.”12 A whaler visited Sitka for re-
pairs in 1891 after grounding in a fog and breaking its rudder while pursuing a 
wounded whale. It boasted a catch unusual for the time: nine right whales taken 
in eight days in Prince William Sound. One had dragged a whaleboat under-
water and drowned a crew member.13 Between 1805 and 1914 whalers landed 
an estimated 14,480 North Pacific right whales, not counting those struck and 
fatally wounded or otherwise lost.14
Whalers sought the sperm whale in the Atlantic and South Pacific and 
found more in the subarctic waters of the North Pacific. Sperm whales aver-
aged only 45 barrels of oil in their insulating blubber layer. But they carried 
spermaceti (sperm oil, in the forehead), used to make candles, and the valuable 
ambergris, an ingredient in perfume. Less favored, the gray whale yielded only 
30 barrels of oil and reacted aggressively when attacked. Sulphur bottom (blue), 
finback, sei, and humpback whales usually swam too fast for the sailing vessels 
and rowboats.15
Commercial whalers most highly valued the bowhead, a close relative of the 
right whale. It migrated between the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean, staying 
close to the pack ice, hence its other name, “ice whale.” When New Bedford 
whalers first encountered it off the Kamchatka Peninsula in 1843, they real-
ized that it bested the right whale in commercial value. They found bowheads 
farther north in the Bering Sea.16 Thomas Welcome Roys examined the reports 
and determined that there must be a concentration of whales in Arctic waters. 
As captain of the Superior out of Sag Harbor, New York, he signed a crew for 
the South Atlantic fishery but took them to the North Pacific. There, in the 
Bering and Chukchi seas, they discovered a treasure trove of large, slow-moving 
bowheads. Their catch of eleven set off a rush to the Western Arctic, reviving 
the whaling industry.17
A bowhead contained up to 300 barrels of oil (about 100 on average and 
less as whaling progressed) and a possible 2,500 pounds (1,100 on average) 
of baleen.18 Manufacturers used baleen in corsets, women’s hats, buttons, up-
holstery, suitcases and trunks, fishing rods, buggy whips, and springs. Whale 
oil served in cooking, lamps, soap, candles, paint and varnish, and as a lubri-
cant. Eskimos had relied on the bowhead more than any other great whale and 
hunted it for over a thousand years, landing a few each year. The meat and oil 
furnished food and lighting by stone lamps, the bones a variety of tools and 
weapons. Eskimos used baleen for many implements: ropes, gillnets, crab traps, 
containers, sleds and sled runners, snares, spring baits, spear and harpoon tips, 
knife blades, rivets, and toys.19
Whalers at first found the bowheads docile, trusting, and easy to kill. After 
being pursued for a season or two, however, they grew shy and elusive. In 1849, 
the second year of bowhead whaling in the Chukchi Sea, a ship’s log recorded 
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Captain William Mogg and bowhead whale baleen, ca. 1916. Willoughby coll. 72-116-
12n, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Mogg and other 
Arctic whalers depleted the bowhead whales.
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“plenty of whales in sight but all hands too busy [processing whales] to look at 
them.”20 The catch of North Pacific whales peaked in 1852 during an assault by 
nearly 300 vessels (Table 3.1), most seeking bowheads.
Whaling ships normally deployed four or five whaleboats propelled by oars 
and, in the case of bowhead whales, sails to avoid alarming the quarry. Early 
whalers threw an iron harpoon, let the whale tow the boat by a 600-foot rope 
until exhausted, and drew alongside and lanced it to death. This method al-
lowed bowheads to escape under the ice. By 1880 inventors devised a darting 
gun, a harpoon bearing an explosive projectile that, if properly aimed, could 
kill a whale instantly. The crew towed the dead whale to the mother vessel and 
fixed it to the side. Then they carved it so its head and blubber could be hoisted 
aboard, the blubber boiled for oil, and the head stripped of baleen. Cooking 
an average bowhead lasted about 36 hours. During the return voyage the crew 
dried the baleen on deck and tied it in bundles of 22 slabs, each weighing about 
80 pounds. Crews received pay based on their rank and the value of the catch. 
Despite risking their lives in difficult work, seamen usually made no financial 
gain, often owing money to the whaling companies, from which they bought 
their supplies at inflated prices.21
Technological change kept North Pacific whaling alive in the latter half of 
the 19th Century. Completion of the transcontinental railroad improved the 
cost-effectiveness of Alaska whaling, as did the invention of the shoulder-fired 
harpoon gun and a similar device, the bomb lance. Steamships also revised the 
economics of Arctic whaling, being less subject to entrapment in the ice. The 
first steam whaler designed for bowheads, the Mary and Helen out of Maine, 
entered the Arctic in 1880. San Francisco became the primary supply, ship-
building, and whale oil processing center for the Pacific. For fuel, steam whal-
ers tapped coal deposits in northwestern Alaska, although most coal had to be 
shipped from the States. At a high point in 1887 one vessel tallied 28 whales, 
and a total of 526,000 pounds of baleen reached San Francisco.22
To capture inshore whales, companies set up shore whaling stations, hir-
ing Eskimo or white crews of about twenty men each. Shore stations could 
operate earlier in the spring, later in the fall, and closer to the ice pack than 
whaling ships could. Fifteen such stations operated in the Bering and Chukchi 
seas by the end of the 1880s. Crews killed whales in a traditional manner ex-
cept for the use of handheld bomb guns. Between 1852 and 1914, company-
controlled and independent Eskimo shore whalers captured an estimated 626 
bowheads.23 From 1848 to 1909, pelagic whalers tallied about 29,500 North 
Pacific bowheads.24
Charles Brower—who arrived in 1884, became a shore whaler near Point 
Barrow, and remained as a trader—dispatched a scout in 1888 to investigate 
rumors of bowhead whales congregating off the Mackenzie River Delta. The 
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tales turned out to be true, setting off a last surge of Arctic steam whaling. 
Companies sent north the first ships to over-winter in 1890–1891, and one, the 
Mary D. Hume, stayed two winters. It reaped a plentiful harvest of bowheads 
on the eastern Mackenzie Delta.25 As many as fifteen ships remained through 
the winters, most near Herschel Island, to get an early start on summer whal-
ing.26 Ship-based whaling continued until 1916 but made few highly profitable 
catches after 1899. Beginning in 1870 the price of whale oil had sunk as petro-
leum products became available. But the price of baleen rose, reaching a peak in 
1905. Whalers responded by taking baleen only, wasting the remainder of the 
whale except for those taken at shore stations and given to Eskimos.27
Arctic whaling posed dangers for the sailors as well as the whales. Captain 
Roys related the experience of his bark Sheffield, returning in 1850 full of oil 
and baleen, as a gale drove it toward the cliffs in the Fox Islands passage through 
the Aleutians:
With great exertion we got the mainsail upon her. All was done that man 
could do to save the ship with every man at his post, two men at the helm. 
Some are weeping, some are praying, some in sullen silence look upon the all 
exciting scene and calmly await the stroke of death. At this critical moment 
the gale increases. The tremendous weight of sail is making the ship . . . 
Eskimo whaling station, Cape Prince of Wales, 1891 or 1892; revenue cutter Bear offshore. 
Bear coll. 89-193-116, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. 
Some Natives operated their own shore-based stations, selling the whales or baleen to whal-
ing ships.
Wake of the Whalers
67
groan throughout her extreme length. The sea is breaking over her, throw-
ing the spray upon her topsails and wetting down the men at her helm, her 
leerails are under water. No word is spoken, for the proud ship is laboring 
with destiny and with fearful speed she staggers on, bearing all on board to 
safety or instant death. Onward she drives, until only one wave is between 
us and the rocky bottom, here at a distance of about 100 feet [from shore]. 
Then the memories of years go flying through the brain, the cheek turns 
pale, the heart beats thick and the boldest hold their breath. In another 
moment she is free and a shout of joy resounds through the ship. The rocks 
are passed and orders to reduce sail are obeyed with alacrity and she runs in 
safety o’er the sea.28
Captain Henry Pease of the Champion out of Edgartown on Martha’s Vine-
yard recounted an even less enjoyable experience in 1870. After a strenuous 
whaling effort south of Point Barrow, bad weather forced his vessel southward 
on October 4. Howling winds and “the heaviest sea I ever saw” drove the ship 
through Bering Strait, smashing whaleboats, equipment, and barrels of whale 
oil and leaving the ship covered in ice and oil. It nearly foundered, but the wind 
slackened just before it would have struck St. Lawrence Island. Pease called the 
episode “the most anxious and miserable time I’ve ever experienced in all my 
sea service.”29
As might be expected, whaling vessels often came to grief. Normally the 
unfortunate ones ran into storms and ice, but even war took a toll. During the 
Civil War, Confederates sank Yankee whalers off the East Coast. In June 1865 
their warship Shenandoah sailed to the North Pacific and destroyed 38 whaling 
vessels, unaware that the war had ended.30
As dangerous as whaling had been elsewhere, it could hardly outdo the 
Western Arctic for risk. A combination of ice, storms, and cold conspired to call 
dozens of vessels and scores of men to untimely ends. Almost every year a few 
ships went down, and in 1871 most of the Arctic fleet did so. When the bark 
Japan wrecked off East Cape that spring, 8 men died in a long survival march 
over the ice. As the fleet worked to the northeast between Cape Belcher and Icy 
Cape, officers chose to ignore warnings by the Eskimos that the wind would 
drive the ice pack ashore and trap them. The wind changed and the ice came 
in, crushing some vessels and forcing eighteen into a narrow strip of water not 
connected to any escape route. At length the captains decided to abandon their 
ships and transport their 1,219 passengers and crew southward by whaling boats 
to open water to be rescued by other whaling vessels. They succeeded in saving 
all hands despite heavy seas that threatened to swamp the rowboats. Thirty-two 
vessels had been lost, including Captain Henry Pease’s Champion.31
Five years later, in 1876, ice again caught most of the fleet of eighteen 
American and two foreign whalers. Abandoning their ships to walk to others 
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not icebound, several of the 300 men died of exposure. About 50 elected to re-
main aboard, of whom only one survived by walking to a village. The fleet lost 
twelve ships that year and seven more during the next three years. These losses 
hurt the New Bedford whaling industry, and the Arctic fleet’s home port had 
shifted to San Francisco by 1880.32
Arctic whaling revived somewhat as steam whalers entered the trade in the 
1880s. But at least seventeen more vessels succumbed between 1888 and 1896 
and eleven more between 1899 and 1913.33 The fleet suffered a telling stroke 
when ten vessels became icebound off Point Barrow in 1897. About 16 men 
died trying to reach a rescue vessel. Most of the rest, around 300, remained 
aboard ship or walked to Charles Brower’s whaling station at Cape Smyth. 
Brower found lodging for the survivors and bade his Eskimo employees hunt 
caribou to feed them.34
Attempts to rescue the stranded whalers led to epic struggles against the 
elements. Third Mate George Fred Tilton of the Belvedere and officer Charles 
Walker from the Orca volunteered to go for help. Walker chose the Mackenzie 
River route through Canada. Sledging southward accompanied by two Siberian 
Eskimos on October 1, Tilton reached Point Hope where the Siberians quit the 
expedition. Tilton enlisted two local Eskimos, Tickey and his wife, Canuanar. 
The three drove onward through the winter over mountains and treacherous sea 
ice, so short of food that several times they had to kill dogs to feed the others. 
Near St. Michael they met Revenue officers planning to drive a herd of reindeer 
north to relieve the whalers. No one could be certain the reindeer plan would 
succeed, so Tilton and his companions kept going. They traversed Katmai Pass 
in early March and spent three days lowering their sleds and dogs down the 
steep mountain slopes. While crossing a river to get to the small village of Kat-
mai, they lost half their equipment. At Katmai they found an old dory, and 
Tilton caulked it using his only suit of long underwear. Then, after 1,500 miles 
by dogsled, the three rowed 37 miles across Shelikof Strait to Kodiak Island. 
From daybreak to nearly dark, in rare calm water, Tilton rowed while his com-
panions bailed. At St. Paul the Alaska Commercial Company agent demanded 
an exorbitant fee to take them to Prince William Sound and also charged for 
their lodging. The three caught a boat to Portland, Oregon, where Tilton wired 
his company in New Bedford for relief funds. They refused to believe his story, 
so the three continued to San Francisco, where Tilton found a company willing 
to send a supply ship. Tilton and his companions arrived in early March and 
Walker a few weeks later. Vessels not caught in the ice had returned the previous 
November, prompting a rescue effort by the revenue cutter Bear.35
While Tilton and Walker strove to alert the outside world to the plight of 
the whalers, word of the crisis had reached Washington. The revenue cutter 
Bear headed north to aid the rescue but got no farther than Cape Vancouver on 
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Nelson Island. From there Lt. Ellsworth Bertholf struck out by dogsled carry-
ing provisions to Point Barrow, well over 1,000 miles away. Lt. David H. Jarvis 
and the ship’s surgeon, Dr. Samuel J. Call, separately dog-teamed to St. Michael 
and on to the Seward Peninsula, where they borrowed two reindeer herds to 
drive to Point Barrow. Their perilous winter journey in temperatures reaching 
60 degrees below zero lasted eleven weeks and ended on March 29, 1898. Lt. 
Bertholf arrived afterward. Yet their strivings did not turn out to be essential; 
trader Charles Brower had organized a relief effort and made available all the 
provisions at his disposal. The contingent of more than 300 whalers suffered 
negligible loss of life.36
20th-CENTURY WHALING
The invention of spring steel corsets and changes in fashion reduced the 
value of baleen in 1907, striking a heavy blow against Arctic whaling. High 
insurance rates and uncertainty of profits took their toll. American commercial 
whaling nearly ceased in Alaska except for shore stations. A few more vessels 
ventured north, planning to make the bulk of their profits by bartering trade 
goods for furs. Arctic shore whaling stations, the first erected at Barrow in 1885, 
all closed by 1915. A year later two ships carried out the last regular pelagic 
whaling trip to the Arctic.37
Eskimo whaling crews continued to harvest bowheads for subsistence, pri-
marily food, as they had before the era of commercial whaling. Between 1910 
and 1969 they landed an average of about twelve per year. Siberian Eskimos 
killed a smaller number, perhaps four annually, similar to their take in the 19th 
Century. Canadian Eskimos occasionally took bowheads for food.38
Having exhausted the right and bowhead whales and lost most of the baleen 
market, modern whalers looked for different species found at lower latitudes. 
Accordingly, southerly shore-based stations lasted longer than those in the Arc-
tic. The first opened in the early 1880s on Killisnoo Island in the Southeast but 
closed after several years. Tyee Company operated at Murder Cove on Admi-
ralty Island between 1907 and 1913. A wounded whale assisted the station’s 
closing by ramming and sinking one of Tyee’s motorized schooners in 1909. 
The United States Whaling Company at Port Armstrong on Baranof Island 
caught a record 314 whales in its first year, 1912, but went out of business in 
1923. Norwegians opened a station at Akutan in the eastern Aleutians in 1907, 
joined by the American-owned United States Whaling Company in 1912, the 
year the station tallied 310 whales. American Pacific Whaling Company took 
over the Akutan facility in 1917 and ran it until 1939. The company opened 
a substation at Port Hobron on Sitkalidak Island in 1926.39 It operated, except 
for 1931, through 1937.
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Catcher boats from these stations concentrated primarily on the faster-
moving sperm, blue (or sulphur bottom), humpback, and finback whales (Ta-
ble 3.2), although they pursued right whales whenever sighted. A company 
employee estimated the 1913 value of whale species at: humpback $400, fin-
back $500, blue $600, sperm $1,000, and right whale $2,000. In the same year 
the United States Whaling Company paid catcher boat gunners $5.50 for each 
humpback returned, $10.50 per finback, $13 per blue, $30 per sperm, and 
$50 per right whale. By the mid-1920s, blues surpassed sperm whales in value. 
table 3.2. Shore-Based Commercial Whale Catches in Subarctic Alaska, 1910–1939
Year Humpback Finback Blue Sperm Other Total
1910 — — — — 6 right 146
1911 — — — — — (500)
1912 315 235 112 23 — 685
1913 21 29 58 73 3 sei, 1 gray, 1 bottlenose 186
1914 131 259 35 43 14 482
1915 153 239 53 25 — 470
1916 121 161 64 20 21 sei, 1 right, 1 bowhead 389
1917 44 153 138 51 2 bowhead, 26 other 414
1918 58 170 82 92 4 sei 406
1919 132 242 68 95 2 sei 539
1920 75 179 81 90 4 sei 429
1921 75 2 — 1 1 gray 79
1922 95 204 77 69 — 445
1923 155 151 29 16 1 sei, 2 bowhead, 1 right 355
1924 71 148 46 17 1 right 283
1925 208 234 36 33 1 right 512
1926 383 179 15 2  2 right 581
1927 554 122 35 3 3 sei, 1 right 718
1928 220 98 51 24 1 sei, 6 right, 2 gray 402
1929 214 105 53 12 1 right 385
1930 191 50 78 36 — 355
1931 — — — — (whaling suspended) —
1932 128 60 78 2 2 right 270
1933 114 61 1 3 1 right, 2 gray 182
1934 166 232 44 21 2 sei 465
1935 141 94 87 70 2 right 394
1936 118 160 41 66 — 385
1937 104 170 45 56 1 sei 376
1938 12 65 33 63 — 173
1939 26 91 5 49 — 171
Total 4,035 3,913 1,455 1,061  11,320
Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Fisheries, Alaska fisheries annual reports, 1910–1939; J.N. Tonnessen 
and A.O. Johnsen, The History of Modern Whaling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 734.
Note: Does not include figures for Arctic shore whaling stations, for 1908–1909 and 1911, or for 778 belukhas 
caught between 1917 and 1921. Two of the bowheads listed (in 1917 and 1923) in Bureau of Fisheries data were 
actually right whales (J.J. Brueggeman, T. Newby, and R.A. Grotefendt, “Catch Records of the Twenty North Pa-
cific Right Whales From Two Alaska Whaling Stations, 1917–39,” Arctic 39, 1 [March 1986]: 44–45).
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Kills of right whales ceased in the mid-1930s after the adoption of protection 
measures.40
Employing bow-mounted harpoon guns on motor-driven boats, men 
prowled for whales in the surrounding ocean waters. From a distance of about 
120 feet the gunner fired an explosive harpoon into the quarry. Held fast by the 
rope, the animal would be played like a fish and hauled in by a power winch. Air 
pumped into the carcass prevented it from sinking. The boat towed the catch 
to the shore station for processing. Blubber, bones, and meat went into separate 
cookers for different grades of oil. Oil from the heads of the relatively scarce and 
valuable sperm whales went into other casks. The United States Whaling Com-
pany station at Port Armstrong could handle 500 whales in a season.41 Whales 
supplied oil, fertilizer, dog food, hides (in the case of belukhas), and, to some 
extent, human food.42 Stations at Cook Inlet and Nome (ca. 1917–1920) and 
Golovnin Bay (ca. 1920) caught belukhas to sell their skins for white gloves. 
Settlers sometimes objected to whaling because whales helped fishermen by 
driving the herring ashore and into their nets.43
Between 1910 and 1920, ten shore stations operated from California to the 
Aleutians. A postwar recession and a glut of oil from Antarctic whaling put most 
eastern Pacific stations out of business. From the mid-1920s to the mid-1940s 
only two Canadian stations (Rose Harbor and Naden Harbor in the Queen 
Charlotte Islands) and two in Alaska (Akutan and Port Hobron) functioned, 
and not every year. The Great Depression and competition from Antarctic 
whaling further squeezed the shore stations, closing them for the 1931 season. 
The 1929 invention of a process to make margarine from whale oil helped keep 
the industry alive. But aging equipment caused accidents and raised costs. A 
gun fell backward when fired and killed the gunner. Catcher boats became so 
frail that the pressure from towed whales nearly stove in their sides. The Akutan 
station, the only one remaining in Alaska, ceased operation in 1939. Temporar-
ily revived activity at Rose Harbor and Port Ellice, California, ended Northwest 
whaling in 1942 and 1943 until after the war.44
Japan maintained shore-based whaling stations as far north as the Kurile 
Islands throughout most of the 20th Century. On the eastern side, stations 
operated from California to Akutan in the Aleutians between 1905 and 1969, 
run by Americans, Norwegians, Canadians, and Japanese. Whaling at these 
sites affected Alaska stocks and vice versa because blue, humpback, fin, sei, and 
gray whales migrated north and south. Blues and seis tended to stay south of the 
Aleutians, and other species went into the Bering Sea or farther north. Whale 
migration complicated conservation efforts by adding uncertainty about popu-
lation levels. It also encouraged the attitude “If we don’t get them, someone else 
will.” Periods of high profit, principally during World War I and 1925–1928, 
inspired greed that sanctioned overkill. Perhaps most important, conservation 
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Harpoon gunner striking finback whale near Akutan. Core coll. 01-2928, Alaska State 
Library. Steam- or gasoline-driven ships and harpoon guns enabled whalers to kill the faster 
blue, finback, sei, and humpback whales.
pleas had to combat the pervasive belief that endless numbers of whales swam 
the seas.45
By the late 1920s the need for whale conservation had begun to alter national 
policies. Sustainability for the whaling industry rather than demands by conser-
vation groups motivated the change. Norway passed a law in 1929 forbidding 
its citizens to kill right whales, young or mothers with calves, and immature 
whales, or to waste body parts. Two years later a League of Nations–sponsored 
International Whaling Convention adopted protection for right and bowhead 
whales and the young of most species. Eskimos could take bowheads for subsis-
tence provided they employ nonmotorized craft and primitive weapons.46 They 
continued to use explosive weapons but killed only for subsistence.
Worldwide whale harvest shot up by 400 percent during the 1930s and in-
cluded large-scale killing of immature animals in the Antarctic. Conferences in 
1937 and 1938 wrote stricter provisions into whaling regulation. In the North 
Pacific the agreements protected right, bowhead, and gray whales. They allowed 
whaling by factory ships only in western waters, a concession to the Japanese 
whose factory operation had recently been launched. Governments rather than 
companies would keep statistics on whales caught.47
Japan, not a signatory of the 1931 Convention or the 1937–1938 agree-
ments, promised in 1939 to fulfill the agreed-upon provisions but changed its 
position when war broke out in Europe. Competition among Japan, Germany, 
Britain, and Norway depleted stocks of blue, finback, and humpback whales in 
the Antarctic. Whaling continued there until 1941 and revived in 1946, further 
reducing populations. Meanwhile, a 1946 Washington conference produced 
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the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and its related International 
Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, which went into effect in 1949. 
Japan joined in 1951.48
Factory ships accompanied by motor-driven catcher boats could gather 
whales more quickly than shore stations could, although high operating costs 
limited their use. A California company sailed the first American factory whaler 
between Mexico and Alaska in 1921, got 158 whales, lost money, and quit. 
Another repeated the undertaking in 1926–1927 and got 568 whales. It hunted 
various parts of the North Pacific until 1937. In 1940 Japan sent its first factory 
ship into the north, capturing 681 whales in waters extending to the Bering Sea 
icepack. A similar venture reaped 590 whales off the Kamchatka Peninsula in 
1941. Even higher kills resulted from revival of the voyages in 1950, ranging 
as far east as Akutan. The Russians operated a factory ship in the North Pacific 
continuously from 1934 to 1961 and then added others. They caught large 
numbers of blue, finback, and sperm whales between Kamchatka and the Gulf 
of Alaska. By the late 1960s the bulk of the world whale harvest had shifted 
from Antarctica to the North Pacific, where only Japan and the Soviet Union 
deployed ships. The IWC made ongoing efforts to persuade the two nations to 
improve conservation practices.49
Right whale at Port Hobron whaling station, 1926. Described as “15 feet high, 65 feet long, 
approximate weight 250 tons.” Lagen coll. 7557, University of Washington Archives. Com-
pany records list the whale at 62 feet. The weight estimate is almost certainly exaggerated. 
Commercial whaling nearly destroyed the North Pacific population of right whales.
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Japanese whalers captured 69 North Pacific right whales prior to the cre-
ation of the International Whaling Commission in 1946. They killed another 
13 under “scientific” permits between 1956 and 1968, when the permits for 
right whales expired. Russians, who also had not signed in 1931 but joined in 
1937, caught 10 in 1955 under the permits. Adding a near-fatal blow to an 
otherwise slowly recovering population, they illegally killed at least 251 in the 
western Gulf of Alaska and 121 in the southeast Bering Sea between 1963 and 
1967.50
The IWC banned harvest of gray whales in 1946 and of blues and hump-
backs in 1966. These three species, the bowhead, and especially the right whale 
emerged as the most depleted of the great whales in the North Pacific.51 The 
phasing out of the American whaling industry, followed by pressure from a 
growing environmental movement, placed the U.S. government in the fore-
front of efforts to preserve the great whales through IWC regulations.
By the 1990s some whale populations had recovered fully, others less so. 
Eastern Pacific gray whales, migrating between the Arctic and Baja California, 
had never been intensively hunted. They increased to more than 25,000 and 
continued at 2.4 percent annually. In 1994 they became the only great whale 
species to be removed from the endangered species list. Russian Natives annu-
ally harvested more than 100, and Makah Indians in Washington occasionally 
killed them in traditional ceremonial hunts.52
Northeast Pacific finback whales ranged from Baja California to the lower 
Arctic. An estimated 5,000 concentrated for summer feeding in the Bering Sea. 
Population totals and trends remained unknown. Similarly, no firm estimates 
existed for sperm whales, ranging widely in offshore waters. Commercial whal-
ers took at least 258,000 of this species in the North Pacific between 1947 and 
1987. North Pacific humpback whales included a small population summering 
along the Aleutians and a larger number summering along the coasts from Brit-
ish Columbia to the northern Bering Sea. Researchers counted 127 near Kodiak 
Island and 404 in Southeast Alaska. Commercial whalers killed at least 28,000 
during the 20th Century and may have reduced the total to as few as 1,000. 
Biologists believed the population to be increasing in the 1980s and 1990s. Na-
tives did not harvest finback, sperm, or humpback whales.53
Western Arctic bowhead whales, originally numbering between 10,000 
and 23,000, shrank to an estimated 3,000 as a result of commercial whaling. 
Tightened protection under the IWC permitted a growth rate of more than 3 
percent and an increase from about 5,000 to 8,200 from the late 1970s to the 
mid-1990s. Eskimos, almost entirely on the American side, harvested a yearly 
average of 54 in the late 1990s, below the limit of 77 calculated to sustain the 
population. The far less fortunate North Pacific right whale declined from at 
least 11,000 to the verge of extinction. Occasional sightings in the Bering Sea 
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in the 1990s included no calves and may have been strays from a small Western 
Pacific population.
Entanglements in commercial fishing gear and being struck by boats 
claimed the lives of all great whale species, although not in sufficient numbers 
to endanger populations other than the right whale. Various disturbances such 
as airborne pollutants, oil spills, and whale watching posed unquantified but 
probably minor problems. Researchers could not determine the effects, if any, 
of climatic warming on North Pacific whales.54
COMMERCIAL WALRUS HUNTING
Resource exploiters also found profitable applications for the Pacific walrus. 
Ivory, one of the commodities sought by Russian fur seekers in Alaska, appeared 
on returning vessels as early as 1755.55 In their first year at the Pribilof Islands 
in 1786–1787, Pribylov’s Aleut hunters killed enough walruses to yield 14,400 
pounds of ivory.56 During the 1810s Aleuts collected 7,200 pounds of ivory an-
nually for the Russians, hastening the eventual extermination of walruses at the 
islands.57 The last of the Pribilof herd fell in 1891.58
Russians forced Aleuts to hunt walruses on the north side of the Alaska 
Peninsula. Frederick Litke witnessed the process in the 1820s:
The hunters surround them from the water’s edge then rush in upon them, 
shouting and crying out, and driving them all inwards towards the middle 
of the sandbank. They then set upon them with pikes, stabbing them where 
their skin is least thick. One of the most essential precautions is to prevent 
any of them from getting to the sea because then the whole herd will follow 
and it becomes difficult to dodge the tusks of these enraged animals and 
avoid being knocked down by them and dragged into the sea. This danger-
ous hunt lasts about ten days. When they are preparing to leave for it, the 
Aleuts always bid farewell to one another.59
Between 1799 and 1857 the Russian walrus kill totaled an estimated 
500,000.60
Whalers turned their attention to the walrus in the late 1850s in the off-
season for whaling and as a substitute for whales a few years later (Table 3.3). 
The bark Carib out of San Francisco brought in one of the first large catches: 
100 barrels of walrus oil in 1860 or 1861. Whalers found the best hunting on 
the ice floes of the northern Bering Sea. For several years they harpooned the 
animals; thereafter they used rifles. Customarily, a boat carrying three men ap-
proached a herd from downwind. A rifleman clothed in white stepped onto 
the ice floe, crept up to the herd, and tried to shoot one dead lest it go into the 
water followed by the others. If the first one fell in place the rest of the herd 
would stay, and the rifleman could approach the herd and kill many or all of 
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them. Accustomed to the cracking of ice, walruses showed no fear of rifle shots. 
In this manner one whaling vessel secured 700 walruses in 48 hours and 1,600 
in less than three weeks in summer 1877.
After the killing, crew members removed the heads for ivory and the skin 
and blubber in strips. Occasionally the warm blood caused the ice floe to melt 
or split, sending the walruses to the bottom and giving the hunters a cold bath. 
Aboard ship, crews separated the blubber from the skin strips, diced it, and 
rendered it into oil in the try-pots used for whale blubber. Cooks often fried the 
liver and heart and made sausages or roasts of the meat.
Ivory went to carvers in New York, London, Japan, and China. Carvers 
fashioned handles, dice, dog whistles, and other ornaments. American whalers 
seldom bothered to keep the skins, although Europeans took them for manu-
facture of harnesses and shoe soles.61 Weighing 200 pounds or more, skins sold 
in London for $1–$1.25 per pound for use in metal polishing and other in-
dustrial processes.62 In the peak walrus-hunting years of the 1870s, whalers 
discarded all but a few of the skins. On average they got 20 gallons of oil from 
a walrus, graded equal in quality to elephant seal oil and marginally superior to 
whale oil. A large bull walrus could contain 60 gallons. Between 1869 and 1880 
whalers gathered an estimated two million gallons of walrus oil. They wasted 
many animals; one herd of 1,600 killed on a beach all washed away in a high 
tide.63 Catches and herds atrophied.
table 3.3. Recorded Pacific Walrus Harvests by the Whaling Industry, 1849–1914
Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number
1849 29 1866 273 1883 3,523 1900 24
1850 180 1867 1,144 1884 665 1901 3
1851 107 1868 2,300 1885 851 1902 4
1852 109 1869 5,998 1886 21 1903 5
1853 68 1870 14,443 1887 144 1904 6
1854 110 1871 6,674 1888 281 1905 32
1855 2 1872 5,775 1989 11 1906 0
1856 0 1873 4,515 1890 10 1907 51
1857 174 1874 9,215 1891 11 1908 0
1858 551 1875 13,080 1892 0 1909 50
1859 946 1876 35,663 1893 0 1910 68
1860 108 1877 13,294 1894 9 1911 0
1861 1,395 1878 13,128 1895 0 1912 30
1862 130 1879 6,699 1896 38 1913 20
1863 58 1880 2,676 1897 77 1914 8
1864 602 1881 0 1898 0
1865 239 1882 2,624 1899 0
Source: John R. Bockstoce, “The Harvest of Pacific Walruses by the Pelagic Whaling Industry, 1848 to 1914,” Arctic 
and Alpine Research 14, 3 (1982): 187.
Note: Does not include Native subsistence kill or animals killed and lost.
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Effects on Eskimos
Commercial whaling and walrus hunting greatly affected Eskimo culture, 
mostly in negative ways. It ended the trading system by which Eskimos ob-
tained Russian goods from Siberia and Hudson’s Bay goods from Canada. To 
augment profits or avoid losses, whalers increasingly carried trade goods to the 
Eskimos. Inland Eskimos moved to coastal towns for access to trade items and 
to work as whalers or walrus hunters. By the turn of the 20th Century, several 
shore-based Eskimo crews operated on their own, selling baleen and keeping 
what they needed for food. The collapse of whale populations reduced food 
supplies of those still relying on them. Whalers carried diseases, periodically 
devastating local populations. Influenza and measles killed about 300 people 
at Barrow between 1900 and 1902. Liquor imported by whalers, traders, or 
whaler-traders proved irresistible and socially destructive, as it did among other 
Native Americans. One quart of whiskey could bring $200 worth of furs or 
other products.64
Liquor and disease hurt the Eskimos more than the loss of walruses did. 
In 1873, primarily because of Indian troubles in the West, the U.S. govern-
ment banned the sale of liquor and breech-loading rifles to Native Americans. 
Revenue cutter patrols appeared in the Arctic in 1879, but liquor smuggling 
persisted and the gun ban made it more difficult for the Eskimos to get food 
and clothing. Prostitution and venereal disease escalated. In 1890 an estimated 
half of Barrow’s population had syphilis. Large numbers of Eskimos died of 
introduced diseases, as had other Natives.65
In 1877 the whaling brig William H. Allen stopped at Cape Prince of Wales 
and traded liquor for fox furs. That night the Eskimos got drunk. The next 
day, sixteen men and a woman returned to the ship in an umiak. The men 
came aboard and demanded liquor. Captain George Gilley, seeing that they had 
nothing to trade, refused to give them liquor. Becoming more belligerent, the 
Eskimos began to push the crew around. First Mate Finnegan lost his temper 
and struck back, whereupon one of the Eskimos stabbed him to death. The 
Hawaiian crew then attacked the Eskimos, who retreated under the forecastle. 
They used boat hooks to pull the Eskimos out one by one, clubbed them, and 
threw them over the rail into the umiak or the sea. Only the woman survived. 
The incident soured relations between whalers and Eskimos for years and may 
have induced the murders of several crew members who went ashore.66
Hired Eskimos carried out much of the commercial harvest of walruses on 
which they had traditionally relied for food, boat coverings, dwellings, leather, 
and ivory to carve into spearheads and other implements. Once at least, their 
lack of foresight backfired. According to visiting seafarers, in 1878 St. Lawrence 
Islanders obtained barrels of whiskey from traders. Then came a season of heavy 
ice, making hunting difficult. Some combination of alcoholism, bad weather, 
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absence of whales and walruses, starvation, and disease caused ruin. During 
the winter of 1878–1879 all the people of three villages on St. Lawrence Island 
died, and only one of the island’s eight villages remained viable. People ate skin 
houses, boats, and dog harnesses. By 1881 two-thirds of the island’s popula-
tion of 1,500 had died. As news of the disaster spread, some whaling captains 
brought loads of food to the Eskimos.67
Modern analysis led to the conclusion that in 1878–1879 an El Niño event 
caused warm winds to blow from the south, preventing the normal semi-open 
ice cover on which walruses and seals hauled out. By contrast, a La Niña event 
in 1879–1880 blew so cold from the north that it left few openings in the pack 
ice. In neither year could the St. Lawrence Islanders successfully hunt walruses, 
already depleted by commercial hunting. Of the fewer than 2,300 people, at 
least 90 percent died. The population continued to decline for two decades or 
more despite the immigration of culturally similar Yup’ik from the Chukotka 
Peninsula. Living patterns changed from dispersed groups to concentration in a 
few villages. Hunting methods changed from solitary pursuit to groups in umi-
aks. Ironically, the survivors reaped a valuable harvest of walrus ivory and baleen 
from the schooner Lolita, wrecked on the coast in the fall of 1880.68
Ivan Petroff commented in 1880 that
the trading vessels coming to this [Arctic] region . . . have carried such quan-
tities of alcoholic liquor that the natives have acquired a craving for the same 
Remains of villagers starved at St. Lawrence Island, early 1880s. In Michael A. Healy, 
Report of the Cruise of the Revenue Steamer Corwin in the Arctic Ocean in the Year 
1884, Washington, DC: GPO, 1889, p. 13. A combination of unfavorable weather and 
depletion of sea mammals visited ruin on island residents.
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that no longer can be subdued, and this causes them to look for no other 
equivalent for their furs, oil, and ivory than the means of intoxication. At the 
same time they become utterly reckless in their pursuit of fur-bearing and 
other animals, thinking only of satisfying their desire for the present without 
the slightest thought of the future; and if this state of affairs be continued the 
extermination of the people, consequent upon the exhaustion of their means of 
subsistence, can only be a question of time.69
Captain Michael Healy, commander of the revenue cutter Corwin, stated 
that in 1884 liquor caused the only significant conflicts between whites and 
Eskimos. He described the Eskimo men as “kindly and hospitable” when sober 
but “demoniac” when drunk: “The most brutal fights occur when they are in 
this condition. Their long, sharp hunting-knives make frightful wounds, and 
their rifles are used without stint and often with deadly effect.” Their wives, 
normally well treated, “are frequently brutally beaten when liquor has frenzied 
the men.” When the Corwin crew conducted a liquor seizure, “[T]he women 
recognized us as their friends and used every exertion to assist us in our search.” 
Healy called for stiffer regulation of liquor and for lifting the ban on repeating 
rifles and ammunition so Eskimos could more effectively hunt for food.70 Pa-
trolling by the revenue cutters, however, caused the whaler-traders to take their 
liquor to the Siberian side. Alaskan Eskimos then traded their furs and ivory for 
liquor from the Chukotka Natives, who in turn gave the goods to the whaler-
traders for more alcohol.71
Stories about the walruses surfaced in the mass media. As early as 1869 the 
Alaska Herald of San Francisco lamented, “American whalemen seem to think 
of [walruses] as of no consequence, being only anxious to secure the tusks, 
abandoning the carcass.” The complaint would become familiar a century and 
more later, when Eskimos took the place of whalers. An editorial in the Alaska 
Appeal of San Francisco related in 1879:
Sixteen of the nineteen vessels of the Arctic which have arrived at this port 
during the past month have brought 27,500 pounds of ivory, consisting 
entirely of tusks of the walrus, and 4,000 pounds were lost in the Mercury. 
This is an average of 1,853 pounds to the vessel. . . . Let us be moderate in 
our estimate, and say that 10,000 walruses have been destroyed this season. 
We have characterized this wholesale destruction as wanton; it were, perhaps, 
more fitting to term it criminal. . . . [We are told by] intelligent and truth-
ful masters of whaling vessels, that “for every one hundred walruses taken 
a family is starved.” The season’s slaughter, then[,] represents the sufferings 
and death of thirty-five families, and the word families implies that at least as 
many helpless mothers have striven ineffectually to ward off the death pangs 
of their still more helpless little ones. The total value of the ivory brought to 
San Francisco this season cannot exceed $3,500, for of late years the market 
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has been glutted, and the price at which this article is sold is actually not 
over ten cents per pound.72
People in the villages between Point Hope and Barrow traditionally con-
sumed about 500–600 walruses annually, but by 1890 they seldom got more 
than 10.73 One critic of the slaughter, missionary Sheldon Jackson, Alaska’s 
general agent of education, visited northwest Alaska in 1890. He learned of the 
steep reduction of sea mammals, caribou, and Eskimos over the previous fifteen 
years. He blamed the commercial whalers directly for the losses of whales and 
walruses and attributed the disappearance of caribou to breech-loading rifles 
the Eskimos had recently acquired. At King Island in 1891 he found the in-
habitants in a state of starvation, eating seaweed and, in some cases, their dogs. 
Captain Healy steamed the revenue cutter Bear 200 miles to the nearest trad-
ing post and bought food to tide the islanders over to the next hunting season. 
Jackson organized a reindeer industry (Chapter 14) as an alternative economic 
base for the Eskimos.74
Cash wages stimulated wants and needs, many artificial, from industrial 
society. Visits by whalers, traders, and other Europeans or Euro-Americans re-
inforced values that weakened Eskimo traditional cultures. The shift toward a 
cash economy increased dependency on outside technology and income op-
portunities. Eskimos voluntarily participated in the changes, benefiting in some 
ways and suffering in others.
20th-Century Walrus Hunting
Predation of walruses did not end when the great whaling fleets no longer 
journeyed to the Arctic. During the Gold Rush era, passengers on steamships 
bound to and from the Yukon River shot hundreds of walruses from the rails 
as they passed by. By 1900 the walrus had virtually disappeared south of Nuni-
vak Island. The entire North Pacific herd had been cut down drastically.75 The 
U.S. government halted commercial hunting of the walrus in 1908 after it had 
become less profitable.76
The new law restricted the take of walruses in American waters to Natives 
for food and clothing, to scientific collectors, and to others in emergencies. But 
walrus hunters simply moved outside the three-mile limit and resumed opera-
tions. Charles Madsen, contracted by the Hibbard Stewart Company in 1909, 
gathered 100,000 pounds of walrus hides to be used on polishing wheels and 
for women’s handbags. Hunting in Bering Strait and the Chukchi Sea from 
Nome in the summer, he usually took aboard his schooner Sea-Wolf ten Eski-
mos and their one-man kayaks plus two umiaks. He picked them up at King 
Island, Cape Prince of Wales, and Little Diomede. They sailed north until they 
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spotted walruses on ice floes, launched the skin boats, and quietly approached 
from downwind. First they tried to shoot the lookout animal and, next, as 
many others as quickly as possible before they slid into the sea. They shot some 
in the water and speared them with ivory-tipped harpoons tied to sealskin floats 
to prevent sinking. To be lethal, a bullet had to strike a walrus on the neck ver-
tebrae, in the brain through the eye, or from the side or rear of the head. The 
Eskimo crew undertook the heavy work of skinning the animals, some weigh-
ing 3,000 pounds or more, and feasted on meat, blubber, and clams taken from 
the stomachs. Successful trips could reap 40 to 50 walruses per day, the skins 
weighing 300 to 400 pounds each.77
Crews salted the hides and stowed them in the hold, to be sold at 7.5 cents 
per pound and shipped to Seattle for processing. Each member owned an equal 
share of the ivory, although Madsen received nearly all of it in exchange for 
trade goods. Much of the meat and blubber went back to the hunters’ home 
villages. The crew also shot many hair seals and polar bears. At least five other 
walrus-hunting vessels operated at that time: Captain Louis Lane’s Polar Bear, 
Olaf Swanson’s Nanook, C.T. Pederson’s King and Winge, and the Norwegian 
Kit.78 The Kit, a factory whaler, had arrived in 1912 and returned in 1913 and 
1914. Unable to find whales, it took on Eskimo hunters and pursued walruses 
Polar bear struck by bullet, off Point Barrow, 1920. By J. Hadley. Powell coll. 64-43-201, 
University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Explorers, whalers, sport 
hunters, and others shot polar bears without concern for the survival of the species.
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in the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea. It collected about 2,400 walruses, but the 
owners lost money on the venture and sold the vessel to Russia.79
Like many undertakings in wild corners of the North, walrus hunting of-
fered moments of peril. Chasing a wounded bull in his umiak, Madsen fended 
off repeated attacks by the enraged beast, which nearly succeeded in sinking the 
boat. When an Eskimo arrived to assist, the bull tore his kayak to pieces, and 
the hunter survived by getting behind the bull’s head and hanging on to the 
tusks. A near-drowning followed when the walrus dove, the hunter still cling-
ing to it.80
Madsen guided sport hunters for walrus, as did other captains. F.E. Klein-
schmidt chartered Captain Larsen’s Abler out of Nome for a 1913 trip by four 
wealthy men from the East Coast. They bagged 14 animals but lost at least 
24 more killed or wounded. They noted that the Kit had taken 900 skins that 
year, raising protests.81 Sport hunting, while far more modest in impact than 
commercial ventures, nevertheless aggravated the scarcity of walruses, to the 
detriment of Eskimos.
Eskimos, however, on their own killed large numbers of walruses from the 
American shores. They hunted the animals on the ice, removed the tusks, and 
left nearly all the bodies. Biologist Joseph Bernard traveled 200 miles along 
the coast north of Point Hope in the summer of 1923 and counted the walrus 
Walrus sport hunter and trophy, Chukchi Sea, 1913. In Edward M. Scull, Hunting in the 
Arctic and Alaska, Philadelphia: Winston, 1915, p. 124. Sport hunting added, if modestly, 
to the strain on the walrus population.
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bodies that had drifted ashore. He found more than 1,000, two-thirds of which 
had their tusks cut off. The rest, presumably, had been shot and lost. Walruses 
no longer dared to come ashore where they could more easily be harvested for 
food. Bernard recommended that a 25-mile stretch of shoreline formerly used 
as a walrus haulout be declared a walrus preserve, as had been done by the 
Chukchis on the Siberian side. The preserve did not materialize, but in 1925 
the village council of Gambell on St. Matthew Island imposed restrictions on 
hunting walruses for ivory only.82
During the Great Depression the Bureau of Indian Affairs assisted Eskimos 
in organizing cooperative stores and a handicraft industry, including ivory carv-
ing, as substitutes for the failing reindeer and trapping economies.83 The 1941 
“Walrus Act” limited hunting on the American side to Native Americans. It 
set no numerical limits on kills or on the export of ivory but prohibited killing 
solely for ivory. Carving expanded into an industry in the 1940s and, by the 
early 1950s, the economies of King Island, Gambell, Savoonga, and Little Dio-
mede depended primarily on it. University of Alaska student Jim Brooks, one 
of the first to do research on the walrus, estimated the kill on Little Diomede at 
six to ten times what would be needed for food and skins. Regarding hunting 
methods, he observed that
harvest techniques now employed unquestionably destroy, without recovery, 
more walrus than are secured. The Eskimo hunters, at least the older ones, 
are not ignorant of efficient killing methods, but fail to practice them when 
game appears abundant. . . . In so far as the writer could discern, the people 
of the Bering Strait feel absolutely no remorse over the wholesale loss of 
animals during the hunt; at the onset they stoically expect to lose more than 
they recover.
Wasteful practices included uncoordinated shooting, failure to use harpoons, 
and killing to prevent possible attack by immature walruses.84
Compared with an original population of possibly 200,000, the walrus 
herd in the North Pacific dropped to a conservatively estimated 40,000 by the 
mid-1920s. Russian seal hunters and Eskimos continued to kill them at a high 
rate between 1931 and 1957 but phased out the killing by 1962.85
After mid-century, walruses recovered but ivory hunting increased. In 1956 
Congress amended the law to allow sport hunting, again outlawed by the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. Walrus numbers rose gradually during 
the late territorial period, and surveys done in 1960–1961 placed the total at 
about 85,000. In 1960 Alaska reserved the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctu-
ary in Bristol Bay. At that time Round Island in the Walrus Islands functioned 
as the only remaining regularly used haulout site on the American side.86
The State of Alaska maintained jurisdiction over walruses between 1960 
and 1972, regained it briefly from 1976 to 1979, and then relinquished it. The 
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state encouraged sport hunting before 1972 and stiffened restrictions to dis-
courage ivory hunting. Recorded walrus kills in the postwar and early statehood 
years averaged fewer than 2,000 annually. Subsistence kills totaled nearly 3,000 
in the 1970s. The walrus population swelled to an estimated 140,000–200,000. 
But so did killing for ivory, even in the more conservation-oriented villages of 
Gambell and Savoonga. Eskimos killed for ivory to help pay for new boats, 
television sets, and other modern goods. As snowmobiles replaced dogsleds and 
aluminum skiffs succeeded umiaks, the need for walrus skins declined. Hunt-
ers concentrated on ivory and justified it by citing their right to subsistence. To 
them, the discarding of walrus bodies could not be considered criminal while 
such a high and perhaps excess population of the animals existed.87 Yet the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act prohibited wasteful killing. In a modern form, 
conflict persisted among the ideals of mammal protection, communal subsis-
tence living, and modernizing lifestyles.
At the end of the 20th Century, biologists believed North Pacific walruses 
numbered between 200,000 and 250,000. Eskimos on the American and Rus-
sian sides accounted for nearly all known kills; an insignificant number died 
Eskimo carver, Nome, ca. 1887. Powell coll. 64-43-213, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 
Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. A traditional cultural and commercial activity, ivory 
carving helped sustain the Eskimo economy after World War II.
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in fishery-related entanglements. In the 1990s the annual toll, including a 42 
percent loss rate of those struck by bullets, averaged about 5,000. Neither hunt-
ing nor other known causes of mortality posed a measurable threat to the wal-
rus herd.88 But future commercial exploitation of underwater clams could be a 
problem, and the effects of climatic warming remained to be determined.
SEA LIONS AND HAIR SEALS
Commercial uses for other pinnipeds cut into their numbers during the 
Russian and American periods. Alaska Natives, especially Aleuts, had tradition-
ally pursued Steller sea lions and hair seals for food, oil, and hides to make 
clothing and construct baidarkas for sea mammal hunting. A population of 
about 15,000 sea lions found at the Pribilofs underwent continuous assault 
during the fur-seeking era. Organized hunts at Northeast Point on St. Paul Island 
in the early 1870s proceeded as follows: Aleut hunters selected a moonlit night 
to approach the rookery. They crept onto the beach, frightened the animals 
Walrus herd at Walrus Islands haulout, Bristol Bay, ca. 1957. By William H. Sholes. Alaska 
Game Commission, 19th Annual Report, July 1, 1957 Thru June 30, 1958. The islands 
became one of the first state wildlife sanctuaries in Alaska.
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inland, spent up to three weeks assembling them into a group of several hun-
dred, and drove them to the village ten to twelve miles away. To avoid stress-
ing the animals to the point to death, the final trip lasted a minimum of three 
days. After the slaughter, some of the skins went to the Aleutians for sale at 60 
cents each.89 Pribilof Islanders kept some for making boats. Aleuts used dried 
intestines for waterproof jackets, flipper skins for shoe soles, whiskers for hat 
decoration, and fat for oil lamps and fire fuel.90
By the 1870s white commercial sealers looked for the Steller and California 
sea lions when other, more profitable seal hunting waned. Some obtained oil or 
skins to be turned into glue, but they made the easiest money in the “trimmings” 
trade. Chinese bought the whiskers for toothpicks and opium pipe cleaners, the 
male genitalia as aphrodisiacs, and the gall bladders for medicinal purposes. 
Hunters approached a haulout site by land, shot a few males before the herd 
plunged into the water, cut off what they wanted, and left the carcasses. The 
Steller population fell precipitously in California and did not recover.91
At the high point of exploitation, sea lions grew so scarce in the Aleutians 
that skins had to be imported from Baja California.92 Hunters allegedly killed 
sea lions to reduce the supply available to their competitors.93 Unregulated tak-
ing of the creatures continued into the 20th Century. In 1913 a lack of fur 
seals induced the Aleuts to kill sea lions on St. George Island, mainly to feed 
foxes being raised for fur. The rookery ceased functioning in 1916. At North-
east Point, a breeding colony that numbered 10,000 in 1872 dwindled to 120 
adults in 1914. To preserve the Pribilof population the island manager banned 
harvest of pups and females.94 Tolerance of human activity around rookeries 
varied widely; in some cases the herds survived repeated incursions by hunters. 
Relying on such precedents, Fish and Wildlife Service officials permitted Aleuts 
to take sea lion pups from a revived Northeast Point herd beginning in 1949. A 
decade later the site, the only Steller sea lion rookery in the world accessible to 
observers on foot, lay abandoned.95
Of the four or five known sea lion rookeries in the Pribilofs active in 1867, 
none showed breeding activity in 1960, although sea lions visited all of them as 
haulout sites. Walrus Island, formerly the breeding site of the walrus herd, then 
operated as the only sea lion rookery in the Pribilofs for its partially restored 
population of about 6,000. Researchers could not determine whether harass-
ment by hunters and tourists might have driven the animals from Northeast 
Point to Walrus Island or why the population had not made greater recovery in 
several decades of restricted hunting.96
No longer needed for baidarkas to hunt sea otters and less relied upon for 
food and clothing by Natives, Steller sea lions recovered in the 20th Century. 
They became best noted for raiding salmon nets. Fishermen shot many of them, 
and predator control agents (Chapter 13) killed some in the vicinity of fishing 
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operations. Fisheries officials investigated possible uses of the animals to take 
pressure off fish stocks. They found that leather manufacturers did not want the 
skins because of numerous cuts and scars. The meat, though palatable, would 
serve only a specialty market. Fox farmers rated it highly as feed, but the fox 
business evaporated in the 1950s. Pet and fish food would require removal of 
most of the fat. Processing, preservation, and transportation from distant sites 
might impose prohibitive costs.97 A revived fur market prompted the killing of 
65,000 pups at rookeries between 1959 and 1972. Then the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act restricted sea lion killing to Native Americans for subsistence 
purposes and to fishing operations on a limited permit basis. Management 
passed from state to federal control.98
In the 1970s, populations of sea lions, hair seals, and fur seals started a 
downhill slide. By the mid-1980s they had shrunk by about half, and the trend 
continued. An ongoing debate and research program suggested that reduced food 
supply, possibly caused by commercial fishing or changes in ocean temperature, 
Sea lion breeding male, Northeast Point, St. Paul Island. By Victor B. Scheffer. FWS 428, 
Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. Heavily hunted for meat and skins, sea 
lions abandoned Northeast Point as a breeding colony site.
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accounted for most of the losses. In 1990 the National Marine Fisheries Service 
declared the Steller sea lion a threatened species under the Endangered Species 
Act.99 By the end of the century the western population (Aleutians to central 
Gulf of Alaska) numbered a minimum of 39,000, compared with 140,000 in 
the late 1950s. Now listed as endangered, it continued to decline at more than 
4 percent annually despite measures to restrict fisheries in its feeding zones. The 
Southeast Alaska population, by contrast, rose by an annual 6 percent through 
the 1980s to a total of more than 15,000.100
Hunters commercially exploited the smaller but widespread harbor seals 
beginning in 1889 and took large numbers for bounty payments between 1927 
and 1967.101 Alaska Natives traditionally hunted them for subsistence purposes, 
employing a variety of capture methods. Hunters might sit on the rocks at 
haulout sites and attract seals by calls and sealskin decoys. When the seals ap-
proached, the hunters clubbed or speared them or frightened them into a net 
stretched offshore. Hunters paddled up to seals sleeping in seaweed, attached 
hooks tied to sealskin floats, and killed the seals when they tired. Chugach Es-
kimos stood in the water near haulout sites on stormy nights and speared seals 
by means of harpoons on long poles. In winter they loaded stones into a skin 
boat to lower it to the water line and positioned a large piece of ice on the bow. 
Approaching the quarry, a hunter speared it through a hole cut in the ice. Pull-
ing the dead seal aboard, the hunters threw out an equivalent weight of stones. 
They repeated the process until they acquired a maximum load of ten or twelve 
seals.102
Tlingits approached swimming seals by canoe or lay waiting in their boats 
among the ice floes until seals surfaced nearby. They shot or speared the animals 
and, if the spear had no float attached, they hurried to recover the quarry be-
fore it sank. At rookeries they killed pups by clubbing them. Women in camp 
removed the skin, separated the blubber, and heated it in a pot to render it 
into seal oil. They dried the skin and soft parts, the latter to be eaten. They 
sewed skins into footwear, some to be sold as tourist items. Seal oil would be 
consumed as food or sold for local consumption. A two dollar bounty in 1931, 
increased to three dollars in 1939, induced some hunters to kill seals for the 
bounties and discard the bodies. Tlingits used an undetermined percentage of 
the seals for meat, oil, and handicrafts.
Between 1931 and 1945, hunters, about 85 percent Alaska Natives, col-
lected bounties on approximately 890 seals per year. From 1963 to 1965 a shift 
in the European fashion industry drove up the price of sealskins, resulting in 
large-scale killing. A downturn in the fur market and termination of the bounty 
in 1967 took the pressure off the harbor seals.103
A predator control program (Chapter 13) to protect commercial fisheries 
accounted for about 38,000 harbor seals in the 1950s. From 1927 to 1957 
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the territory and state paid bounties on more than 358,000 hair seals of all 
species.104 The decrease of hair seals may at times have inconvenienced coastal 
Natives, although no species approached extinction. The 1972 Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act ended all commercial killing but, soon thereafter, harbor 
seals accompanied the sea lions and fur seals in a steep downward trend.105 In 
the late 1990s Alaska harbor seal estimates stood at (1) Bering Sea and Aleu-
tians: a minimum of 13,000, possibly stabilized and increasing; (2) Prince Wil-
liam Sound to Unimak Pass: 29,000 and possibly increasing; and (3) Southeast 
Alaska: 35,000 and increasing. In general the trend appeared to slow or reverse 
the declines of the 1970s and 1980s. Direct contact with fisheries accounted 
for little of the mortality, but possible effects of food supply removal by fisheries 
remained unknown. Subsistence harvest by Natives approximated 2,700 seals 
annually, about two-thirds in Southeast Alaska.106 As for sea lions, fur seals, 
and sea otters, the central causes of population loss likely included killer whale 
predation, commercial fishing, and climatic change.107
PROSPECTS FOR WHALES AND PINNIPEDS
North Pacific whales, walruses, sea lions, and some hair seals experienced 
their most intensive exploitation in the near-absence of public commitment 
to conservation values. Utilitarian regulatory steps to sustain species generally 
waited until short-term economic advantage no longer existed, especially under 
American rule. Even the apparent danger to Eskimo populations proved insuf-
ficient to curb the commercial slaughter. Government and corporate account-
ability extended only to the point of avoiding species extinction—even if, as 
for the right whale, the efforts might well be too feeble and too late. Almost no 
public participation evidenced itself, and the scant scientific data available had 
minimal impact on policy.
Apathy toward most sea mammals in the century before Alaskan statehood 
stood in sharp contrast to the attitudes of the last three decades of the 20th 
Century. The lack of concern stemmed from a series of particular conditions. 
Killing took place thousands of miles away, often in international waters, out of 
sight of video cameras. Insufficient scientific knowledge of far-ranging oceans 
made them an alien and mysterious world in the eyes of the public. Virtually 
no one perceived the ocean as a functioning ecosystem. Almost no one could 
know the whale as a gentle, intelligent creature. Whale products, primarily oil, 
eased the lives of vast numbers of people, and the whaling industry enjoyed a 
venerable reputation. The walrus, to the extent that people held any image of 
it, seemed ugly and perhaps fearsome. Large numbers of sea lions died to sup-
ply boats for industrial-scale sea otter hunting, to which few objected. Euro-
Americans placed a high value on salmon fishing and readily endorsed the 
Wake of the Whalers
90
slaughter of seals and sea lions as nuisances. Technology of the period lacked the 
capacity to accurately count sea mammal populations and permit timely warn-
ing of their endangerment. The wide variety of whales and pinnipeds deterred 
focus on a single species such as the fur seal or sea otter. And no dominant figure 
like Henry W. Elliott pled the animals’ cause. Salvation for the sea creatures 
awaited changes in economics and communications technology.
All Alaskan sea mammal species survived to statehood, albeit some by a 
small margin. Beyond statehood they encountered a different set of conditions: 
waning of markets for their body parts (walrus ivory a glaring exception), ris-
ing public interest and concern for their preservation, and degradation of their 
physical environment by commercial fishing, various disturbances, and pollu-
tion. Inexorably they moved into the realm of environmental politics.
As the food demands of an ever-multiplying human population exhausted 
fishing grounds elsewhere, attention turned to the North Pacific. Directly and 
indirectly, whales and pinnipeds now had to compete against modern fishing 
machinery for their space and sustenance. Global climate change introduced 
worrisome uncertainties. Ecosystem sustainability for either consumptive or 
nonconsumptive purposes called for advanced ecological understanding and 
international cooperation in research and management. Survival of the sea 
mammals would tax the knowledge and wisdom of humans into the foreseeable 
future.
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John Muir and the Land
“in God’S WiLdneSS LieS the hoPe oF the WorLd—the Great FreSh unbLiGht-
ed, unredeemed wilderness. The galling harness of civilization drops off, and 
the wounds heal ere we are aware.”1 So wrote John Muir, paraphrasing his in-
tellectual forebear Thoreau, in his journal during a climbing trip around the 
glacier later to bear his name. Muir (1838–1914), a founder of the wilderness 
preservation movement, may have had the most important indirect infl uence 
on Alaska of all its conservation activists. His ideas ultimately bore fruit in pro-
tective land designations in Alaska and elsewhere. Yet like many others of his 
time and afterward, he perceived the territory as so large and isolated that its 
wilderness character could not be threatened.
Muir learned a love of Nature as a small boy in Scotland where his grand-
father took him for walks. He and his brother David liked to roam the country-
side and see how many bird nests they could fi nd. They thrilled when the family 
emigrated to the United States in 1849 and settled in the “glorious Wisconsin 
wilderness.” Muir pursued his interest in Nature in the rare intervals between 
the chores of a harsh pioneer life on the frontier. As an older child he had to 
4
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do a man’s share of the farmwork, and he once hand-dug a well 90 feet down 
through sandstone using hammer and chisel, working for months from dawn to 
dark. On one occasion he barely escaped death by carbonic acid gas poisoning 
at the bottom of the shaft.
Muir attended the University of Wisconsin between 1861 and 1863, tak-
ing courses that interested him, but he had no desire to complete a degree. A 
pacifist, he went to Canada to avoid the likelihood of being drafted. He trav-
eled, studied plants, and worked in a sawmill until the Civil War ended. His 
mechanical genius landed him a job as a mechanic in Indianapolis. A shop 
accident temporarily blinded him in his late twenties, redoubled his apprecia-
tion of Nature, and caused him to rethink his priorities. Setting off on a “Thou-
sand Mile Walk” in 1867, he visited Florida and then took a boat from New 
York to California, arriving in 1868. There he explored and observed the Sierra 
Nevadas intensely and guided people on wilderness trips. An extraordinarily 
eloquent and insightful man, Muir deeply impressed others with his discourses 
about Nature. Friends urged him to publish his views, and he did so begin-
ning in 1871. He wrote of the beauty of Nature and the need for conserving it 
through better management and the creation of parks. In 1876 he began a long 
career in public speaking on Nature and conservation.2
Travels through time and space took Muir on a parallel philosophical jour-
ney. Observations of Nature during his youth caused him to reject his father’s 
fundamentalist view of Nature as an alien, if not evil, force to be conquered. 
Reading Emerson and other transcendentalist thinkers while at the University 
of Wisconsin, he moved toward the conception of Nature as God’s work cre-
ated for the benefit of humans. Further reflection, deepened by his experiences 
in the Canadian woods, the Thousand Mile Walk, and trips into the Sierras, 
convinced him of the divinity and interrelatedness of all existence. He now saw 
God as the substance and process of Nature, and humans as an integral part not 
possessing the right to dominate or destroy the other parts. Humans had the re-
sponsibility and the privilege of living in the universe as citizens, respecting and 
appreciating other living and nonliving elements. Muir held this biocentric, es-
sentially ecological understanding of life decades before its time as a contending 
view, although he did not attempt to explicitly develop it in his writings. In the 
words of environmental historian Max Oelschlaeger,
Muir recognized that whatever humankind might be, one’s essential human 
beingness could be known only in relation to the nonhuman other. Thus 
Muir’s mature idea of wilderness eradicated the boundaries between wilder-
ness and civilization. The flowing whole of nature was the ultimate reality, 
the process in which life and death (and all other human conceptualizations) 
were merely part of everything else.3
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MUIR IN ALASKA
As a lover of mountains and glaciers Muir took an interest in Alaska, mak-
ing seven trips between 1879 and 1899.4 They started when Alaska missionary 
Sheldon Jackson met Muir at a Presbyterian Church convention at Yosemite in 
the summer of 1879 and alerted him to the departure of a mail steamer in ten 
days. Muir boarded the ship and went to Alaska.5 In unbounded enthusiasm 
he set out, usually alone, on mountain- and glacier-climbing trips. Carrying 
little food or equipment, he often hiked and camped overnight in rain or snow-
storms. He and his 1879–1880 traveling companion, Reverend S. Hall Young, 
a Presbyterian missionary at Wrangell, became the first non-Natives to fully 
explore and map Glacier Bay, featuring the great glacier later named for Muir. 
Twice they journeyed 700 miles from Wrangell to the bay and back by dug-
out canoe, guided by Tlingit Indians. In a daring rescue following a near-fatal 
mountain-climbing accident, Muir used his necktie, which he always wore in 
the wild, to bind Young and pull him from the edge of an abyss.6 Young’s dog 
Stickeen accompanied Muir on an exploring trip that climaxed in a death-defying 
crossing of a narrow 70-foot ice bridge on Brady Glacier. The plucky little mutt 
so impressed Muir that he won abiding fame as the hero of Stickeen, the best 
selling of Muir’s several books on Alaska. A tourist stole Stickeen in 1883 and 
bore him away on a steamer.7
Muir’s purpose in visiting Alaska involved more nature appreciation than 
science, although he promulgated theories of glacial movement and carefully 
recorded a wide variety of natural phenomena. Science, he thought, achieved its 
highest value by aiding spiritual understanding of Nature. Compared to Cali-
fornia, Alaska offered a more perfect place to experience the harmony of Nature 
because of its unspoiled wild character. Glaciers in particular, in their advances 
and retreats, displayed what Muir interpreted as Nature’s harmonic cycles.8
Belief in the spiritual healing power of Nature, and the desire to protect 
Nature, moved Muir to write. He made vigorous efforts to impress his read-
ing public, believing that, once directly acquainted with natural beauty, people 
would be motivated to respect and preserve it. Following his 1879 trip through 
the Inside Passage he wrote, “Never before this had I been embosomed in scen-
ery so hopelessly beyond description. . . . [T]he whole is so tender, so fine, so 
ethereal, any penwork seems coarse and unavailing.”9 By 1897 he had risen to 
the challenge: “To the lover of wilderness Alaska offers a glorious field for either 
work or rest: landscape beauty in a thousand forms, things great and small, 
novel and familiar, as wild and pure as paradise.” This he followed by a 192-
word sentence extolling the scenic grandeur of Southeast Alaska.10
Sheldon Jackson and John Muir produced the first literature designed to 
publicize and attract people to Alaska—Muir highlighting natural beauty and 
Jackson the educational and spiritual needs of the Natives. In an 1880 letter to 
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the San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin Muir asserted, “Alaska is full of food 
for man and beast, body and soul, though few are seeking it as yet. Were one-
tenth of the attractions this country has to offer known to the world, thousands 
would come every year, and not a few of them would stay and make homes.”11 
His descriptions of Glacier Bay persuaded the Pacific Coast Steamship Com-
pany to offer large-scale tourist visits to the Southeast, carrying 5,000 passen-
gers annually by 1890. Publicity also attracted hunters and mountain climbers 
to Southeast Alaska, helped to counter impressions of the territory as a land 
of ice and cold, and tied it more closely to the rest of the nation.12 Historian 
Frank Buske said of Muir, “His magazine articles confirmed his reputation as 
an Alaskan expert, and conservation efforts with regard to Alaska at the turn of 
the century had his support. Alaska’s reputation as a treasure house of natural 
beauty and resources began with his reports.”13
John Muir’s Alaska writing may also be seen as part of the process of ex-
tending the American frontier. In this context, after Americans conquered and 
acquired land from the Atlantic to the Pacific, some looked northward to con-
tinue the pursuit of their perceived Manifest Destiny. Muir’s “discovery” and 
descriptions of natural wonders and Native culture constituted a form of appro-
priation that helped fulfill the desire for American expansion.14 He showed little 
recognition of this aspect of his work and criticized various impacts of Western 
civilization on Alaska Natives.
Muir’s aesthetic appreciation of the northern land did not necessarily ex-
tend to its urban vistas, exponents of the destructive intrusion of civilization. 
Of Wrangell he wrote,
It was a lawless draggle of wooden huts and houses, built in crooked lines, 
wrangling about the boggy shore of the island for a mile or so without the 
slightest subordination to the points of the compass or to building laws of 
any kind. . . . The ground in general was an oozy, messy bog on a foundation 
of jagged rocks, full of concealed potholes. . . . The domestic animals were 
represented by chickens, a lonely cow, a few sheep, and hogs of a breed well 
calculated to deepen and complicate the mud of the streets.15
Muir strongly disapproved of sport hunting and any other unnecessary 
form of killing. While visiting prospectors during the 1879 canoe trip Young 
complained of the lack of meat. Asked by a prospector why they had failed to 
bag lots of ducks, chief Toyatte replied, “Because the duck’s friend won’t let 
us . . . when we want to shoot, Mr. Muir always shakes the canoe.”16 In 1881 
Muir traveled through the Bering Sea and into the Arctic Ocean on the revenue 
cutter Corwin, sent to search for the survivors of the cutter Jeanette, lost in the 
Arctic ice. He did not like all that he saw. Having watched the Corwin crew 
shoot three swimming polar bears from the deck as the ship chased them, he 
expressed disgust:
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They had no chance whatever for their lives, and the whole affair was as 
safe and easy a butchery as shooting cows from the roof of a barn. . . . The 
Eskimos hunt and kill them for food, going out to meet them on the ice 
with spears and dogs. This is merely one savage living on another. But how 
civilized people, seeking for heavens and angels and millenniums [sic], and 
the reign of universal love, can enjoy this red, brutal amusement, is not so 
easily accounted for. Such soft, fuzzy, sentimental aspirations, and the frame 
of mind that can reap giggling, jolly pleasure from the blood and agony and 
death of these fine animals, with their humanlike groans, are too devilish for 
anything but hell. Of all the animals man is at once the worst and the best.17
Although he occasionally ate meat, Muir opined that, ideally, “people 
should learn to put their fellow mortals in their hearts instead of . . . their din-
ners.” He valued all creatures including snakes, lizards, spiders, and even flies. 
He rejected popular notions, overwhelmingly accepted in his time, that animals 
could be classified as good or bad, moral or immoral.18
Muir believed that wild animals, unlike tame ones, could teach humans 
valuable lessons about life. While trying to avoid anthropomorphizing the 
creatures and losing the respect of scientists, he saw in wild animals qualities of 
beauty, grace, and self-reliance from which humans could benefit if they were 
to appreciate and understand Nature. He contrasted the intelligent, clean, and 
vigorous mountain sheep to the stupid, dirty, defenseless beast of domestic 
flocks. He chose not to dwell on the violence inherent in predator-prey rela-
tionships and possessed a limited understanding of the connection between 
population and food supply. In essence he held an animistic philosophy, even 
though he used the term God to describe a causal force behind the evolution-
ary process.19
He rejected the mechanistic Darwinian focus on survival as the most sig-
nificant aspect of Nature but accepted the concept of evolutionary change and 
viewed Nature as flowing like a river. He abhorred the notion of Nature as a 
bank of resources to be conquered, improved upon, and consumed for human 
benefit. To him the process of manipulating Nature degraded it and humans 
as well. Wilderness held a store of superior knowledge and wisdom developed 
through evolution, and its destruction removed the possibility of higher devel-
opment in humans. As Muir scholar Michael P. Cohen summarized it, “Muir 
wanted civilized Man to improve his spiritual condition by immersing himself 
in the flow, not transcending it.”20
While climbing Muir Glacier the philosopher mused:
The wilderness, I believe, is dear to every man though some are afraid of it. 
People load themselves with unnecessary fears, as if there were nothing in 
the world but snakes and bears who, like the Devil, are going restlessly about 
seeking whom they may devour. The few creatures there are really mind their 
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own business, and rather shun humans as their greatest enemies. But men 
are like children afraid of their mother. Like the man who, going out on a 
misty morning, saw a monster who proved to be his own brother.
A reflection later that day: “There is love of wild nature in everybody, an ancient 
mother-love ever showing itself whether recognized or no, and however covered 
by cares and duties.”21
Like nearly all Americans of his time, Muir did not ponder whether Na-
tives, as distinct from the United States, might rightfully own Alaska. Yet as he 
did for trees and wild animals, Muir felt sympathy toward and spiritual unity 
with Alaska Natives. He questioned the taking of totem poles for museums. 
The degrading effects of Euro-American culture on wildlife and the Natives 
reinforced his view of civilization as an aggressive and pernicious force. He 
witnessed liquor dismantling the culture and vitality of Native life.22 In 1879 
Muir attended a Tlingit dance depicting deer, porpoise, and bear. He admired 
the performance but noted the speech given by a dancer: “Dear Brothers and 
Sisters, this is the way we used to dance. We liked it long ago when we were 
blind, we always danced this way, but now we are not blind. The Good Lord has 
taken pity on us and sent his son, Jesus Christ, to tell us what to do. We have 
danced today only to show you how blind we were to dance in this foolish way. 
We will not dance any more.”23
Principled missionaries (“common-sense Christian teachers”) merited 
Muir’s favor, and he felt such a relationship with the Tlingits. He found the 
Tlingits more virtuous than Christians in atonement for their sins and admired 
the depth of their spiritual thinking. His friend Kadachan exemplified what 
Muir believed to be their ecological perspective. According to scholar Richard 
Fleck, the Tlingits “taught Muir that happiness in one’s original environment 
is a true key to wisdom. To be happy in a place is to be at one with it.” Muir 
admired the simplicity and joie de vivre of the Eskimos, whom he regarded as 
brave and capable. He saw the coming of the white man as a disruption of the 
Natives’ harmonious adjustment to Nature.24
Muir made little effort to publicize the lessons Native life might have to of-
fer Euro-American culture, reserving that honor for nonhuman creatures or for 
Nature as a whole. In his posthumously published Travels in Alaska Muir stated 
of the Tlingits: “[I]n all my travels I never saw a child, old or young, receive a 
blow or even a harsh word,” and “the young are fondly indulged without being 
spoiled.” Crying is rarely heard.”25 But his writings showed no awareness of the 
legacy of Native warfare and slavery or the brutality and degradation women 
commonly experienced in traditional cultures of Alaska.
The repeating rifle, Muir judged, encouraged the Natives to waste game. 
Hall Young told of seeing Muir “furiously angry for the first and last time in 
my acquaintance with him.” Noticing mountain goats on the hills above yet-
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to-be-named Muir Glacier, Young asked their Tlingit companion to “go up and 
get us a kid.” At length the young man returned carrying a goat, explaining, 
“I picked the fattest and most tender of those that I killed.” Astonished, Hall 
queried, “What! You killed more than one?” The Indian raised fingers to count 
to eleven. At that, “Muir’s face flushed red, and with an exclamation that was 
as near to an oath as he ever came, he started for Joe. Luckily for that Indian he 
saw Muir and fled like a deer up the rocks, and would not come down until he 
was assured that he would not be hurt.”26
While Muir lamented the corrupting influences of Euro-American culture 
on the Natives, he lacked a full understanding of the latter in their relationship 
to Nature. He interpreted Tlingit fears and superstitions as evidence of separa-
tion, whereas the Tlingits viewed themselves as integrally related to Nature. 
Muir’s preservationist conception did not include Native subsistence living as 
part of an ecosystem. National Park Service philosophy tended to incorporate 
Muir’s concept, encountering little difficulty in the states where, in nearly all 
cases, Native Americans had been removed from lands that became parks.27 But 
in Alaska, notably in Glacier Bay, the continuing use of wildlands by Natives 
generated conflict that went on through the 20th Century. It centered on ques-
tions of “subsistence” rights: Who should be permitted to use natural resources, 
for what purposes, and by what means of harvest? Should hunting for sport or 
commercial profit, or by modern technology, be classified as subsistence? At 
what point should modernization of lifestyle render a person or a group ineli-
gible for subsistence privileges? Should any lands be closed to harvest? These 
and related issues bore implications for the management of public wildlands 
and for the philosophies of those supporting environmental protection.
THE GOLD RUSH ERA
John Muir played a minor part in the Gold Rush. Crossing into Canada 
through the Stikine River Valley in 1879, he made the acquaintance of min-
ers. In a January 1880 letter in the San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin he 
wrote from Sitka, he speculated that most of Alaska contained gold, that the 
mountains geologically resembled California. Although he expressed doubt that 
Alaska goldfields would be as rich as those in the States, his mention of seeing 
nuggets up to 40 ounces may well have fired the imaginations of would-be 
prospectors.28
Muir chanced to be traveling in Alaska in the summer of 1897 and en-
countered the driven hordes bound for the Klondike. A newspaper asked him 
to accompany the gold seekers as commentator. “Do they think I’m daft?” he 
exclaimed. “When I go into that wild it will not be in a crowd like this or on such 
a sordid mission.” During a brief stay at Skagway and Dyea he wrote articles 
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describing the Chilkoot, White, Chilkat, Taku, and Stikine passes over which 
the gold seekers traveled into Canada on their way to the Bonanza Creek re-
gion. Of the quest for Klondike gold he commented, “The way to Heaven is less 
anxiously looked for.” He adopted a tolerant stand toward gold seeking, con-
sidering it preferable to “the mildewed inaction of crowds of purposeless people 
in big towns.” Few would become wealthy, he thought, but each would gain 
“knowledge better than gold” and attract to Alaska others who would increase 
their appreciation of Nature. Minimal injury could be done to the land because 
the cold climate would discourage development. He predicted that abundance 
of wildlife would allow the Klondikers to exist for years “living off the country 
as free as a bird.”29 As for himself, Muir asserted, “I never wasted a minute hunt-
ing goldmines, knowing that gold dust in one’s eyes prevents one from seeing 
all else. Gold digging is only a dull chore, and no sane man will allow it to blind 
him and draw him away from the real blessings of existence.”30
The Alaska-Yukon Gold Rush of the late 1890s and early 1900s highly 
stimulated public interest in Alaska. World attention focused on the Klondike 
in Canada’s Yukon, although much of the Klondike activity and several other 
gold strikes took place in Alaska. To the public the Gold Rush signified adven-
ture, trial, freedom, and the vision of instant wealth. Written accounts and tales 
told by participants, and the fiction of such writers as Jack London, Robert 
Service, and Rex Beach, elevated the Gold Rush to permanent mythical status. 
Nature prepared a harsh setting where wits and physical and moral capacities 
could be tested, fortunes made and lost, legends born. It invited both reader 
and adventurer to extend the vanishing frontier.31
A less noble reality greeted the vast majority of gold seekers. By the time 
they reached the goldfields nearly all the desirable sites had been claimed. Most 
men found it necessary to work for claim owners, an arrangement similar to the 
industrial system they hoped to escape. As historian Kathryn Morse observed, 
“[W]hatever gold mining was supposed to be, it quickly turned into a familiar 
round of hirings and firings and bosses, and always too many men for too few 
jobs.” She assessed gold mining as “one of the most unproductive, unpredict-
able, and generally unpleasant occupations anyone could have chosen.”32
Misery and danger supplemented drudgery in the pursuit of gold. Miners 
picked their way through the bodies of scores of horses and mules on White 
Pass, and more than 50 miners died in an 1898 avalanche on Chilcoot. Sur-
vivors again risked their lives in the river rapids descending to the Klondike. 
Many died of starvation and disease attempting to reach the goldfields through 
the Copper River Valley. Others braved the North Pacific in aged boats to as-
cend the Yukon. All but a few arrived too late to realize significant gains.33
Miners indeed rarely suffered from “mildewed inaction.” In the early days 
they traveled primarily on foot in the summer and by snowshoe in winter, 
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carrying their supplies by backpack. Sourdough and later U.S. marshal Lynn 
Smith told of an 1899 incident wherein his boat became frozen in the Yukon 
ice below Woodchopper Creek. Hearing of a gold strike fifteen miles inland, he 
set out carrying two days’ food but forgot to take extra matches. After walking 
all day he met his own snowshoe tracks and realized he had lost his way. En-
countering a moose, he shot it and used his last match to start a fire. He cooked 
and ate some of the moose but could not keep the fire going because he had 
misplaced his hatchet. As a last resort he cleaned out the moose and crawled 
inside it to sleep. He awoke the next day to find the moose frozen and himself 
entombed. After two more days he heard a pack of wolves. They approached 
and tore at the moose. As Smith lay still he could see a black wolf chewing a 
hole six inches away from him. Eventually the wolves opened up the moose 
enough for Lynn to force his way out. Perhaps fearing attack, he killed the black 
wolf and wounded at least four others. The weather had cleared up, and Smith 
made his way back to the Yukon River.34
Muir, who disdained pretentiousness, would probably have approved of the 
1896–1897 social arrangements at Circle City detailed by Arthur Walden, who 
Placer miners on American Creek. Core coll. PCA 01-4508, Alaska State Library. Left to 
right: Charlie Gay, Libby, Allen, Civil War veteran “Dod” Gardner, Jack Coulter. Pole of 
telegraph line visible at left ran from Eagle (twelve miles away) to Valdez. The Gold Rush 
era brought a flood of adventurers, and even small-scale mining operations could create long-
term environmental impacts.
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freighted supplies between mining towns by dogsled: “Here was a town made 
up of men from all parts of the world, intelligent men all. I knew an Oxford 
man, a younger son, married to a squaw who had blondined her hair: he could 
quote Greek poetry by the hour when he was liquored up. Another man, raised 
in the wilds of the Rocky Mountains, never drank and didn’t have a squaw, and 
taught himself to read and write.” In Circle City, Walden recalled, “if you look 
for a fool you find only one.”35 The town of 300–400
had no taxes, courthouse or jail; no post-office, church, schools, hotel or dog 
pound; no rules, regulations or written law; no sheriff, dentist, doctor, lawyer 
or priest. Here there was no murder, stealing or dishonesty, and right was 
right and wrong was wrong as each individual understood it. . . . No firearms 
were carried for protection; no prayers were said for the dead; but money 
was raised for the widow. The Indians were treated fairly and squarely and 
were honest, as no liquor was sold to them. A man could be as wet or dry as 
he liked, and there were as many dries as in any community. Every man had 
a right to his own opinions, and was not taunted for them if he did not try 
to force them on others. There were no hypocrites in Circle City, and there 
was no need for them. . . . No man was a hero, no matter what he did, and 
no man was a saint, no matter how good he was.36
Stores took payments in gold dust, and one customarily turned one’s back 
while the clerk weighed the poke. Before 1898, Miners’ Meetings dispensed jus-
tice, operating by consensus. Then, “after the gold rush of ’98 conditions here 
and elsewhere on the Yukon changed. Civilization, with religion, laws, disorder, 
stealing, education, murder, social life, commercial vice, comforts, and broken 
pledges, crept in; justice cost money and disease raged.”37
U.S. Geological Survey officer Josiah Edward Spurr recounted a Circle City 
dance held in the late 1890s: “The couples gyrated in eccentric curves around 
in obedience to the cries; the candles flickered in the draft from the open door; 
and a row of miners too bashful to dance, or who could find no partners, sat 
on boxes next to the wall, hunched up their legs and spit tobacco juice until 
the middle of the floor was a sort of island. In short it was the most brilliant 
affair Circle City ever witnessed.”38 The town emptied almost overnight when 
it heard news of the Klondike gold strike. Local traders sold the mining supplies 
upriver for higher profits, so Circle City miners resorted to hijacking steam-
boats and seizing supplies, although making full payment.39
Indians, who sold moose, caribou, and salmon to the gold seekers, paid a 
fearful price. Introduced diseases including measles, smallpox, diphtheria, in-
fluenza, and typhoid fever cut deeply into their numbers. Disease often weak-
ened them to the point where they could not carry out food gathering, causing 
starvation. Traders sometimes shifted their business to higher-paying miners, 
leaving Indians without supplies of blankets and ammunition. Market hunting 
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undermined traditional communal patterns of gathering and contributed to 
shortages of moose and caribou on which the Indians depended for food.40
Gold seekers exerted a greater impact on the land than Muir anticipated. 
In the early years, prospectors dug up streambed gravel in the summer and 
channeled water into rockers or sluices to settle out the placer gold. By the mid-
1890s they worked through the winter, burning piles of wood to thaw holes 
down to bedrock and then digging laterally, a process called drift mining. When 
individual gold seekers exhausted the readily accessible placer deposits in the 
first decades of the 20th Century, companies brought in heavy machinery to dig 
deeper. They burned wood to heat boilers and piped the steam into the ground 
to melt the permafrost, enabling them to continue deep subsurface work all 
summer. As mining advanced in scale and industrial organization, some min-
ing operations applied hydraulic hoses and dredges.41 When the government 
raised the price of an ounce of gold from $20.67 to $35 in 1933, Alaskan gold 
production rose from 469,286 ounces in 1933 to 749,933 ounces in 1940, 
escalating the environmental impact.42
Hydraulic miners wielded high-pressure hoses to remove soil covering gold-
bearing deposits. The hoses washed away the organic material, silt, and fine 
gravel, called the overburden, and flushed it into nearby streams and rivers. 
Material below the water table could be forced out through an inclined pipe 
and elevated aggregations torn down. Some gold deposits existed in benches 
well above the valley floor. At Cripple Creek in the Fairbanks region in 1939, 
strippers removed hills as high as 140 feet and muck as deep as 140 feet below 
ground level. Following the hydraulic hoses, a giant dragline dug out nearly 
12,000 cubic yards of gravel daily. Stripping commonly prepared the way for 
dredging operations. Dredging worked best in relatively level areas such as the 
Yukon and Tanana valleys and the Nome beaches, where gold had settled in 
large-scale gravel sediments.43
After hydraulic hoses tore down the riverbanks and hillsides, gold dredges 
sifted through the material and converted the valleys into piles of discarded 
gravel. At Chatanika north of Fairbanks in the mid-1930s the Fairbanks Explo-
ration Company, biggest of its kind in the region, ran a hydraulic gold mining 
operation. Pipes forced water into the frozen ground to thaw it, and giant hoses 
blasted away the top layers of soil. Then
the big dredges follow up and dig out the gold-bearing gravel clear down 
to bed rock, which is anywhere from twenty to seventy-five feet below the 
washed surface. . . . They follow the sluicing operation around the val-
ley—up one side and down the other, digging up the whole valley floor in 
the process. . . . [T]hey are made like barges and float on a pond dug by 
themselves as they go. . . . A big endless chain of digging buckets projects 
from the front. By cables fastened to each side of the pond and running over 
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Hydraulic mining operation on Dan Creek, a tributary of Nizina and Chitina rivers in the 
Wrangells. Alaska files 8268, University of Washington Archives. Hydraulic mining esca-
lated the impact on the land.
winches in the dredge, it is constantly kept swinging from side to side along 
a two-hundred-foot front. . . . This digging outfit is a regular four-story fac-
tory with engine room and control room, operated on electricity from the 
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$5,000,000 power station in Fairbanks. . . . The dredge was never stopped, 
night or day, except for repairs.44
Historian Clark Spence characterized the gold dredge as “a marvelous inven-
tion, able to do the work of an army of men and to make a profit where none 
existed before,” yet “the seemingly insatiable leviathans wreaked havoc with the 
environment as few other types of mining have done, leaving behind a wake of 
desolation and ruin.” The Fairbanks Exploration Company furthered natural 
science in at least one way, donating to the University of Alaska the remains of 
mammoths and other prehistoric creatures found in the muck.45
Extensive removal of trees and topsoil disrupted the ecology of stream val-
leys, normally among the most biologically productive interior zones. Studies 
eventually showed that soil loss changed vegetation and that silt from mining 
could diminish populations of grayling and other fish. Loss of root structures 
and topsoil, and destruction of mossy wetlands—the latter done in part to dis-
courage mosquitoes—contributed to flooding and loss of evened water flow 
needed for mining operations.46 By damaging the environment, miners hurt 
their own immediate interests as well as those of the Indians and wildlife.
Fairbanks Exploration Co. dredge on Cripple Creek, twelve miles from Fairbanks. Alaska 
files 8272, University of Washington Archives. Such large-scale operations could permanently 
alter an entire valley.
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Hard-rock mining for gold seemed even less romantic than hydraulic min-
ing. A visitor to Juneau in the 1890s wrote, “Within two miles of Juneau are 
the famous Treadwell Mines, the largest in the world. Columns of dense smoke 
could be seen arising from these great works, surrounding which are mountains, 
grown white with the timber bleached under the poisonous smoke that comes 
from the burning of that ore, which cannot be separated from the gold by bat-
teries.” Another writer’s impression of Douglas during operation of the gold ore 
crushers: “Nearly two thousand tons of quartz rock are crushed daily at these 
mills, and the roar made by the eight hundred or more stamps . . . in pulverizing 
this rock, dwarfs all other rackets I ever heard.”47
By the end of the 20th Century, regulation had reduced the impact of gold 
mining in Alaskan lands and waters, but the permissive 1872 mining law, al-
lowing easy access to most federal lands, remained in force.
INTERIOR FORESTS
Alaska’s forests felt the impact of gold mining. In contrast to the rainy coast-
al region familiar to Muir, the interior featured warm and dry summers. Largely 
because of the Gold Rush, forest fires burned continually. Miners used fire to 
clear woods and thaw permafrost for prospecting, and wood fueled steamships 
on the Yukon and other rivers.48 Miners deliberately set forest fires to scorch and 
dry out trees to make them more useful as fuel. In the course of a winter a pair 
of miners might consume 30 to 60 cords of wood. Average-sized steamboats 
needed 30 cords daily, large ones 50 cords. Between St. Michael on the lower 
Yukon and Dawson across the Canadian border, a paddle wheeler used 150 to 
1,000 cords. At the height of activity after the turn of the century, about 250 
steamers plied the Yukon.49
In addition to mining operations, white settlers employed fire for camp-
ing, signaling, protection from insects, and killing green trees to provide fire-
wood and clear land for agriculture. An 1899 view of the Yukon River above 
Circle City: “Smoke on all sides fills the air, as camp-fires are built and not 
extinguished, and the flames slowly climb the mountainside, destroying the 
much-needed wood, and spoiling the picture otherwise so beautiful.”50 Whites 
copied some practices from Alaska Natives, who used fire for many purposes, 
from signaling and driving game to entertainment. Both Natives and whites 
exercised little care to maintain control of their fires. Escaping or deliberately 
freed fires had rendered interior Alaska in part an unnatural environment prior 
to Euro-American contact.51
Lightning caused fires in the interior and, before the end of the 19th Cen-
tury, Indians probably set most of the fires. The Gold Rush accelerated burning. 
Geologist Alfred H. Brooks observed in 1911 that
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hundreds of square miles of timber have been burned off the Yukon Basin 
during the last decade. This burning of timber is in part done purposely by 
both whites and natives in order to get rid of insect pests or to improve the 
growth of grass near their habitations, and is in part due to carelessness. . . . 
[T]he amount of timber destroyed by the natives is small compared with 
that for which the whites are responsible. Many a white man has deliber-
ately started a forest fire which has swept over miles of country solely that 
he might obtain a few acres of dry wood for winter use. If this willful waste 
does not stop, the time is not too far distant when there will be a scarcity of 
timber even for local use.
Settlers commonly believed that fire improved the country by increasing grass 
and moose browse, killing insects, and easing prospecting. They could see scant 
use for spruce forests except as fuel and construction material.52
An unknown but vast acreage burned between 1898 and 1939, when the 
Alaska Fire Control Service originated. A fire that started along the Valdez-
Eagle trail at Mosquito Fork Flat in 1922 burned a swath 48 miles long by 
30 miles wide. Construction workers started fires that consumed more than 
100,000 acres at Chatanika River in 1926 and 128,000 acres at Copper River 
in 1927. A trapper, probably by accident, is believed to have set the Sheenjek 
River fire that blackened 312,320 acres in 1937. After the Fire Control Service 
became effective in 1942, aided by reduced activity in the forests, burned acre-
age dropped precipitously except in dry years (Table 4.1).53
Wood consumption rose in the interior as population grew and mining op-
erations became more mechanized. Sawmills cut spruce in the river valleys for 
tabLe 4.1. Forest Acreage Burned in Alaska, 1940–1970
Year Acres Burned Year Acres Burned Year Acres Burned
1940 4,500,000 1951 221,669 1962 38,975
1941 3,654,744 1952 74,690 1963 16,290
1942 452,510 1953 472,549 1964 3,430
1943 666,773 1954 1,430,645 1965 7,093
1944 110,604 1955 23,582 1966 672,765
1945 117,313 1956 476,593 1967 109,005
1946 1,438,963 1957 5,049,661 1968 1,013,301
1947 1,431,665 1958 317,215 1969 4,231,820
1948 35,190 1959 596,574 1970 113,486
1949 18,147 1960 87,180 
1950 2,063,983 1961 5,100 
Source: (1940–1954): Harold J. Lutz, Ecological Effects of Forest Fires in the Interior of Alaska. USDA Tech. Bull. 
No. 1133. Washington, DC: March 1956, 14; (1955–1970): U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, Alaska Fire Service, 1992 Fire Statistics. Fairbanks: 1993, 21.
Note: Nearly all acreage is in interior Alaska. Low and high figures reflect reduced activity in war years and climate 
variations.
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lumber and to support World War II construction. Mining operations, especial-
ly dredges, continued to consume great quantities of firewood. One gold dredge 
used up 1,500 cords annually between 1913 and 1947.54 Steamboats, homes, 
placer mines, railroads, and other businesses required large volumes. Until mid-
century, Fairbanks heated itself primarily by burning wood, directly or in a 
steam-producing plant.55 Settled in 1901, the town had to send woodcutters 
33 miles to the Salcha River for its supply in 1909. By 1916 the town needed 
100,000 cords annually, enough to create a pile 4 feet high and deep, 152 miles 
long. Mining consumed more than 70 percent of the wood, and heating and 
power generation about 12 percent each.56 For great distances around popu-
lated or industrial sites, hills stood shorn of trees. When introduction of coal 
and fuel oil reduced woodcutting, the forests recovered some of their natural 
character by statehood, nearly a half-century after Muir’s death.57
In the Southeast, Russians operated sawmills to build ships and other facili-
ties, primarily near their capital, Sitka. Canneries, fish traps, housing, and rail-
road construction required larger amounts of wood in the American period, as 
did heating. World Wars I and II called for wood from the Southeast to be used 
in aircraft and military facilities. Attempts to launch a pulp industry failed be-
tween 1913 and the mid-1920s58 but succeeded in 1954 at Ketchikan and 1959 
at Sitka.59 International demand for pulp and, to a lesser extent, lumber from 
the Southeast rapidly increased at the time of statehood. Massive clearcutting 
wrought such violence on old-growth forests and wildlife that environmental-
ists (including, prominently, John Muir’s Sierra Club) and wildlife managers or-
ganized to oppose it, setting in motion a struggle that lasted out the century.60
Interior forests, while frequently ravaged by fire, did not lend themselves to 
large-scale cutting for lumber and pulpwood after statehood. Relatively small in 
diameter and found along scattered river valleys seldom reached by roads, they 
cost too much to harvest. Only a small market for the wood existed locally, and 
that need could be met by lumber from Canada or the Pacific Northwest, de-
livered by the Alaska Railroad.61 Although fires continued to burn considerable 
acreage after statehood, the interior suffered only slight habitat degradation and 
fragmentation from logging roads.
Loss of trees degraded stream valleys, and broader environmental changes 
followed forest fires. White spruce, the dominant upland tree, burned readily. 
Aspen and paper birch usually replaced it, and a full return to the white spruce 
climax stage required about 160 years. Fire tended to kill small furbearers, es-
pecially martens, weasels, foxes, and lynx. In that respect it worked a dispro-
portionate hardship on Indians, who relied on trapping for income. Birch and 
aspen growth favored moose, at least until the trees grew taller. Loss of white 
spruce and the lichens growing on them and on the forest floor had a direct det-
rimental effect on caribou. Recovery of lichens took 40 years or more. The Gold 
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Rush, perhaps supplemented by climatic warming, almost certainly reduced 
caribou populations in subarctic Alaska. Burning added nutrients to the soil but 
depleted the supply of timber needed for economic development.62
Neither Muir nor others of his time could foresee the effects of global 
warming to be manifested in the 21st Century. Alaska’s average temperature 
rose about 4 degrees F from 1960 to 2000 and promised to continue. A warmer 
climate favored the spread of bark beetles and fire, reducing the white spruce 
forests of the interior and associated populations of caribou and marten. Melt-
ing permafrost would cause large-scale land erosion, siltation of watercourses, 
and further loss of spruce forests. Tundra would be progressively converted to 
steppe. Release of carbon by fire and permafrost melting would increase atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide, accelerating the changes. Rising sea levels would de-
stroy coastal habitat for great numbers of waterfowl and other creatures. Higher 
ocean temperatures would diminish populations of salmon and affect sea mam-
mals. In the Arctic, sea ice melting would jeopardize the survival of seals and 
Wood yard at Tanana River Railway, ca. 1905–1910. Cole coll. 76-38-20, University of 
Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. The railroad burned wood in its lo-
comotives, used it for railroad ties, and delivered it to mining sites. Added to forest fires, the 
use of wood for mining, steamboats, railroads, heating, and power generation stripped many 
hills and valleys of trees.
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polar bears. Many or most of the glaciers so loved by Muir could disappear.63 
The ecological impact of global warming might well exceed all the depredations 
of pre-statehood eras.
COAL, COPPER, AND AGRICULTURE
Twentieth-Century development stimulated the use of coal, resulting in 
both positive and negative effects on the environment. Found in small deposits 
of varying quality in widely scattered locations around Alaska, coal served the 
Natives, Russians, prospectors, and settlers. Most frequently burned for resi-
dential and mining purposes, it also helped fuel steamships offshore and on the 
Yukon River. Discovery of large deposits in the Matanuska Valley and south of 
Nenana appeared to justify building an Alaska Railroad from Seward to Fair-
banks, completed in 1923. The railroad, intended to support mining in the 
interior for economic development, could burn the coal as well as deliver it. Lo-
comotives utilized coal until the late 1940s when they converted to diesel fuel. 
Coal heated some buildings throughout the territorial period and generated 
electricity for civilian and military use. Only the Usibelli coal mine at Healy 
operated after 1971.64 Coal had taken the pressure off interior forests, and, to a 
large degree, oil and natural gas replaced coal. Marginal deposits and moderate 
exploitation of coal permitted Alaska to avoid the pervasive land scarring and 
water poisoning typical of coal mining regions in the Lower 48.
Next to gold, copper accounted for the most mining activity in Alaska. 
Natives had used it for centuries, and white prospectors began to look for it in 
the late 1890s. They found the most productive and accessible lodes in south-
central Alaska near Prince William Sound. Among 200 sites along the sound, 8 
produced substantial volumes of ore. In 1900, prospectors Clarence Warner and 
Jack Smith discovered what became the Kennecott Company’s Bonanza mine 
50 miles up the Copper River from Cordova. The Guggenheim group and oth-
ers tried to build a railroad to it from Valdez and Katalla, but mountainous ter-
ritory foiled the attempts. A railway from Cordova, constructed between 1906 
and 1911, succeeded. Mining rapidly exhausted the most valuable deposits. 
Bonanza, the last large mine, closed in 1938. Between 1900 and 1930, Alaska 
had produced $212 million of copper compared to $400 million of gold.
Copper mining had minimally affected the Alaskan environment, consid-
ering that most of the ore went to Washington for smelting. Boosters had hoped 
the Copper River and Northwestern Railway would be extended into the inte-
rior and open it up to settlement and economic development. But the railway 
folded in 1938 when the mine closed. Copper had not set off a rush as gold 
did, and the small towns it created either withered away or turned to enterprises 
such as fishing.65
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Agriculture, the primary source of environmental degradation in the States, 
bore far less economic potential in Alaska. Aided by federal funds during the 
Depression, settlers established commercial farms in the relatively small Mata-
nuska Valley north of Anchorage. Similarly, the Tanana River Valley near Fair-
banks produced some commercial crops. Suitable land existed along the west 
coast of the Kenai Peninsula. Kodiak Island and parts of the Alaska Peninsula 
and Aleutian Islands could support cattle or sheep grazing to a degree. A few 
types of vegetables for personal use could be grown in many areas, including the 
lower Arctic. But commercially viable farming faced numerous obstacles: cool 
air and ground temperatures; short growing seasons; unfavorable soils; high op-
erating costs including land preparation, processing, transportation, and winter 
maintenance of livestock; and price competition from food shipped from the 
States.66
Notwithstanding the limits imposed by location, Alaska boosters insisted 
that the territory possessed the agricultural potential to support large numbers 
of people, millions by some calculations. If only the federal government would 
subsidize farm settlement, they believed, agriculture would open up the ter-
ritory to development. The American pioneer spirit would conquer the wil-
derness in the name of progress. Besides underwriting the Matanuska Colony, 
government policy resulted in scattered settlement elsewhere. But agriculture 
attained only a weak and uncertain position in Alaska’s economy (Table 4.2). As 
historian Orlando Miller described the workings of the frontier myth,
Local pride, a belief that growth and size mean progress, and an awareness 
of the gains to be made from rising property values and increased retail trade 
explain the boosting activities, but in addition promoters, journalists, and 
politicians swayed to their own incantations. . . . [T]hey eagerly awaited the 
urban and industrial development that Americans outside sometimes nos-
talgically regretted and hoped to escape in Alaska. . . . In the postwar period 
continued frontierism was a means of blinking away complex economic 
and social problems that could not be escaped in the wilderness. For all but 
an eccentric or unusual few, pioneer settlement meant not opportunity but 
poverty.67
tabLe 4.2. Agricultural Activity in Alaska, 1940–1969
Year Farms (full- and part-time) Acres Products Sold ($ million)
1940 623 11,000 n.d.
1959 367 14,500 3.2
1964 382 16,500 3.8
1969 332 13,000 3.6
Source: Orlando W. Miller, The Frontier in Alaska and the Matanuska Colony. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1975, 223–224.
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By the time of statehood only 367 farms, most worked by part-time farmers, 
produced 14,500 acres of crops, much of it grasses for livestock. A handful of 
families from the Matanuska Colony still farmed full-time. The Matanuska Val-
ley and its environs produced 70 percent of Alaskan agricultural value. Few, if 
any, of the conditions inhibiting agriculture improved after statehood.68
John Muir committed an oft-to-be-repeated error in assuming that the 
Gold Rush and related settlement could not hurt Alaska’s environment. One 
dramatic example suggested otherwise: in 1898, prospectors endured weeks or 
months of the most exhausting and dangerous trials of their lives to reach the 
remote goldfields of the Klondike. By mid-1900, thanks to the White Pass and 
Yukon Railway and steamboats in Canada, one could ride in comfort from Se-
attle to Dawson in less than a week.69 Other stimuli as powerful as gold—such 
as war or oil—might similarly break down the barriers to Alaskan wilderness.
Followers of John Muir and other advocates of wilderness preservation have 
often perceived wilderness as a state of Nature unaltered by humans. The fact 
that many wildlands have been lastingly influenced by set fires or other human 
activities has suggested the need for a more flexible concept of wilderness. But 
Matanuska Colony farm, Palmer, 1937. Drawbaugh coll. 89-128-151, University of Alas-
ka Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Agriculture made limited inroads into 
wildlife habitat because of cold, unsuitable soils, and transportation costs.
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what degree of temporary or permanent disruption should make a wild area 
unworthy of protection? Does the constant change in Nature, with or without 
human intervention, render the notion of “preservation” meaningless? Should 
consumptive uses, such as those claimed as subsistence rights, be considered 
natural or be allowed in protected ecosystems? These questions became part of 
the debates over disposal of natural resources in Alaska.
MUIR AS POLITICAL ACTIVIST
Years after their Alaskan adventures, Hall Young visited Muir’s successful 
California fruit farm where he found his friend chafing in his harness. “I am 
losing the precious days,” lamented Muir; “I am degenerating into a machine 
for making money. I am learning nothing in this trivial world of men. I must 
get out into the mountains and learn the news.” Muir’s obsessive attention to 
farmwork also wore down his health. Alaska trips revived him both physically 
and spiritually, renewing his enthusiasm for Nature. Farm profits enabled him 
to return his attention to experiencing and writing about Nature.70
Muir’s writings attracted the attention of Robert Wood Johnson, editor 
of the prestigious New York magazine Century, who acted as a powerful ally 
in the wilderness preservation movement. Johnson journeyed to California in 
1889 and asked Muir to continue writing nature preservation articles for Cen-
tury. They visited Toloumne Meadows in the Yosemite Valley and witnessed the 
damage being done by logging, mining, and grazing. They decided to launch 
a campaign to preserve Yosemite and its surroundings. Muir would write sup-
portive articles and Johnson would contact members of Congress and the Har-
rison administration. In October 1890 their plan succeeded.71 The resultant 
Yosemite National Forest Preserve, later named Yosemite National Park, sur-
rounded Yosemite Valley, which had been ceded to California as a park in 1864. 
Five days before the Yosemite vote and almost certainly influenced by the efforts 
of Johnson and Muir, Congress created the reserve that evolved into Sequoia 
National Park. Publicity generated by the Yosemite effort spurred the imple-
mentation of the 1891 Forest Reserves Act that enabled President Benjamin 
Harrison to set aside 13 million acres, including the Afognak reserve in Alaska. 
Muir and Johnson, among others, co-founded the Sierra Club (1892), dedi-
cated to the enjoyment and preservation of the Sierras. Muir served as president 
until his death.72
Muir increasingly assumed the character of public figure and political activ-
ist. Alarmed at the razing of forests by private interests, he assisted the efforts 
of utilitarian conservationists to create reserves for the public benefit. Like the 
Progressives coming to prominence, he fought against the social Darwinist idea 
that natural competition required conquest of Nature and that government 
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should facilitate the process by minimizing regulation. Muir argued that citi-
zens should be educated to appreciate Nature and government should protect 
it. Uncontrolled exploitation of Nature, such writers as George Perkins Marsh 
warned, would be disastrous for humans as well. When in 1896 a federal For-
estry Commission of scientists chosen to evaluate forest policy invited Muir 
to participate as an ex-officio member, he accepted. No comprehensive policy 
had been written for federal wildlands, and Muir and Johnson recognized the 
opportunity to set a precedent by establishing protection as a goal. Muir acted 
as unofficial publicist for the commission’s activities, expressing spiritual val-
ues but cautiously avoiding a preservationist stance. The commission recom-
mended corrective measures, including a ban on grazing, and President Grover 
Cleveland reserved 21 million acres before he left office in 1897. But the new 
McKinley administration withheld the report from the public, and Congress 
passed and McKinley signed a bill removing protective restrictions from the 
reserves and encouraging commercial development.73
Preservationists called on Muir to defend Cleveland’s forest reservation de-
cree, under heavy attack from Western senators beholden to logging, grazing, 
and mining interests. In a pair of Atlantic Monthly articles he fought back: 
Any fool can destroy trees. They cannot run away, and if they could they 
would still be destroyed—chased and hunted down as long as fun or a dollar 
could be got out of their black hides, branching horns or magnificent bole 
backbones. . . . Through all the wonderful, eventful centuries since Christ’s 
time—and long before that—God has cared for these trees . . . but he can-
not save them from fools. Only Uncle Sam can do that.
Public opposition swelled and a bill to abolish the reserves, having passed the 
Senate, died in the House.74
Muir had befriended and supported Gifford Pinchot, a member of the 
Forestry Commission and the leading exponent of utilitarian values who later 
served as Theodore Roosevelt’s first chief of the Forest Service. Eventually it 
dawned on Muir that utilitarianism meant loss of the forests’ wilderness charac-
ter. Hearing of Pinchot’s advocacy of sheep grazing in the reserves, Muir person-
ally confronted him in 1897. Their friendship entered a downward course from 
which it never recovered. From what he had seen in the mountains, Muir re-
garded sheep as “hoofed locusts,” and “[a]s sheep advance, flowers, vegetation, 
grass, soil, plenty, and poetry vanish.”75 Muir’s break from Pinchot, the prime 
mover of the federal utilitarian conservation effort, constituted both symbol 
and substance of the division between conservationists and preservationists last-
ing through the 20th Century.
Only preservation made sense to a thinker so convinced of the spiritual and 
ecological values of Nature. Yet preservation on public lands could not easily be 
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achieved even on a minor scale. Any restriction on exploitation by Euro-Americans 
would have to overcome trenchant resistance from corporate interests or set-
tlers. It would have to mobilize significant elements of a public either apathetic 
or sympathetic toward exploitative behavior. And it would require a variety of 
compromises. Accordingly, Muir somewhat reluctantly accepted a public role 
of heroic nature philosopher as a means of generating public influence. He 
hosted numerous tourists in Sierra parks in hopes that they would gain a love 
for Nature and support future parks. To these ends, Muir and the Sierra Club 
even advocated the construction of numerous trails and roads in wild areas.76
Although he did not win all his battles, Muir grew increasingly prominent. 
Both Roosevelt and Taft, while serving as president, visited him during trips to 
California. Roosevelt described his time alone with Muir, when they camped 
out in Yosemite during a snowy night in 1903, as “the grandest day of my life.” 
He made a greater concession when Muir asked him, “When are you going to 
get beyond the boyishness of killing things . . . are you not getting far enough 
along to leave that off?” Replied the world’s best-known hunter, “Muir, I guess 
you are right.” Muir’s efforts helped make possible Roosevelt’s designation of 
148 million acres of forest reserves, including the Grand Canyon, between 
1902 and 1909.77
Muir participated in the Harriman Expedition, a grand finale for the natu-
ralists’ 19th-Century Alaska trips. Paid for and headed by railroad magnate 
Edward H. Harriman, the expedition combined an exotic vacation and an elite 
scientific undertaking. A handpicked coterie of 23 top natural scientists—in ad-
dition to artists, photographers, and others—boarded a comfortably outfitted 
ship, the George W. Elder, and sailed Alaskan waters from the Southeast to the 
Arctic and Siberian coasts during the summer of 1899. The plan succeeded in 
providing a unique experience for all and reinforcing a network of influentials.78 
Harriman’s other purposes for the trip achieved mixed success. Like some other 
wealthy adventurers of the period, he shot a brown bear. He gained temporary 
status in New York society, but his hope of linking the hemispheres by a railroad 
tunnel under the Bering Strait fell by the wayside.79 The expedition’s ensuing 
books and articles expanded awareness of Alaska and its resources, although not 
especially toward resource conservation.
Muir’s ties to Harriman, president of the politically influential Southern 
Pacific Railroad, paid dividends in the campaign to add Yosemite Valley to the 
surrounding national preserve.80 California governor James Pardee had accom-
panied Muir and Roosevelt on the 1903 Yosemite outing. He promised Sierra 
Club member William Colby, also in the group, that he would sign a bill to 
return Yosemite Valley to national control if it could pass the legislature. Muir 
and Colby made nine lobbying trips to Sacramento, and the Sierra Club–led 
effort paid off. Another lobbying campaign, supported by the Union Pacific 
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Railroad over which Harriman also presided, culminated in a congressional 
vote to accept the property in 1906.81
As much as he loved Alaska, Muir never returned after the 1899 trip. Em-
broiled in the fight to save Yosemite, he devoted his time to politics and the 
education of public opinion. The Yosemite success preceded a long and acri-
monious conflict over Hetch Hetchy Valley to the north. In late 1913 Congress 
approved the dam that would drown the valley. Muir had lost the contest and 
exhausted himself in the process. He died in December 1914. In addition to 
the glacier, Muir is remembered by Muir Inlet and Muir Point in Glacier Bay 
National Park and Mt. Muir in the Chugach Range.82
John Muir exercised a powerful, if mainly indirect, impact on Alaska, in the 
first instance by drawing attention to its natural beauty. His writings stimulated 
ecotourism and ultimately bore fruit in the establishment of Glacier Bay Na-
tional Park (Chapter 8). Had he lived longer, he would certainly have approved 
of this and other Alaskan parkland designations. It is difficult to determine, but 
John Muir (right) and John Burroughs at St. Matthew Island, 1899. By Edward Curtis. 
Harriman coll. RBD 0201-118, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions 
Archives. Through his writings and political work, Muir made lasting contributions to en-
vironmental protection in Alaska.
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doubtful, that by attracting people to Alaska for aesthetic purposes he enhanced 
the environmental values of settlers.
Muir perceived no significant environmental threat to Alaska, not project-
ing impacts to a time when visitors and technology would be multiplied. He 
did not address the question of whether subsistence uses of the land by Natives 
or others could be considered natural and compatible with wildland preserva-
tion. Beyond making his preservation sentiments known, as in the case of polar 
bear killing, he did not directly participate in Alaskan resource disputes.
In the long run, as an icon of nature preservation, Muir substantially ad-
vanced environmental awareness and values in Alaska and elsewhere. The terri-
tory held six of the reserves created by Roosevelt, persuaded in some degree by 
Muir. The Sierra Club evolved into a significant participant in Alaskan environ-
mental issues after statehood. It played a central role in the Alaska lands settle-
ment legislation of 1971 and 1980, two of the most important environmental 
events in 20th-Century North America. It took the lead in protecting the Ton-
gass National Forest from logging that bid fair to destroy it and participated in 
nearly all the environmental disputes that marked the statehood period. One 
of its members, Stephen T. Mather, became the first director and builder of the 
National Park Service, promoting the establishment of national monuments 
and parks in Alaska and elsewhere.
Like George Bird Grinnell and Henry W. Elliott, Muir pioneered national 
publicity and lobbying campaigns for natural resource preservation. In doing 
so, he won a reputation as the nation’s leading spokesperson for wilderness. Per-
haps most important, he gave force to an idea that reappeared in the thinking of 
environmentalists and their public following: that wilderness and its creatures 
possess beauty, dignity, and merit as elements of the community of life; that 
humans must learn to see themselves not as owners or conquerors but as fellow 
citizens of that community.
As a precursor or founder of the modern environmental community, Muir 
modeled and articulated many of its key values: ecosystem sustainability, non-
consumptive uses of Nature, corporate and government accountability, and 
public participation in resource disputes. Far ahead of his time, he believed in 
a holistic relationship of humans to nonhumans, including animal and species 
rights. He relied more on poetic appeals than on scientific data, although he 
excelled as a self-trained scientist and, when the need arose, as a political ad-
vocate. At the same time, his utopian concept of spiritual fulfillment through 
immersion in Nature would prove eternally difficult to translate into environ-
mental policy. Nevertheless, he shifted the nation’s environmental agenda closer 
to nature preservation.
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The Boone and Crockett Club
oF all The IndIVIdualS and GrouPS reSPonSIBle For The PreSerVaTIon oF alaS-
kan lands and wildlife, none deserves more credit than the Boone and Crockett 
Club. This small but highly effective organization fused the power of govern-
ment and the perspectives of an outdoor-oriented elite to draft a blueprint for 
national land and wildlife protection. It led wildlife groups during the fi rst 
decades of the conservation movement and adopted a disproportionate interest 
in Alaska.
Despite the immensity of the American land, its natural integrity soon 
withered before the driving force of entrepreneurship. In the face of apathy 
and opposition from the public and governments, a few early voices called for 
conservation of wildlife and wildlands. George Catlin pleaded in 1832 for a vast 
Western park to preserve both the land and the way of life of the Indians. In 
Walden (1854) Thoreau extolled the virtues of Nature as an antidote to indus-
trializing civilization. George Perkins Marsh, having witnessed environmental 
collapse in the Near East and elsewhere, anticipated the ecological era by more 
than a century in Man and Nature (1864), warning that survival of civiliza-
George Bird Grinnell, Madison Grant, William T. Hornaday, 
Charles H. Townsend, Charles Sheldon
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tion depended on maintenance of the integrity of the land. Frederick Law 
Olmsted urged the acquisition of public parks. In the 1870s Interior Secretary 
Carl Schurz and John Wesley Powell, later chief of the U.S. Geological Survey, 
advocated conservation of forests and watersheds. Such appeals made almost no 
impression on a Congress responsive to the demands of settlers and to timber, 
mining, grazing, railroad, and other acquisitive interests.
At the state level, on the other hand, outdoor sportsmen and nature groups 
began to press legislatures for conservation measures in the post–Civil War 
era. National publications, among them outdoor sporting magazines, acted as 
leading critics of the rampant despoiling of forests and wildlife. Bird watchers 
and other nature enthusiasts added their voices for reform, and humanitarians, 
opposed to mistreatment of animals, supplemented the push for conservation 
measures. An increasingly urbanized society grew less inclined to view Nature 
as a force to be conquered. Rather, Nature took on status as an asset to be con-
served, appreciated, and even romanticized. Darwinian concepts of evolution 
revised the notion that humans possessed a divine right to dominate and exploit 
Nature. Not least, the Progressive Era of political reform lent force to the no-
tion that natural resources should be conserved and rationally managed for the 
good of society.
Motives behind the conservation of wildlife and, therefore, what exactly 
should be conserved varied. Some like John Muir espoused spiritual values. 
Others worked for concepts of justice or effi ciency, and many valued forms of 
recreation. Outdoor sportsmen wanted a guaranteed supply of fi sh and game, as 
did the arms industries that helped fund their organizations. A few elite hunter 
groups had broader goals in mind, including habitat preservation. One of these, 
the Boone and Crockett Club, initiated the effort that moved the federal gov-
ernment to action in wildlife protection. Its originator and leading light, George 
Bird Grinnell, transformed conservation in Alaska and the United States.
GEORGE BIRD GRINNELL
Grinnell (1849–1938) came from a privileged family in New York City. 
Huguenot immigrants to Rhode Island in 1630, the Grinnells attained promi-
nent positions in business, education, and politics. George’s grandfather rep-
resented Massachusetts in Congress, and his father ran textile and investment 
businesses in New York. An interest in birds gained reinforcement when at age 
seven George moved to Audubon Park where the family had purchased land 
from Lucy Bakewell Audubon, widow of John James. Mrs. Audubon, George’s 
academic tutor, shaped his character as well as his interest in Nature. Sur-
rounded by Audubon’s paintings, artifacts, and accounts of expeditions, young 
George grew fascinated by the West. His father, his uncle Tom, and Audubon’s 
5
The Boone and CroCkeTT CluB
118
sons John and Victor, who lived at Audubon Park, all encouraged his interest in 
birds and his work in taxidermy.
An undisciplined and indifferent student, George nevertheless entered Yale 
and graduated in 1870. That summer he joined Yale paleontologist Othniel 
C. Marsh in a fossil-hunting expedition to Nebraska, Wyoming, and Utah. 
He returned to employment at his father’s investment firm and in 1872 ac-
cepted an invitation to participate in a traditional Pawnee buffalo hunt in Ne-
braska. This experience confirmed a lifelong interest in Indians, about whom 
he wrote extensively, and a concern about the destruction of the buffalo by 
market hunters.1
Traveling in the plains and Rockies, Grinnell personally encountered much 
of the American frontier. At least twenty books and as many articles flowed 
from his adventures with wildlife, hunters, Indians, Cavalry soldiers, and for-
tune seekers. General Custer chose him as a naturalist for the 1874 Black Hills 
expedition. The next year Grinnell accompanied the Ludlow expedition to the 
new Yellowstone National Park. When Custer sent word in 1876 inviting him 
to join the trip that ended in Little Big Horn country, duties prevented Grinnell 
from leaving his work at the Peabody Museum.2
Witnessing the decline of wildlife in the West, Grinnell derived an interest 
in conservation work. He inherited his father’s investment firm but quickly tired 
of it and sold it. At the museum he completed a Yale doctorate in osteology and 
paleontology. In 1876 he signed on as natural history editor and, from 1879 
to 1911, as editor-in-chief of the journal Forest and Stream, one of the earliest 
conservation-oriented outdoor magazines. He adopted and elaborated upon a 
code of “sportsmanship” originating in the British upper class, articulated by 
his editor predecessor Charles Hallock. The true “sportsman” took game in a 
restrained, clean, and dignified manner, within the context of an understanding 
of the quarry and its environment. By contrast, unsportsmanlike hunters killed 
wastefully, crudely, without great skill or knowledge, or, worst of all, for crass 
commercial gain. Grinnell also promulgated the British notion that sportsman-
like hunting instilled courage and strength of character, without which a nation 
would be vulnerable to aggressors.3
The gentleman-hunter concept, modified to idealize wilderness adventure 
as differentiated from the English day-in-the-field, evolved as a reaction to in-
creased urbanization and alienation from Nature in everyday American life after 
the Civil War. It sought to keep alive pioneer virtues of rugged individualism 
as the frontier disappeared. A related phenomenon, nature appreciation, ex-
pressed the romantic ideal of spiritual fulfillment through closeness to Nature. 
The noble hunter and nature sophisticate conceptions also enabled established 
Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin to maintain their distance from the lower 
classes and southern European immigrants. The two images, popularized by 
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such publications as Forest and Stream, spread to less privileged groups and 
added impetus to wildlife conservation action by government.4
Grinnell may also be seen as a practitioner and promoter of the myth of 
the American frontier superman. In this view, as the nation grew more indus-
trialized and citified it began to lose the manly virtues of physical prowess, 
courage, self-reliance, integrity, freedom, and individualistic pursuit of progress 
that appeared to characterize leading men on the frontier. The society seemed 
to be “going soft,” as had Europe. To nurture the frontier virtues, writers, sci-
entists, and adventurers romanticized the West. They set about recording, col-
lecting, and preserving its artifacts. Wealthy Eastern men, whose fortunes had 
often been made through destructive exploitation of the frontier, sought to link 
themselves to the frontier myth. They visited the West as explorers, hunters, 
or absentee ranch owners. However consciously, they wanted to define their 
manhood and legitimize their leadership in a modernizing world. Further, they 
considered pioneer virtues vital for the moral integrity of the nation and for the 
nation’s standing in the world.
A model of the neo-frontiersman emerged in the form of the noble hunter-
naturalist. As a hunter of big game in the wilderness away from the comforts 
of civilization, he could prove his courage, physical prowess, self-reliance, and 
ability to take aggressive action when needed. As a naturalist he demonstrated 
his education, discretion in taking game, and devotion to preserving the wild-
life that gave the wilderness its special character. A successful hunter-naturalist 
could return from the wilds to the admiration of his colleagues and the public, 
rejuvenated as a leader in business, military, or civic affairs. Theodore Roosevelt 
best exemplified the model in the minds of the public. But George Bird Grin-
nell, Roosevelt’s friend, may have done more to shape the hunter-naturalist 
image than any other person. His vision achieved some of its most enduring 
expressions in the writings of Forest and Stream and the workings of the Boone 
and Crockett Club.5
Convinced that organized greed threatened the very existence of wild re-
sources as demonstrated by the fate of the buffalo, Grinnell embarked on a cru-
sade to end market hunting and protect wildlife. Merging a business manage-
ment concept and an appeal to democratic ideology, he called for management 
of forests and wildlife on behalf of the people as a whole rather than leaving 
their fate to a narrow few who destroyed for monetary gain. Protected forests, 
he contended, would be necessary for healthy game populations and should be 
managed by government professionals on a scientific basis for sustained yield. 
The notion of ownership by and for the public provided a basis for the Ameri-
can national park philosophy.6
Grinnell exercised an abiding influence on Theodore Roosevelt, whom he 
first met in New York in the early 1880s. Having read a Grinnell commentary 
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questioning some of his assertions in Hunting Trips of the Ranchman, Roosevelt 
strode into the offender’s office for a showdown. The two men took a liking to 
one another and met frequently thereafter to discuss mutual interests in Nature 
and the West, setting the stage for Roosevelt’s commitment to conservation.7 
Grinnell persuaded Roosevelt to join the decade-long effort to save Yellowstone 
Park from ruin by hunters and commercial interests. Grinnell conceived the 
idea of an elite group of hunter-conservationists to model the ideals of true out-
door sportsmanship and to work for the preservation of game species. Roosevelt 
liked the plan and arranged a dinner meeting in 1887, attended by Grinnell, at 
which the Boone and Crockett Club originated. The club adopted its name from 
two famous frontiersmen who symbolized manly virtues. It received its direc-
tion from Roosevelt and from Grinnell, who used Forest and Stream as its voice. 
Through the Yellowstone campaign the club strengthened its public following.8
Historian John F. Reiger considered the Yellowstone episode, culminating 
in protective legislation in 1894, the beginning of the American conservation 
movement, for several reasons. First, the enabling law recognized the need for 
continual on-site management, a future standard for national lands. Second, the 
fight focused on saving the park’s buffalo herd from poachers. This generated a 
national expression of support from the public, who lamented the destruction 
of the great herds on the plains and realized that wildlife would disappear if 
not protected. Third, the campaign involved top conservation leaders working 
together for the first time. Fourth, Yellowstone’s designation as a national park 
presented a model for all forest reservations. The campaign and its outcome 
perfectly reflected Grinnell’s philosophy and cemented Roosevelt’s dedication 
to land and wildlife protection.9
A conservation measure crucial for American wildlands, the Forest Reserves 
Act of 1891, sought to curb the destruction of Western forests and their rapid ap-
propriation by large private interests. General John W. Noble, Benjamin Harrison’s 
secretary of the interior, succeeded in having the measure inserted in a bill in 
conference committee, and it passed without notice by Congress, which would 
almost certainly have opposed it.10 The measure formed the legislative basis of 
the national forest system. Noble, a Boone and Crockett Club member, proved 
instrumental in convincing Harrison to support the first reserves.
Afognak Island in Alaska, among other candidates for reserve status, re-
ceived Grinnell’s attention. A study of Alaskan salmon fisheries ordered by Sec-
retary Noble originated the effort. The team’s report, reflecting concern over 
excessive commercial fishing, recommended setting aside part of Afognak as a 
salmon reserve. Officials called it the Afognak Forest and Fish Culture Reserve, 
but Grinnell saw it as a refuge for wildlife and applied his editorials and person-
al influence. Harrison signed the order in 1892.11 Afognak Island, often cited as 
the first federal wildlife reserve, contributed to the conservation movement as 
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an important early Boone and Crockett success and a step in involving outdoor 
sporting groups in national efforts to protect wildlife.12
Grinnell reinforced his ties to Alaska by joining the 1899 Harriman Expe-
dition and authoring its report on the salmon industry. As an active member, 
foremost writer, and long-term president of Boone and Crockett, he directly 
or indirectly influenced every important Alaskan wildlife issue from the game 
law of 1902 to the Game Law of 1925 and Glacier Bay National Monument 
in 1925. He played a prominent role in the passing of the Lacey Act of 1900 to 
curb commercial exploitation of mammals and birds. He participated in Roos-
evelt’s 1902–1909 forest reserve selections, the Migratory Bird Acts of 1913 and 
1918, and the establishment of Katmai National Monument in 1918.
Outside Alaska, Grinnell’s initiative led directly to the establishment of 
Glacier National Park in 1910. In addition to the Boone and Crockett Club, he 
had founded and directed the forerunner of the National Audubon Society in 
1886. It failed because he could not handle the paperwork; 50,000 people had 
joined by 1888. Local chapters continued and the national organization revived 
in 1905. Grinnell helped found the New York Zoological Society (1895), Soci-
ety of American Foresters (1900), North American Wildlife Foundation (1935), 
and Wildlife Management Institute (1935). He held leadership positions in the 
National Audubon Society, National Park Committee, and National Parks As-
sociation. President Calvin Coolidge presented him the Roosevelt Memorial 
Service Award in 1925.13 The citation stated in part, “[N]one has done more to 
preserve vast areas of picturesque wilderness. . . . [Y]ou have done a noteworthy 
service in bringing to the men and women of a harried and worried age the 
relaxation and revitalization which comes with nature.”14
Historian James B. Trefethen described Grinnell as “a forerunner of the 
preservationist school of conservation” and assessed his character as follows:
Grinnell was quiet, modest and self-effacing to the point of shyness, but his 
personal accomplishments and experience rival fiction. His circle of friends 
ranged from frontier trappers and Indian warriors to generals, millionaires, 
leaders in Congress, cabinet members and Presidents of the United States. . . . As 
Aldo Leopold is recognized as the founder of modern wildlife management, 
Grinnell in many ways was the spiritual father of Leopold.15
New York Times editors titled Grinnell the “father of American conservation.”16
Politically astute and moderate as well as a hunter, Grinnell could appreci-
ate the viewpoints of nonhunters. As the elder statesman of the conservation 
movement in the 1920s and 1930s, he bridged the gap between the two groups, 
making possible many achievements in wildlife conservation. Grinnell molded 
and moved several of the central American conservation principles of the 20th 
Century.
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Boone and Crockett endured for 
40 years or more as one of the lead-
ing groups in the conservation move-
ment. During the first three decades 
of the 20th Century the club oper-
ated in close coordination with eight 
other outdoor sporting and nature 
organizations: American Bison Soci-
ety, American Game Protective As-
sociation, American Ornithologists’ 
Union, American Society of Mammal-
ogists, American Museum of Natural 
History, Camp Fire Club of America, 
National Association of Audubon Societies, and New York Zoological Society. 
Club members had taken the lead in founding most of these groups. About 
three dozen prominent men who knew one another sat on their governing 
boards. This “interlocking directorate,” essentially controlled by Boone and 
Crockett, made up the core of the conservation movement.17 Roosevelt’s presi-
dency (1901–1909) enhanced the movement’s power and advanced its goals 
considerably. Club members enjoyed access, often behind the scenes, to a wide 
range of top government officials, some of them associate members of the club. 
For over half a century virtually every chief of the Bureau of Biological Survey 
and its successor, the Fish and Wildlife Service, held a regular or associate 
membership.
MADISON GRANT
Grinnell’s background and interests closely paralleled those of another lead-
ing hunter-naturalist in Alaska’s environmental future, Madison Grant (1865–
1937). A New York patrician, lawyer, and son of a prominent physician and city 
health commissioner who won a Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry 
in the Civil War, Grant knew how to operate in the political realm. His earlier 
ancestors had settled in New York and New England in the 1620s and 1630s 
and become religious, political, and military leaders. One, Robert Treat Paine, 
signed the Declaration of Independence. The Grant family lived in a mansion 
George Bird Grinnell at Yale, ca. 1890s. Yale 
University Archives. Few if any Americans 
did more than Grinnell to advance wildlife 
conservation.
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on Long Island where Madison played in the surrounding countryside and de-
veloped a love for wild creatures. In his teens he studied in Germany.
Following degrees at Yale in 1887 and Columbia Law School in 1890, 
Grant opened a law office in New York City. Not much interested in law, he 
pursued an active social life in the exclusive clubs where wealthy men spent 
their time. He founded and led several organizations. Some of these, such as the 
Society of Colonial Wars, emphasized the historical prominence of the mem-
bers’ families. Outside of New York, Grant engaged in big game hunting—in 
the West, Canada, and Alaska’s Kenai Peninsula. He met George Bird Grinnell, 
who nominated him for Boone and Crockett Club membership.18 Close friends, 
the two worked together on conservation issues for more than 40 years.
Quickly assuming a leadership role within Boone and Crockett, Grant be-
came the driving force behind its conservation activities. He soon won the con-
fidence of Theodore Roosevelt, another man of highly similar background and 
interests. After Roosevelt moved to Washington in 1894 to serve on the Civil 
Service Commission, he left the day-to-day activities in the hands of Grinnell and 
Grant. They shifted the focus of club activities from social get-togethers toward 
political action. Grant’s quiet demeanor and multiple contacts among the Eastern 
elite suited the club’s lobbying agenda. He organized legislative efforts and moved 
them forward by meeting key people in private settings. Grinnell, a member of 
some of the same social clubs, advanced the agenda through Forest and Stream.19
Grant and Grinnell kept in daily contact to develop political strategy. They 
first attacked market hunting and worked for state and federal laws to stop 
it. They understood the need for habitat as distinct from species protection 
and strove for the creation of forest reserves. Grant persuaded Gifford Pinchot, 
Roosevelt’s chief forester and a fellow Boone and Crockett member, to recom-
mend forest reserves in the West and Alaska. Pinchot opposed wildlife sanctuar-
ies in national parks, however.
Moving in a preservationist direction, Grant pushed for national parks and 
for game reserves in national forests. He believed, and convinced many of his 
hunting colleagues including Roosevelt, that other creatures had a right to ex-
ist. Boone and Crockett set up a committee on refuges in 1901 and became 
the most prominent force for American wildland preservation. The commit-
tee, largely through Grant, achieved its goal through the establishment of Mt. 
McKinley, Glacier, Olympic, and Everglades national parks.20
Well ahead of his time in thinking about predators, Grant saw them as ben-
eficial in that they weeded out the less fit of their prey. He expressed the belief 
publicly in 1911. Supplementing the efforts of the American Society of Mam-
malogists and the New York Zoological Society, Boone and Crockett officially 
opposed predator control in 1929. Grant helped convince the conservation 
community that wildlife, like other aspects of society, needed to be managed. 
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Boone and Crockett’s game preserva-
tion committee officially endorsed 
game management in 1915, citing the 
overpopulation of elk in Yellowstone 
after removal of predators.21
Observing the multiplying en-
croachments on game during his 
travels, Grant worried about their 
prospects for survival. Of the Alaska 
situation he wrote, “It should be clear-
ly understood that the game of Alaska, 
or any other region, does not belong 
exclusively to the human inhabitants 
of that particular region. . . . The in-
terest of the entire people of the U.S. 
and to some extent that of the civilized world, is centered in the continued exis-
tence of the forms of animal life which have come down to us from an immense 
antiquity through the slow process of evolution.” As a hunter and established 
Boone and Crockett member he pinned the blame for Alaska wildlife depletion 
on commercial hunting:
The destruction of game is far more often effected by local residents than it 
is by visiting sportsmen, but the chief evildoer, and the public enemy of all 
classes, is the professional hunter, either Indian or white, who kills for the 
market. Worse still, perhaps, is the professional dealer in heads and antlers, 
who employs such hunters to provide game heads for the decoration of the 
banquet halls of the growing class of would-be sportsmen, who enjoy the 
suggestion of hunting prowess conferred by a selected collection of pur-
chased heads.22
Grant’s answer to the threat to big game species went beyond game protec-
tion laws: “[P]reserves should be set aside in Alaska, while land is yet of little 
value. . . . Certain islands should also be utilized, particularly in southeastern 
Alaska. Beyond doubt such refuges will ultimately be established, but it is to 
be hoped that they can be done before the game is decimated and the forests 
cut down and burned.”23 It took seven more decades to win protection for the 
brown bears on Admiralty Island, one of the objects of Grant’s concern.
Madison Grant at Yale, 1912. Yale Uni-
versity Archives. Grant and Grinnell led 
Boone and Crockett Club efforts in wildlife 
conservation.
The Boone and Crockett Club
125
Grant’s interest in Alaska and love of wildlife naturally focused on the wel-
fare of game species. The rapid expansion of market hunting to supply the gold 
miners sparked action by Boone and Crockett. Grant organized a 1901 explor-
ing and collecting expedition led by Andrew J. Stone and funded by the New 
York Zoological Society, Boone and Crockett, and the American Museum of 
Natural History. Stone’s party traveled down the Mackenzie and Yukon rivers 
and along the coast to Southeast Alaska. Also in 1901 Grant sent J. Alden Loring 
to the Cook Inlet region. Loring’s portrayals of the waste of wildlife moved 
Grant and his colleagues to action to stop market hunting in Alaska.
Grant and his friend and fellow Boone and Crockett member, Representa-
tive John F. Lacey of Iowa, collaborated to draft a bill to stop the market export 
of game from Alaska. The first protective game law for the territory, it passed in 
1902. Market hunters objected, but Grant insisted that the law would benefit 
the individual Alaskan by conserving game. He returned to Alaska in 1907 as 
part of an expedition to dig up a mastodon skeleton and toured the interior to 
assess the game situation. He gained the impression that, while the export of 
game had been controlled, irresponsible killing had continued. Alaska Natives, 
he believed, destroyed more than white hunters did. A 1908 law, influenced by 
Boone and Crockett, introduced more flexibility in regulations and reduced the 
number of trophies a nonresident could export.24
Outside of Alaska, Grant participated decisively in a long list of important 
government decisions. He and Lacey co-drafted the Lacey Act of 1900 that 
increased the national government’s responsibility for wildlife. Another monu-
mental measure, the Migratory Bird Act of 1913, owed much to Grant.25 He 
took leadership positions in efforts to save the pronghorn antelope, European 
bison, whales, Galapagos tortoises, mountain gorillas, and numerous other en-
dangered species. These measures and the setting aside of reserves lent both 
strength and legitimacy to government protection of wildlife. They set prec-
edents to be followed by states, other nations, and subsequent actions by the 
federal government.
An inveterate joiner, Grant held leadership positions in more than 30 orga-
nizations. Of those working on conservation on a national level, he co-founded 
the American Bison Society (1905), the National Parks Association (1919), and, 
with John C. Merriam of the University of California, the Save-the-Redwoods 
League (1919). He founded the American Committee for International Wild-
life Protection (1930) and presided over Boone and Crockett for the last twelve 
years of his life. The 1,605-acre Madison Grant Forest and Elk Refuge (1946) 
preserves a stand of redwoods in memory of Grant’s work. He is also honored in 
the naming of Rangifer tarandus granti, or Grant’s caribou. Originally denoting 
the subspecies encountered by Andrew Stone in 1901 on the Alaska Peninsula, 
the name later applied to all caribou in Alaska and the Yukon.26
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Grant’s concerns about disappearing wildlife and the necessity of manage-
ment to maintain populations influenced his social theory. A “splitter” mam-
malogist, he saw numerous racial distinctions among humans. Like wildlife, he 
thought, some races are superior to others. He noted the disruption caused by 
alien wildlife species and the dramatic influx of immigrants in New York. He 
concluded that immigration, particularly from southern and eastern Europe, 
posed a threat to both wildlife and the social order. In addition to his respected 
writings on wildlife, Grant promulgated theories of racial distinction and hier-
archy that made him an internationally recognized racist. Notwithstanding his 
numerous accomplishments in wildlife conservation, the loss of support among 
scientists caused his conservation work to be nearly forgotten.27
Boone and Crockett counted as one of its most significant accomplish-
ments the creation of the New York Zoological Society (NYZS) to oversee a 
zoological park for New York wherein animals could enjoy semi-natural sur-
roundings. Madison Grant, the prime mover, and C. Grant La Farge succeeded 
in lobbying the bill through the New York Legislature in April 1895. Boone 
and Crockett exercised an abiding influence over NYZS through Grant and 
Henry Fairfield Osborn.28 The NYZS envisioned much more than a park; it 
planned to advance wildlife preservation. Even before the New York Zoological 
Park (popularly called the Bronx Zoo) opened in 1899, writings on endangered 
species appeared in the society’s bulletin. Thereafter NYZS, later renamed the 
Wildlife Conservation Society, took part in several Alaskan and many national 
and international efforts to preserve wild creatures.
WILLIAM T. HORNADAY
Grant and Osborn selected as the New York Zoological Park’s first direc-
tor William Temple Hornaday, a noted zoologist and taxidermist. Hornaday 
(1854–1937) grew up on farms in Indiana and Iowa, where he spent plenty 
of time outdoors. At sixteen he entered Oskaloosa College for a year, and then 
transferred to Iowa State College at Ames. There he studied natural sciences for 
two years and decided on a career in taxidermy and museum work. In 1873 he 
signed on as an apprentice taxidermist in Ward’s Natural History Establishment 
in Rochester, New York, an institution that fielded collecting expeditions and 
supplied specimens to museums. Hornaday’s excellent work won him a six-
year assignment as a collector in the Caribbean, South America, India, Ceylon, 
the Malay Peninsula, and Borneo. He brought back the greatest aggregation of 
faunal specimens ever gathered by one person—all of which he had personally 
prepared. In 1880 he co-founded the American Society of Taxidermists, and in 
1882 he became chief taxidermist at the Smithsonian. There he developed his 
ideas for more realistic displays, including family groupings in natural habitat. 
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An 1886 trip to the West impressed on him the extent of devastation of wild 
mammals. He resolved to fight for wildlife protection and in 1889 wrote The 
Extermination of the American Bison.
When Congress appropriated funds for a National Zoological Park, the 
Smithsonian named Hornaday director. But he could not abide the controlling 
behavior of the Smithsonian’s new director, Samuel P. Langley, so he resigned in 
1890 and entered the real estate business. When the Boone and Crockett Club 
succeeded in launching the New York Zoological Park, Hornaday accepted its 
directorship in 1896.29
Boone and Crockett and New York Zoological Society board members 
Madison Grant and Henry Fairfield Osborn acted decisively in the formulation 
of the park and its policies, as well as its spin-off organizations and projects. 
Hornaday directed the New York Zoological Park until his retirement in 1926. 
At a meeting hosted by the park, NYZS co-founded the American Bison Society. 
As co-founder, first president, and a strong champion of the society, Hornaday 
earned much of the credit for rescuing the buffalo from the edge of extinction. 
In 1911, through NYZS, he organized the Permanent Wild Life Protection 
Fund, eventually a leader in the creation of parks and wildlife preserves in Af-
rica and other continents. Hornaday’s book Our Vanishing Wild Life went into 
print just in time to aid passage of the federal Migratory Bird Act of 1913. Also 
in 1913 he authored the key provision of a bill backed by conservation groups, 
banning the importation of exotic birds for use in women’s hats.30 In all, he 
wrote twenty books and numerous magazine articles and letters to editors.31
Maintaining a lively interest in Alaska even though he never visited it, 
Hornaday helped bring into being the game laws of 1902 and 1908. In a 1902 
article in Recreation Magazine he raged against the loss of wildlife and pointed 
out that “there is not one line of game law to protect the game of Alaska or 
restrict its slaughter in any manner.” He urged readers to support a bill before 
Congress declaring the Kenai Peninsula a wildlife preserve and empowering the 
president to create others by proclamation. He called for a game preserve to 
take in a wide coastal strip from Bristol Bay to Yakutat, including Kodiak-Afog-
nak islands and the Alaska and Kenai peninsulas.32 He directed heavy criticism 
at the lack of controls on hunting by Natives and prospectors. “Alaska and its 
resources,” he asserted, “do not belong to the very few people from ‘the States’ 
who have gone there to make their fortunes and get out again as quickly as 
possible.” He recommended banning the sale of wild game, quadrupling the 
warden force, halving the bag limits on big game, and instituting a ten-year 
moratorium on the killing of walruses for their ivory.33 Most of these sugges-
tions ultimately became law.
Hornaday worked tirelessly for decades to save wildlife species. He ag-
gressively criticized commercial hunting and the arms industry and incurred 
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the wrath of hunter-conservationists with his opposition to sport hunting. A 
former hunter for museums, he evolved into militant if somewhat selective 
preservationism: “The wild life of the world is not ours, to dispose of wholly 
as we please. We hold it in trust, for the benefit of ourselves, and equal benefits 
to those who come after us. As honorable guardians we have no right to waste 
and squander the heritage of our grandchildren. It is our duty to stay the hand 
that strives to apply the torch.” He did not hesitate to identify “the hand.” 
Terming them an “army of destruction,” he declared, “In the United States 
there are about 5,000,000 gunners, game-hogs and sportsmen. In that entire 
multitude I venture to say that there are not over 2,000 men or boys who by 
reason of their own high principles could be trusted in country to hunt wild 
game wholly unrestrained by the hand of the law.”34 He believed “the mental 
attitude of the men who shoot constitutes a deadly factor in the destruction 
of wild life and the extermination of species. Fully ninety-five percent of the 
sportsmen, gunners, and other men and boys who kill big game, all over the 
world and in all nations, regard game birds and mammals only as things to be 
killed and eaten, and not as creatures worth preserving for their beauty or their 
interest to mankind.”35
Like most conservationists of his era, Hornaday thought wildlife needed 
protection from other wildlife as well as from humans. “Unmoral” animals, 
predators that killed other animals (of use to humans), needed to be “brought 
to justice.” He made an exception for owls because they ate so many rodents. 
Reflecting the moralistic humanitarianism of the era and projecting it to non-
humans, he foresaw a time when animals would no longer act violently toward 
one another. But as a zoo director, Hornaday fought back against humanitarian 
charges of the cruelty of caging wild creatures. He saw “no higher use” for an 
animal than to be in “comfortable captivity” where people could view it.36
Through his writings and political action, Hornaday helped shape environ-
mental issues, including fur seal (Chapter 2) and migratory bird protection and 
the 1925 Alaska Game Law. After retirement he continued his efforts through 
the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund. Summing up his career, he explained 
that “my chief object in life for the past fifty-four years has been to try to bring 
the wild creatures of the world to the human millions who cannot get to them. 
. . . But as an ethical estimate, my thirty-five years of fighting to preserve some 
wild life has ranked far above that academic work.”37 Never satisfied with the 
progress made by conservationists, he declared at age 80 that the thought of the 
ongoing destruction of wildlife still put him in a “red rage,” inspiring him to 
continue his work.38
Hornaday resented not being accepted as a Boone and Crockett member 
despite his outstanding deeds as a big game collector. At length he gained as-
sociate membership. His tenacity, arrogance, and abrasiveness, backed by a rare 
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talent for skewering his adversaries with well-chosen words, severely strained 
his connections to other conservationists.39 His dedication and combative char-
acter also called attention to his causes and won support in the media and the 
public. He could claim among his admirers Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt. 
From his deathbed he wrote FDR asking him to do all he could to preserve 
William T. Hornaday and buffalo calf, Washington, DC, 1890. Smithsonian Archives. A 
prominent museum director and ardent conservationist, Hornaday pushed for wildlife pro-
tection laws in Alaska.
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wildlife; FDR replied that he would do so.40 At FDR’s request, Mt. Hornaday 
in Yellowstone National Park received its name following Hornaday’s death.41
CHARLES H. TOWNSEND
Research scientist and associate Boone and Crockett member Charles 
Haskins Townsend (1859–1944) also cared about Alaskan environmental con-
ditions. Townsend, a Pennsylvanian, studied zoology at Ward’s Natural History 
Establishment and the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia. He then 
served the U.S. Fish Commission and as a field naturalist for the Smithsonian. 
He first visited Alaska in 1885 on the USS Corwin expedition up the Kowak 
(Kobuk) River. During nine years in the Pacific aboard the research vessel Al-
batross, he studied birds, walrus, sea lions, fur seals, and fish in the Bering Sea. 
Annual summer inspection trips to the seal rookeries in the Pribilofs between 
1891 and 1897 led to membership on the Bering Sea and fur seal commissions. 
In 1902 he began a 35-year career as director of the New York Aquarium, a 
facility controlled by the New York Zoological Society. A leading authority on 
water life around the world, Townsend headed the effort for preservation of the 
Galapagos tortoises. Among Alaskan topics, he wrote on birds, sea mammals, 
fish, mammoths, and reindeer.42
While serving in 1911 on the Fur Seal Advisory Board, Townsend endorsed 
a limited harvest of male fur seals on the Pribilofs, thereby running afoul of his 
colleagues William T. Hornaday and Henry W. Elliott. An unpleasant encoun-
ter wherein his position met with defeat soured Townsend’s feelings toward 
Hornaday.43 Attempting to head off a congressional vote to postpone the seal 
harvest for five years, Townsend had written an article in the influential journal 
Science. The proposal, he said, originated from “men who had not been on the 
islands for twenty years [Elliott] and who cannot appreciate the recent detailed in-
vestigations. Severe criticisms have also been made by men [Hornaday] who have 
not been there at all, and whose opinions on the subject are of little value.”44
Townsend had represented both the Cleveland and Taft administrations 
in fur seal negotiations. He possessed considerable knowledge of the animals, 
whereas Hornaday did not. David Starr Jordan and Bureau of Biological Survey 
chief C. Hart Merriam, also experienced in fur seal policy, backed Townsend, 
as did Boone and Crockett’s game preservation committee. They adopted a 
utilitarian position advocating limited harvest, whereas Hornaday adamantly 
opposed any killing. Madison Grant tried in vain to smooth over relations be-
tween his friend Hornaday and the others. The dispute over the fur seals ended 
in a compromise five-year moratorium on killing at the Pribilofs.45
Townsend and Charles Sheldon worked for two decades on the game 
preservation committee, influencing a variety of Alaskan issues including the 
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Game Law of 1925. The two men also 
helped lead the National Conference 
on Outdoor Recreation, Townsend 
chairing its fish committee.46
CHARLES SHELDON
Boone and Crockett recruited yet 
another and by no means the least sig-
nificant of Alaska’s early conservation 
leaders: Vermonter Charles Alexander 
Sheldon (1867–1928). Like Grin-
nell, Grant, and Roosevelt, Sheldon 
personified the ideals of the hunter-
naturalist. A privileged first child of a 
prominent family that owned a pros-
perous marble business, Sheldon spent much of his youth outdoors. He entered 
Yale in 1886 and graduated in 1890 as a civil engineer, but the family busi-
ness had failed, so he took a management trainee position in the Lake Shore 
and Southern Michigan Railway Company. His honest and friendly character 
showed in his peaceful settlement of a strike. From 1894 to 1898 he managed an 
Albany, New York, company that made heaters for railroad cars. His leadership 
skills came to the attention of investors who held railroad and mining interests 
in Mexico. On behalf of his investors he acquired a mine that turned out to be 
Mexico’s top producer of silver; his share in the mine made him wealthy.47
Sheldon left Mexico in 1902. He had hunted big game there and found 
mountain sheep and grizzly bears especially appealing. He knew that the Bu-
reau of Biological Survey (BBS) collected fauna from all over North America. In 
1903 he went to Washington and met BBS chief C. Hart Merriam and Edward 
W. Nelson, the latter in charge of the Mexico field operation. They suggested 
that he combine hunting and collecting for the Smithsonian. In all, he contrib-
uted 554 specimens to the museum, 120 of them big game mammals.
Nelson had collected the first white mountain sheep from Alaska (and 
named the subspecies for William H. Dall) and wanted more information and 
specimens. BBS arranged a collecting trip to the Yukon, and Sheldon, BBS bi-
ologist Wilfred Osgood, and wildlife artist Carl Rungius arrived there in 1904. 
Charles Haskins Townsend, 1918. Smithso-
nian Archives. A government marine scien-
tist and aquarium director, Townsend began 
research in Alaska in 1885.
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Upon Sheldon’s return home to New York the Boone and Crockett Club, at 
Nelson’s recommendation, elected him to membership. There he befriended 
George Bird Grinnell, who trained him in conservation activism, and Theodore 
Roosevelt, whom he often visited at the White House and Sagamore Hill on 
Long Island.48
Sheldon hunted brown bears on Prince William Sound, Alaska, in May 
1905. Next he collected sheep in the Yukon mountains until October. He wrote 
a popular book, The Wilderness of the Upper Yukon, about his experiences. A 
year later he stalked sheep and grizzly bears around Mt. McKinley from July to 
October. In summer 1907 he returned and, assisted by Alaskan outdoorsman 
Harry Karstens, built a cabin and remained over the winter to study Dall sheep. 
Sheldon had made himself the foremost authority on the subspecies. On their 
honeymoon trip in 1909, Sheldon and his bride camped and watched brown 
bears on Admiralty Island.49
Sheldon perceived the grizzly bear as the prime symbol of Alaskan wilder-
ness and worked to protect it. Displaying astute political judgment and moder-
ate utilitarian conservationist views, he succeeded in cultivating Alaskan support 
for the 1925 Game Law, for which he performed double duty as a principal 
author and a leading lobbyist.50
Upon discovering the notes from Sheldon’s 1907–1908 Mt. McKinley ad-
venture, his son asked him why they had not been published. “I’ve said enough 
about myself,” replied Sheldon. Following his death the family published his 
best-known book, The Wilderness of Denali.51 Sheldon’s experiences in the De-
nali region inspired him to lead the successful drive (Chapter 6) to designate it 
a national park in 1917.
Sheldon persevered as a political activist. Like Grinnell and Grant, he pre-
ferred quiet diplomacy and allowed others to receive the credit for his achieve-
ments. Working closely alongside Grinnell and Nelson as chair of the game 
preservation committee, Sheldon committed himself to nearly full-time effort 
in wildlife protection. He moved the family to Washington in 1916 so he could 
more effectively carry out his work. Their home became a gathering spot for 
conservationists, hunters, and explorers, including Edward Nelson, Amundsen, 
and Byrd. Sheldon went on a few more collecting trips to the Southwest and 
worked to save the vanishing pronghorn antelope. After his death, Boone and 
Crockett raised money for a Charles Sheldon National Antelope Range in Ne-
vada, so designated in 1931 and expanded to 540,000 acres by FDR in 1936.52 
It became the Sheldon National Wildlife Refuge.
Sheldon’s philosophy derived from his own experience and that of the 
club: “Wildlife conservation will best be promoted by the encouragement of 
legitimate sport; of scientific interest in natural history; and by building up the 
public opinion to make and enforce wise laws.”53 Like some of his colleagues, 
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Sheldon believed that people, Americans in particular, derived moral and spiri-
tual strength and physical well-being from closeness to Nature. He advocated a 
nationwide recreation plan, coordinated by the federal government, to establish 
parks and wild areas at national, state, and local levels.54
Sheldon served as leading organizer and a member of the permanent com-
mittee of the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation (1924–1929). The 
conference brought together government agencies and private groups to make 
numerous recommendations on wildlife management and the setting aside of 
natural areas. It succeeded in getting a high proportion of its resolutions trans-
lated into government policy, thus materially promoting modern wildlife man-
agement. It also helped raise outdoor recreation to national prominence as a 
valued realm of activity. Historian James B. Trefethen regarded the conference 
as Boone and Crockett’s greatest single contribution.55
Of Sheldon’s character C. Hart Merriam observed: “Sheldon was a splendid 
type of vigorous manhood; self reliant, courageous, of pleasing personality, pos-
sessed of sober, earnest dignity, unassuming, simple in tastes, kindly, generous 
and when estimating others always fair, giving due weight to their environment 
and opportunities.”56 Trefethen ventured that “probably no individual in the 
history of biological inquiry has possessed the rare combination of scientific 
curiosity, dedication to a cause, physical stamina, and financial independence 
that made his research possible.” Roosevelt regarded him as a model Boone and 
Crockett member.57 A man of such social standing and virtue fit the mold for 
national leadership in the conservation movement, and Sheldon filled the role.
By all appearances in good health, Sheldon died of a heart attack at age 60 
at the family’s summer home in Nova Scotia. His achievements and writings 
helped confirm Alaska’s reputation as a wild, forbidding arena of adventure fit 
to challenge the best that a man could muster. At the same time, he left a price-
less legacy to Alaskan wildlife conservation. But the ingredients of success for 
people like Sheldon, Grinnell, and Grant—a wealthy, influential, urban, East-
ern elite who determined the fate of Alaska’s resources from power bases in New 
York and Washington—fostered an image of outside control that embittered 
Alaskan attitudes toward the federal government for decades to come.
The scientists and hunter-naturalists of Boone and Crockett practiced stout 
advocacy of an advanced form of utilitarian conservation. In addition to the goal 
of protecting favored species, they called for refuges embodying many aspects of 
ecosystem sustainability. To the extent practicable they gathered scientific data 
and urged that wildlife management be government-controlled and science-
based. Their devotion to wildlife, especially large land mammals, reached well 
beyond guaranteeing a supply for hunters; they believed the animals possessed 
inherent value. Hornaday and, to some extent, Grant articulated elements of 
species rights philosophy.
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Boone and Crockett activities constituted an early, if elite, form of public 
activism, but the club formed productive alliances with nature associations and 
with outdoor sporting groups more narrowly interested in hunting and fishing. 
The club’s inordinate access to decision-making power enabled it to see its ideas 
through to completion. Initially, its contributions to environmental thinking 
showed more in the States than in Alaska. Yet broad-scale Alaska land and wild-
life protection, and specific accomplishments such as Mt. McKinley National 
Park and the 1925 Alaska Game Law, owed much to its efforts.
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Charles Sheldon and 
Mt. McKinley National Park
Charles sheldon stood oUt aMonG Boone and CroCKett ClUB leaders in 
expressing interest in Alaska. His experiences on the slopes of Mt. McKinley cul-
minated in Alaska’s second (after the 1910 Sitka National Historical Park) and 
most prominent national park. Originally intended to protect game species, the 
park evolved into a standard for ecosystem preservation in Alaska and the nation.
A fortuitous combination of circumstances made possible the preeminent 
Alaskan national park. Albeit the territory embraced numerous sites worth sav-
ing, any attempt to do so sparked resistance from Alaskan politicians, business 
interests, and other boosters. They interpreted such restrictions as unfair im-
pediments to their birthright to use the land for immediate profi t and rapidly 
growing prosperity, as had been done in the States. To them, a group of in-
competent Washington bureaucracies, unconcerned about the welfare of local 
citizens, ruled the territory. Boosters wanted the national government to build 
the infrastructure for them and then get out of the way, letting them exploit the 
resources. They suspected, to some extent justifi ably, that elites from the States 
fashioned the rules to suit their own narrow interests.
6
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The seating of a legislature in 1913, and verbal commitments from Wash-
ington to develop Alaska, increased the difficulty of land withdrawals. Setting 
aside a large park, especially if near a populated area or a mining zone, would 
require just the right conditions. The land would have to be extraordinary in 
some way, Congress would have to feel a sense of urgency, Alaskans would have 
to see value for themselves, and astute leadership would be needed to orches-
trate the process. No Alaskan would likely take the initiative. But a leader from 
outside would need qualities of manliness, humility, diplomacy, and knowledge 
of the North country to win the respect of Alaskans. One of the few such men 
in existence, Charles Sheldon, stepped forth.
MT. McKINLEY
Sheldon’s studies of wildlife near Mt. McKinley had convinced him it 
should be preserved. He may have been unaware that the Denali area would 
eventually be world-famous as the site of 20,320-foot-high Mt. McKinley, the 
tallest peak in North America, but he appreciated its extraordinary presence and 
radiance. As he topped a foothill above Wonder Lake in the Alaska Range on a 
clear day in July 1906, Sheldon beheld a scene that would thrill millions, even 
those never to visit Alaska:
Three miles below lay the Muldrow Branch of McKinley Fork, fringed on 
both sides by narrow lines of timber, its swift torrents rushing through many 
channels. Beyond, along the north side of the main Alaska Range, is a belt of 
bare rolling hills ten or twelve miles wide, forming a vast piedmont plateau 
dotted with exquisite little lakes. The foothill mountains, 6,000 or 7,000 feet 
in altitude and now free from snow, extend in a series of five or six ranges 
parallel to the main snow-covered range on the south. Carved by glaciers, 
eroded by the elements, furrowed by canyons and ravines, hollowed by 
cirques, and rich in contrasting colors, they form an appropriate foreground 
to the main range.
Denali—a majestic dome which from some points of view seems to 
present an unbroken skyline—rises to an altitude of 20,300 feet, with a 
mantle of snow and ice reaching down for 14,000 feet. Towering above all 
others, in its stupendous immensity it dominates the picture. Nearby on the 
west stands Mt. Foraker, more than 17,000 feet in altitude, flanked on both 
sides by peaks of 10,000 to 13,000 feet that extend in a ragged snowy line as 
far as the eye can see.1
The centerpiece of the region is Mt. McKinley (or Denali, a Tanana Atha-
baskan word for “The Big One” or “The High One”).2 In its first recorded 
reference, Captain George Vancouver saw “distant stupendous mountains” 
from Cook Inlet. Russian explorer Andrei Glazunov adopted the Native name 
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Tenada, but the mountain did not appear on the map employed in the transfer 
to U.S. jurisdiction, and the name Tenada lost its opportunity for permanent 
recognition.3 Prospector Frank Densmore wrote of it after an 1889 trip, lead-
ing to local usage of the term “Densmore’s Mountain.” Mt. McKinley acquired 
its enduring name in 1896 from prospector William A. Dickey, a Princeton 
graduate. He and his partner, he said, tired of a free silver harangue from a pair 
of mining colleagues and retaliated by naming the mountain for presidential 
nominee and gold standard advocate William McKinley. Dickey related his ad-
ventures to the New York Sun and, despite protests from the U.S. Geological 
Survey, the name stuck.4
The great mountain had been noticed because it could be seen for 200 
miles in clear weather. But its distance from the coast and from easily traveled 
rivers, added to the ruggedness of the terrain, kept traders and prospectors away 
until the early 20th Century. The Klondike Gold Rush precipitated efforts to 
find access from the southern coast into the interior, to avoid the difficult routes 
through Canada and up the Yukon River. In 1898 Congress assigned the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) the responsibility of mapping routes to the inte-
rior. Later that year a USGS expedition led by Josiah Edward Spurr made the 
first known traversal by explorers of the Alaska Range in the environs of Mt. 
McKinley. Also that summer another USGS team, George Eldridge and Robert 
Muldrow, crossed the range to the headwaters of the Tanana River. Muldrow 
measured the height of Mt. McKinley as more than 20,000 feet.5
The U.S. Army continued explorations begun earlier in the territory and 
sent teams up the Susitna River Valley in 1898 and 1899. Under the command 
of Captain Edwin F. Glenn, William Yanert and George Vanschoonoven passed 
through the Alaska Range at Broad Pass in 1898. A year later Lieutenant Joseph 
Herron and his group crossed the range, but they ran out of food as fall ap-
proached. Athabaskans, whose ancestors had hunted in the region since the last 
Ice Age, rescued the party and outfitted them for travel by dog team. Herron’s 
group became the first Euro-Americans to reach the Yukon River from Cook 
Inlet. A 1902 expedition led by USGS geologist Alfred Hulse Brooks mapped 
the northeast end of the Alaska Range, approaching the base of Mt. McKinley. 
All of the USGS and Army explorations between Cook Inlet and the interior 
prepared the way for the railroad and auto road that eventually followed.6
Publicity about the mountain inspired attempts to climb it. Federal Judge 
James Wickersham launched the first sortie from the new gold strike boom-
town of Fairbanks in 1903. Wickersham’s party attained about 11,000 feet. 
A few weeks later a team directed by noted polar explorer Frederick A. Cook, 
approaching from Cook Inlet, gained a similar height. Cook’s 1906 expedi-
tion catapulted Mt. McKinley into an international controversy. Unable to find a 
route to the top in an exploration of the mountain’s south side, the party returned 
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to Cook Inlet and disbanded. Cook and a companion then set out again for 
the mountain. Returning, he announced that he had reached the mountain 
and climbed to the summit in a period of twelve days. Original team members 
Belmore Browne and Dr. Herschel C. Parker disputed the sensational story, 
but debate among adherents clouded the issue until 1908 when it merged with 
Cook’s claim to have been first at the North Pole. Evidence mounted against 
Cook; two investigatory expeditions in 1910 rendered judgments that he had 
not climbed Mt. McKinley. Browne and Parker discovered and photographed 
the “fake peak” Cook had represented as the summit, a foothill twenty miles 
from the top. Ed Barrill, Cook’s 1906 partner, concurred, adding that Cook 
had dictated fraudulent journal entries. Shorn of nearly all credibility, Cook 
held to his contentions until his death in 1940.7
Sheldon played two small parts in the Cook affair. Believing at first that 
Cook had conquered the mountain, he agreed to contribute a chapter on Alas-
kan Indians to Cook’s forthcoming book To the Top of the Continent. By the time 
the truth became clear, the book had already been published. Years later when 
Amundsen visited his friend Cook in Leavenworth prison, newspapers pub-
lished the false impression that Amundsen supported Cook’s claim to the North 
Pole. The National Geographic Society withdrew an invitation to Amundsen 
to address its meeting. Sheldon tried to defend Amundsen, to no avail, and 
resigned his society membership in protest.8
Listening to the claims and counterclaims and convinced that Alaskans 
could do the job themselves, Fairbanks prospector Tom Lloyd raised funds and 
handpicked a team of miner acquaintances—Pete Anderson, Billy Taylor, and 
Charley McGonagall—for an attempt in 1910. A surveyor, the only scientifi-
cally trained member, soon left the expedition in the wake of a dispute. At 
the end of the climb the three prospectors went straight to their mining sites. 
Lloyd returned to Fairbanks, declaring that all four men had surmounted both 
the north and south peaks. Without proof, the “Sourdough Expedition” met 
disbelief.
Parker and Browne made a bid in 1912 by a northeast route first suggested 
by Charles Sheldon and Harry Karstens in 1906. Karstens had tried unsuc-
cessfully to interest Sheldon in attempting the route, but the sourdoughs had 
followed it in 1910. Browne, Parker, and Merl LaVoy got to within 300 vertical 
feet of the top when, despite the gentle final slope, a storm forced them back.
Archdeacon Hudson Stuck’s expedition reached the top on June 7, 1913. 
Walter Harper, son of a trader-prospector-explorer and an Athabaskan woman, 
led the first climb to the summit. Stuck, Robert Tatum of Tennessee, and Harry 
Karstens joined Harper at the top. On the north peak, 2 miles distant and 850 
feet lower, they could see the flagpole left by the sourdoughs in 1910. Pete 
Anderson and Billy Taylor, wearing shoepacs and without ropes, had carried 
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continued on next page
the 14-foot spruce pole from 11,000 feet to the top and returned in eighteen 
hours—one of the great feats of mountaineering.9
ALASKA’S prEMIEr NATIONAL pArK
During his 1906 visit, Sheldon had conveyed to Karstens his idea of na-
tional park status for the Mt. McKinley environs. His main motivation lay in 
the desire to save the magnificent populations of large mammals: Dall sheep, 
the prime focus of his study, as well as caribou, moose, and grizzly bears. Gold 
mining in the Fairbanks vicinity had proliferated after 1902, and a 1905 boom-
let in the Kantishna country attracted thousands of miners to the Alaska Range. 
Mining activity meant increased consumption of game.10 Sheldon presented 
the park idea to his Boone and Crockett game preservation committee col-
leagues in 1908. But resentment in Alaska over the 1908 game law and lack 
of urgency in Congress made it an inopportune time to appeal for an Alaskan 
park. Circumstances changed, however, over the next few years. Alaska became 
a territory, and the Taft and Wilson administrations initiated efforts to develop 
it economically. The 1912 territorial act contained a rider calling for a rail-
road commission to determine routes into the interior. Congress authorized 
Members of the expedition making first ascent of McKinley’s South Peak, 1913. Denali Na-
tional Park Archives. Left to right: Robert Tatum, Esais, Henry B. “Harry” Karstens, Johnny, 
Walter Harper. Absent, probably photographer: Archdeacon Hudson Stuck. Mt. McKinley, 
later the park’s centerpiece, played no significant role in its designation. Karstens, a former 
prospector and dog teamer, became the first park superintendent.
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a railroad in 1914, and Wilson chose the Seward-to-Fairbanks route in 1915. 
As construction began, Boone and Crockett leaders recognized the imminent 
danger to sheep populations in the Denali region through which the railroad 
would pass. They feared the railroad would generate mining, market hunting, 
or other intrusions—all detrimental to wildlife.
Charles Sheldon and Madison Grant took the initiative. In an October 
1915 letter to Edward W. Nelson, soon to be promoted to director of the Bu-
reau of Biological Survey, Sheldon laid out his strategy. First he would contact 
Alaska’s congressional delegate and Mt. McKinley climber James Wickersham, 
whose acquaintance he and the Boone and Crockett Club had made. With-
out Wickersham’s support no park would be possible, and Wickersham could 
nominally lead the effort by introducing the bill in Congress. Sheldon would 
contact Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and a few key members of 
Congress, then kick off the campaign officially at a club dinner. Sheldon per-
suaded Stephen T. Mather, newly in charge of national parks, to secure Lane’s 
backing, and he succeeded in less than a month.11
Boone and Crockett’s election of Mather to club membership at its De-
cember 1915 meeting did nothing to discourage his cooperation. Mather asked 
Thomas Riggs Jr., then in charge of the railroad planning survey, to lay out 
boundaries similar to Sheldon’s proposal. Satisfied that mining could continue 
unhampered, Wickersham introduced one of several bills. All incorporated 
Sheldon’s boundaries, but none adopted his proposed name of “Denali Na-
tional Park.”12
One of the Mt. McKinley climbers, Belmore Browne, had begun in 1912 
to work for a park in the Alaska Range through the Camp Fire Club of Amer-
ica. Browne (1880–1954), a hunter-painter-author-naturalist, belonged to a 
privileged New York family funded by his father’s work as a stockbroker. Several 
years of residence in Europe cultivated young Belmore’s appreciation of art and 
mountains. After a vacation trip to Southeast Alaska in the late 1880s, the fam-
ily settled in Tacoma, Washington, to engage in the lumber business. Belmore 
attended private schools in the East and roamed the wilderness of the Cascades 
during the summers. A financial downturn prevented his attending Harvard, 
and he chose the New York School of Art.
In 1902, 1903, and 1904–1905 Browne served as a hunter and artist in 
collecting expeditions of Andrew J. Stone and others on the Alaska and Kenai 
peninsulas and in the Yukon and Southeast Alaska. Author of several books and 
articles on hunting, mountain climbing, and other outdoor subjects, Browne 
painted on similar themes and composed natural history dioramas for muse-
ums. He directed the Santa Clara School of Fine Arts for several years. During 
World War II he operated out of Ladd Field in Alaska as a consultant on Arctic 
survival training.13
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Upon hearing of Sheldon’s efforts in late 1915, Browne offered his assis-
tance. Sheldon called a meeting of the Boone and Crockett game preserva-
tion committee, attended by representatives of the Camp Fire Club and John 
B. Burnham’s American Game Protective and Propagation Association. Those 
present selected Burnham to head the congressional lobbying campaign. The 
three groups controlled the private-sector effort for the park. They employed as 
their strongest argument the impending threat to the game mammals.14 In the 
Camp Fire Club pamphlet Browne warned,
[W]hile the Mt. McKinley region is the fountainhead from which come the 
herds of game that supply the huge expanse of south-central Alaska, that 
fountainhead is menaced. Slowly but surely the white man’s civilization is 
closing in, and already sled loads of dead animals from the McKinley region 
have reached the Fairbanks market. Unless a refuge is set aside, in which the 
animals can breed and rear their young unmolested, they will soon “follow 
the buffalo.”15
Charles Sheldon, in winter camp north of Mt. McKinley, 1907. Portrait file 01-3394, 
Alaska State Library. A Boone and Crockett activist, Sheldon led the drive to establish Mt. 
McKinley National Park.
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Public lands committees of both congressional houses held hearings in the 
spring of 1916. Burnham, Browne, Grinnell, and Sheldon testified before a 
sympathetic House Subcommittee on Public Lands in May. Browne and Sheldon 
extolled the beauty and wildlife of the region and, accepting the inevitability 
of the railroad, emphasized the park’s potential for tourism and economic de-
velopment in Alaska. They reiterated the necessity of protecting the land from 
commercial meat and headhunters but insisted that miners be allowed to take 
game from the park, in part because regulations prohibiting it would be unen-
forceable. They pointed out the lack of evidence that the proposed park held 
any significant mineral reserves.16
Belmore Browne in climbing gear. Portrait file PCA 01-3441, Alaska State Library. Browne 
nearly succeeded in being the first person to climb Mt. McKinley and assisted the formation 
of Mt. McKinley National Park.
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U.S. Geological Survey officer Stephen R. Capps, detailed to investigate 
the matter of sheep killing in the proposed park, made an inspection trip in the 
summer of 1916. His report appeared in National Geographic in January 1917, 
shortly before the new Congress voted on the park bill. Capps related that 
in the early days Fairbanks hunters found sheep in “the mountains just south 
of Fairbanks and east of the Nenana River.” When they had cleaned out that 
source, hunters went to the Alaska Range: “I talked with several men who take 
sheep meat to Fairbanks for sale, and one of them estimated that each winter for 
the last three years from 1,500 to 2,000 sheep have been taken from the basin 
of Toklat and Teklanika Rivers. Only a part of these reaches Fairbanks, for the 
sled dogs must be fed during the hunt and on the trail, and some hunters leave 
behind all but the choicest hind quarters.” Growth of the town of Nenana and 
the projected Alaska Railroad, to pass within fifteen miles of the park boundary, 
also bode ill for wildlife.17
Sheldon spoke before the National Parks Conference in Washington short-
ly before the final congressional vote on the park bill. Recalling his first view 
of Mt. McKinley, he declared, “I felt just exactly the same impression that I 
had when I was alone in the Grand Canyon, that feeling of reverence and awe 
produced by grandeur.” But he placed the most emphasis on the wildlife, the 
“principal reason” for the park. He wondered why the enthusiastic descriptions 
of beauty in the parklands so seldom mentioned animals. He invoked the tradi-
tional scenery of Europe for comparison:
In more civilized countries, on mountains and hills that have been more 
stamped with civilization for centuries, the adornments, the little castle with 
its spires, the Moorish castles in Spain—they enhance the landscape. . . . 
Well, it’s exactly the same in the wilderness. Does not . . . a wild animal, the 
product of that environment, so adorn it that we feel that it is complete? 
That feeling, that completeness of all your feelings that is aroused by such 
wild scenery will in this region be constantly gratified to the utmost.18
No one disputed the danger to game populations, and no powerful op-
position to the bill materialized. The measure passed and President Woodrow 
Wilson signed the McKinley Park bill on February 21, 1917.19
MANAGEMENT OF THE pArK
Sheldon, who had personally delivered the bill to President Wilson for sig-
nature, continued to lobby for management funds for the park. He had prom-
ised to support Harry Karstens for the position of superintendent, and Karstens 
occupied that position until 1928. Karstens energetically built what facilities he 
could, given minimal appropriations, and he made an earnest effort to enforce 
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the law protecting game animals. But his aggressive manner in relating to local 
citizens and subordinates led to his forced resignation.20
The enabling bill drew Mt. McKinley Park to extend about 100 miles along 
the Alaska Range, totaling 2,200 square miles. Miners retained the right to 
hunt so as to feed themselves. Congress provided no money for protection or 
construction of facilities until 1920–1921 when the National Park Service ac-
quired jurisdiction. Sheldon organized an effort to extend the park boundary 
10 miles eastward to protect it from disruptive influences related to the railroad. 
As a result, in 1922 Congress added 445 square miles to the park, and Karstens 
Dall rams in McKinley Park, June 1966. By Adolph Murie. A. Murie coll. Box 13, Univer-
sity of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Preservation of wildlife, and 
the Dall sheep in particular, inspired the initial movers to create the park.
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moved the headquarters from Nenana to McKinley Park station on the Alaska 
Railroad east of the park boundary. A quarter-million-acre addition in 1932 
took in Wonder Lake and wildlife habitat bordering on the Nenana River, in-
creasing the park’s size to nearly two million acres.21
Mount McKinley/Denali National Park and Preserve, 1932 and 1980. Courtesy Jason 
Geck
Charles sheldon and Mt. MCKinley national ParK
146
As in the case of other parks and reservations, no one consulted Alaska 
Natives about the establishment or management of McKinley Park. Tanana 
Indians had traditionally lived along the region’s main rivers and hunted and 
fished in what eventually became the park. Although relatively isolated, they 
eventually succumbed to the influences of the Euro-American invasion: disease, 
alcoholism, and cultural change. Some worked for wages in mining or other-
wise served miners and travelers. Some trapped for the fur trade but lost their 
territories to the more aggressive white men. By the time the park materialized, 
very few Indians hunted within its boundaries.22
Wildlife protection
Dedicated by law both to the preservation of unspoiled Nature for future 
generations and to access for tourism and other recreation, the National Park 
Service faced a dilemma. Virtually none of the parks in the States contained 
enough acreage to be an intact ecosystem for large mammals, and as tourists 
multiplied, wilderness declined. Mt. McKinley National Park embodied ad-
Former market hunter’s cabin used by park rangers for night shelter, 1926. RG 79G Box 11, 
National Archives at College Park. Commercial hunting threatened wildlife populations, 
especially as railroad construction neared the park. Park status prohibited sport hunting, and 
the Park Service banned all hunting in 1928.
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vantages and disadvantages in relation to the Park Service’s mission. In addition 
to scenic splendor, it featured a community of wildlife unprecedented for a 
national park and offered a chance of retaining it. Wildlife protection had moti-
vated the conservation clubs to push for park status, but Alaskan politicians and 
other boosters valued the park more for its economic development potential. 
They wanted to maximize mining and tourism, and they tolerated game pres-
ervation as a benefit to local hunters. In evolving forms, the tension between 
development and preservation dogged the park throughout its existence.
Wildlife continued to be central to park affairs. Imminent danger from 
commercial hunting had helped create the park, and instances of excess killing 
of game prompted a 1928 ban on hunting. The small number of miners in-
volved could acquire game outside park boundaries. Appreciation of the value of 
protecting game stocks enabled Alaskan support for park boundary extensions, 
which otherwise would have been opposed. But Alaskan opinion erupted in 
virulent form over the alleged depletion of Dall sheep by wolves (Chapter 13). 
This episode, lasting more than two decades, forced the Park Service to partially 
abandon ecological principles in park management. Research by Adolph “Ade” 
Murie, added to work by his brother Olaus and biologists George M. Wright 
and Joseph S. Dixon, helped turn public opinion toward an understanding 
of the park’s ecological function and reinforced the Park Service commitment 
to maintenance of ecological integrity as a core goal. National Park Service 
historian William E. Brown described Ade Murie as probably “the single most 
influential person in shaping the geography and the wilderness-wildlife policies 
of the modern [Denali] park.”23
Mining, permitted by the enabling bill, jeopardized the park’s scenery, 
wildlife, and wilderness quality. Kantishna, the most active district, lay just 
outside the northern boundary, and boosters wanted a road through the park to 
connect the district to the Alaska Railroad for ore hauling. The road, adopted as 
a goal by the Park Service, would also ease tourist access to the north side of Mt. 
McKinley. Miners found modest deposits of gold and copper in the 1920s but 
not enough to overcome the costs of operation. Fewer than twenty miners re-
mained year-round in the Kantishna vicinity in the early 1930s. Governmental 
setting of gold at $35 per ounce, and the completion of the park road in 1938, 
revived gold mining during 1937–1942. An antimony deposit proved valuable 
for wartime needs. Then the government shut down gold mines as nonessential 
to the war effort. No significant resurgence of mining took place in the region 
until the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971 and the value of 
gold escalated. But in 1965 the Park Service and Bureau of Land Management 
arranged a withdrawal of the region surrounding Kantishna to protect wildlife 
habitat.24 In 1976 legislation ended new mining claims in the park, and after 
1980, no mining could be conducted in the park.
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Tourism
As soon as the park came into existence, Stephen Capps declared in Travel 
magazine that “the area on the north flank of the Alaska range is of unrivaled 
value as a national playground not only because of its abundant big game, but 
because it contains America’s most stupendous mountain scenery.”25 Tourism 
commenced in 1922, by which time the park could be reached via the Alaska 
Railroad. Sixty-two tourists appeared in 1924 and 206 in 1925. Cars and buses 
took them 12 miles into the park to Savage River camp, and they could go far-
ther on horseback. The 90-mile road reached its terminus at Kantishna in 1938. 
Tourism declined during the early Depression years but peaked at 2,900 in 
1939. The park’s visibility had been stimulated by the first climb of both peaks 
of Mt. McKinley in 1932 by superintendent Harry Liek and ranger Grant Pear-
son, accompanied by Minneapolis lawyer Alfred Lindley and Norwegian skier 
Erling Strom. Unlike later expeditions that flew to glaciers at high altitudes, the 
Liek expedition traveled to its base camp by dog team.26
In 1942 the U.S. Army requisitioned the park as a recreation area for service 
men and women, hosting as many as 8,000 per month. The army relinquished 
the park after the war, but the Alaska Highway opening in 1948 guaranteed a 
steep upswing in visitors to the park. Plans called for a hotel by Wonder Lake at 
the far western end of the park road. It would supplement campgrounds along 
the road and the hotel built in 1939 at McKinley Park near the entrance.27 A 
1951–1952 recreation survey report by the Interior Department exuded unre-
strained enthusiasm for tourism potential. It recommended that
comfortable accommodations and facilities for eating and sleeping should be 
developed somewhere in the park where there is a good view of Mt. McKin-
ley. The Wonder Lake vicinity has excellent possibilities as a site for a lodge. 
. . . The accommodations and facilities that will be needed when the park 
is connected with the Richardson Highway should be constructed as soon 
as possible. Roads and bridges should be added and improved. In addition 
to the campgrounds and lodge mentioned above, there will be a need for a 
store, gas station, automobile repair facilities, restaurants, and more housing. 
Once the park is readily accessible by automobile, it is reasonable to assume 
the attendance figures will skyrocket. . . . Facilities should be constructed 
that would enable a visitor to participate in summertime activities such as 
tennis, golf, and swimming [and] winter sports activities. . . . Means should 
be found to improve the park program so that visitors will be encouraged to 
stay in the park for a few days, rather than to treat it as a target for “quickie” 
sightseeing trips.
This scenario apparently did not trouble the writers as undermining the values 
for which visitors came to the park, especially if numbers continued to escalate. 
Rather, the writers worried that “it will take years to overcome the bad publicity 
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Tourist party crossing moraine of Muldrow Glacier, 1927. RG 79G Box 11, National Ar-
chives at College Park. From a trickle in the 1920s, park visitors multiplied to hundreds of 
thousands by the end of the century.
that will reach potential tourists in the States if the first group of motorists 
brings back word that facilities are lacking.”28
Park officials realized that such infrastructure would severely diminish the 
park’s wild character. A 170-mile road, the Denali Highway, connected the en-
trance eastward to the Richardson Highway in 1957, giving auto-borne tourists 
their first direct access to the park. The expected Parks Highway from Fairbanks 
to Anchorage, completed in 1972, would pass by the entrance and again mul-
tiply the number of visitors.
Slow funding during the 1950s and the emergence of wilderness advocacy 
groups tipped the balance toward keeping the park more natural. Olaus and 
Adolph Murie, Aldo Leopold, Sigurd F. Olson, and others had lent their voic-
es, and the Fairbanks chapter of the Pioneers endorsed further park expansion 
to protect wildlife. Park planners, prompted by a survey conducted by Olson, 
pushed for an expansion that ultimately more than doubled the size of the park 
to 5.7 million acres in 1980. Renamed Denali National Park and Preserve, it 
retained the name Mt. McKinley for its famous centerpiece. Planners did not 
build the recommended hotel at Wonder Lake and arranged for buses rather 
than private automobiles to take visitors through the park.29 But the ongoing 
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growth of traffic near and into the park, and the conversion of mining claims 
at Kantishna to tourist facilities, left the future of Denali’s wilderness quality 
in doubt.
Mt. McKinley (later Denali) National Park won renown as the central focal 
point of Alaska’s wilderness image, one of the nation’s flagship parklands, and a 
unique national treasure. In mounting numbers people came from around the 
world to take in its dramatic scenery, to climb the mountain, to view its wild-
life, to be touched by Nature on a grand scale. In no small part, their interest 
had been generated by the photography of Charles J. “Charlie” Ott. Raised on 
a farm in Wisconsin, Ott visited the park in the late 1940s following military 
service during the war. Superintendent Pearson offered him a job as a main-
tenance man and mechanic. Ott spent his spare time exploring the wildlands 
with his friend Ade Murie, eventually becoming one of the park’s leading natu-
ralists. Honing his skills as a photographer, Ott produced many of the images 
that made the park famous. A committed conservationist, he joined numerous 
environmental groups and donated his photographic slides to them. After re-
tirement in 1974 he studied birds in the Southwest and spent summers at his 
cabin near McKinley Park. The University of Alaska awarded him an honorary 
doctorate in 1989.30
Park visitors might encounter any of 37 species of mammals—including 
black and grizzly bears, moose, caribou, Dall sheep, wolves, wolverines, and 
lynx—and 137 species of birds.31 Perhaps unknowingly, they would glimpse 
Mt. Sheldon and Browne Tower near Mt. McKinley, named for the park’s two 
founders.32 They would not soon forget their adventure in the shining land of 
the North, and they told the story to anyone who would listen. Almost cer-
tainly, the excitement and wonder experienced by American visitors to the park 
swelled the outpouring of approval for the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act that expanded Denali and preserved tens of millions more 
acres in Alaska.
The formation and management of McKinley Park reflected significant 
changes in environmental values. Before 1917 and, in effect, before the assign-
ment of rangers in 1921, only the weakly enforced game law of 1908 safeguard-
ed wildlife. Mining operations had free rein under the dominant paradigm of 
free-enterprise exploitation of natural resources as the presumed basis for eco-
nomic progress. Absence of scientific information and effective regulation cast 
doubt on the long-term viability of a unique ecological asset. But ownership of 
the land by the federal government, and the vigilance of conservationists in the 
States, made possible a reversal of the downward trend. Boone and Crockett 
and the Bureau of Biological Survey insisted on a minimal goal of selected spe-
cies protection and, by their advocacy of a large game reserve, moved the goal 
toward habitat, if not ecosystem, preservation. Based on their mandate to retain 
Charles Sheldon and Mt. McKinley National Park
151
Adolph Murie at McKinley Park, November 1939. Denali National Park Archives. Dr. 
Murie made notable contributions to the science of predator-prey relationships and to the 
preservation of wilderness values in the park.
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unspoiled Nature, National Park Service officials aspired to ecosystem protec-
tion as an explicit goal for the park. Yet all had to accommodate Alaskans and 
tourism entrepreneurs, who showed little interest in ecosystem protection as 
such. Park management objectives included elements—the road to Kantishna, 
hotel-building, and temporary wolf control—that fell short of nonconsumptive 
human use or even sustainable use of the land and wildlife.
Charlie Ott, Fairbanks, 1984. By Malcolm Lockwood. Ott’s wildlife photos enhanced the 
popularity of Mt. McKinley National Park.
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Charles Sheldon had initiated the effort to provide the science necessary to 
validate ecologically oriented goals and management objectives. Stephen Capps 
produced timely and telling evidence of the need for legislation to conserve the 
Dall sheep. Prompted by the wolf control controversy, Adolph Murie and other 
biologists promoted a more explicit ecological perspective and agenda. Delays 
caused by the Depression, World War II, and the Korean War kept McKinley 
Park relatively unspoiled. Then the growing environmental community, in-
creasingly backed by public opinion, lent its weight to ecosystem preservation 
and nonconsumptive uses of the park.
In terms of decision-making power, the enabling act forced the Park Ser-
vice to accommodate miners and Alaska Railroad supporters, who stood to 
benefit from mining and tourism. The 1928 hunting ban and the gradual phas-
ing out of mining left management more firmly in the hands of government 
experts. But pressure to increase tourist access to the detriment of Denali’s eco-
system continued to rise. Not until after statehood would there be Alaskan en-
vironmental organizations ready to participate in management deliberations in 
support of ecological values. They, their stateside environmentalist colleagues, 
and the Park Service fought against repeated efforts by the state and some 
federal administrators to increase commercial exploitation of the environs of 
McKinley/Denali Park.
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Robert F. Griggs and 
Katmai National Monument
late in tHe sPRinG oF 1912 a natuRal disasteR ConCeiVed a suPeRlatiVe alasKan 
parkland. A geologic event on the Alaska Peninsula between Kodiak Island and 
Bristol Bay claimed a place among the greatest volcanic eruptions ever recorded. 
In doing so it triggered a series of events that produced one of the nation’s larg-
est national parks and fi nest examples of ecosystem preservation.
American Pete, the Aleut chief of Savonoski and among the few recorded 
eyewitnesses of the event, recalled, “The Katmai Mountain blew up with lots 
of fi re, and fi re come down trail from Katmai with lots of smoke. We go fast 
Savonoski. Everybody get in bidarka. Helluva job. We come Naknek one day, 
dark, no can see. Hot ash fall.”1 The town of Savonoski had been evacuated 
because of volcanic rumblings, but American Pete and his companions had 
returned to a camp on the Katmai trail 18 miles from the explosion to retrieve 
hunting equipment. They barely escaped by a 75-mile paddle to Naknek on 
Bristol Bay.2
Three days after the explosion a Russian at Kafl ia Bay on Shelikof Strait, 30 miles 
east of and downwind from the eruption site, wrote a letter to his wife, Tania:
7
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A mountain has burst near here, so that we are covered with ashes, in some 
places 10 feet and 6 feet deep. All this began on the 6th of June. Night and 
day we light lamps. We cannot see the daylight. In a word, it is terrible, and 
we are expecting death at any moment, and we have no water. All the rivers 
are covered with ashes. Just ashes mixed with water. Here are darkness and 
hell, thunder and noise. I do not know whether it is day or night. . . . Perhaps 
we shall see each other again. . . . Pray for us. Your husband, Ivan Orloff.3
At the time of the eruption most of the people along Shelikof Strait in 
the Gulf of Alaska either worked at canneries on Kodiak Island or fl ed south-
westward from their villages to Puale Bay or eastward to Afognak. Some from 
the villages of Katmai and Kaguyak (Douglas) remained at Kafl ia Bay where a 
salmon saltery operated. Six days after the eruption the Revenue Marine Service 
evacuated the people at Kafl ia Bay to Afognak. Later in the summer the service 
resettled most of them, 78 in all, at Perryville 200 miles southwest of Katmai 
village. Katmai, Kafl ia Bay, and Kaguyak on the Gulf side and Savonoski and 
two other small settlements on the Bristol Bay side were never reestablished. By 
the time the sites became habitable by humans, perhaps ten to twenty years af-
ter the eruption, the sites had been incorporated into a national monument.4
The Katmai eruption threw up more than 6 cubic miles—29 billion tons—
of material. At Seward, 250 miles away, sulfuric acid killed vegetation. A ship’s 
bell at Cape Spencer, 750 miles away, tarnished twenty minutes after being 
polished. Dust could be seen and booms heard 750 miles away at Juneau, and 
fumes were detected in British Columbia and Washington State. Ash covered 
950 square miles 3 feet deep and 30,000 square miles an inch deep. Europeans 
noticed a haze, and the Northern Hemisphere experienced an unusually cool 
summer, averaging 1.6 degrees Fahrenheit below normal.5
A colorful legacy preceded the 1912 eruption at Katmai. In 1789 the Rus-
sians set up a trading post at the Koniag Alutiiq village of Katmai; Aleuts wiped 
it out. Alexander Baranov, manager of the Shelikov-Golikov Company, reestab-
lished it in the early 1790s. When the United States purchased Alaska, a series 
of geographical expeditions immediately set forth to inventory the territory’s 
resources. Several visits to the Katmai coast beginning in 1867 turned up no 
evidence of important mineral resources in the region.6 In 1868, Hutchinson, 
Kohl & Company assumed control of the trading post at Katmai, and its suc-
cessor Alaska Commercial Company opened a post at nearby Douglas in 1878. 
Earning substantial amounts of money from sea otter pelts in the 1870s and 
1880s, the Aleuts converted to a cash economy. When the otters disappeared 
by about 1886, the Aleuts lapsed into poverty, relieved in part by employment 
in salmon canneries.
Katmai Pass, the high point of a trail across the Alaska Peninsula to Bristol 
Bay, served Alaska Natives for centuries and Russians for decades. Ivan Petroff 
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passed through the divide while conducting the 1880 census and felt “com-
passed on every hand by the grandest visions of Alpine scenery, snows and 
glaciers.”7 Crossing from Savonoski in the north to Katmai on the south side, 
Petroff ’s group hoped to find a ship to take them to Kodiak. Finding none, 
they paddled in baidarkas. A local weather forecaster’s judgment turned out to 
be wrong, and they underwent a hazardous thirteen-hour voyage in rough seas, 
partly at night.
Briefly, the U.S. Postal Service carried over the pass. Beginning in 1899 
hundreds of prospectors followed the route as a shortcut to the goldfields of 
Nome, avoiding the hazards of ocean travel through the Aleutian passes.8 In 
the howling winds and sudden storms of winter, Katmai Pass could be a death 
trap. Its fame spread after an 1889 visit by Hugh Cecil Lowther, the Fifth Earl 
of Lonsdale. Leaving England to escape publicity of his affair with an actress, 
the earl sought adventure in the American North. He traveled up the Macken-
zie River Valley, along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, across the Brooks Range 
to the Porcupine River, and by dog team down the Yukon and south along the 
Bering Sea coast. Expected to negotiate the pass in mid-February and thinking 
the weather prohibitive, his Native companions balked. Lowther, impatient to 
Village of Katmai after eruption, 1913. By Mel Horner. KATM 40415, Lake Clark Kat-
mai Center. Natives abandoned Katmai and five other small villages during the eruption 
and did not reestablish them; the sites became part of Katmai National Monument.
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get home, threatened to shoot anyone who resisted. This persuaded the Natives, 
who had just seen Lowther repay a dog that had bitten him by shooting it in the 
head at a distance of 150 yards. After crossing the divide, Lowther wrote, “We 
began to descend but the storm was terrible, gale very strong we could hardly 
stand, snowing, drifting & freezing hard. I could not see the man in front of me 
at all times & he was only 4 or 5 paces ahead.” A momentary lift in the weather 
revealed three large glacial crevasses nearby. Separated from the main party on 
the way down the south slope, Lowther had to camp in another storm. The 
starving dogs ate the rawhide from the sleds and snowshoes, and two dogs died 
before the party made it to Katmai.9 Before long such adventures as Lowther’s 
would be replaced by scientific expeditions.
VOLCANIC STUDIES
U.S. Geological Survey geologist Josiah Edward Spurr examined the Kat-
mai region in 1898. Like Petroff he traveled from Naknek to Katmai, but he 
made the trip in mid-October. He described the snow-covered Katmai Pass as
extremely wild and rugged. . . . For several miles on both sides of the summit 
there is no trace of vegetation. . . . Many Natives have perished here by being 
caught in gales, for during storms, even in summer, the wind blows with 
piercing intensity and coldness. At such times stones of considerable size 
are picked up by the wind and carried through the narrow defiles where the 
traveler must walk, and we found many of these stones lying on the snow. 
Owing to this danger the Natives can not be induced to cross except in 
perfectly calm and clear weather.
Spurr noted a small earthquake, hot springs, and other evidence of volcanic 
activity on the south side of the pass.10
Native lore made no mention of eruptions; the 1912 event surprised every-
one and stimulated great curiosity. Canadian explorer Jack Lee, first to visit the 
scene, arrived a week after the explosion.11 Mt. Katmai had lost 800 feet of its 
7,500-foot elevation and displayed a new crater lake 3 miles across and 3,500 
feet deep that observers assumed to be the locus of the explosion. Actually, 
Novarupta, 5 miles distant, had erupted, and the loss of material beneath the 
surface had caused the top of Mt. Katmai to collapse. Semimolten sand then 
flowed into the valley west of Katmai Pass, burying it an average of 100 feet 
deep and causing fumaroles of gas and steam to shoot upward.12 Lee reported 
that Katmai had not been the source of the explosion, a thesis finally proven 
correct in the 1950s. A few days after Lee’s visit geologist George C. Martin 
arrived representing the National Geographic Society. A year later curiosity 
seekers William A. Hesse of Cordova and Mel A. Horner of Seward arrived, 
climbed into the mountains, and became the first to view the agglomeration 
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of fumaroles in the sand-covered valley soon to be famous as the Valley of Ten 
Thousand Smokes.13
One organization showed strong interest in Katmai: the National Geo-
graphic Society, sponsor of seven expeditions beginning in 1912 to study 
botany and vulcanology at Katmai. Articles in National Geographic followed 
most of the expeditions. Immediately upon hearing of the eruption the society 
dispatched Martin, who had surveyed the Katmai coast as a member of a U.S. 
Geological Survey team in 1904. He arrived in the town of Kodiak on Kodiak 
Island four weeks after the event, having interviewed witnesses in several places 
along the way. The town had been plunged into darkness for nearly 60 hours 
and had lost radio transmission capability. The steamer Dora, headed for Ko-
diak, instead had to run out to sea in midday darkness so deep the crew could 
not see the ocean surface. Captain C.B. McMullen reported that “heavy thun-
der and lightning commenced early in the afternoon and continued through 
the night. Birds of all species kept falling on the deck in a helpless condition. 
The temperature rose owing to the heat of the volcanic ash, the latter permeat-
ing into all parts of the ship.” The Dora proceeded to the Kenai Peninsula and 
again ran into darkness created by ashfall.14
A series of heavy explosions and earthquakes, followed by gigantic clouds 
of ash, had occurred for the first three days after the eruption, and lesser activity 
persisted throughout the summer. Martin found ash layers 3.5 inches deep on 
parts of Afognak Island 113 miles downwind from the presumed volcano, about 
12 inches deep at Kodiak 100 miles east and directly downwind of the source, 
and 55 inches deep at Amalik Bay on the Katmai coast 15.5 miles southeast of 
the source. Rafts of pumice a foot thick floated in the bay. Nearly all vegetation 
at the bay had been buried or killed, and only fox tracks testified to the pres-
ence of mammals. Three dogs survived at the nearby village of Katmai, whose 
few residents had left just before the eruption. On Kodiak and Afognak islands, 
hungry and partially blind brown bears reportedly attacked cattle. As far away 
as Iliamna Lake the ash blinded rabbits and killed a wide variety of small birds 
and mammals. Fewer salmon could be found in the streams, and barnacles and 
mussels died. Two or three people at Kodiak died after breathing the volcanic 
dust. Martin regarded the inconveniences to humans as temporary and judged 
that “the soil will probably be improved.”15
On southern Afognak Island the ash lay 10 inches deep and covered 70 
percent of the vegetation. But when the surface dried and cracked after rains, 
the taller and stronger plants emerged through the cracks. Foxes virtually dis-
appeared from the island, and the following winter trappers complained that 
the abrasive ash had ruined furbearer pelts by wearing them down and matting 
them. Spawning salmon and steelheads choked on sediment in the streams, and 
relatively few sockeye fingerlings returned to the sea the following year. Ash also 
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W.A. Hesse filming Katmai volcano, 1913. Greely coll. PCA 66-368, Alaska State Library. 
The Katmai eruption drew scientific and public interest, ultimately producing a national 
park.
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killed worms and insects needed by fish. In the salt water, sea urchins, clams, 
and cockles died and the growth of kelp appeared to be retarded. The near-
complete destruction of mosses caused postponement of a plan to introduce 
reindeer for sustenance of the Natives.16
Botany professor Robert Fiske Griggs (1881–1962) of Ohio State Uni-
versity first visited the Katmai area in 1913; and in 1915, 1916, 1917, 1919, 
and 1930 he headed expeditions. A native of Columbus and 1903 graduate of 
Ohio State, Griggs earned a master’s degree at the University of Minnesota and 
a doctorate at Harvard. His kelp study on the Alaskan coast caught the atten-
tion of National Geographic Society officers, who chose him to lead most of the 
organization’s safaris to Katmai.17
Volcanic debris rendered the Katmai region difficult to negotiate and poten-
tially dangerous to visitors. A landslide had dammed up Katmai River, forming 
a large lake in the valley. In early 1915 the dam burst, sending a wall of water 
down the valley at 70 miles per hour, moving boulders the size of houses.18 In 
places the water washed away ash and revived buried vegetation. When Griggs 
and his partner Lucius G. Folsom arrived that year, they found most trees dead 
but some regenerating. On the beaches around Katmai Bay they saw tracks of 
fox and brown bear. Salmon ascended the streams to spawn. A year later they 
encountered numerous signs of additional predators—wolves and wolverines—
and by 1919 abundant evidence of moose and caribou.19
Katmai volcano ash at Kodiak, 100 miles downwind, 1912. Thwaites coll. 0182-1252A, 
University of Washington Libraries Special Collections. Ashfall from one of history’s greatest 
volcanic explosions temporarily disrupted agriculture and ecosystems.
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Griggs and his colleagues paid the most attention to vegetative recovery, the 
key to rejuvenation of Katmai’s ecosystem. Several elements inhibited regrowth: 
ashfall, ranging up to 40 feet deep, buried many plants. Some trees, notably 
willows, survived by protruding above ground level. Horsetail, one of the old-
est plants on earth, could push up through three feet of ash. Grasses and other 
plants could penetrate thinner layers. Streams might rescue plants by exposing 
roots, but they often changed course in the unstable volcanic material. Katmai’s 
frequent high winds lowered ash levels in many locales but also contributed to 
surface instability by constantly moving material, and flying particles damaged 
vegetation. Seeds could germinate in the ash if given water and protection from 
wind. Yet lack of nitrogen and humus retarded soil stability and plant growth. 
Brown bears contributed to recovery by leaving deep footprints in which seeds 
could find increased moisture and protection from the wind.20
The 1915 research team set up vegetation observation stations on the Kat-
mai coast and near the village of Kodiak. When he arrived in June, Griggs 
marveled at the rapidity of change:
It was not the same Kodiak that I had left two years before. The mountains 
were everywhere green. . . . Where before had been barren ash was now 
rich grass as high as one’s head. Everyone agrees that the eruption was “the 
best thing that ever happened to Kodiak.” In the words of our hotel keeper, 
“Never was any such grass before, so high or so early. No one ever believed 
that the country could grow so many berries, nor so large.”21
At Kodiak, particles lay in three sizes: a light gray dust on top, medium-
sized grains, and angular grains the size of fine sand on the bottom. Wind blew 
away most of the gray dust and some of the medium-sized material. Wind and 
water exposed hilly areas, facilitating vegetative growth. Trees still carried coats 
similar to snowfall, but most survived. Numerous plants arose from roots bur-
ied as long as three years. Seedlings could be seen in 1916, and earthworms had 
begun to mix the soil and create humus. But sphagnum bogs did not recover, 
and in some spots the ash formed a hard layer that acted like quicksand when 
water-saturated.22 Whatever the effect on animals, the eruption disturbed most 
vegetation only temporarily.
Griggs returned in 1930 to observe the change in vegetation since 1919. 
He found widespread growth of small plants and willows, largely from roots not 
killed by volcanic ash. Others such as grasses had taken root from the surface 
where seeds, plants, and small amounts of organic material had been blown in 
by the wind. In the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes, covered by ash essentially 
devoid of nitrogen, he found extensive and luxurious growth of two species of 
liverwort. He theorized that the plants had somehow managed to fix nitrogen 
in a sterile environment and would provide organic material for succeeding 
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plant life. The uncontaminated ash bed at Katmai offered a rare opportunity to 
examine plant colonization and succession.23
Griggs and Folsom first sighted the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes, so 
named by Griggs, on their 1916 expedition. The once-green valley below Mt. 
Katmai, about seven miles wide by fifteen miles long, now appeared as a barren 
plain punctuated by highly active steam vents. For years it represented the most 
dramatic expression of volcanic activity in North America, attracting the notice 
of writers and visitors. Even though he knew of Hesse and Horner’s 1913 sight-
ing of the valley, Griggs for some time regarded himself as its discoverer and 
generally received credit for it. Similarly, he erroneously believed his party had 
been the first to view the crater of Mt. Katmai.24
Donovan B. Church, Griggs’s photographer on the 1917 expedition, re-
counted his impressions of the valley:
It seemed to me, as we stood on the edge of Novarupta, that this was the 
Devil’s own private corner in hell itself. It seemed, as I gazed at the seething 
steam clouds that rushed from the cooling lava plug, and at the shattered, 
steam-smothered furnace that filled the vale beyond, that there was some 
vague, fantastic form, a horrid dream, a hideous, potent “thing” which was 
Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes; Mt. Mageik (left) and Mt. Katmai in background. Jasper 
Sayre coll. KATM 7696, Lake Clark Katmai Studies Center 7696. The fumaroles, a deter-
mining factor in Katmai’s park designation, proved short-lived.
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not for human eyes to see nor human ears to hear. . . . As, homeward bound, 
we skirted Cerberus, the steamers turned in the dying sunlight to shimmer-
ing gold and the snowy crests of distant mountains glinted yellow. I forgot 
the heavy pack which bowed my shoulders as I glanced backward at the 
growing beauty which filled the valley. Through its giant gateway the “Valley 
of the Ten Thousand Smokes” sank from sight as we dropped over the pass, 
and the sky above reddened to a crimson halo in the fading rays of the sink-
ing sun.25
Such descriptions, supplemented by photographs in National Geographic and 
by scientific articles, shifted public attention away from botanical studies and 
identified the Katmai region as primarily a volcanic phenomenon.
KATMAI BECOMES A PARK
Katmai so impressed Griggs that while in camp during the 1916 expedition 
he resolved to work for its status as a national park. National Geographic Society 
president Gilbert Grosvenor liked the idea and arranged expeditions for 1917 
and 1918, in part to support the park status effort. Most of the politics took 
place behind the scenes. Grosvenor contacted society board member Franklin 
K. Lane, who happened to be secretary of the interior. Lane referred him to 
acting National Park Service director Horace M. Albright, who approved of the 
project. Albright advised that the 1917 designation of Mt. McKinley National 
Park made it unwise to ask Congress for another park so soon, that Katmai 
should be designated a national monument by presidential proclamation.26
National Geographic expeditions and articles generated a favorable public 
attitude toward Katmai, as did a few other magazine articles. Griggs pulled 
out the stops in an August 1918 issue of Nature: “The Valley of Ten Thousand 
Smokes . . . is traversed by hundreds of fissures extending along its margin or 
criss-crossing its floor. These fissures are the seat of several millions of volcanic 
vents of all sizes, from great volcanoes pouring forth columns of vapor more 
than a mile high, down to minute jets of gas.” For readers more difficult to 
sway he declared, “As a spectacle of the grandest of all the forces of Nature, the 
Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes is so far beyond anything else known to us on 
the globe as to make it quite certain that it will rank as the first wonder of the 
world.” Moreover, the reader might share directly in the glory: “Were the means 
of transportation provided, it would be quite possible to land from an ocean 
liner in the morning and cover the whole of the district in a single day by auto-
mobile.”27 Having read Griggs’s articles, Alaska congressional delegate Charles 
Sulzer offered to introduce a park bill if needed, adding that “we have the highest 
mountain in the continent enclosed in a national park in Alaska; why shouldn’t 
we have the biggest volcanic crater in the world similarly enclosed?”28
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Laura Griggs and husband, Robert, at Baked Mountain, Katmai National Monument, 
1919. National Geographic Society Katmai Expedition No. 6491, University of Alaska 
Anchorage Archives. Griggs led five NGS expeditions to the Katmai region and succeeded in 
gaining monument status for it.
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One question had an important bearing on Katmai’s status: whether the 
10,000 smokes, a potential tourist attraction, constituted a permanent phe-
nomenon or just temporary releases of trapped water. In 1918 the National 
Geographic Society declared the phenomenon permanent. This assessment 
may have made the difference in Lane’s favorable recommendation to President 
Wilson. No organized opposition surfaced, and no public debates or hearings 
had been conducted. National Geographic articles had left an impression of the 
region as essentially a scientific curiosity of no economic value except for tour-
ism. Preoccupied by the war and sensing no controversy, Wilson signed the or-
der for the 1,700-square-mile monument on September 24, 1918.29 The proc-
lamation cited the work of the National Geographic Society as the determining 
element in the monument’s creation.30
Several groups of sightseers and filmmakers visited the monument in the 
1920s and 1930s. But the distance from population centers and travel routes 
restricted access to a relatively wealthy and adventurous few. No one could af-
ford to invest in comfortable facilities at or near the monument, and this lack 
of accommodations in turn retarded the flow of tourists.31
Father Bernard Hubbard, the adventurous “glacier priest” and geologist 
who had climbed extensively in the Alps and elsewhere, enhanced Katmai’s 
magic appeal by making seven visits between 1927 and 1934. Accompanied 
by his friend Red Chisholm and two graduate students in 1929, he climbed 
Mt. Katmai and traversed the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes. Atop Katmai, 
Hubbard peered into the gigantic caldera, three miles across and a half-mile 
deep: “a vivid mosaic in yellow, violet, orange, green and vermilion, empha-
sized by bold lines of black and studded with glaciers glinting like jewels in the 
sun.” He descended to the blue lake at the bottom. On the way to the fabled 
valley the party cowered in their tents, pelted by pumice stones driven by a 
36-hour blizzard. Hubbard described the valley as they viewed it on a clear 
morning: “On either side rose a line of lofty, smoking mountains, ash-yellow 
slopes hung with snow fields and sparkling blue glaciers. The feet of those 
volcanoes were gashed with fissures red as blood. The smooth valley floor was 
yellow, but punctuated by fumaroles ringed with brilliant red, blue, violet and 
orange.” He noticed, however, that the valley “is growing cold. . . . Instead of 
thousands of smokes, there are now only hundreds.” Hubbard also took note of 
one of the sources of post-eruption recovery. During blizzards the men watched 
numerous small trees and bunches of grass fly past, uprooted from elevations 
far below.32
Hubbard’s crews compiled the most complete motion picture record of the 
Katmai region available in the 1930s. In 1934 they found access to the interior 
still difficult. Men and pack dogs sank up to their waists and bellies in the soft 
sand. They walked through a dead forest left by the explosion:
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Stark, gaunt trunks of fallen giants sprawled about the ground, their limbs 
fl ung out in reckless abandon as though they had grasped for life as life was 
departing. Dead trees stood upright, without leaf of foliage, without color save 
the ghastly color of death. . . . This phantom forest stretched for miles, and in 
all that expanse we and our dogs were the only living things. Curiosity led us 
to strike some of the dead branches—they snapped like pistol shots; and when 
we examined them they showed no sign of decay. There was no appreciable 
weight to the wood, either, and logs of impressive size could be heaved about 
as though we were giants of prodigious strength playing with twigs.33
In the valley Hubbard found “tough grasses a foot or more in height, and 
large patches of fl owering Alaska cotton.” As for the smokes, Hubbard judged 
them “a great disappointment. [The valley] is so inaccessible, so totally different 
from the enthusiastic descriptions of its fi rst explorers, and fi nally, so belies the 
predictions of what might be expected of it, that it should be discontinued as a 
National Monument, and the trappers who made an honest living in the Valley 
should be allowed to return there.”34 Hubbard therein touched on a weak point 
in Katmai’s standing; namely, whether restrictive monument status represented 
a higher use of the land. Other critics had challenged the designation, and more 
would do so in the coming decades.
Katmai National Monument/Park and Preserve, 1931 and 1980. Courtesy Jason Geck
Robert F. Griggs and Katmai National Monument
167
Father Bernard Hubbard and dog at Katmai Crater, 1929. Hubbard coll. VTS 29-03, 
Santa Clara University Archives. Hubbard, the “glacier priest,” compiled the first moving 
picture record of Katmai National Monument.
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CHALLENGES TO THE PARK
Like other federal attempts to protect land in Alaska, Katmai met op-
position from settlers and politicians. The monument designation happened 
not long after the closure of coalfields in 1906 and oil lands in 1910. Alaska’s 
governor Thomas Riggs remarked pointedly in his 1918 annual report that 
“practically all of the reservations should be eliminated.” In 1920 he declared 
that Katmai Monument “serves no purpose and should be abolished.” But the 
writings of Griggs and others, promising tourism dollars, helped dampen criti-
cism. In 1923 the U.S. Geological Survey sent two teams into the monument 
to assess mineral potential. They reported a low likelihood of finding significant 
mineral deposits. Thereafter, governors’ reports focused on tourism potential 
rather than mining.35
Prospects for immediate tourism expansion faded in the 1920s. But anoth-
er Park Service goal, preservation of wilderness and wildlife, emerged. Charles 
Sheldon, expressing the interest of the Boone and Crockett Club, had recog-
nized the potential for a brown bear sanctuary and drafted revised monument 
Looking north across head of Geographic Harbor, 1940. By Victor B. Scheffer. RG 79G Box 
9, National Archives at College Park. Snowy Mountain at upper left. Vegetation has risen 
through the ashfall in many places.
Robert F. Griggs and Katmai National Monument
169
boundaries for that purpose. As the brown bear controversy (Chapter 12) heat-
ed in the late 1920s and the 1930s, Griggs, Stewart Edward White, and others 
rose to the bears’ defense. After Griggs visited Katmai in 1930 he pointed out 
in a report to the Interior Department that only in the monument did brown 
bears live unmolested. Boundaries needed to be extended north and west, he 
contended, to sustain the bears on a long-term basis. Writings in defense of 
the bears helped prompt President Herbert Hoover’s signing of a 1931 order 
enlarging Katmai National Monument to 4,214 square miles, for “features of 
historical and scientific interest and protection of the brown bear, moose and 
other wild animals.”36 Thus the rationale for the park broadened to encompass 
status as a wildlife sanctuary. This change would prove vital in National Park 
Service efforts to prevent decommissioning of the monument, by now the larg-
est in the national park system.
In spite of its size, Katmai maintained a tenuous hold on monument status. 
Remoteness and lack of facilities deterred tourism, and the scarcity of tourists 
in turn inhibited budget appropriations for facilities. Katmai received virtually 
no money during its first three decades. Its headquarters were in Mt. McKinley 
National Park 400 miles away, itself underfunded. Neglect of Katmai encour-
aged poaching of wildlife and other intrusions and a revival of demands for 
abolition of the monument.37
Alaska Game Commission wardens reported frequent illegal trapping in 
Katmai in the mid-1930s. Unable to field a ranger, the Park Service relied on 
the wardens, who had enormous territories to cover. Trapping resumed when-
ever surveillance slackened. Some violators operated from islands along Shelikof 
Strait. To prevent such encroachments a 1942 presidential order altered the 
monument boundary to include all islands within five miles of the shore. The 
service finally brought trapping under control by deputizing warden Carlos 
Carlson in 1949. A year later it initiated summer ranger patrols.38
During World War II the army built an air base and two recreation camps 
near Naknek. Soldiers engaged in illegal hunting and fishing in the monument. 
Private air carriers, having flown in small numbers of visitors since 1929, now 
brought numerous cannery workers to fish the lakes and streams. These activi-
ties put pressure on wildlife, but the Park Service tolerated them—in part for 
lack of enforcement capacity and in part because it wanted to encourage tour-
ism.39 Sport fishing held potential to open Katmai to development minimally 
damaging to wilderness values.
Other interests sought economic exploitation or discontinuance of Kat-
mai. In 1941 Alaska’s Territorial Department of Mines pushed for termination 
of the monument, claiming mineral potential. The Park Service managed to 
forestall the effort. In 1945–1946 commercial clammers and fishers launched 
another attempt at abolition, backed by a territorial legislative resolution. The 
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petitioners received permission from the Park Service to clam below high tide 
and fish offshore.40 In 1947 an Anchorage entrepreneur investigated use of the 
Katmai pumice deposits to manufacture building blocks for construction. He 
pressed for a law opening the monument to mining. Meanwhile, he illegally 
entered the monument and set up a pumice extraction operation at Geographic 
Harbor. When tested the material proved inadequate, and the operation ceased. 
Yet long afterward the law passed, opening Katmai to pumice mining by per-
mission of the secretary of the interior.41
Trappers and commercial salmon fishers tried unsuccessfully to reduce the 
size of the monument or to gain entry. The Naknek Civic Club, assisted by 
Alaska congressional delegate E.L. “Bob” Bartlett, made concerted bids in 1950 
and 1953 for trapping access. Trappers argued that beaver dams impeded salm-
on migration upstream, a claim not supported by experience. Fishers accused 
brown bears of damaging the salmon runs by catching large numbers of fish on 
their way to spawn. Again the Park Service, aided by the National Parks and 
Recreation Association, staved off the assaults.42
Park Service biologist Lowell Sumner, carrying out a boundary survey in re-
sponse to calls for reduction of the monument, recommended an overall increase 
Abandoned cannery, Kukak Bay, Katmai National Monument, 1951. By Lowell Sumner. 
Courtesy Lake Clark Katmai Studies Center. Clamming and other commercial activities 
threatened to revoke Katmai’s national monument status.
Robert F. Griggs and Katmai National Monument
171
in size. He noted that of all the national park units, “only Katmai appears to 
contain all its native species in approximately their original numbers.”43 Higher-
level officials defended the proposed expansion, reinforcing the National Park 
Service commitment to wildlife preservation values as articulated in its original 
mandate and in the 1931 Katmai proclamation.
Park status moderately affected area Natives. Once a locus of villages living 
on seafood, salmon, and land resources, the Katmai coast lost most of its popu-
lation to disease during the Russian era. Survivors permanently abandoned the 
nearby small villages when the volcano erupted in 1912. Some Natives made 
subsistence use of Brooks River salmon until the 1950s when Park Service pri-
orities and sport fishing discouraged their activity. Absence of Natives along 
the river, a mile-long stream between Brooks and Naknek lakes, changed the 
ecology of the area. Humans had lived there for about 4,000 years, most of the 
river’s geological time span. After they left, the brown bear presence gradually 
expanded. Rarely seen on the river in the 1930s and 1940s, bears proliferated in 
the late 20th Century to a park total of 1,500 to 2,000, and as many as 40 at a 
time visited the river. The large gathering of bears so appreciated by tourists and 
regarded as a primeval scene may never before have existed at Brooks River.44
The many actual or potential intrusions on the natural integrity of the park 
included a fishway at Brooks Falls. Fisheries agents had noticed that sockeye 
salmon had difficulty jumping the 5- to 8-foot waterfall, especially in times of 
low water. In 1920–1921 they cut a channel through the falls at one end. To 
complete the project, in 1949–1950 the Fish and Wildlife Service, assuming it 
had permission from the Park Service, built a concrete fishway in the channel. 
Park Service officials insisted no such permission had been granted and objected 
to the visibly intrusive structure that altered migration patterns and ended the 
spectacle of salmon jumping the falls. Park Service research in 1984–1985 in-
dicated that the fishway did not significantly enhance fish migration and might 
harm genetically distinct populations of sockeye salmon spawning below and 
above the falls. Accordingly, the service proposed to the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game (ADF&G), the agency holding jurisdiction since statehood, 
that the fishway be removed. ADF&G denied approval, arguing that the fish-
way did allow more fish upstream and that removal of the structure would vio-
late state and borough coastal management programs, which emphasized fish 
production.45 The issue remained in contention.
To combat critics of the monument and claims on its resources, the Park 
Service carried out a research program in 1953–1954. Called the Katmai Proj-
ect, it combined the efforts of federal agencies and university scientists to study 
Katmai’s geology, biology, and archaeology. In February 1953, a few months 
before researchers arrived, Mt. Trident erupted. It spewed out lava and ash spo-
radically for two years and offered an unexpected opportunity to observe a 
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volcano in action. Of the fifteen recently active volcanoes in the monument, 
about half steamed in 1953–1954. Vulcanologists also observed two rare phe-
nomena: five glaciers buried by the 1912 explosion and the glacier formed in-
side Mt. Katmai’s crater, the only known glacier whose date of origin could be 
determined.46
A study by University of California–Berkeley geologist Garniss H. Curtis 
and his graduate student Jack Sheehan revised the theory of how the 1912 
explosion occurred. They measured the depth of fallen ash at selected sites and 
found that concentric circles of similar depth surrounded Novarupta, not Mt. 
Katmai. They found no large stones around Katmai as would be expected from 
a source. They speculated that an underground connection caused Mt. Katmai 
to cave in when Novarupta expelled the material.47 Their interpretation won 
acceptance.
In the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes a few fumaroles remained active. 
The vegetation had changed as well. The liverworts found in abundance by 
Griggs in 1930 had disappeared, but numerous species of plants—including 
willows—grew on the hillsides. Botanists set up plots to record future vegeta-
tive growth.48
To justify the monument to Alaskans, the Park Service needed to acceler-
ate tourism. In a December 1953 letter to Interior Secretary Douglas McKay, 
congressional delegate Bob Bartlett made the case that, given the disappearance 
of nearly all the smokes,
the very purpose for which the Monument was established no longer exists. 
Notwithstanding, I for one believe that the beauty of the area and its other 
special features warrant a national monument there. But it should be realistic 
in respect to size and should not deny to residents of the area land which has 
no proper place within the Monument. It is interesting though discouraging 
to note that while in the years gone by the Interior Department has resisted 
uniformly and successfully any attempt to restore to the public domain any 
of the area within the boundary, it has never done anything at all—that 
statement is almost literally true—to open the Monument to public use.49
Bartlett’s lament articulated the essence of the booster perspective: brown bears 
had no place, a modest reserve might be tolerated as long as it brought in mon-
ey, and the Park Service goal of ecosystem preservation for posterity should 
be sacrificed for the slightest economic advantage of the smallest number of 
people.
National Park Service officials warded off nearly all competing claims on 
Katmai, and its recreational value gradually advanced to the fore. Ray Petersen, 
owner of a flying service named Northern Consolidated Airlines, had made 
bush flights in the Katmai vicinity since 1935. Acting on Park Service approval, 
he built Brooks and Grosvenor camps on-site in 1950 to accommodate tourists. 
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Brooks Camp sat in the middle of prime bear habitat, causing long-standing 
conflict between ecological values and tourist preferences. The Park Service built 
a ranger station at Ukak River between 1955 and 1957. Under pressure from 
Victor Cahalane at base of Novarupta, August 1954. By George Schaller. RG 79G Box 9, 
National Archives at College Park. National Park Service chief biologist Cahalane and oth-
ers surveyed Katmai National Monument in the 1950s and fought successfully to include 
wilderness preservation in the monument’s purpose.
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Senator Ernest Gruening it constructed a road in 1962 from Brooks Camp to 
the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes. This sparked requests to continue the road 
to the East Coast, but cost and resistance from Park Service officials doomed the 
idea. Money spent on the valley road delayed construction of a park headquar-
ters, completed at King Salmon in 1964.50
Katmai had achieved recognition as a recreational resource as well as a wild-
life sanctuary. In 1969 President Lyndon Johnson increased the size to 4,361 
square miles, and in 1980 it became Katmai National Park and Preserve.51 To 
a perpetually growing tourist population Katmai offered a variety of scenic and 
scientific attractions: evergreen forests, lakes and streams, tundra, volcanic fea-
tures, glaciers, and archaeological sites as much as 4,500 years old.52 Mt. Griggs, 
named for the monument’s founder, overlooks the now-cooled Valley of Ten 
Thousand Smokes.53 Of the four million acres, 85 percent is designated wilder-
ness. Katmai hosts at least 117 species of birds54 and 27 species of land mam-
mals, including a large and viable population of brown bears, as well as moose, 
Adlai Stevenson (second from left) and party at Brooks Falls, August 1954. By George 
Schaller. RG 79G Box 79, National Archives at College Park. Others identified: guide Don 
Holbrook (left) and John Fell Stevenson (with camera). Controversial fish ladder is out of 
sight at left. Katmai lost much of its appeal as a scientific curiosity but became famous for 
fishing and wildlife viewing. Remoteness deterred tourism until the 1950s.
Robert F. Griggs and Katmai National Monument
175
wolves, wolverines, lynx, red foxes, river otters, beavers, porcupines, and Arctic 
hares. Offshore swim sea otters, seals, sea lions, and several species of whales. Its 
fresh waters hold northern pike, Dolly Varden, Arctic char, grayling, and sock-
eye, chum, silver, king, and pink salmon.55 A rare geological event in a remote 
region, followed by timely and intelligent efforts of a few dedicated individuals, 
made possible one of the world’s largest and finest national parks.
More than almost any other American national park, Katmai embodied 
values of ecosystem preservation. The initiation of the monument involved a 
classic case of collusion between government and a small but influential inter-
est group, the National Geographic Society. But the society planned no detri-
mental use of the land and did not interfere in government efforts to manage 
it. Initially, Griggs and the National Geographic Society intended to preserve 
a scientific wonder analogous to Yellowstone National Park (1872). Action by 
Sheldon, Griggs, and others on behalf of the brown bears moved the purpose 
closer to species preservation and ecosystem sustainability. Additions by Presi-
dents Hoover, FDR, Johnson, and Carter reinforced the sustainability value.
Scientific information in the form of field observation precipitated a crucial 
but erroneous judgment about the park’s geology. Later, research demonstrated 
the lack of potential for significant resource extraction. Had the land potentially 
benefited the mining or logging industries, it probably would not have become 
a park. The National Geographic articles overcame the inaccessibility and inter-
ested the attentive public enough to warrant its designation as a monument. 
National Park Service biologists, backed by their superiors, clarified and fought 
for the park’s wildlife and wilderness values. When Katmai eventually drew 
tourists in numbers, it increasingly demonstrated the strength and economic vi-
tality of nonconsumptive use values. As one of the five largest national parks in 
the United States, Katmai marked a signal victory in ecosystem preservation.
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John Muir, William S. Cooper, and 
Glacier Bay National Monument
CoMpared to KatMai, a MuCh More diFFiCult and lenGthy StruGGle preCed-
ed the fi nal form of Glacier Bay National Monument. Unlike Katmai, Glacier 
Bay had been seen by large numbers of people, sat closer to populated areas, and 
contained gold and other valuable minerals. Moreover, nearby Tlingits possessed 
credible claims to ownership or, at least, subsistence uses of the land. Glacier 
Bay’s preservation therefore required more public support and incurred greater 
resistance. Like Katmai, however, as in the case of nearly all national parks, 
Glacier Bay possessed far more scenic value than mineral or logging potential. 
And, like Katmai, Glacier Bay attracted university scientists and inspired one to 
lead an effort for its permanent protection.
VISITORS TO GLACIER BAY
Glacier Bay, now more than 50 miles long, extends northwest of Chichagof 
Island into the center of the monument. Its best-known feature, Muir Glacier, 
crucially infl uenced the attainment of monument status. The glacier fi lled the 
8
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bay when the fi rst westerners, a crew sent out by Captain George Vancouver of 
the HMS Discovery, visited it in 1794. The ice receded and U.S. Navy Lieuten-
ant Charles Erskine Scott Wood, who reached it by canoe from Sitka in 1877, 
explored the bay in its modern form. Also by canoe came John Muir, S. Hall 
Young, and their Tlingit guides in 1879 and 1880.1
Of all the grandeur he had surveyed, few places moved Muir as did Glacier 
Bay. There he spent many days climbing, hiking, and studying vegetation and 
glaciation processes. After witnessing the calving of Muir Glacier he wrote:
When a large mass sinks from the upper fi ssured portion of the wall, there is 
a keen, piercing crash, then a deep deliberate, long-drawn-out, thundering 
roar, which slowly subsides into a comparatively low, far-reaching, mutter-
ing growl; then comes a crowd of grating, clashing sounds from the agitated 
bergs that dance in the waves about the newcomer as if in welcome; and 
these, again, are followed by the swash and roar of the berg-waves as they 
reach the shore and break among the boulders. . . . When the sunshine is 
pouring and sifting in iris colors through the midst of all this wilderness 
of angular crystal ice, and through the grand, fl ame-shaped jets and sheets 
of radiant spray ever rising from the blows of the falling bergs, the effect is 
indescribably glorious.2
Muir thrilled his reading audience with his portrayal of a morning on the bay. 
As a spectacular sunrise faded,
the green waters of the fi ord were fi lled with sun-spangles; with the up-
swinging breeze the fl eet of icebergs set forth on their voyages; and on the 
innumerable mirrors and prisms of these bergs, and on those of the shattered 
crystal walls of the glaciers, common white light and rainbow light began to 
glow, while the mountains, changing to stone, put on their frosty jewelry, 
and loomed again in the thin azure in serene terrestrial majesty. We turned 
and sailed away, joining the outgoing bergs, while “Gloria in excelsis” still 
seemed to be sounding over all the white landscape, and our burning hearts 
were ready for any fate, feeling that whatever the future might have in store, 
the treasures we had gained would enrich our lives forever.3
Muir had been drawn to Alaska not only by his love for Nature but also 
by a desire to learn more about glaciers and how they shaped the earth, a con-
tinuation of his investigations in the Sierras. His writings for the public high-
lighted the spectacles of Southeast Alaska, most prominently the glaciers. Thus 
the 300-foot-high and two- to three-mile-wide Muir Glacier, the largest and 
most accessible at tidewater, became a “frozen Niagara,” a source of pride for 
Americans who wished to believe they possessed grander treasures than could 
be found in Europe. The fi rst tourists, eager to see what Muir had described, 
arrived in 1883 in the Idaho under the veteran coastal shipmaster James Carroll. 
Captain Carroll is said to have given Muir Inlet and Muir Glacier their names. 
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John Muir. Muir Woods coll. P83-143.050, San Francisco Maritime National Historical 
Park Archives. Muir’s writings, and those of Sheldon Jackson, Eliza Scidmore, and others, 
focused national attention on Alaska.
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His sojourn in the Idaho heralded a steady stream of visitors in other vessels, 
including the Pacific Coast Steamship Company’s City of Topeka, George W. 
Elder, and Queen.4 The spreading fame generated by enthusiastic vacationers 
and by the 1899 Harriman Expedition moved Glacier Bay toward ultimate 
status as a park.
Lituya Bay on the Pacific coast enriched the history of Glacier Bay National 
Monument. For years it hosted the largest Tlingit settlement on the Fairweather 
coast. Tlingits also visited to take advantage of its abundant resources. But Na-
ture made Lituya Bay a dangerous place. Two French vessels under Commander 
Jean Francois de Galaup de La Perouse, hoping to make territorial claims, paid 
the first European visit to the bay in June and July 1786. They passed through 
the narrow entrance at an unusual slack tide and nearly foundered. Once in-
side, they found their exit barred by rolling waves continuously sweeping the 
entrance from shore to shore. It turned out to be an agreeable place to be con-
fined, endowed by plentiful fish, berries, herbs, wood, and freshwater. Many 
mammal species lived on the land and sea otters along the coast. Of the scenery 
La Perouse remarked, “I doubt whether the profound valleys of the Alps and 
Pyrenees exhibit a picture equally terrific.” He voiced less appreciation for the 
local Tlingit men, who stole at every opportunity, “always quarreling among 
S.S. City of Topeka at Muir Glacier, 1890. Reid coll. 115-24, Alaska State Library. By the 
1890s outheast Alaska had become a favorite vacation destination for elites.
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continued on next page
themselves, indifferent to their children, absolute tyrants to their women, who 
are incessantly condemned to the most laborious occupations.”5
While reconnoitering the exit, a boat commanded by an able officer was 
pulled into the waves by the powerful current. Attempting a rescue, a second 
boat followed. Both sank, drowning all 21 men. After more than three weeks’ 
delay the ships gained the ocean, only to be wrecked and ending the lives of 
the remainder of the 200-man expedition in the Solomon Islands.6 Evidence of 
the Alaska stay survived in dispatches La Perouse sent back to France by way of 
Kamchatka.7
Hearing of the French landing and planning to extend their own territorial 
control down the Northwest coast, the Russians entered Lituya Bay in 1788 
and buried a copper plate as a symbolic land claim. Nothing came of the French 
visit, and the Russians built forts at Yakutat and Sitka. Their hunting crews 
killed 1,800 sea otters in or near Lituya Bay in 1788 and quickly stripped the 
region of otters. In retribution the Tlingits attacked and destroyed the forts at 
Sitka in 1802 and Yakutat in 1805.
Tlingits also suffered from disasters at Lituya Bay. In 1788 a war party of 
ten canoes overturned in the breakers and 80 men drowned.8 Legend spoke of 
an entire village disappearing beneath an enormous wave. The legend came 
alive in July 1958. As three trolling vessels operated in the bay an earthquake 
struck, sending down 90 million tons of rock from a mountainside and 1,300 
horizontal feet of ice from Lituya Glacier. A gigantic wave climbed the wall of 
Gilbert Inlet opposite the slide, scouring off vegetation to a height of 1,700 feet. 
At 100 miles an hour a surge of water raced down the bay toward the ocean, 
engulfing 2 vessels and claiming 2 lives. The Edrie snapped her anchor chain 
and rode out the wave, passing over a forested spit 80 feet above the trees. When 
the water calmed, great rafts of logs spread for miles out to sea.9
William H. Dall in 1874 conducted one of the first scientific observations 
of Lituya Bay.10 The bay attracted gold seekers as early as 1880, and prospectors 
found placer gold in the beach sands not far from the bay entrance in the late 
1880s. Mining peaked in 1896 when upwards of 200 men worked the sands. 
Lituya Bay Placer Gold Mining Company manager Hans Nelson, his wife, 
Edith, and three other employees stayed through the winter of 1899–1900. In 
the fall of 1899 one of the men shot dead a fellow worker, wounded another, 
and aimed the gun at Edith. Hans knocked him down and subdued him. Un-
able to take the accused to court or effectively guard him, the miners held a trial 
and sentenced the man to death. Edith carried out the sentence by hanging 
him. The company left the area in 1900.11
Ownership of the Glacier Bay region lay in dispute during most of the 19th 
Century. An 1825 Anglo-Russian treaty described the boundary in vague terms. 
In 1887 Canada advanced a claim interpreting the treaty in its favor, to include 
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the Glacier Bay area. The Gold Rush forced the issue, necessitating clear owner-
ship of mines and ports. Negotiations completed in 1903 resolved the issue in 
favor of the United States and established Glacier Bay and its surroundings as 
U.S. territory.12
John Muir’s articles about Glacier Bay attracted the attention of academic 
scientists who studied glaciers to understand Ice Ages. Tour vessels enabled 
them to reach Alaska, and the first scientist, George Frederick Wright of Ober-
lin College representing the U.S. Geological Survey, arrived in 1886. A sec-
ond team under Harry Fielding Reid of the Case School of Applied Sciences 
entered the inlet in 1890, finding John Muir on the site measuring glacial 
movement. Others continued the investigations in the 1890s, among them 
the scientists of the Harriman Expedition. Grove Karl Gilbert, a member of 
the Harriman party representing the U.S. Geological Survey, initiated a focus 
on plant succession in the wake of the retreating glacier. Then, weeks after the 
expedition departed, earthquakes apparently caused the face of Muir Glacier 
to collapse into the bay, leaving it full of ice. This ended visits by tourists for a 
decade. For many years, tour boat companies took their clients to Taku Glacier 
near Juneau.13
Lack of access to Glacier Bay also suspended glacial research for well over 
a decade. But the writings of John Muir and the glacial scientists sparked the 
curiosity of Detroit native William Skinner Cooper (1884–1978), a botany 
professor at the University of Minnesota. Fascinated by mountains after accom-
panying his father on outings, Cooper made numerous trips to the Colorado 
Rockies beginning at age eighteen. Earning a degree in botany and ecology 
from Alma College in 1906, he completed a PhD at the University of Chicago 
in 1911. He spent four years in California examining the redwoods, chapar-
ral, other plant communities, and sand dune morphology. In 1914 he studied 
postglacial vegetation in British Columbia and took a side trip to Alaska look-
ing for a site to assess plant growth in the wake of a rapidly receding glacier. A 
colleague later suggested Glacier Bay, and Cooper found what he sought when 
he returned to do research in 1916, 1921, 1929, and 1935.14
Cooper had been mentored by Harry Fielding Reid and had taken courses 
in plant succession from Henry Chandler Cowles, a prominent theorist in plant 
ecology. When he started work at Glacier Bay in 1916, Cooper and his col-
league John V. Hubbard laid out quadrats to be examined in periodic surveys of 
plant species and growth rates in the soil where the glacier had receded. Rapid 
plant growth, and known locations of the glacier front at various points in 
time, made Glacier Bay an ideal site for measurement of successional processes. 
On nine quadrats, three each on land first exposed in 1879, 1892, and 1899, 
Cooper compared vegetation growth between 1916 and 1921. He found a high 
mortality rate in individual plants but a net gain in numbers and surface area 
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William S. Cooper, Blackstone Bay, 1935. University of Minnesota Archives. Botanist Coo-
per studied plant succession at Glacier Bay and spearheaded the effort to make it a park.
covered. One pioneer species in the evening primrose family declined while 
others increased: 
The major part of the advance in the establishment of the vegetation cover 
was due to the activities of a few individuals which survived and persisted 
from the many that germinated. The most important of the persisting indi-
viduals were the Dryas [in the rose family] and the willows, all mat-formers 
and therefore extremely effective in covering the ground.
The gradual acceleration of the successional process, evident in general 
observation study, has already begun even at this early stage.
Cooper’s work culminated in the presentation of a paper in 1922 at the Eco-
logical Society of America, and the ensuing discussion gave birth to the idea of 
preserving Glacier Bay. The society appointed Cooper chair of an exploratory 
committee.15
MONUMENT STATUS FOR GLACIER BAY
Cooper’s committee launched a survey of the bay area and proposed bound-
aries to encompass all the desired ecological features. Robert F. Griggs sat on the 
John Muir, William S. Cooper, and Glacier Bay National Monument
183
four-member committee. Reflecting on his Katmai experience and congressio-
nal responsiveness to extractive interests, Griggs suggested, “A national monu-
ment is created by presidential proclamation, whereas a national park is made 
by an act of Congress. In the first case it is necessary to convince only one man 
of the advisability of the action, whereas in the second, six hundred, more or 
less, must be converted to the idea.”16 This lesson had inspired the design of the 
Forest Reserves Act of 1891 and of the Antiquities Act of 1906, the legal basis 
for nearly all Alaskan preserves between 1892 and 1978.
Warren Harding, the first president to see Alaska, visited Glacier Bay in 
1923 and expressed a desire to see it protected. More than 80 organizations 
endorsed the plan of the Ecological Society of America, including the National 
Research Council, American Geographical Society, National Parks Association, 
Explorers Club, Associated Mountaineering Clubs of North America, American 
Forestry Association, Botanical Society of America, and American Society of Ge-
ologists.17 Proponents cited five attractive features of the proposed monument: 
(1) numerous tidewater glaciers, not found in any other park or monument, (2) 
accessibility for tourists, (3) a pristine coastal forest, (4) opportunity for study 
of glaciation, and (5) historical associations from Vancouver to Muir.18
In Juneau and Haines, the chambers of commerce registered their objec-
tions. Cooper’s committee had emphasized the lack of economic potential at 
Glacier Bay but had thought it best to seek the advice of the U.S. Geological 
Survey’s chief representative in Alaska, Alfred H. Brooks. Mining appeared at 
that time to be the main land-based means of developing the Alaskan economy. 
Based on a brief assessment reporting gold, silver, and molybdenum, the Geo-
logical Survey prepared to oppose monument status. But the influential Coun-
cil on National Parks, Forests, and Wild Life endorsed the monument. Secre-
tary of the Interior Hubert Work recommended a presidential executive order 
withdrawing land in the wide parameters recommended by Cooper’s commit-
tee, pending a review by the Interior Department. President Calvin Coolidge’s 
signature on the order on April 1, 1924, provoked a negative reaction from the 
Juneau Daily Alaska Empire and settlers in Southeast Alaska.19
A Daily Alaska Empire editorial, citing concern for loss of mining and 
homesteading opportunities, ventured,
The suggestion that a reserve be established to protect a glacier that none 
could disturb if he wanted and none would disturb if he could or to permit 
the study of plant and insect life is the quintessence of silliness. And when it 
is proposed to put millions of acres, taking in established industries and ag-
ricultural lands and potential resources that are capable of supporting people 
and adding to the population of Alaska, it becomes a monstrous crime 
against development and advancement. It leads one to wonder if Washing-
ton has gone crazy through catering to conservation faddists.20
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Cooper replied in part that “the time is not too far distant when, due to de-
struction, and to proper use as well, our forests will have lost their primeval 
magnifi cence. We [wish] to reserve a few small areas so that our children may 
enjoy the bounties of nature untouched by man.” He added that Alaska could 
expect, as in the cases of Yellowstone and Yosemite parks, to reap economic 
benefi ts from tourism.21
Secretary Work sent General Land Offi ce offi cial and soon-to-be Alaska 
governor George A. Parks to do the economic assessment of Glacier Bay. Parks, 
an advocate of Alaskan development, listed in his report every such activity 
actually or potentially occurring in the proposed monument: fox farming, tim-
bering, mining, homesteading, fi sh traps and canneries, Native allotments, and 
agriculture on the 90,000-acre Gustavus forelands. He recommended against 
monument status for more than a core segment of the withdrawn lands, if any at 
all. Cooper’s committee called forth another massive expression of demand for 
monument status from citizen groups. In negotiations toward a compromise, 
the Geological Survey insisted on access for mining, and the Forest and Na-
tional Park services both sought control of the monument. Cooper fought for 
Glacier Bay National Monument/Park and Preserve, 1939 and 1980. Courtesy Jason 
Geck.
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inclusion of some forest perimeter. He achieved it in the boundaries eventually 
accepted, but, for the time being, the monument consisted mostly of a moun-
tainous core. The Park Service won control over a monument closed to mining 
in the presidential proclamation of February 26, 1925. The edict cited—in ad-
dition to the traditional scenic values—scientific study of glaciology and ecol-
ogy, protection of forests, and historic values based on famous visitors.22
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
A scattering of small-scale economic activities existed within the monu-
ment lands. Salmon salteries and canneries operated at Bartlett Cove from 
1888 to 1890, Dundas Bay from 1900 to 1931, Dry Bay from 1910 to the 
mid-1940s, and Excursion Inlet from 1908 throughout the remainder of the 
century. A sawmill operated at Excursion Inlet from shortly after 1900 to the 
late 1930s. Fox farms occupied Lemesurier, Beardslee, Strawberry, and Willow 
islands between 1920 and the late 1930s when the value of fox fur went down. 
Nearly all the lands occupied by these ventures passed to monument status.23 
During World War II the army constructed a storage base at Excursion Inlet, 
cutting down acres of surrounding forest. At Gustavus it built an air base to 
accommodate B-29s that might strike Japan from the Aleutians. Neither facil-
ity proved necessary for the war effort, and the lands reverted to National Park 
Service control.24
Mining in the Monument
Mining presented a problem for the monument. In 1936 a second move to 
permit mining in the monument brought Cooper back to chair a committee as-
sembled to combat it. He had the sanction of 150 groups including Audubon, 
Isaac Walton League, National Parks and American Forests associations, Ameri-
can Nature Association, and the new Wilderness Society. Nevertheless, not all 
public sentiment in the States could be counted on. Popular Hearst writer Rex 
Beach, author of many Alaskan adventure stories and champion of the small 
man, envisioned a movement of prospectors exploiting Alaska’s mineral wealth 
as an antidote to the Great Depression. He took up the cause of miners work-
ing a claim prior to designation of the monument. Joe Ibach and his wife, Muz, 
prospected at Reid Inlet in 1924 and found gold in two locations, filing their 
claims in the late summer after Coolidge’s withdrawal. Six months later monu-
ment status specifically prohibited mining. Although the Ibachs probably had 
a legal right to proceed, officials advised them not to develop the claims. Their 
protests failed until Rex Beach visited in 1935. Beach had known Joe as a guide 
in 1915 and felt sympathy for him.25 Beach touted the mining bill and went 
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to see FDR. Roosevelt wanted to avoid alienating the Hearst papers, but he 
also wanted compromise among the federal agencies and environmental groups 
involved. In a week’s time and without notice to the conservationists, the min-
ing bill rushed through congressional committees and passed both houses, and 
Roosevelt signed it.26
More than sympathy may have motivated Beach’s efforts. He returned to 
join Joe Ibach in prospecting, and in 1936 they staked a group of claims. The 
venture did not pan out. Never discouraged, the Ibachs engaged another part-
ner, Captain Tom Smith. After two years of effort the three split their total 
profits of $26. Joe and Muz worked their original claims until 1956.27
Contrary to the hopes of economic boosters, prospectors discovered few 
promising mineral deposits in Glacier Bay National Monument. Miners dug 
in numerous locations, finding copper and nickel deposits, albeit none of out-
standing commercial value. The U.S. Geological Survey, territorial and state 
politicians, and development interests backed mining in the monument but 
ultimately lost the contest. In 1976 the Mining in the Parks Act ended new 
claims and permitted buyouts of old claims.28
Boundary Changes
Although the 1936 mining law dismayed conservationists and National 
Park officials, another issue promised to change the picture. Since the mid-
1920s, Forest Service and National Park Service planners had contemplated 
widening the monument’s boundaries to the west and south to encompass 
Lituya Bay and forest habitat suitable for a brown bear sanctuary. The Forest 
Service felt pressure from brown bear advocates to designate Admiralty and 
Chichagof islands as national parks. Large stands of commercially exploitable 
timber covered both islands; the Forest Service therefore preferred expansion 
of, and national park status for, Glacier Bay. National Park Service directors 
concurred, reasoning that Admiralty and Chichagof offered comparatively little 
except for brown bear populations. Bureau of Biological Survey chiefs, Alaska 
Game Commission officials, and Governor Parks favored the Glacier Bay Na-
tional Park option. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes visited Glacier Bay in 1938 
and indicated approval of eventual national park status.
After FDR opened Glacier Bay to mining in 1936, advocates of expansion 
had begun to consider retaining monument status. Some believed mining in a 
national park would set a bad precedent and that conservationists might oppose 
such a plan. FDR signed a proclamation in April 1939 adding 905,000 acres of 
national forest and other lands, including Lituya Bay, to Glacier Bay National 
Monument.29 The additions increased the size of the monument from 1,820 to 
3,850 square miles.30
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Soon after the 1939 boundary change, residents in the settlement of Gus-
tavus on Strawberry Point at the edge of the monument complained that po-
tentially valuable agricultural land had been closed to them. Some blamed the 
decline of cattle herds, down by half from a high of 278, and the decrease of 
settlers, from 35 to 10, on monument expansion. Alaska congressional delegate 
Bob Bartlett contacted park officials in the mid-1940s suggesting deletion of 
much of the lowland near Gustavus. National Park Service officials rated the 
land as submarginal for cattle or crops, noting that cattle herds had shrunk be-
fore the boundary change. They predicted that loss of the flatland, including a 
small airfield, would result in elimination of wolves and bears in the monument 
within reach of the private lands. Moreover, in the words of Chief Architect 
Thomas C. Vint, “Anyone taking up a homestead would certainly be doing so 
for the future, as a business property in connection with the airport and the Na-
tional Monument, rather than for future farming.” He proposed that to avoid 
an array of administrative problems, the government should acquire all private 
plots in the Gustavus area.31
Part-time Gustavus resident Charles Parker organized a campaign to re-
move the disputed land from the monument. In a December 18, 1954, letter 
to the Juneau Daily Alaska Empire he termed it “disheartening to see this vir-
gin 10,000 acres of agricultural and stock-raising land dormant and unused.” 
Pointing to the Cold War buildup he pronounced, “It is time every red-blooded 
Alaskan and American write his delegate and Congressman and insist that pres-
sure be put on and the release of Gustavus Land from the Glacier Bay National 
Monument be secured at once. Then we can settle this section with veteran 
fighting men, and come what may, we will be able to produce thousands of 
tons of food for our people and military force.”32 The campaign triumphed 
in 1955 when President Dwight Eisenhower signed an order deleting about 
18,000 acres for “an airfield for military purposes” and “limited type of agri-
cultural use.”33
As in many other Alaskan disputes, national security claims provided 
more excuse than reason for the deletion. A Daily Alaska Empire editorial 
came closer to the truth: “Although the farming possibilities of the area have 
long been known, to many the new release order is more important in that a 
large area has been thrown open to duck hunters for the first time in 16 years. 
Geese and ducks by the thousands stop to rest on the Gustavus flats and in 
the many sloughs that criss-cross the grassy coastal plain, but when the 1939 
order took in the area, hunting was forbidden.” No airfield materialized and, 
eighteen months after the opening of the “agricultural” area, only one party 
had filed for a homestead. Within three months they abandoned their farming 
project.34
John Muir, WilliaM S. Cooper, and GlaCier Bay national MonuMent
188
Native Claims
Tlingit Indians possessed far broader and more long-standing claims to 
Glacier Bay than did either miners or settlers. At least since the most recent 
Ice Age glacial retreat, Tlingits had hunted seals and mountain goats, fished for 
salmon, gathered gull eggs, and picked berries on its lands and in its waters. 
Implicitly, and notwithstanding the designations of the Tongass National For-
est and Glacier Bay National Monument, they could insist on ownership of at 
least part of the monument. But in the process of designating and adding to the 
monument in 1925 and 1939, neither conservationists nor the National Park 
Service paid attention to Tlingit concerns. They focused on a vision of park-
lands as “natural,” or unspoiled by human activity. They viewed mining as the 
foremost potential threat and also sought to eliminate fish traps, canneries, fox 
farming, trapping, logging, hunting, and other consumptive activities. Monu-
ment status precluded nearly all of these, mining being a glaring exception.35
After the 1925 proclamation, Tlingits in the 800-person village of Hoonah 
25 miles south of the monument continued to visit it for hunting, fishing, and 
gathering. They may have been unaware of the new law, and, in any case, no 
Park Service personnel lived within many miles of the monument. Park Service 
planners avoided the questions involved in Native land claims, in part because 
they had no experience accommodating such claims in parks in the States. Also, 
Native Americans as well as whites commonly accepted the goal of assimila-
tion in the 1920s and 1930s. Hoonah Tlingits had engaged in cannery labor 
and commercial fishing since well before the turn of the century and actively 
sought wage work during World War II. Park Service leaders interpreted this as 
evidence of progressive integration into the cash economy and corresponding 
abandonment of economic dependence on, and cultural ties to, subsistence 
use of natural resources. In this light, hunting and fishing in the monument 
appeared as poaching. If done for cash or commercial sales, the taking seemed 
unnecessary or even immoral.
Moreover, hunting in the park ran counter to tourists’ desire for close-up 
views of trusting animals. This applied particularly to harbor seals, the most nu-
merous marine mammal species at Glacier Bay. Hoonahs traditionally hunted 
them for meat, seal oil, and skins for clothing. During the territorial period 
they killed seals in large part for a two- or three-dollar bounty and, later, for 
skins to be sold on the European market. Park rangers came upon the remains 
of 243 seals killed at Bartlett Cove in 1963. Nearly all the meat had been left. 
Another Tlingit hunter killed 300 seals at Glacier Bay in 1964. Such incidents 
fed a determination to end hunting in the monument, a goal the Park Service 
finally accomplished in 1974.36
For their part, the Hoonah Tlingits believed they possessed a legitimate 
right to enter the monument lands for subsistence to fulfill cultural traditions 
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and that the Park Service had unfairly restricted them. Research indicated that 
they retained a significant level of dependence on Glacier Bay resources, even 
during the high-wage years of World War II. They considered seal hunting for 
bounties and hides essentially the same as subsistence hunting.37
The 1968 resolution of Tlingit and Haida Indians v. United States, first 
brought in 1929, acknowledged Tlingit rights to land ownership in the Tongass 
National Forest and Glacier Bay National Monument. The court ordered com-
pensatory payment of $7.5 million. Passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act (ANCSA) in 1971 extinguished land claims in exchange for cash and 
Park ranger and harbor seal carcass, Glacier Bay National Monument, 1964 or 1965. Fol. 
2, 00524, Glacier Bay National Park Archives. Tlingits killed seals to sell the skins and 
claimed it as a legitimate subsistence activity; Park Service officials regarded the practice as 
wasteful and illegal.
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land selections, not to be made in national parks or monuments. While the 
Hoonah Natives could not own land in the monument, ANCSA and the 1980 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act both supported subsistence 
use rights on most federal lands. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 
permitted Native Americans to hunt seals and other creatures for traditional 
purposes if not done in a wasteful manner.38
Unlike Katmai, Glacier Bay’s formation featured a cultural, philosophical, 
and political clash over Native rights. Preservation-oriented conservationists 
and Park Service officials thought their insistence on unspoiled Nature a just 
goal that outweighed Tlingit prerogatives. Hoonah Tlingits eventually received 
land claims compensation in the form of cash payments and land selection 
outside the monument, and the Park Service eventually ended hunting. The 
experience suggested, but did not illuminate or resolve, some basic questions 
about natural resource protection: Is it fair to exclude traditional users from a 
park for the presumed benefit of society? Could or should “nature preservation” 
include human consumptive activities? If so, where should the lines be drawn 
between “natural” and disruptive or destructive activities? What motives, needs, 
traditions, and technologies should determine the limits of use? Who should 
be eligible for consumptive use rights, and would the arrangement be politi-
cally viable and manageable? These questions plagued the Park Service into the 
21st Century in the dispute over commercial and subsistence fishing in Glacier 
Bay.
Park Service officials had for years pointed to the apparently wasteful kill-
ing of seals and tried to exclude all subsistence hunting and fishing in the mon-
ument. But jurisdiction over the waters beyond low tide had not been legally 
determined. Exercising interim control, the State of Alaska permitted commer-
cial and, in 1989, subsistence fishing in Glacier Bay. At the onset of the 21st 
Century, fishing vessels contested whale-watching and sightseeing tourist boats 
for space in Glacier Bay in the heart of the monument.39
Tourism picked up rapidly in the 1970s. Whereas small private boaters had 
done most of the visiting in the 1940s and Canadian cruise ships in the 1950s, 
American cruise vessels reappeared in 1969 and escalated their trips over the 
following decades.40 The mixture of fishing and tourism operations threatened 
to injure the park’s ecological integrity and degrade the value of visitation. Nev-
ertheless, as tourism multiplied over the years, Glacier Bay rivaled Katmai as 
proof of the appeal of nonconsumptive use values.
National Park Status
Glacier Bay National Monument, like Katmai, survived for decades de-
spite challenges to its integrity and a near-absence of supervision and funding. 
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Physical remoteness and relative lack of pressure from extractive commercial 
enterprises helped protect the units. Concerted action by astute Park Service 
leaders fended off challenges in Washington. Territorial officials, viewing the 
units as potential tourist attractions, began to call for their development rather 
than their abolition. Seasonal rangers appeared in both units in 1950, and year-
round supervision began in the mid-1960s. Glacier Bay’s government-owned 
tourist lodge opened in 1966 and Park Service on-site headquarters in the early 
1980s.41
At the 1966 dedication of the Park Service lodge at Bartlett Cove in the 
southeast corner of the monument, honored guest William S. Cooper predict-
ed that “Glacier Bay National Monument will become Glacier Bay National 
Park.”42 Upon passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
two years after Cooper’s death, his prophecy came true. Glacier Bay National 
Park and Preserve soon proved a highly popular scenic and wildlife viewing at-
traction, one of the best-known parks in Alaska. More than 200 bird species can 
be seen on its 3.3 million acres (5,322 square miles), encompassing colonies of 
nesting sea birds. Despite its mountainous character it is home to brown bears, 
black bears (some in the blue or “glacier bear” phase), wolves, moose, moun-
tain goats, coyotes, wolverines, and smaller land mammals. In its waters swim 
humpback, minke, and killer whales, harbor and Dall’s porpoises, sea lions, 
harbor seals, sea otters, and four species of salmon.43 Mt. Cooper, within its 
boundaries, honors its founder, the botany professor.44
First intended as a reserve for tourism and science, Glacier Bay evolved into 
an outstanding example of ecosystem preservation. Quite similarly to Katmai 
National Monument, it offered scientific curiosities in the form of glaciers. 
Publicity by John Muir and others, followed by thousands of sightseers in-
cluding President Harding, generated stateside interest in its preservation. A 
dedicated advocate, Cooper effectively mobilized public support. Like Katmai, 
Glacier Bay held almost no appeal for mining or logging companies or agricul-
tural interests. A thoroughly unscientific claim of agricultural potential cost 
the park an ecologically valuable waterfowl feeding site, but a political com-
promise added a brown bear sanctuary. Visitors cherished the birds and mam-
mals, thereby confirming ecosystem preservation as a central purpose of the 
park. Designation in the 1990s as part of a 27-million-acre U.S.- and Canada-
managed Glacier Bay–Kluane-Tatshenshini-Wrangell/St. Elias World Heritage 
Site broadened the park’s role to participation in a holistic plan for international 
cooperation in ecosystem maintenance.
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Alaska Natives and Conservation
NotWitHstANdiNG eUroCeNtriC NotioNs, NAtive AMeriCANs deserved tHe 
status of Alaska’s “discoverers,” fi rst human explorers, and, perhaps, rightful 
owners. The story of Western exploitation of Alaskan natural resources is in 
large part a record of destructive impact on the Natives. Russians (Chapters 1 
and 2) enslaved the Aleuts and some of the Koniag Eskimos, Kenaitze Indians, 
and Chugach Eskimos and fought the Tlingit Indians. Whalers (Chapter 3) 
hired Eskimos to deplete the sea mammals and caribou on which the Eskimos 
themselves relied for food. Gold seekers (Chapter 4) dried up stocks of game in 
the interior. Commercial salmon fi shers (Chapter 15) often refused to honor 
Native fi shing territories. Federal offi cials (Chapter 8) ignored Tlingit claims 
in establishing the Tongass National Forest and Glacier Bay National Monu-
ment. Wildlife managers (Chapter 11) paid more attention to the needs of 
white trappers and hunters than to those of Alaska Natives. The national and 
territorial governments overrode and deferred Native land claims, although not 
denying them in principle. Accidentally introduced disease did by far the most 
damage to Native populations, but reductions of wildlife also took a toll. More 
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dependent than the transient whites on fi sh and mammals, Alaska Natives faced 
poverty and even starvation when wildlife became scarce. But Native hunters 
(Chapters 3, 5, 10, 16) killed excessive numbers of animals for commercial sale 
of antlers, horns, hides, ivory, and meat.
Scholars have debated whether European and Euro-American intrusion in 
Alaska is a case of an environmentally consumptive culture replacing an envi-
ronmentally responsible and stable system. Were Natives the fi rst environmen-
talists? Did they see themselves as integrally related to their natural environ-
ments? Did they believe in sustainability or practice prudent use of resources? 
The answers have implications not only for cultural understanding but also for 
future prospects for sustainable use of natural resources in Alaska.
In addressing questions of aboriginal conservation, observers often cite eco-
logically oriented statements of Native American leaders and the relatively un-
altered state of the natural environment when Europeans arrived. Others point 
to the extirpation of the mammoths and ancient bison in part by hunting and 
argue that Natives simply did not possess the technology to do more damage. 
Anthropologists examining these questions have found it diffi cult to distinguish 
Native American culture from the infl uences of European and Euro-American 
(or Western, or white) culture that have existed for so long. They also point out 
Commercial walrus hunters, Nome, early 20th Century. Newman coll. 97-201-113, Uni-
versity of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Natives often engaged in 
industrial killing of wildlife they might need for their own subsistence. Some vessel captains 
took walrus meat to the villages.
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the difficulty of translating one belief system into terms that can be understood 
by the other.
EVIDENCE FROM ALASKA
Alaska, having encountered European and Euro-American culture later 
than most contiguous American colonies and territories, offered a better op-
portunity to find uncontaminated evidence of aboriginal behavior. Even there 
the coastal Natives have been affected for more than 200 years. Only fragments 
of relevant evidence are available for generalized conclusions about conserva-
tion practices in pre-contact Alaska.
George Bird Grinnell thought many Native Americans practiced conserva-
tion. He cited an incident recorded near Lake Champlain in 1687 in which 
Indians trapped deer but let the pregnant females go. He believed Algonquins, 
Athabaskans, and Aleuts had hunting territories carefully managed by fami-
lies within a framework of overall tribal jurisdiction so as to maintain long-
term abundance of wildlife. Grinnell’s conclusion: “We sometimes think of 
the Indian as an improvident savage but in his control of the game supply he 
showed a wisdom which it has taken his white successors generations to ac-
Inupiat Eskimo boy netting auklets, Little Diomede Island, 1930s. Keys coll. 88-174-113, 
University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Low technology and, 
possibly, a conservation ethic prevented extinction of most wildlife species before the arrival 
of Europeans.
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quire. Had we followed his ways from the beginning, the story of American big 
game would have been quite different.”1 Grinnell, however, spent little time in 
Alaska and based his judgment on anecdotal evidence rather than the findings 
of modern anthropology. Attempts to identify aboriginal conservation practices 
among Alaska Natives have been made in recent decades, yielding some relevant 
information.
Aleuts
Based on Russian accounts, researchers have affirmed aboriginal Aleut use 
of hunting territories, a system broken up during Russian control.2 Some schol-
ars viewed the Aleuts as ideally integrated into their oceanside environment in 
a sustainable manner. They argued that Aleuts exercised an ecologically benefi-
cial, stabilizing effect; for example, consuming sea otters that might otherwise 
overexploit sea urchins and generate high population oscillations. Other infor-
mation suggested that Aleuts had taken too many otters at Amchitka Island, 
Eskimo hunter and largha seal he has speared, Bering Sea, early 1900s. Lomen coll. 72-
71-3225, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. In varying 
degrees, Eskimos, Aleuts, and Indians continued to rely on wildlife for subsistence throughout 
the 20th Century.
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and, as a result, sea urchins must have multiplied and eaten up the kelp beds 
that harbored and fed fish and other creatures.3 Russian cleric Ivan Veniaminov 
noted that Aleut hunters sought status by trying to “kill as many . . . wild ani-
mals as possible.”4
Henry W. Elliott described the method used by Aleuts in the 1870s to catch 
finback and blue whales congregating in herds in the Aleutian Island passes:
They tip a large number of spear handles with glass heads deeply notched (in 
primitive days they used slate), and paddling out quietly into a herd uncon-
sciously feeding, they drive these weapons into forty or fifty of the whales, 
if the day is a favorable one. The glass head works in a day or two into the 
vitals of the creature, causing first inflammation, then death; and after a cer-
tain amount of time the carcass floats, and the currents carry the burden to 
the beach or else far out to sea, where it is never heard of again. If the natives 
manage to secure one whale this way, even though they strike hundreds, they 
feel well repaid for their labor.5
Given that the blue and finback whales are the two largest known vertebrate 
species ever to have lived on Earth, it is difficult to imagine a more ecologically 
costly means of acquiring food.
Southeastern Indians
Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian Indians of the Southeast also divided their 
hunting, fishing, and gathering areas into clan-controlled territories and, to a 
degree, exercised care not to overtax the resources. Economist George Rogers 
summarized their system:
[T]he Indian had managed to create institutions and organizations which 
permitted a sound and rational relationship of man to his environment and 
a balanced utilization of the natural resource base to support something far 
greater than a bare subsistence existence. . . . [T]he picture is one of a highly 
rational relationship of population to resource base, a series of striking stud-
ies in balanced human ecology. . . . [T]he clans practiced a fairly sophisticat-
ed form of sustained-yield resource management in the best “modern” sense.
Other analysts concluded that Southeast Indian land use patterns had been 
oriented more to ownership than to conservation and that waste of wildlife oc-
curred in the aboriginal culture.6
Anthropologist Frederica de Laguna, in a lengthy study of Yakutat Tlingits, 
found an essentially religious relationship between humans and nonhuman ani-
mals. The latter possessed moral standing approximately equal to humans and, 
according to one myth, had once been humans. They could understand human 
thoughts and affect the well-being of humans. To take a life of another species, 
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a hunter had to observe correct preparatory behavior. After the kill the hunter 
explained, often in a song, why he had taken the creature’s life. Body parts had 
to be treated in specific ways; for example, a bear’s head would be covered and 
left facing inland, and salmon bones would be burned. Unnecessary killing and 
waste of body parts also constituted disrespect for the animal taken. Failure to 
observe proper etiquette could bring bad luck to the hunter or his relatives, 
or punishment in the next life. Familial groups maintained hunting territories 
for their own benefit, not for conservation in the modern sense of conscious 
sustainable use.7
Athabaskan Indians
For reasons not well understood, evidence of conservation practices is much 
stronger for Athabaskan Indians, living predominantly in the interior, than for 
other Alaska Native groups. Dena’ina Indian elder Andrew Balluta, a noted bear 
hunter, told of a traditional form of utilitarian conservation of brown bears in 
the Lake Clark vicinity. Certain stream valleys where the bears fished for salmon 
would be set aside. No activity that disturbed the bears would be allowed. The 
reserve kept the bears well fed, thus available for use and not hungry enough to 
be a nuisance to villagers.8
In his studies of the Koyukon (upper Koyukuk River) Indians, anthropolo-
gist Richard K. Nelson discovered a pattern of utilitarian conservation and eco-
system maintenance. Koyukons knew every stream, every patch of woods, every 
stretch of the river. They knew how many fish, mammals, and plants could be 
gathered from each and took care not to waste or exhaust the resources. Nelson 
observed that “Koyukon tradition contains an enormous wealth of empirical 
knowledge covering the entire spectrum of natural history. This includes a so-
phisticated understanding of interrelationships among natural phenomena, an 
ecological perspective essentially identical to that recently evolved in Western 
scientific thought.” At the same time, the Koyukons proffered spiritual explana-
tions for their relationship to Nature and did not appear to perceive any conflict 
between the two perspectives.9 Nelson noted that “one of the basic themes in 
Koyukon ideology is a prohibition against wasting anything from nature. . . . 
Although avoidance of waste is based on spiritual sanctions, Koyukon people 
also believe it has practical significance in maintaining populations of resource 
species. They are always encouraged to harvest only what they can use, and to 
use anything they harvest.”10
Beyond the avoidance of waste, “[S]ustained yield considerations are impor-
tant to the entire spectrum of hunting, trapping, fishing, and gathering activi-
ties. This empirically based approach to conservation of resources derives from 
the Koyukon people’s practical understanding of ecological dynamics.” Nelson 
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advised, however, that insufficient data existed to prove in scientific terms the ef-
fectiveness of Koyukon conservation practices.11 He also detected a conservation 
ethic among the Black River Kutchin Indians of northeastern Alaska, although 
he cautioned that the idea may not have pre-dated Western influence.12
Historian Melodie Webb found that, in the upper Yukon Valley in the 
1930s, Athabaskan trappers displayed a much more conservative attitude to-
ward game regulations than white trappers did. Relying primarily on trapping 
for income and apparently desirous of ensuring adequate furbearer stocks, Indi-
ans seldom overtrapped their territories. Webb believed the behavior stemmed 
from cultural ties to the land.13
Research on wood bison in the upper Yukon drainage suggests a lack of 
sustainable behavior on the part of Athabaskans. Oral tradition consistently 
described the animals as common in the early 1800s. Buffalo Shirt Mountain 
in the Sheenjek River country is said to have received its name when a large 
herd passed over its slope, appearing to cover it. Hunters easily killed the beasts 
using versatile bows and arrows, dogs, and snowshoes in winter. According to 
one account they drove herds off a cliff. Stories also blamed excessive hunt-
ing for eradicating the bison and causing starvation. Wolf and bear predation 
could have contributed little to the extirpation, nor would climate or vegetation 
change likely have had such an impact over a relatively short period.14
Examining subarctic Indians including Koyukons and Chipewyans, cultur-
al historian Calvin Martin found their relationship to wildlife to be grounded 
in a fundamentally different conception of reality than that of Western civi-
lization. The latter viewed Nature as matter to be dominated and exploited, 
whereas for the Indians,
[a]nimals lived the majority of time as spirits in the bush, the spirit realm, 
and were every bit as intelligent and sophisticated as man. . . . Hunting these 
animals was a series of spiritual maneuvers designed to engage the spirit of 
the game so that it would agree to make a sacrifice of its flesh to the needy 
hunter. Hunting was a kind of contract between man and animal: animals, 
as conscious and intelligent beings, were well aware that their flesh was nec-
essary for man’s survival and they willingly donned fleshy clothing from time 
to time and surrendered themselves to the hunter. But they in turn demand-
ed respect. Respect lies at the heart of North American hunting; it forms the 
core of the man-animal relationship in Amerindian society.
Therefore, Martin concluded, hunting represented “much more than a straight-
forward pursuit. It is an act that embraces all of life; it is a relationship of recip-
rocating esteem and courtesy. . . . Animals are members of man’s social universe, 
and man a member of theirs.”15
Martin perceived three deterrents to overexploitation of wildlife: the small 
number of Native Americans, the low level of technology, and the lack of eco-
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nomic incentives. Of these, Euro-American influence removed the second and 
third. Disease and Christianity weakened faith in traditional values and, added 
to the fur trade, destroyed the spiritual relationship of mutual respect and ob-
ligation between the Natives and wildlife. As a result the Natives became ag-
gressively exploitative; in effect, they declared war on wildlife. However, Martin 
attributed the extinction of ground sloths, mammoths, horses, and other plains 
mammals more to climate changes than to slaughter by Natives.16
Eskimos
Robert F. Spencer cited evidence of conservation practices among Eski-
mos17: “In the aboriginal culture, the foxes were hunted by means of traps be-
tween December and April. . . . [O]nly five of each kind of fox could be taken 
at a time. The theory was the five skins were sufficient for a parka of matched 
skins and the fox was offended if more that five of his kind were killed.”18 The 
same rule applied to the wolf and wolverine. Ethnographer Knud Rasmussen 
noted that the Icy Cape Inupiat trapped no more than five wolves or wolver-
ines in a season lest the hunter lose his catch or be attacked and killed by the 
animals.19 As in Indian beliefs, logical sustained-yield principles melded into 
spiritual explanations. Animals could think and communicate like humans; 
they sensed human thoughts and actions and could bring bad luck, including 
reduced hunting success, if mistreated.
In the central Brooks Range, Nunamiut Eskimos reduced Dall sheep popu-
lations to low levels between 1885 and 1910. Anthropologist John M. Campbell 
determined that, following an absence of 600–800 years, the Eskimos moved 
into the mountains in substantial numbers around 1750. Relying primarily on 
migrating caribou, they hunted sheep in the summer and at other times when 
caribou did not appear. They employed bows and arrows and, even more effec-
tively, snares. Periods of starvation came to pass in 1906–1907 and 1910–1911 
when few caribou or sheep remained. By 1920, in part because of diseases intro-
duced by whalers, virtually no Eskimos lived in the area. Campbell concluded 
that sheep had either been gradually hunted out over generations or overutilized 
during the period of caribou scarcity around the turn of the century. As of the 
late 1930s, in the near-absence of hunters, sheep herds had recovered.20
Moose and muskox populations also reflected hunting pressure by Eski-
mos on the North Slope. Both had existed in the region during the Pleistocene 
Era. As moose began to move northwest to recolonize the area in the 1800s, 
Nunamiut hunters probably killed off most of the few that crossed the Brooks 
Range into the northern river valleys. Study of climate, vegetation, and wolf 
predation indicated that none of these would have been a deterrent to moose 
range extension. After the Nunamiut left the Brooks Range in the early 20th 
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Century, moose dispersed from populations south of the range and established 
themselves in the north.21
Fragmentary fossil evidence suggested that muskoxen existed in small num-
bers relative to other grazers. Climatic change turned steppes into forest dur-
ing the Holocene, restricting muskox populations to northern coastal Alaska 
and the northern foothills of the Brooks Range where they could find suitable 
feed. Bernik, Inuit, and Nunamiut hunters stalked the creatures from several 
thousand years bpe into the 19th Century. They ate the meat, used the skins for 
warmth, and carved ladles and other implements from the horns. Like moun-
tain sheep, muskoxen served as a reserve meat supply in times of scarcity of 
caribou or, for the Inuit, whales and other sea mammals. Introduction of an im-
proved dogsled permitted hunters to range more widely and find the small and 
isolated herds. Dogs could be trained to force the animals into their defensive 
arcs where they could be killed by bow and arrow. Native hunters, therefore, 
probably caused the virtual extinction of Alaskan muskoxen before the advent 
of whaling or firearms.22
Anthropologist Ann Fienup-Riordan found that Yup’ik Eskimos on Nelson 
Island traditionally perceived themselves as integrally and reciprocally related to 
nonhumans. Both possessed souls, and each could influence the thoughts and 
behavior of the other. As creatures of equivalent moral standing, humans could 
not be stewards or owners of others. Humans could justifiably take the lives of 
nonhumans provided it was done in a proper, respectful manner. In the har-
vest of herring, individuals earned the right to particular fishing spots through 
long-term demonstration of appropriate behavior toward the fish by them and 
their relatives. Failure to fulfill obligations toward wildlife could induce the prey 
creature to go into hiding or otherwise refuse to make itself available for harvest 
in the future. If a creature presented itself for harvest, the hunter felt obliged to 
take it lest it be offended. All creatures eventually returned to life after death; 
humans could cause local or temporary disappearance of species but not ex-
tinction. Therefore, in fulfillment of their obligations, the Yup’ik sometimes 
engaged in what Euro-Americans would consider unnecessary killing and waste 
of wildlife, and their belief in reincarnation precluded any concern for species 
preservation.23
Ecosystem Sustainability
Regarding maintenance of ecosystem integrity, few opportunities for as-
sessment of aboriginal practices have appeared. Sustainable harvest of wildlife 
by Koyukons and others afforded a degree of ecosystem integrity, if only inci-
dentally. But their care for wildlife did not necessarily apply to vegetation, a vi-
tal foundation for wildlife populations. Citing fragmentary evidence, historian 
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Harold Lutz believed Natives sometimes abused the environment through fire. 
Eskimos and Indians used fire for a variety of purposes, among them campfires, 
signaling, warding off mosquitoes, repairing birch bark kayaks and canoes, and 
felling trees. Carelessness prevailed, and fires often went out of control. An 
observer wrote in 1898 that in the upper Yukon Valley “the Indian also has a 
way of signaling by burning trees. When in a locality where he expects to find 
his friends or family, he sets fire to a tall spruce, and then calmly sits down and 
watches the horizon for an answering column of smoke. The wind will fan these 
flames into a fierce forest fire in a short time, and the Indians are too utterly in-
different to think about putting them out.” White men, judged Lutz, exercised 
even less care in using fire than Natives did.24
Athabaskans in the upper Tanana region, like Algonquins in Canada, em-
ployed fire as a tool in a planned strategy to raise the productivity of the taiga. 
Regularized, prescribed burnings increased furbearers, waterfowl, and big game, 
especially moose. Fires set in the village periphery suppressed vegetation that 
might endanger the village in case of wildfire.25 Uncontrolled fire could wreak 
widespread havoc in the interior but had virtually no capacity to do large-scale 
damage to the tundra regions of northern and western Alaska or to the rainfor-
est of the Southeast. Except for destruction of wildlife populations, Natives 
possessed no means of dismantling these ecosystems. Some spoke of the sacred-
ness of the land and the importance of their ties to it, and some tribes allotted 
territories for harvest. But the notion or practice of ecosystem preservation as 
such may not have existed.
INTERPRETING THE EVIDENCE
Whether aboriginal Natives can be considered “environmentalists” or “con-
servationists” depends in part on definitions. It seems clear that Alaskan aborig-
inal societies felt close to or part of Nature and respected other creatures. Rituals 
for taking wild creatures might have had the effect of preventing depletion of 
species. A society that practiced sustainable use of natural resources, however 
indirectly, might well be considered conservationist. Utilitarian conservation-
ism in the modern sense would call for institutionalized and conscious restraint 
in harvest of natural resources based on awareness of their limited availability. 
To be environmentalist, the society would take steps to protect the ecosystem 
as well and would order itself so as to perpetuate a sustainable relationship to 
the ecosystem. Such a holistic system would integrate social beliefs, feelings, 
behavior, technology, and population levels with the characteristics—including 
resource limits—of the natural environment.
Perhaps no human society, ancient or modern, has achieved an ideally ho-
listic relationship to its natural environment. Numerous barriers have existed, 
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among them lack of understanding of the environment, changes in the envi-
ronment, interference by other societies, dissident behavior or beliefs, self-cen-
teredness, and lack of population control. Assessing the evidence for aboriginal 
environmentalism is not a matter of searching for perfect societies. It is an at-
tempt to find responsible practices by some tribes and individuals that may 
reflect on their wisdom or, more importantly, may be useful in a modern era of 
environmental distress.
The apparent infrequency of species extinction and the existence of trib-
al societies within the land’s carrying capacity, said anthropologist Raymond 
Hames, led people to assume that aborigines practiced conservation. Many 
myths, taboos, and rituals reinforced the impression. But Hames insisted that 
“if a people have a conservation ideology but do not act as conservationists, 
then they are not conservationists. . . . [C]onservation is a matter of perfor-
mance, not intent.” The best proof of conservation behavior would be data 
on the relationship of hunting practices to wildlife populations. In the case of 
declining prey species, hunters should reduce their take. Yet tribal societies had 
caused the extinction of some species on islands. Based on his study of Amazo-
nian tribes, Hames believed that none practiced conservation. For conservation 
to work in a tribal culture, he posited the need for internal rule enforcement to 
prevent fellow tribesmen from cheating and external defense to prevent outsid-
ers from taking the resources. The former required strong chiefs and the latter 
some form of territorial control. Amazonians lacked both, but the Polynesians 
and Micronesians, who possessed both, enforced effective conservation on their 
fishing grounds. Hames suggested that coastal Alaska Natives, having strong 
chiefs and territories, may well have practiced conservation.26
Numerous observers have commented on the tendency of Alaska Natives 
to waste wildlife such as caribou, deer, and sea creatures.27 To the extent that 
Eskimos thought about population balances, some of this profligacy may have 
been related to the large groupings and migratory nature of the animals in ques-
tion. Unlike the interior Indians less dependent on migratory mammals, coastal 
Eskimos would have found it difficult to acquire a sense of the ecology of the 
sea and how their behavior could influence it. A premium might then have 
been put on killing as many (whales, walrus, seals) as possible, never knowing 
for certain when they might reappear. Similarly, it would have been difficult 
to imagine that the massive herds of migratory caribou, for example, could be 
threatened by wasteful killing at a particular time and place.
The extravagant slaughter and waste of whales by the Aleuts, as related by 
Elliott, may have involved an assumption that the supply could not be exhaust-
ed. Given a small number of consumers in a large ocean, the practice by itself 
would probably not have endangered a species. Added to commercial whaling, 
it might have contributed materially to whale declines. Whatever the effect, 
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in comparison to the later use of handheld guns, it represented a rare case of 
primitive technology being as destructive as modern methods.
Introduction of technologies such as the gun, said Hames, did not neces-
sarily increase the killing of game. It might mean the hunter simply spent less 
time hunting. But market hunting—for skins, feathers, furs, pets, and other 
purposes—could quickly exhaust wildlife populations. Contact with modern 
civilization also encouraged settlement near schools, hospitals, missions, and 
trading posts, resulting in depletion of natural resources in the vicinity.28
Much of the prodigal behavior of Alaska Natives probably stemmed from 
the adoption of Western values and technology. When John Muir upbraided 
a Tlingit for needlessly shooting a gull, the Indian replied that he had learned 
careless killing of wildlife from whites.29 The impact of just one implement, 
the gun, exceeded the ability of social norms to evolve fast enough to control 
the weapon’s use. Western culture overpowered the Alaska Natives in several 
ways. As in nearly all pre-modern societies it has encountered, it weakened the 
legitimacy of traditional beliefs and practices. It taught Natives to think of wild 
creatures as commodities to harvest for personal material gain. Knowing that 
by killing large amounts of wildlife they could earn money to purchase prized 
luxuries such as guns and alcohol, many Natives did so even though it eroded 
their life-support base.
Alaska Natives eagerly adopted technologies—the match, rifle, powerboat, 
modern heating and lighting, medicine—that yielded material comforts and 
ease of taking game. All of these turned out to be two-edged swords, creating 
dependency on outside income and resources and undermining traditional cul-
ture. Resource exploiters, traders, missionaries, teachers, government officials, 
and other representatives of Euro-American civilization implicitly or explic-
itly conveyed a sense of the superiority of white culture. Before the mid-20th 
Century most educated whites thought assimilation to be in the Natives’ best 
interest. Many or most Natives adopted these judgments and willingly engaged 
in behavior that damaged their own heritage. Each village and ethnic group 
contained individuals for and against Westernization, and considerable regional 
variation existed. Traditional views prevailed more among tribal leaders, the 
elderly, and the Athabaskans.
Unlike modern technology, adaptation to the core values of Euro-American 
culture proved extremely trying. Excepting the Southeast coastal Indians and 
perhaps the Aleuts, traditional Alaska Native culture emphasized group ori-
entation, cooperation, sharing. It differed vastly from Western industrial val-
ues of individualism, aggressiveness, and material acquisitiveness. It sought 
to minimize skills and attitudes necessary for competitive “success.” Caught 
between making the difficult transition and returning to traditional material 
culture often viewed as a form of poverty, Natives experienced identity crises. 
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High rates of alcoholism, school dropout, violence, suicide, and mental illness 
followed.30
Some Alaskan aboriginal beliefs and practices demonstrated ecological 
orientation in a sense of community and mutual obligation with natural sur-
roundings or in awareness of ecological processes. Natives valued animals for a 
variety of nonconsumptive reasons and regularly granted them a form of rights. 
Some articulated an appreciation of the land or the ecosystem as a whole. Na-
tives evolved elements of a holistic sense of connectedness to the land that in 
important respects surpassed the wisdom of the Euro-Americans.
Other Alaska Native practices, especially among Athabaskans, manifested 
utilitarian conservationist principles, managing and using resources for sus-
tained yield. In some cases this wise use principle may have been a product of 
the fur trade, an attempt to maximize trapping income by conserving furbearer 
populations. Groups and, probably, individuals varied in their beliefs and be-
havior. Practice did not necessarily correspond to belief, as witnessed by many 
Natives’ swift adoption of the wasteful and disrespectful habits of outsiders. 
Nor did the felt sense of obligation toward wild creatures always protect hunted 
species from extirpation.
Alaska Natives engaged in constant efforts to survive, as did other organ-
isms, and the value of physical survival implied the need for a value of sustain-
ing the resources on which they depended. Moreover, the hunted species had 
an implicit need for survival and, arguably, a corresponding right to exist. It 
seems relevant, therefore, to consider whether Natives engaged in sustainable 
use of Nature.
Compared to that of Euro-Americans, Alaskan aboriginal treatment of Na-
ture appears to have been relatively benign. As to whether aboriginal Alaskans 
qualified as conservationists, the evidence suggests that some people, to some 
degree, in some places practiced elements of conservation, if the criterion is be-
havior that had the deliberate effect of conserving natural resources. Similarly, 
some Natives practiced aspects of environmentalism, including a holistic rela-
tionship to the land and an acknowledgment of nonhuman rights. By changing 
technology, attitudes, and land ownership patterns, Euro-American civilization 
distorted Native environmental practices and social systems as a whole. What-
ever the degree of traditional commitment to environmental protection, not 
much evidenced itself by the time of statehood.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE
Many scholars and others who attributed ecological wisdom to aboriginal 
cultures hoped it could be an object lesson to Western civilization, which they 
viewed as destructive and unsustainable. To the extent that aboriginal Alaskans 
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practiced principles of modern environmentalism, in particular an ecocentric 
perspective and ecologically sustainable natural resource use, they lacked the 
power to transfer those values to arriving Europeans and Euro-Americans. Most 
outsiders thought they had little to learn from the Natives in the realms of 
philosophy and economics. In the post-1960s era, Alaska Native environmen-
talism may have marginally affected the thinking of Alaskan environmentalists, 
who discovered elements of holism by other means.
Calvin Martin described North American Indians’ reciprocal relationship 
to Nature as “inherently conservationist” but added that the idea that West-
ern society might adopt it seemed “preposterous.” The gap in perspectives, he 
argued, is too great. Even the philosophies of Thoreau, Emerson, Muir, and 
George Perkins Marsh, he thought, had been ethnocentric in that they saw 
Nature as God’s work. And Aldo Leopold’s land ethic implied a form of human 
dominance, if benign in intent, of the land. “Surely,” said Martin, “we deluded 
ourselves when we imagined that the Indian could teach us his particular land 
ethic; we did not understand that it was not just a land ethic but a comprehen-
sive way of life. Anyway, as far as the Indian is concerned, it isn’t he who does 
the teaching but rather the land.”31
A second reason for asking whether Natives practiced conservation would 
be to assess the prospects for sustainable living by present-day tribal societies. 
In post-statehood Alaska many Natives relied substantially on the land for sub-
sistence and cultural identity. Could these values be maintained, and, if not, 
what would be the fate of the people? Speaking of tribal societies in general, 
Hames postulated that social and ecological deterioration did not have to oc-
cur: “[S]imultaneous conservation of ethnic and biological diversity is possible. 
Native peoples can exist in equilibrium with game populations if the technol-
ogy they use is regulated, if hunting and fishing are aimed solely at meeting 
nutritional demands, and if settlement patterns remain dispersed, mobile, and 
at low population densities.”32
As applied to Alaska, Hames prescribed a difficult set of criteria for social 
and ecological viability. Resource politics reflected some of the obstacles. Use 
of wildlife and other natural resources lay at the core of long-standing disputes 
over Native rights and subsistence rights. Alaska Natives had won a large land 
settlement through the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, but the 
state and national governments retained jurisdiction over fish and wildlife. State 
wildlife managers, like the federal officials they succeeded in 1960, tended to 
reflect the interests of sport hunters. Management focused on enforcement of 
licensing, seasons, bag limits, and methods (e.g., snowmobiles and aircraft), 
backed by biological research aimed at maintaining viable game populations. 
Natives commonly ignored the regulations and the science, harvesting wildlife 
according to custom or convenience. Wildlife managers understood little of 
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Native culture and judged Native hunting behavior in terms of its adherence to 
regulations. Finding the Natives frequently in violation of the law, they reacted 
unsympathetically to appeals for special Native rights to wildlife. Constitution-
al principles of equality cast doubt on claims of special rights. Also, changes 
in Native society raised questions of what constituted Native culture and led 
many non-Natives to conclude that modernizing Natives no longer needed or 
deserved special resource use rights. A cultural and political gap existed over 
who should have priority rights to wildlife and what level and type of use met 
the criterion of fulfillment of a true need.33
The gap in perspectives and the remoteness of many Alaska Native hunt-
ing grounds resulted in weak enforcement of regulations. Yet some conserva-
tion progress occurred. State and federal laws gave Natives a partial priority 
status in uses of wildlife and included Natives on regulatory panels. Natives 
found themselves at a disadvantage in competing through the regulatory pro-
cess, especially in state proceedings. Cooperative management of some feder-
ally controlled wildlife, such as bowhead whales and polar bears, incorporated 
Native participation and succeeded in protecting both wildlife populations and 
Caribou left in woods by Inupiat hunters, Shungnak, 1949. By Ray Woolford. FWS 1214, 
Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. Alaska Game Commission agent Wool-
ford required the hunters to retrieve the caribou. Numerous instances of wildlife waste by 
Natives generated an ongoing controversy about causes and management options.
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cultural traditions.34 At the onset of the 21st Century some species had been 
safeguarded by cooperative management, some had not, and the broader ques-
tion of subsistence rights had yet to be resolved.
Hames’s prescription called for controls on technology in taking wildlife 
and restriction of the harvest to traditional needs. For some species and locales 
such as bowhead whales and polar bears along the northern coasts, these goals 
could be feasibly met. Large animals taken near a small number of villages could 
be easily monitored. For smaller or more dispersed species such as waterfowl or 
wolverines, monitoring would be much more difficult. Swift and long-range 
snowmobiles, powerboats, and aircraft carried the potential for excess killing of 
wildlife. Enforcement of rules restricting harvest to nutritional needs would be 
expensive and politically contentious. Acceptance of such rules could grow only 
gradually among hunters who, by historical experience or traditional beliefs, 
had not practiced conservation of wildlife. Moreover, Natives could hardly be 
expected to give up the comforts and pleasures of modern society to which they 
had become accustomed. Yet these advantages and implements depended on 
substantial monetary income, not easily achievable for many Natives. To the 
extent that higher income derived from increased consumptive exploitation of 
natural resources, such as timber and walrus ivory, sustainability would be put 
in jeopardy.
On the whole, Alaska Natives have behaved much the same as non-Natives 
in their treatment of natural resources since statehood. Yup’ik Eskimos depleted 
goose populations but, after intervention by the Fish and Wildlife Service, co-
operated in restoration measures. Hoonah Tlingits opposed clearcut logging in 
their vicinity but engaged in unsustainable logging elsewhere. Gwitch’in Indi-
ans opposed oil drilling in the Arctic Refuge for fear it would undermine their 
traditional lifestyle and caribou supply, while the Alaska Federation of Natives, 
and Eskimos who stood to gain from oil revenues, advocated drilling. Some 
individuals, and some groups such as the Koyukon Indians, emphasized conser-
vation values. Others, especially those active in regional corporations, favored 
rapid exploitation of resources. In environmental controversies, Alaska Natives 
and environmentalists have made selective and temporary alliances.35
Hames also envisioned dispersed, mobile, and small human populations 
as necessary for cultural and ecological sustainability. Most Alaska Native vil-
lages are widely separated and small, but seasonal migration for subsistence has 
all but disappeared. The last nomadic group, Nunamiut Eskimos, settled at 
Anaktuvuk Pass in 1947.36 Television and other influences attracted the young 
to outside popular culture, almost certainly eroding their ties to the land. Most 
villages could not support themselves economically; they relied on the land for 
part of their sustenance and on cash transfers from outside. Native regional cor-
porations, designed for commercial exploitation of natural resources as a path 
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to modernization, undertook environmentally destructive logging and mining 
operations. But population growth constituted the most serious problem. Be-
tween 1990 and 2000, Alaska Natives increased at three times the rate of white 
Alaskans (Table 10.1). This trend alone, if continued, would preclude living in 
harmony with the land and would probably undermine cultural pride as well.
Remnants of aboriginal beliefs supportive of species or ecosystem sustain-
ability could supplement and enrich modern science in resource management. 
Each could learn something from the other. Management science might become 
more holistic, developing a broader understanding of human ties to the land. 
Conversely, ecological science could help Natives understand the dynamics of 
wildlife populations and the imperatives of balancing human population and 
resources. Cooperative wildlife management has achieved this in some degree. 
Broader success would depend in part on whether aboriginal culture has been 
ecologically responsible and, even more, on whether Natives and non-Natives 
believe it to be so.
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Wildlife and Wildlife Managers
as aleUtIan fUr CatCHes sHranK In tHe 1790s, rUssIans eXtended tHe range 
of their trade to the Alaskan mainland. Americans and the British arrived shortly 
after Cook’s 1778 visit and aggressively sought furs both on land and at sea. The 
quasi-governmental Russian-American Company could not control or compete 
against American whalers, who operated at will in Russian waters. Hudson’s Bay 
Company, long arm of Russia’s rival the British Empire, established a trading 
presence in Southeast Alaska by the 1830s. It moved west from the Mackenzie 
River Valley and in 1847 set up a post at Fort Yukon in Russian-claimed Alaska. 
Vulnerable to potential hegemonic moves by the British and Americans and 
realizing modest fur profi ts, the Russians concluded that they had no viable 
future in Alaska. Not wanting the British on their eastern border, they resolved 
to sell the territory to the United States.
The United States assumed jurisdiction over all of Alaska claimed by Rus-
sia, even though the Russians had controlled very little of it. It set aside the 
question of Native claims for future consideration. It placed the land under 
military rule, but traders, gold seekers, and other exploiters carried on almost 
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unsupervised. After the opening of salmon canneries in 1878 and the Juneau 
gold strike of 1880 the non-Native population swelled, generating an obvious 
need for law and order. The 1884 Organic Act made Alaska an administra-
tive district overseen by an appointed governor. It permitted mining claims by 
whites on lands not occupied or claimed by Natives.
From the beginning, a strained relationship existed between the non-Native el-
ements and the federal government. Settlers demanded more services, autonomy, 
and control over resources, accusing the government of obstructing progress 
and favoring salmon canning companies and other outside corporate interests. 
The salmon industry, for its part, did long-term biological damage to runs of 
salmon. Federal officials looked upon Alaskans as unprepared for self-govern-
ment and irresponsible in their treatment of natural resources. They viewed 
the resources as belonging to the nation, not just to white settlers or Alaska 
Natives.
While gold rush dramas played themselves out, events in the States had 
been building for decades toward state and federal wildlife protection. An or-
nithology office within the Department of Agriculture evolved into the Bu-
reau of Biological Survey and ultimately the Interior Department’s Fish and 
Wildlife Service. It gained power and responsibility through the Lacey Act of 
1900, bird and mammal conservation laws, and the assembling of a complex 
of wildlife refuges. Well before the turn of the century Alaskan wildlife issues 
caught the attention of federal officials and their allies in private conserva-
tion groups. Natural resource abuses in the States, and laws attempting to 
curb them, echoed in federal policy toward Alaska. Unlike the other territories 
where the damage had largely occurred prior to federal protective action, Alaska 
offered the nation a chance to take a preemptive stand against wholesale loss of 
Nature.
During the gold rushes of 1880–1910 the rising non-Native population 
intensified the pressure on game mammals. Commercial slaughter for meat, 
hides, and antlers progressed into a booming industry, depleting several species 
of mammals in the early years of the 20th Century. At the urging of federal of-
ficials, the Boone and Crockett Club, and other conservation groups, Congress 
enacted laws between 1900 and 1925 in an effort to curb the abuses. A similar 
series of laws attempted to stop the overexploitation of salmon. Distance from 
Washington and prevailing attitudes of local citizens and fortune seekers ob-
structed law enforcement.
When Alaska gained territorial status and a legislature in 1912, the federal 
government retained jurisdiction over natural resources through the appointed 
governor and natural resource agencies. But the legislature mirrored local antag-
onism toward federal wildlife management jurisdiction and policies, especially 
protection of the grizzly bear and oversight of commercial salmon fishing. And 
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neither the territorial nor the federal government permitted the Natives much 
say in natural resource policies.
Alaska’s naturalist-wildlife managers spent time in Alaska varying from 
months to years; some worked in the territory and others out of Washington. 
Three directors of the Bureau of Biological Survey and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service belonged to their ranks. All loved wild Alaska, or aspects of it, and 
committed themselves to its defense. They incorporated the values of the Pro-
gressive Era conservation movement that guided federal wildlife management. 
Like the private naturalists, their brands of conservation ranged from utilitarian 
to moderately preservationist. Most approved of predator control, and some 
endorsed species translocations or other projects of dubious ecological or eco-
nomic wisdom. They participated in the writing of wildlife protection laws and 
worked to gain public support. Traveling by dogsled and boat and later by bush 
plane, they came to know the country and people, building respect for conser-
vation and guarding fisheries and land mammals. A few, notably Bob Marshall, 
Olaus and Margaret Murie, and Ira Gabrielson, bestowed lasting gifts in the 
preservation of large tracts of land as parks and reserves. They assisted and built 
upon the endeavors of the early private naturalists to complete a vital phase in 
the development of conservation in Alaska.
Government biologists, through their work on lands and wildlife, reinforced 
the values of species sustainability for consumptive use (utilitarian conserva-
tion). To some extent, as in the Arctic National Wildlife Range, they advocated 
ecosystem preservation and nonconsumptive use. Ecological science led some 
to oppose aggressive predator control. Bob Marshall and the Muries forthrightly 
articulated nonconsumptive use values. All respected and furthered the applica-
tion of science as a means to sound management. In retirement and sometimes 
during government service, several mobilized the public through writing or 
political action. Their efforts sowed seeds of modern environmentalism in both 
the States and Alaska.
Bureau of Biological Survey chiefS
212
Bureau of Biological Survey Chiefs
BeTWeeN 1902 aND 1924, JuriSDicTioN over alaSKa’S laND MaMMalS aND Mi-
gratory birds came under the purview of the Agriculture Department’s Bureau 
of Biological Survey (BBS). For most of the fi rst half-century of its existence, 
members or associate members of the Boone and Crockett Club directed the 
agency. At least three of these well-educated men maintained a strong interest 
in Alaska and used their contacts in government to implement its fi rst game 
laws and some of its wildlife preserves. Evidence of decimation and waste of 
wildlife, largely a product of the Gold Rush and the salmon industry, fi rmed 
their resolve to conserve Alaska’s game animals.
ABUSE OF LAND MAMMALS
Alaska’s land mammals and birds escaped the brunt of the assault by the 
early fur seekers. This began to change when the Russians moved inland and 
American and Hudson’s Bay traders arrived. In their quest for furbearers, some 
traders introduced alcohol to the Natives, cheated them, and undermined their 
C. Hart Merriam, Edward W. Nelson, Ira N. Gabrielson
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culture in a variety of ways. The Gold Rush era, however, affected land mam-
mals more detrimentally than the land fur traders did. Russians found gold 
in parts of Alaska but did little or no prospecting. Men attracted by the 1880 
Juneau gold strike, as well as salmon canners, put heavy hunting stress on the 
deer in the Southeast. Then came the great Klondike strike of 1896 and its af-
termath. Gold fever drove people from around the world to explore the creeks 
of the Yukon and of Alaska, whose non-Native population jumped 750 percent 
between 1890 and 1900 (Table 10.1). Gold seekers killed accessible wildlife to 
feed themselves or pay their bills. They caught furbearers by any means pos-
sible, including poisons and destruction of beaver lodges. Meat hunters, many 
of them Indians, supplied the miners. Widespread reckless slaughter of game 
mammals took place. Game and some furbearers dwindled, especially in river 
drainages where the gold seekers traveled and worked.
Settlers, sport hunters, and commercial trophy hunters added to the toll 
of wildlife, often wastefully. Treasury agent Joseph Murray described in 1895 
what he had witnessed in the Southeast: “[T]he smell from decaying deer car-
casses became horribly offensive around the towns and villages. White men go 
out and kill the animals for fun, just to see who can knock down the most in 
a given time. The natives kill them, because they can get a drink of whiskey, 
valued at 25 cents, for each skin secured.”1 An investigative report by J. Alden 
Loring for the New York Zoological Society in 1901 stated, “It is believed by 
TaBle 10.1. Human Population of Alaska, 1740–2000
Year Native American White Other Total
1740 74,700 — — 74,700
1840 40,016 700 — 40,716
1880 32,996 430 — 33,426
1890 25,354 4,298 2,298 32,052
1900 29,542 30,450 3,600 63,592
1910 25,331 36,400 2,625 64,356
1920 26,558 27,883 595 55,036
1930 29,983 28,640 655 59,278
1940 32,458 39,170 896 72,524
1950 33,884 92,973 1,976 128,643
1960 43,081 174,546 8,540 226,167
1970 (52,000) 236,767 (12,000) 300,382
1980 64,357 311,968 25,526 401,851
1990 85,698 415,492 48,853 550,043
2000 98,043 434,534 94,355 626,932
Sources: George W. Rogers and Richard A. Cooley, Alaska’s Population and Economy: Regional Growth, Development, 
and Future Outlook, Vol. 2: Statehood Handbook. College: University of Alaska, Institute of Business, Economic and 
Governmental Research, 1963, 28; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, annual census data, 1970–2000, 
Washington, DC
Note: 1970 fi gures for Native American and Other are approximate.
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responsible men that five moose are killed for every one that is used.” One In-
dian reportedly shot 50 moose in a summer, when the meat would not be at its 
best. Hunters killed many so the largest antlers could be picked out for sale and 
left the rest of the bodies. They shot thousands of deer for the hindquarters or 
for the skins alone, which sold for 10 to 20 cents each.2 Many deer died for even 
lesser reasons. A Mr. Britten recalled a winter day in 1901 when deep snow had 
driven deer down to the shore to feed on seaweed in Wrangell Narrows: “Soon a 
five dory halibut boat came along with, I think, five guns shooting. They simply 
shot the deer, leaving them lay, not even putting a boat down to pick one up. I 
counted 28 deer killed below the snow line, with bloody tracks leading into the 
woods where cripples had escaped, to die later. This took place within a stretch 
of five or six miles.”3 At Sand Point in 1911, F.E. Kleinschmidt encountered a 
Native offering 82 caribou tongues at 50 cents each. The remainder of the ani-
mals lay in the field on the Alaska Peninsula where they fell.4 In various localities 
hunters eradicated herds of mountain sheep.5 Governors’ reports stated that bea-
vers approached extinction and that furbearers in general had become scarce.6
Trophy hunting got under way before the turn of the century, mainly in 
the relatively accessible Southeast and the Alaska and Kenai peninsulas where 
settlers first appeared about 1898. It took two forms: sport hunting by wealthy 
individuals who sought adventure, social status, and decorations for their dens 
and clubrooms; and commercial gathering of animal parts to be sold outside 
Alaska. Both groups of hunters looked for the largest specimens they could find 
of moose and caribou antlers, sheep horns, and bear heads and hides.
British military officer Colonel Claude Cane, who visited both peninsu-
las in 1902, exemplified the gentleman-hunter perspective. Reflecting on his 
sheep hunt on the Kenai, he reasoned, “Some people, I know, will blame me 
for shooting four rams in one day and five in another, and call it massacre and 
not sport; but they must remember I had come thousands of miles to get these 
specimens, and had already hunted many blank days and put in a great deal of 
hard work without results.”7 By contrast, his sporting friend Frances Paget
had just come down from the headwaters of the Indian, and had got six 
nice rams, though he said they were neither so plentiful as they were the 
year before, nor did there seem to be as many good heads. This was not to 
be wondered at, as two brothers had spent the whole winter in this ground, 
and had brought out twenty-five big heads, besides, as we afterwards found 
out, leaving a good many smaller ones, which they did not think worth the 
trouble of packing out, to rot on the ground.
Such slaughter as this is inexcusable, and cannot even be profitable, as 
the fur dealers will pay only five dollars each for sheep heads, and it is to be 
hoped that the new Alaskan Game Law will effectively put a stop to it in the 
immediate future.8
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Regarding moose, Cane pointed to the Berg brothers as having
killed and shipped out during the last winter to taxidermists in the States 
twelve moose with heads more than 65 inches in spread, a number which, 
most sportsmen will agree, is somewhat excessive, even in a country as full of 
game as the Kenai Peninsula.
It is this demand for trophies by people who go no farther in search of 
them than the nearest taxidermist’s shop which is doing all the harm—at 
least on the American continent—and closing so many districts which only a 
few years ago were teeming with game, to legitimate sportsmen.9
By implication, many other moose may have been shot to pick out those car-
rying the largest antlers. Cane himself had killed four moose, nine Dall sheep, 
and three brown bears on the trip.10 Apparently an educated and conscientious 
person, Cane believed sport hunters deserved priority status in taking wildlife 
and that they would not become so numerous or kill so much as to place a spe-
cies in jeopardy.
Having heard the accounts of his fellow countryman Cane and others, 
Charles R.E. Radclyffe and two companions traveled to the United States in 
1903. After personal briefings by BBS officials C. Hart Merriam and Theodore 
Palmer, they set out for the Kenai Peninsula. They took a considerable toll of 
wildlife (Table 10.2). Radclyffe argued, however, that
sportsmen . . . have been so few and far between in the country up to the 
present date, that they have not been to any extent a real menace to any kind 
of big game. The real danger at present lies in the indiscriminate killing of 
bears, moose, caribou, and sheep by the natives for the sale of the hides and 
horns, and also for the sake of the meat of the last three species which is sold 
by the natives and others to ships, canneries, and miners throughout the 
country. For the last-named purpose males, females, and young of all kinds 
of game have hitherto been killed at all seasons of the year.11
TaBle 10.2. Game Killed by Radclyffe Party, Kenai Peninsula, 1903
Species Number Species Number
Brown bear 13 River otter 1
Black bear 2 Wolverine 1
Moose 6 Porcupine 6
Dall sheep 15 Snowshoe hare 31
Caribou 7 Eagle 3
Seal 3 Grouse & ptarmigan 108
Fox 2 Goose, duck, other birds (sp.) 60
Source: C.R.E. Radclyffe, Big Game Shooting in Alaska (London: Rowland, Ward, 1904), 73.
Note: Includes some sheep and caribou shot by guides for food.
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continued on next page
English sport hunter Charles R.E. Radclyffe (left) and guides pose over record brown bear he 
shot, Kenai Peninsula, 1903. In C.R.E. Radclyffe, Big Game Shooting in Alaska, London: 
Rowland Ward, 1904, frontispiece. As hunting grounds in other parts of the world became 
exhausted, wealthy sportsmen turned their attention to Alaska in the 1890s. Commercial 
and sport hunting for heads, hides, or meat led to the Alaska game laws of 1902, 1908, and 
1925.
Sport hunters from faraway nations answered Alaska’s call. In 1907 Charles 
Madsen guided Austrian Baron von Guttman on a hunt lasting several weeks. 
After bagging eleven walruses and four polar bears north of Bering Strait, the 
baron killed eight mountain sheep and fourteen brown bears on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula in Siberia. At Herendeen Bay on the Alaska Peninsula he got seven 
bull caribou; then he wound up the trip by shooting nine Dall sheep and six 
bull moose on the Kenai Peninsula, considerably more than the law allowed. 
In recounting the hunt, Madsen accurately observed that “game was in theory 
under the protection of the territorial governor . . . but in reality there was little 
control.”12 F.E. Kleinschmidt organized a similar hunt in 1913. First the group 
of four American hunters collected fourteen walruses and five polar bears in the 
north. Then at Pavlov Bay on the Alaska Peninsula they bagged eight caribou 
and a brown bear. On the Kenai Peninsula they added eighteen Dall sheep, 
seven moose, and four black bears. One of the polar bears and all four of the 
black bears were cubs or yearlings.13
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Whatever the sport of killing nearly defenseless animals with a high-powered 
rifle, the excursions often entailed danger and hardship. Madsen had a close call 
when he tried to skin a sleeping brown bear he thought had been shot, and the 
next day another bear injured him. Kleinschmidt’s party lost a rudder, narrowly 
escaped being frozen into the Arctic icepack, and nearly foundered on the rocks 
of the Alaska Peninsula. On the Kenai they boated into the interior and back-
packed far into the mountains. On the way out they carried their trophy heads 
and skins and pulled their loaded boats eighteen miles up the fast-moving Kenai 
River in subfreezing temperatures. One of the guides froze his feet as the ther-
mometer approached zero. Yet as they left the hunting grounds in late October 
they met English hunters coming in.14
Gold miners, often too busy to hunt, relied on commercial meat hunters. 
In 1903, a year after Felix Pedro discovered gold near Fairbanks, moosemeat 
sold for 40 cents a pound and caribou for 20 cents. Mountain sheep and fresh 
salmon fetched even higher prices. Between 1903 and 1908 Tom and Elmer 
Gibson, among others, supplied mining camps, restaurants, and meat markets 
in the region. Journeying hundreds of miles in winter by dogsled and carrying 
large quantities of meat, they engaged in a difficult and dangerous occupation. 
Construction of the Tanana River Railway in 1905 made transportation much 
easier. On November 12, 1907, the Gibson brothers shipped 2,430 pounds of 
meat to Fairbanks; on the 24th, 1,905 pounds; and on the 27th, 1,554 pounds. 
By that time entrepreneurs had begun to import livestock in quantity from the 
States via the Gold Rush routes, undercutting the meat-hunting business.15
THE 1902 AND 1908 GAME LAWS
Depictions of wildlife abuse alarmed stateside conservation groups. Boone 
and Crockett, American Ornithologists’ Union, New York Zoological Society, 
and other organizations applied their weight. Aided by the Bureau of Biologi-
cal Survey, they lobbied through a series of wildlife protection laws, including 
the Alaska game laws of 1902 and 1908. These laws built upon the Lacey Act 
of 1900, which prohibited interstate transportation of game taken in violation 
of state statutes. The 1902 law transferred jurisdiction over most land mam-
mals, plus walruses and sea lions, to the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of 
Biological Survey. Land mammals classified as furbearers remained under the 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Fisheries, until 1920.
The 1902 law sought to curb the trade in deer and bear hides, moose antlers, 
and sheep horns and to head off plans to increase the market export of meat. It 
prohibited sale of hides, horns, and heads of game mammals, excluding furbear-
ers, in or from Alaska. It permitted shipment of game parts and live animals 
from Alaska to the outside as registered trophies and by scientific permit. It 
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outlawed killing of female and yearling ungulates and set bag limits for all land 
game mammals and birds, including brown bears but excluding black bears. In 
any one year a hunter could kill two moose, walrus, or sea lions; four caribou, 
mountain sheep, mountain goats, and adult brown bears; and eight deer. The 
law instituted hunting seasons and allowed sale of meat until fifteen days be-
yond closing of the season. It authorized the secretary of agriculture to make 
rules, such as halting the taking of an endangered species for up to five years. 
However, it left enforcement to existing federal marshals, burdened by other 
duties and reluctant to impair their local ties by upholding an unpopular law. 
Moreover, local citizens complained that well-connected outside sportsmen re-
ceived favored treatment in being permitted to ship out their trophies.16
Criticism of the 1902 law led to a revision in 1908 empowering the gover-
nor to appoint wardens and issue licenses for hunting and exporting game. In 
response to complaints about protection of brown bears, the law compromised 
by removing the season limit on bears north of 62 degrees, a line running across 
south-central Alaska. It reduced annual bag limits on large mammals to two 
moose; one walrus or sea lion; three each of caribou, sheep, and brown bear; 
and (by regulation), six deer, reduced again to three by 1916. It tightened the 
rules for shipping hides, trophies, and scientific specimens and retained the 
other key provisions of the 1902 law. While the governor’s wardens enforced 
the law, the Bureau of Biological Survey wrote the regulations.17
Alaska Natives, who did the bulk of commercial hunting, suffered most 
from the prohibition of hide and horn exports and sale of game meat out of sea-
son. Except for work in the salmon industry and selling items to tourists, coastal 
Natives had few opportunities to earn money. But Boone and Crockett leaders 
and other supporters of the game laws firmly believed excess killing and waste 
by Natives jeopardized wildlife populations. They fought off attempts to revise 
the laws to ease the impact on Natives. In 1916 the Bureau of Biological Survey 
prohibited the sale of sheep and moose to railroad construction camps, another 
source of cash for Natives. When the BBS assumed responsibility for furbearer 
management in 1920, it banned the shooting of muskrats and beavers. In 1923 
it temporarily outlawed trapping of beavers statewide, even though the animals 
had been depleted only in some locations. Indians in the interior, who relied on 
furs for most of their cash, saw their income lowered.18
In legal terms, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 also impinged upon 
the Natives’ economic well-being. To protect nesting geese and ducks it banned 
hunting between December 15 and September 1. Almost all the birds left Alas-
ka by early fall, especially in the interior. Adherence to the law would deprive 
Natives of vital food supplies and put sport hunters at a disadvantage relative 
to those in the States where most of the birds wintered. Yup’ik Eskimos on the 
Yukon Delta, a major nesting area, ignored the law and harvested geese and 
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ducks in the spring and summer.19 The conflict went unresolved until long after 
statehood.
Wardens, being gubernatorial appointees, acquired a reputation as political 
hacks who exhibited little will to enforce the law. In one case a warden report-
edly participated in a “side hunt,” a sport calling for a group of hunters to 
choose up sides for a day and kill every wild creature they could find. Players 
assigned points to different creatures, and the side tallying the most points won. 
Although some wardens performed their duties well, many lacked competence 
and ignored blatant lawbreaking.20 In any case, the governor needed person-
nel and funds to police the enormous territory. Seven wardens, occasionally 
supplemented by Bureau of Forestry officials, carried the responsibility in 1911. 
In 1918 fish and fur wardens from the Department of Commerce, as well as 
forest rangers, assisted eight regular game wardens under the Department of 
the Interior. Until 1924 three departments shared jurisdiction over Alaskan 
wildlife, creating confusion and duplication of effort.21 Despite the enforce-
ment weaknesses, the 1902 and 1908 laws appeared to succeed in shutting off 
the commercial export of wild animal parts. Sport hunting (Table 10.3) took a 
modest toll of game.
When Alaska achieved territorial status in 1912, its federally appointed 
governor retained the power to hire game wardens. The new legislature, unlike 
those in other territories, had no jurisdiction over fish, furbearers, or game. For 
decades, resolutions called for territorial control of wildlife, for an end to land 
restrictions by the federal government, and for surveys and other measures to 
facilitate settler ownership of land. A typical 1913 resolution demanded that 
the land “be thrown open for the general use of the prospector, miner, and set-
tler.” Withdrawals of the Tongass and Chugach national forests in 1903–1907 
provoked anger; then parks and monuments at Mt. McKinley, Katmai, and 
Glacier Bay later appeared, followed by numerous military reservations in the 
1940s. Territorial governor and later U.S. senator Ernest Gruening, an inveter-
ate booster, lamented that “the story of land in Alaska is one of contrast between 
TaBle 10.3. Game and Trophies Shipped From Alaska, 1910–1916
Specimen 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916
Brown bear skin 10 26 15 7 19 22 35
Glacier bear skin 3
Sheep head/horns/skin 10 34+ 15 31 30 19 28
Moose head/antlers 6 21+ 13 18 17 11 9
Caribou head/antlers — 3 1 1 4 5 11
Goat head/horns/skin — 2+ — 1 6 6 1
Source: Annual Report of the Governor of Alaska on the Alaska Game Law, 1910–1916.
Note: Does not include an unknown number of trophies shipped in personal baggage or killed but left in Alaska.
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natural and man-made restriction. It is a tale of continuous effort by Americans 
there to secure a small share of this abundant ground. It is, no less, a necrology 
of their legitimate aspirations through the thwarting by a distant government. 
Its full narration would be depressing. It begins in 1867 and it is still ‘to be 
continued.’ ”22
Alaska’s population had been calculated at 64,000 in the 1910 census, 
about 37,000 of it white. By 1939 the total stood at 72,524, including 39,170 
non-Natives. The 1912 report of the congressional House Committee on Ter-
ritories described the enabling act as containing “more than the usual safeguards 
against unwise or vicious legislation.”23 Federal politicians and administrators 
did not want to entrust such a huge territory to so few people, and entrepre-
neurial Alaskans strongly resented the government’s barring their full access to 
the resources. The difference in attitudes informed virtually all natural resource 
disputes in the territorial period and during statehood as well.
C. HART MERRIAM
Clinton Hart Merriam (1855–1942) can be considered, at least in a ju-
risdictional sense, one of Alaska’s first wildlife managers. Brought up near the 
Adirondacks in a wealthy family at Locust Grove, New York, Merriam acquired 
an interest in natural science. His father, a former congressman, introduced 
him to Smithsonian director Spencer F. Baird. Impressed by the boy’s work in 
taxidermy, Baird arranged a position for him on the Hayden Yellowstone expedi-
tion of 1872. This experience confirmed the sixteen-year-old’s desire to do taxi-
dermy. Medical degrees at Yale and Columbia, and work as a doctor between 
1879 and 1885, diverted him from professional pursuit of his passion. But in 
his spare time he earned a reputation as a highly competent student of birds 
and mammals. When an elite group of ornithologists formed the American Or-
nithologists’ Union (AOU, 1883), Merriam assumed leadership as a founding 
member, secretary, and chair of the migratory bird committee. He organized 
a volunteer reporting network to track migration routes in North America.24 
Through AOU he made the lifelong friendship of Theodore Roosevelt. Later 
he befriended John Muir; they spent time in the field together.
Merriam ranks as an ancestor of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. AOU 
members feared the imminent extermination of the passenger pigeon, Caro-
lina parakeet, and other species and sought government intervention. Through 
AOU lobbying the Agriculture Department created a position for an ornitholo-
gist in 1885 and hired Merriam. The office advanced to Division of Economic 
Ornithology and Mammalogy in 1886, Bureau of Biological Survey in 1905, 
and Fish and Wildlife Service in 1940. Merriam directed the agency from 1885 
until his retirement in 1910.25
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Merriam presided during a pivotal era in government and public attitudes 
toward wildlife protection. Modeled by such writers as John Muir and John Bur-
roughs, nature appreciation grew popular after mid-century. It found organized 
expression in private groups like AOU and the Audubon societies. Scientists in 
and out of government began to show active concern in the 1870s. Baird of the 
Smithsonian Institution applied his connections to help create the U.S. Com-
mission on Fish and Fisheries (1871), perhaps the first federal government unit 
expressly dedicated to conservation of wildlife species. Similarly, through AOU 
Baird pushed for the ornithology office within the Agriculture Department. 
Now able to operate both inside and outside of government, AOU worked for 
laws protecting birds. George Bird Grinnell tried to complement the group’s 
mainly scientific membership by organizing a national Audubon Society to in-
volve the public more directly.26
Public and private naturalists recoiled at the slaughter of the passenger pi-
geon, fur seal, and other species. They objected to the fashion in women’s hats, 
lasting from about 1890 to 1910 and causing mass killing of egrets and other 
birds for their feathers. As the naturalists sought legislation to halt commercial 
hunting, a peculiar event involving Alaska cropped up to assist them. Rumors 
of a gigantic harvest of wild bird eggs in Alaska and northwest Canada attracted 
national attention in 1895. Allegedly, the commercial photography and pre-
pared food industries bought and used the eggs. Grinnell of Forest and Stream 
investigated the claims, finding them untrue. Nevertheless, coming at a time 
of heightened concern about commercial abuses of wildlife, the affair strength-
ened public sentiment for a protective law passed in 1900.27
Outdoor sporting groups had proliferated after the Civil War and held 
significant potential for wildlife protection. Attempts to organize them to that 
end produced the League of American Sportsmen (1898), the most active pri-
vate group supporting the Lacey Act. Its leaders included Merriam, William 
T. Hornaday, and Ernest Thompson Seton. The league, the Audubon societies, 
scientists led by AOU’s Joel A. Allen and New York Zoological Society’s Hor-
naday and Henry Fairfield Osborn, and the supporting Boone and Crockett 
Club and Bureau of Biological Survey made up the first broad-based American 
coalition for wildlife conservation. Their victory in the Lacey Act advanced 
wildlife protection to prominence within federal policy and in the conservation 
movement of the 20th Century.28
Merriam and his small staff conducted fieldwork over much of the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico, collecting and classifying thousands of specimens 
of fauna for the Smithsonian. On a research expedition to Arizona in the late 
1880s, Merriam noticed the differences in flora and fauna at different altitudes. 
He found that each layer, based on temperature, hosted a distinct community 
of plants, birds, and mammals. Relating altitude to latitude and terming the 
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habitats “life zones,” he projected the concept onto the map of North America, 
identifying seven life zones from the Arctic to the Florida tropics. Approaching 
the description from the perspective of habitat rather than plant and animal 
identification, Merriam significantly advanced the emerging science of ecology. 
Scholars later modified his theory to account for moisture differences in under-
standing ecological zones and communities.29
In 1891 superiors recalled Merriam from a Death Valley expedition to go 
to the Pribilofs and investigate the fur seal controversy. Ignoring warnings about 
robbers, he took a shortcut alone across the Tehachapi Mountains. He spotted 
two armed men following him. When they separated in an apparent pincers 
movement, he readied his rifle, crouched behind a rock, and picked them both 
off. As a scientist who had studied the fur seals, in 1909 he received appoint-
ment to the Fur Seal Advisory Board. He took a more conservative position 
than that of Henry W. Elliott, whom he could not abide.30
In his capacity as a government scientist and administrator, Merriam 
raised public awareness of the beneficial nature of most birds, especially those 
that controlled rodents and insects. He worked for legal protection of birds 
but harbored no such charitable views of mammals. He testified in a 1908 
hearing that the “great bulk of mammals are pests. Except the badgers, weasels, 
skunks, bats, moles and shrews, very few of our mammals are of service to 
man.” Merriam expressed a highly utilitarian perspective oriented particularly 
to the interests of Western agriculture, a potent force in government. Congress 
had forced a more directly economic role on the renamed Bureau of Biological 
Survey in 1905, including a rodent control program that widened to target a 
variety of mammalian predators. Merriam preferred a research emphasis but 
did not object to predator control as such. He considered rodents, coyotes, and 
wolves bad. Although he revised his stand on predators late in life, the Bureau 
of Biological Survey acted as the prime mover in efforts at predator control 
that decimated some species and begot decades of controversy in Alaska and 
elsewhere.31
Founder and first president of the American Society of Mammalogists 
(1919), Merriam authored more than 500 books and articles on birds, mam-
mals, plants, Indians, and the life of William H. Dall. His mastery of taxonomy 
won widespread adoption of his methods of classification of animals. He domi-
nated the early evolution of the modern science of mammalogy, even though he 
possessed only a partially ecological view of the environment.
Merriam participated in, organized, and chose the scientists for the Harri-
man Alaska Expedition of 1899 and supervised the publication of its volumi-
nous reports. As a result, Mt. Merriam in Glacier Bay National Park is named 
for him.32 His positions as chief of the Division of Economic Ornithology and 
Mammalogy and the successor Bureau of Biological Survey gave him supervi-
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sory responsibility for the Alaska game laws, but he had no taste for politics. 
Except for efforts to save the brown and grizzly bears, in which he adopted a 
special interest, Merriam shied away from environmental disputes. He devoted 
most of his time after retirement, funded by a grant from the Harriman Foun-
dation, to research on California Indians.33
THEODORE S. PALMER
Merriam chose as his Biological Survey assistant in charge of game Dr. 
Theodore Sherman Palmer (1868–1955), a Californian and self-taught scien-
tist who had studied birds and other wildlife in Alaska. As had Merriam, Palmer 
earned an M.D., but he did not practice medicine. Arriving at BBS in 1890, 
Palmer led the Death Valley expedition in 1891 and collected and wrote de-
scriptions of fauna. Supported by Merriam, he initiated the bureau’s emphasis 
U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey officials (left to right): Vernon Bailey, C. Hart Merriam, 
Theodore S. Palmer, and Albert K. Fisher at Lone Pine, California, June 13, 1891, after 
Death Valley expedition. Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley. The BBS, 
forerunner of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, initiated federal wildlife management.
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on wildlife protection and maintained connections between the bureau and 
outdoor sporting and nature preservation groups. In addition to work on the 
Lacey Act and the Alaska game laws of 1902 and 1908, Palmer wrote the initial 
draft of the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 and the regulations for the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act (1918).
A leader in the National Audubon Society for 30 years, Palmer also served 
as a biographer in the American Ornithologists’ Union. He assisted states in 
drafting game laws and helped create the programs that evolved into the na-
tional wildlife refuge system. As a member of Boone and Crockett he remained 
active in wildlife protection after retirement, serving on the committee on birds 
at the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation. He wrote on jackrabbits, 
rodents, and other game and nongame species and their protection. At the 
Smithsonian between 1928 and 1933 he helped draft the first whale protection 
treaty.34
JOHN B. BURNHAM
Much or most of the credit for the actual drafting of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty belongs to John B. Burnham (1869–1939), the first president of the 
American Game Protective and Propagation Association founded in 1911. The 
arms industry, promoting wildfowl protection laws as essential to its future in a 
time of rapidly waning flocks, organized the association. George Bird Grinnell, 
for whom Burnham had worked at Forest and Stream, recommended him for 
the directorship.35
Burnham played a leading role in the passage of the Federal Migratory Bird 
(McLean-Weeks) Act. Critics widely regarded as unconstitutional a law placing 
all migratory species under federal protection; President William Howard Taft 
had vowed to veto such a measure. It passed through Congress as a rider to an 
appropriations bill and reached Taft’s desk on March 4, 1913, his last day in 
office. Turning the clock back to prevent his term from legally expiring, Taft 
signed the bill, apparently taking no notice of the migratory bird provisions. 
Courts later affirmed the measure’s constitutionality.
During the Gold Rush in 1897–1898, Burnham crossed White Pass to 
Lake Bennett and returned through Chilcoot Pass. He undertook no scientific 
study and spent only a short time in Alaska but maintained a strong concern for 
conservation of its wildlife. For much of his career he served as a New York state 
game official.36 His game protection association joined the Camp Fire Club of 
America and the Boone and Crockett Club to reserve Mt. McKinley National 
Park (Chapter 6), and he served as the group’s chief congressional lobbyist. 
These groups, and the National Association of Audubon Societies, then assisted 
passage of the 1925 Alaska Game Law.37
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EDWARD W. NELSON
In 1916 the directorship of the Bureau of Biological Survey passed to an-
other prominent naturalist, Edward William Nelson (1855–1934). Born in 
Amoskeag, New Hampshire, Nelson spent the next few years in Manchester. 
His patriotic father joined the Grand Army of the Republic in 1861, and his 
mother followed suit by volunteering as a nurse in Baltimore. She sent Edward 
to live on his grandparents’ farm in the northern Adirondacks where he experi-
enced a reintroduction to Nature. His first overnight trip into the woods to pick 
blueberries sparked a lifelong desire to explore wild places.
Shortly before the war ended, Edward’s father died in battle. His enterpris-
ing mother moved the family to Chicago and established herself as a successful 
dressmaker. School and play in the nearby woods furthered Edward’s interest 
in natural science, above all, birds. The high school principal encouraged him, 
and a friend shared the first bird books, Wilson’s and Nuttall’s, he had seen. A 
prominent entomologist interested him in bug collecting, but fate intervened. 
His home and his mother’s shop burned in the 1871 Chicago fire. As the family 
fled in a stream of refugees, Edward momentarily put down his insect collection 
box. Within seconds it disappeared. He lost interest in entomology.
While skinning birds, Edward contracted a disease for which a doctor 
ordered mountain air. Accordingly, in 1872 he traveled west on a biological 
expedition through the Rockies and to California. A teaching position follow-
ing normal school did not satisfy him, so he went to see Spencer Baird at the 
Smithsonian, seeking a field research position. No opening existed, but a year 
later, in 1877, Baird called him to act as meteorologist at the St. Michael station 
at Norton Sound, replacing Lucien M. Turner. Nelson exulted in striking off 
immediately for Alaska, not least because in addition to the mundane task of 
weather recording he would gather geographical, ethnological, and zoological 
data. This would accomplish Baird’s real object. The Smithsonian lacked funds 
for studies of Alaska but wanted to develop its collections of data and speci-
mens. Baird served simultaneously at the Smithsonian and as the first U.S. fish 
commissioner. This enabled him to get his people assigned to such government 
agencies as the Army Signal Corps and have them collect on the side. Arranging 
for others to do meter readings, Nelson embarked on collecting and exploring 
expeditions, covering thousands of miles by kayak and dogsled in all seasons for 
four years.38
Travel called for endurance of harsh conditions. During a 1,200-mile trip 
through the marshy Yukon and Kuskokwim drainages in 1878, Nelson encoun-
tered “violent storms of snow, rain and sleet accompanied by high winds.”
[M]y bedding became saturated with moisture, as did also my clothing, and 
day after day forced marches were made over a country covered with slush 
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Edward W. Nelson on the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, 1877–1881. National Portrait Gal-
lery. An intrepid explorer and collector, Nelson headed the Bureau of Biological Survey from 
1916 to 1927.
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and water. At night a miserable shelter was improvised from our sledges 
or found in the underground huts of the natives. These were reeking with 
moisture and decaying filth which the warm weather had thawed out, so that 
the floor, forming our resting-place, was a soft mass of all descriptions and 
varying in depth from one inch or two to six inches.
When he reached a half-flooded shelter on the seacoast south of Cape Vancou-
ver just ahead of a storm, “Here my interpreter and myself crouched against the 
wall in silent misery for two days, while one of the most violent tempests I ever 
witnessed swept over the desolate tundra.”39 From this he caught pneumonia, 
which plagued him for the rest of his life. But he grew to be a leading authority 
on Alaska, manifested in his authorship of over 200 books and articles on birds, 
mammals, and Eskimo life.
William Fitzhugh of the Smithsonian characterized the St. Michael achieve-
ments as “pioneering ethnographic work”: 10,000 artifacts collected, extensive 
ethnographic notes, about 100 photographs, and a continuous sequence of 
12,000 meterological observations. “During the course of this work, much of it 
conducted in the face of great adversity and physical danger, Nelson established 
a record unparalleled in extensiveness and diversity of subject matter for any 
individual in the history of North American arctic studies.”40 Nelson Island 
and Nelson Lagoon bordering the Bering Sea commemorate his achievements 
in the region.41
In 1881 Nelson made the acquaintance of John Muir while assigned as a 
naturalist on the Corwin expedition. Stops along the Arctic coast, including the 
first landing on Wrangel Island by Euro-Americans, enabled him to secure ad-
ditional Eskimo artifacts. His study of Nature eventually led to his naming of 
numerous species and subspecies of mammals (including the Dall sheep), birds, 
plants, insects, and other life forms. When he returned to the Smithsonian, tu-
berculosis forced him to reduce his work schedule. He spent most of the 1880s 
in the Southwest, where he and his brother ran a cattle ranch and he served as 
county clerk. He joined Merriam’s Death Valley expedition in 1890–1891 and 
from 1892 to 1908 traveled throughout Mexico and Guatemala as a field agent 
of the Bureau of Biological Survey. Ignoring a damaged lung and heart, he 
climbed the twelve highest peaks in Mexico. He advanced to chief field natural-
ist and, in 1916, to director of the bureau.42
Nelson continued to pay attention to Alaska after leaving in 1881. His 
habit of sending talented young men to Alaska produced Alfred M. Bailey, an 
ornithologist who opened the first Bureau of Biological Survey office in the ter-
ritory in 1919 and who later became curator of the Denver Museum of Natural 
History. Nelson also recruited Lawrence J. Palmer, an agricultural expert who 
studied the ecology of caribou, reindeer, muskoxen, and moose. Not least of 
Nelson’s finds, Olaus J. Murie matured into a national leader in wilderness 
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preservation. On Nelson’s second and final trip to Alaska in 1920, Palmer and 
Murie accompanied him up the Yukon to Fairbanks, whence Murie undertook 
his survey of the caribou herds that led to his prominent place in conservation 
history.
Nelson directed the Bureau of Biological Survey until 1927. He helped for-
mulate the 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act 
Edward W. Nelson in later years. RG22 WB Box 59, National Archives at College Park. Nelson 
shaped the 1925 Alaska Game Law and numerous other wildlife protection measures.
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(1929), and the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act (1934), all fundamental to 
the creation of bird refuges.43 His philosophy of conservation fit well into the 
utilitarian mode and paralleled the thinking of wildlife managers and his Boone 
and Crockett associates:
The game and wild life of this country . . . is of great value from several 
points of view but mainly in supplying a highly prized form of food; as 
affording sport to a multitude of men and employment to others; and as a 
source of renewed health and vigor to numberless men attracted by it to a 
period of vigorous life in the open each year. . . . It is a blot on the custodi-
anship of the wild life of the country, however, that commercial slaughter 
should have been permitted to the extent that the supply was ruthlessly 
wasted both as regards large and small game and game birds.44
THE 1925 ALASKA GAME LAW
Nelson closely followed Alaskan affairs and expressed concern over the 
plight of its wildlife. But Alaska game laws could be no better than their en-
forcement. It proved exceedingly difficult to control the behavior of people 
who saw themselves as fighting for survival in a wilderness and who had seldom 
encountered enforcement of game laws, commonly regarded as imposed by an 
outside urban elite. And the 1902 and 1908 game laws permitted the sale of 
game within Alaska, a practice widely condemned by sport hunters and con-
servation groups in the States. When the United States entered World War I, 
Alaska’s congressional delegate Charles A. Sulzer introduced a bill intended to 
meet the needs of Fairbanks residents, who viewed the 1908 law as an obstacle 
to their food supply. In effect, the bill would seriously weaken the law. Nelson 
and Charles Sheldon went to see Sulzer and persuaded him to modify his posi-
tion.45 The resulting compromise bill would shift the hunting season later into 
December and eliminate the rule restricting the sale of game to fifteen days after 
being killed. Abolition of the August season would reduce spoilage of meat, 
and the indefinite period of sale would enable residents to avoid the high prices 
charged by the “beef trust” over the winter. The new law would apply only to 
Alaska north of 62 degrees latitude and stay in force one year beyond the end 
of the war.46
In February 1918 the House Committee on Territories held hearings on 
the bill. Speaking for the Bureau of Biological Survey and also identifying him-
self as a member of Boone and Crockett’s game preservation committee, Nelson 
endorsed the bill as a useful temporary measure. He cautioned, however, that 
“there is no question that the continuous commercialization of game at the 
present time will bring about its extinction in any part of North America.” 
Sheldon, representing Boone and Crockett, stated that the club had not had 
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time to pass a formal resolution but that the leaders objected only to a clause 
explicitly endorsing the sale of game. Sheldon insisted that “the spirit of coop-
erating with [Alaskans], and understanding their point of view, and winning 
them over—winning each individual over to the idea of protecting game . . . 
will be the most valuable thing.” He added, “If this privilege is not accorded the 
people will go in and kill the game anyhow.”47
William T. Hornaday testified on behalf of the New York Zoological Society 
and the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund. He adamantly opposed the sell-
ing of game and contended that no existing law clearly authorized it. Pointing 
out that the sale of buffalo parts directly caused destruction of the great herds, he 
predicted, “If you commercialize the sale in Alaska any further, it is good-bye to 
the game.”48 Belmore Browne, speaking for the Camp Fire Club, concurred. He 
pointed to a case wherein meat hunters had killed an entire herd of 47 caribou 
but delivered very few to Fairbanks because of the distance. He declared:
When meat is made a business, there is no such thing as sentiment or ethics. 
. . . I know of many cases where 10 caribou have been shot and left because 
other caribou were found nearer the sea, nearer the roads, or nearer the main 
trails. . . . I have seen corporations of different kinds feed their men openly 
out of season on wild game, including steamship lines, cement companies, 
mining companies, and construction companies.
Marshall Scull and Henry W. Elliott, both experienced in Alaska, seconded the 
arguments against game sale.49 Lack of information about game populations 
and uncertainty about the probable results of the bill infused the hearings. No 
bill passed the House, and Nelson lost an opportunity to create goodwill be-
tween Alaskans and the Bureau of Biological Survey.
Nelson and Sheldon enjoyed a working relationship with Alaska governor 
Thomas Riggs, based in part on their cooperative success in establishing Mt. 
McKinley National Park. They had tried to compromise on the sale of game 
issue but met defeat by Hornaday and other militant wildlife protectors. For 
his part, Riggs intensely resented the militants’ attitude. He labeled their views 
“sentimental but ignorant propaganda.” Conservationists, he charged, “have 
done nothing but befog the situation. Alaska has suffered and is still suffering 
so severely from ill-advised so-called conservation measures that the average 
Alaskan sees red when the very word ‘conservation’ is mentioned.” Conserva-
tion had “ruined so many people” and “retarded territorial growth.” The con-
servationist “thinks he is rendering unselfish aid to the cause of conservation by 
putting himself on record against what has been put up to him evilly and falsely 
as wanton slaughter of living animals.” Riggs insisted that Alaskans believed 
in conserving game, “and if the Legislature of Alaska should be given control, 
there would be sane and stringent laws, better enforced and more cheerfully 
obeyed than any laws promulgated by self-chosen champions of wild life.”50
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Alfred Bailey’s 1921 report graphically illustrated the difficulties of game 
law enforcement:
The average person considers a game warden as being a seeker of a “soft” job; 
he is condemned for such a position, and is considered as doing an injustice 
to a person if he makes an arrest, and is a damned loafer if he does not. This 
past season, Mr. Folta, Secretary to the Governor, saw several men kill three 
goats on the mountain tops near Juneau. He informed the warden, and was 
severely criticized for so doing. It is almost impossible to get a conviction for 
deer killing, for a jury trial is necessary, according to Judge Jennings, and the 
person accused is invariably turned loose, or assessed a minimum fine, say 
of twenty-five dollars. What could be more discouraging to a warden than 
to take a prisoner over a hundred miles in his little boat, and then have him 
turned loose, or assessed such a low fine?
Many deer were killed and the meat canned in the salmon canneries. 
Others were used for sport shooting: Many nonresidents come to Alaska 
each summer, cruising about in their own boats, and bringing an arsenal 
with them. The game suffers severely from these people, and females and 
young are the usual victims. Aliens to a great extent are responsible for the 
wanton killing, shooting just to see the animals fall.51
Jim Russell told Bailey, “Speaking of wasting deer, six years ago, in Douglas, 
I saw about one hundred deer scattered about in front of the Indian houses, 
where they had spoiled because the whites wouldn’t buy them. It wasn’t because 
the average white wouldn’t buy either, but just because an Indian is too lazy 
to gut the deer, if they get them near the beach, and of course they sour. The 
dogs were chewing a few.” Bailey noted that the law allowed Alaska Natives to 
take game virtually without limit, adding, “[t]here should be some line drawn 
between natives living a civilized life, and those still in a primitive condition, 
as in the interior. This question would of course be settled in the revision of 
the game laws which must come soon.”52 His speculation turned out to be 
wildly optimistic; the question of Native rights bedeviled wildlife management 
throughout the century. Bailey’s other recommendations, however, laid a foun-
dation for a revised game law.
Nelson’s Bureau of Biological Survey gained jurisdiction over Alaskan fur-
bearing land mammals in 1920. But Nelson’s most immediate concerns involved 
ungulates—moose, caribou, sheep, and Sitka deer, all subject to exploitation to 
fulfill demands for meat. He wanted a strengthened and comprehensive game 
law to overcome the weaknesses of the 1902 and 1908 acts. His 1920 visit to the 
territory allowed him to appraise the situation and make contacts. He directed 
his agents to gather as much information as possible on game populations and 
harvests. Warden Olaus Murie reported a strong reliance on purchased game for 
food in the Fairbanks vicinity in 1921 (Table 10.4). Stores paid their suppliers 
Bureau of Biological Survey chiefS
232
as follows: moose $0.20-$0.25 per pound, caribou $0.20, sheep $0.30, and 
grouse $5.00–$7.50 per dozen.53
BBS could afford to field only a few agents in the vast territory. Like most 
in the early days, Murie traveled by boat in summer and dogsled in winter. 
Game management relied heavily on comments from trappers, miners, and set-
tlers, often reflecting local or temporary conditions or biased by some form of 
vested interest. By the time a trend became clear, it might be too late to prevent 
depletion of a wildlife population.
Nelson enlisted the backing of most major national conservation groups, 
spearheaded by Boone and Crockett. His fur wardens, chosen by the BBS rath-
er than the governor, appealed to the Alaskan game clubs. Nelson demonstrated 
the economic value to the territory of hosting outside sport hunters. A relatively 
stable postwar and post–Gold Rush population responded positively to the idea 
of sustaining wildlife through federal professionals advised by representatives of 
the Alaskan public.54 At the March 1924 hearings in Washington, all major play-
ers submitted statements in favor of the proposed reform bill: the Interior and 
Agriculture departments, the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund (Hornaday), 
Boone and Crockett (Sheldon), American Game Protection Association (Burn-
ham), Camp Fire Club (W.B. Greeley), and National Association of Audubon 
Societies (T. Gilbert Pearson). Nelson pointed out the advantage of having one 
agency manage both game and fur mammals. Hornaday pronounced the bill 
“perfectly sane and just.” Alaska congressional delegate Dan Sutherland, who 
had introduced the bill in 1921, described it as “agreed upon by virtually all the 
people of the territory.”55 Absent significant opposition, Congress passed the 
law effective January 13, 1925.56 Several months earlier, in June 1924, Con-
TaBle 10.4. Game Purchased by Six Fairbanks Stores, Fall 1921
	 Model	 Merchants	 U.S.	 Waechter	 Lavery	&	 Golden’s
	 Café	 Café	 Grill	 Bros.	 Bailey	 Grocery
Moose 30 8 2 8 15 (2)
Caribou 100 24 7 20 — —
Sheep 25 12 1 — (5) (8)
Sharptail grouse 500 100 — — — —
Ruffed grouse 200 50 — — — —
Spruce grouse 125 20 — — — —
Willow ptarmigan 200 200 — — — —
Grouse (all species) — — 60 — 144 80
Source:	Olaus J. Murie, letter to Edward W. Nelson, Chief, Bureau of Biological Survey, January 7, 1922. Alaska State 
Library, Historical Section, USFWS MS 51 Group 162, Entry 162.
Note:	Murie advised that “these figures are very conservative, as some of the dealers showed an inclination to mini-
mize the quantity of game used.” Figures in parentheses include parts of animals, e.g., hindquarters.
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gress had placed all enforcement of Alaska land game laws under the Bureau of 
Biological Survey.57
The Alaska Game Law of 1925, strongly oriented to utilitarian conserva-
tion, crafted a prudent compromise between federal control and local autono-
my. A five-member federally appointed Alaska Game Commission, consisting 
of residents from each of Alaska’s four judicial districts and a chairman-director 
representing the Bureau of Biological Survey, made fur, game, and sport hunt-
ing regulations, subject to approval by the secretary of agriculture. Federal of-
ficers chosen for their skill, integrity, knowledge of the country, and ability 
to convince local Alaskans of the value of wildlife conservation acted as war-
dens. Big game guides applied to the Game Commission for licenses. Written 
and oral exams focusing on skills, reputation, and attitudes toward conserva-
tion produced a corps of guides known for honesty and competence.58 During 
the 35 years of its operation, the 1925 Alaska Game Law and its management 
earned a widespread reputation for success in wildlife management.
BUREAU OF BIOLOGICAL SURVEY ACTIVITIES
From its inception in the mid-1880s, the BBS carried out much of the 
fieldwork necessary for knowledge and conservation of North American flora 
and fauna. In its mature form in the 1930s the BBS engaged in (1) basic re-
search in North America and elsewhere; (2) identification and control of wild-
life diseases; (3) control of pests and predators; (4) propagation (e.g., fox farm-
ing) and distribution of useful plants (such as duck feed) and animals (such 
as quail); (5) protection and habitat restoration for game mammals and birds, 
especially migratory birds; (6) acquisition and maintenance of wildlife refuges; 
and (7) educational activities including scientific publications and assistance to 
museums, educational institutions, government agencies, and private groups. 
The bureau applied its influence to encourage the passage of state wildlife pro-
tection laws. In Alaska BBS reintroduced muskoxen and attempted to create a 
reindeer industry. It managed terrestrial and some oceanic wildlife through the 
semi-independent Alaska Game Commission.59
Plans for a network of national wildlife refuges gathered momentum in the 
1920s and 1930s. They drew strength from shortages of ducks and geese caused 
by market hunting and later by droughts. Outdoor sporting groups and na-
ture preservationists united in support of refuges and migratory bird protection 
laws. The 1929 Migratory Bird Conservation (Norbeck-Anderson) Act, supple-
mented by the 1934 Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act, generated funds for 
refuge acquisition. Franklin Roosevelt, a nature enthusiast and former chair 
of the New York Senate Committee on Forests, Fish and Game, presided over 
a vast expansion of the wildlife refuge system. As a means of assisting farmers 
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during the Depression, the federal government purchased more than 40 million 
acres of marginal lands and converted much of it into refuges. Bureau of Bio-
logical Survey director Jay N. “Ding” Darling, an ardent conservationist who 
held office from 1934 to 1935, employed his position to organize the National 
Wildlife Federation (1936) and headed it after leaving government. The federa-
tion, in turn, lobbied successfully for the Pittman-Robertson Act (1937) that 
funded wildlife research and habitat restoration.60
IRA N. GABRIELSON
Another committed promoter of the refuge effort, Ira Noel Gabrielson, 
directed the Bureau of Biological Survey from 1935 to 1940 and its successor, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service, until 1946. Gabrielson (1889–1977), an Iowa 
farm boy, graduated from Morningside College in 1912. He liked science but 
planned to major in chemistry so he would not have to do biological drawings. 
When a professor noticed his photographs of birds and his impressive knowl-
edge about them, Gabrielson decided to switch to biology. He left a position as 
a high school biology teacher to start a career in wildlife management in 1915. 
He authored books on wildlife conservation, botany, wildlife refuges, and birds 
of Oregon and coauthored Birds of Alaska. His early government work consist-
ed primarily of economic ornithology and rodent control.61 Beginning in the 
1930s he worked to expand the national wildlife refuge complex for migratory 
birds, moose, and Kodiak bears.
Gabrielson held membership in Boone and Crockett and the Audubon So-
ciety and, accordingly, practiced an enlightened form of utilitarianism. A classic 
example of his thinking appeared in his book on wildlife conservation: “If this 
country continues depleting the soil, destroying the forests, and wasting the 
animal and plant life, it will, in time, become a poverty-stricken land inhabited 
by a constantly decreasing population facing a hopeless future. Such a fate has 
overtaken other lands with the exhaustion of their resources. It can well hap-
pen here.”62 A strong believer in predator control during his first two decades 
at the Bureau of Biological Survey, he resigned from the American Society of 
Mammalogists in 1931 to protest its criticism of the bureau’s predator policy. 
His respect for the mounting scientific evidence persuaded him to reverse his 
position during his tenure as BBS director.63
Gabrielson made numerous trips to Alaska and monitored its wildlife issues. 
In 1941 he effected the designation of the Kodiak and Kenai wildlife refuges. 
Upon retirement in 1946 he accepted the presidency of the Wildlife Manage-
ment Institute, until that time closely related to the sporting arms industry. He 
maintained independence from the industry and earned wide respect within the 
national environmental community. Presiding over the institute until 1970, he 
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Dr. Ira N. Gabrielson, July 1939. RG22 WB Box 46, National Archives at College Park. 
A national leader in wildlife conservation both within and outside government, Gabrielson 
secured protective status for the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge and Kenai National Moose 
Range.
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chaired its board until his death in 1977. Like Grinnell in the 1920s and 1930s, 
Gabrielson played a prominent and active part in the 1950s and 1960s, bridg-
ing the gap between hunting and nonhunting groups. He became an increas-
ingly knowledgeable and influential voice in wildlife and habitat conservation.64 
People who met him liked his friendly, down-to-earth manner; he claimed to 
have climbed “more mountains than any other fat man.” Those who knew him 
regarded him as a highly competent naturalist and a man of integrity.65 He be-
came the “Grand Old Man of Conservation” of the postwar era.66
Before the turn of the century the Bureau of Biological Survey had been 
primarily a research agency, concentrating on the effects of birds and mammals 
on agriculture. The passage of wildlife protection laws, from the Lacey Act of 
1900 to the Alaska Game Law in 1925, gave the bureau law enforcement juris-
diction over nearly all Alaskan land mammals and birds. Through the bureau 
and the Fish and Wildlife Service, federal officials managed the wildlife until 
the state assumed control in 1960. The service retained responsibility for migra-
tory birds and for millions of acres of national wildlife refuges created between 
1903 and the passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
in 1980. Merriam, Nelson, and Gabrielson personified the evolution of wildlife 
protection values among government officials from the 1880s to the 1940s. All 
worked for conservation of species excepting a few predators. All believed firmly 
in wildlife management by government experts. Gabrielson in particular labored 
for a complex of wildlife refuges, thereby achieving a measure of ecosystem pres-
ervation. In lobbying for Alaskan game protection the three relied on interest 
groups, often led by the Boone and Crockett Club to which all belonged as 
members. They believed in science as a wildlife management tool and a basis for 
settling disputes. As directors of the leading wildlife management agency, they 
possessed considerable power to conduct research and formulate environmental 
policy. But they avoided honest examination of predator-prey relationships be-
cause of pressure exerted by the livestock industry on their parent Agriculture 
Department. They cared most about game mammals and birds and felt closest 
to outdoor sporting and nature groups. As utilitarians responsible for sustainable 
production of game and fur, they seldom made reference to aesthetic or spiritual 
values of wildlife, much less species rights. Yet Nelson and Gabrielson, at least, 
valued ecological integrity and some species of wildlife on their own terms. All 
three admired the grizzly bear and worked to protect it. They all employed the 
science available to wildlife management in their time. Hand in glove, they and 
their nongovernmental Boone and Crockett colleagues and similar allies contrib-
uted directly to the evolution of Alaskan conservation practices and prepared the 
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game management. Directors of the new Alaska Game Commission repre-
sented the Bureau of Biological Survey, Department of Agriculture, and, after 
1939, the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior. They, 
their agents, and the men who managed the Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game beginning in 1957 put into practice the evolving philosophies of wildlife 
management. Leaders among them made lasting contributions to habitat pres-
ervation and to public acceptance of wildlife protection and science.
THE ALASKA GAME COMMISSION
In addition to creating the Game Commission and structure for enforcing 
regulations, the 1925 Alaska Game Law directly set forth some conservation 
provisions. It prohibited killing cow, yearling, and calf moose and female and 
young deer or sheep and molesting beaver or muskrat houses. But “any Indian, 
Eskimo, prospector or traveler [may] take animals and birds during the close 




season when he is in absolute need of food and other food is not available.” 
Heads and horns could not be marketed, nor could game birds and mammals 
be sold to commercial boats or canneries. No aircraft or powerboat could be 
used to directly pursue game nor any poison employed except by predator con-
trol agents controlling wolves, coyotes, and wolverines. Of these three species 
the law classified only the wolverine as a “land fur-bearing mammal.”1
Under the Game Law, oversight of the land lay in the hands of professional 
wildlife managers, hardy and practical men whose experience in the bush made 
law enforcement feasible. Agents possessed a broad, in some cases scholarly, 
knowledge of Alaskan wildlife. The overwhelming majority of Alaskans prior 
to World War II engaged in hunting and fishing for subsistence rather than for 
sport, and wildlife agents viewed their central task as protecting wildlife popu-
lations for consumption by humans. Top law enforcement priorities aimed at 
preventing market hunting, use of poison by trappers, shooting of beavers and 
cow moose, and excessive trapping of martens. Field agents traveled by road, 
canoe, or small steamboats in summer; dogsled and snowshoe in winter. They 
sometimes employed packhorses, the Alaska Railroad, and aircraft on an ex-
perimental basis beginning in 1930. During the late 1920s nine men covered 
Alaska’s half-million square miles. They endured arduous working conditions: a 
lynx severely mauled one agent, and another disappeared on a solo trip up the 
Chickamin River. Threats from game violators added to the perils, as did ac-
cidents, especially in isolated locations, on fast rivers, or in cold temperatures. 
Arrests, however, yielded a high conviction rate. Agents normally assembled 
only once annually, and some never met during their careers. Mail from head-
quarters in Juneau often took several weeks to reach them.2
Alaska Natives exercised very little influence on Game Commission de-
liberations, although the rules affected them considerably. Both the 1902 and 
1908 laws gave them the right to hunt game out of season for food or clothing. 
The 1925 law weakened the provision, allowing hunting out of season when 
“in absolute need of food and other food is not available.” The commission in-
terpreted the clause very strictly, granting the privilege to Natives not “adopting 
a civilized mode of living” or “exercising the right of franchise.” Going beyond 
the law, the commission required signed application forms stating that the ap-
plicant had no work opportunity or alternate food source. It withdrew the form 
in 1938 after using it for thirteen years.3
While the Game Commission and 1925 Game Law represented a substan-
tial upgrading of wildlife management and won the cooperation of many Alas-
kans, the arrangement did not satisfy the territorial legislature, which perpetu-
ally insisted on control of natural resources. In a 1935 joint memorial addressed 
to the president, it pleaded that
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WHEREAS, the actions of the Alaska Game Commission have largely been 
and are oppressive and repugnant to a large majority of the people of the 
Territory of Alaska [and the commission] has made unreasonable, oppressive 
and unenforceable regulations governing the taking and marketing of skins 
and fur-bearing animals resulting in large financial losses and great incon-
venience to trappers and fur dealers. . . . WHEREFORE, your Memorial-
ist respectfully requests, That the repeal of the Alaska Game Laws and the 
abolishment of the Alaska Game Commission be made at the earliest pos-
sible date and that the legislative power of the Legislature of the Territory of 
Alaska be extended to include the game laws and laws relating to fur-bearing 
animals.4
The resolution shared the fate of numerous other pre-statehood Alaskan re-
quests and demands for jurisdiction over wildlife.
Alaska Game Commission responsibilities included enforcement of the 
Lacey Act, Migratory Bird Act, Alaska Game Law, Migratory Bird Hunting 
Stamp Act, and Walrus Act. Between 1944 and 1956 the commission assisted 
in enforcement of the White Act governing commercial fisheries. Commission 
Alaska Game Commission officers (from left) Sam O. White, Jack Benson, Pete McMullen, 
Frank Dufresne (executive director of Alaska Game Commission), Clarence Rhode, Jack 
O’Connor, Grenold Collins, and Frank Glaser, Fairbanks, 1939. Courtesy Jim King. Under 
the 1925 Alaska Game Law, the Game Commission and its officers won a reputation for 
competence and public service.
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activities consisted of (1) pursuing law violators; (2) issuing licenses and per-
mits for hunting, fishing, trapping, fur raising and dealing; for serving wild 
game as food in nonprofit facilities; for taking wildlife for scientific, educa-
tional, or propagation purposes; and for special hunting of wolves, coyotes, 
and wolverines; (3) predator control; (4) public relations; (5) research; and (6) 
miscellaneous.5
Most enforcement actions involved illegal taking of wildlife (Table 11.1). In 
January 1936 warden Hosea Sarber arrested a man for using poison to kill foxes. 
The man forfeited 25 fox pelts, paid a $300 fine, and spent 140 days in jail. 
Later that year Sarber carried out several seizures of illegal beaver skins in the 
Dillingham district, including one cache of 536 pelts. Normally, agents visited 
trappers before the end of the season to seal the pelts, certifying them as legal.6
Agents arrested a particularly unscrupulous pair of outlaws in 1938 in the 
Stony River country of the Kuskokwim drainage. The wardens found them 
operating traplines more than 100 miles in length nearly two months after the 
close of the season. They had killed no fewer than ten moose and cached much 
of the meat along the trail for dog feed, and it had spoiled. Their packs con-
tained poison, and they had driven the Stony River Indians out of the country 
at gunpoint. A thirteen-year-old son of one of the men had been told to main-
Cache of illegally trapped skins at Mulchatna River, June 1936. By Hosea Sarber. RG22B 
Box 48, National Archives at College Park. Excessive trapping of beavers and marten oc-
cupied a high priority in game protection.
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continued on next page
TAble 11.1. Alaska Game Commission Enforcement Actions, 1936–1937 and 1958–1959
   Fines/ Days Seizures w/o
Violation Prosecutions Convictions Costs in Jail Court Action
Aliens w/o license 28 28 2,830 770 61
Aliens buying/selling furs 3 3 900 180 —
Residents 4 4 575 — 1
Nonresidents hunting/
   trapping/dealing furs 23 23 454 670 6
Taking/possessing game/
   fur/birds 68 67 3,316 2,575 97
Dealing in protected
   game/birds 10 10 165 210 3
Taking furbearers by
   illegal methods 3 3 100 3 8
Possession/use of poison 2 2 175 180 —
Assaulting officer 3 3 1,000 540 —
Total (1936–1937)  144  143 $9,515 5,125 185
Seizures: guns 117, furs 47, game animals and birds 2, other 19
   Fines/ Days Seizures w/o
Violation Prosecutions Convictions Costs in Jail Court Action
1958–1959 363 340 $36,567 1,972 42
Violation Number
Hunting/fishing/trapping in closed area 100
Hunting/fishing/trapping w/o license 81
False statement on license 72
Hunting/fishing/trapping in closed season 62
Taking protected sex/species 46
Hunting/fishing/trapping with illegal devices 30
Migratory bird violations 27
Illegal possession of game/fur/birds/fish 26
Illegal transport of fur/game/trophy 23
Exceeding bag limit 14
Removing evidence of sex/identity of game 10
Wanton destruction of game 7
Illegal purchase/sale of game/fur 7
Walrus act violations 5
Seizures: licenses 160, guns 50, traps & snares 30, moose 55, deer 18, caribou 16, bear 16, sheep 8, 
mountain goat 5, elk 1, furs 43, birds 73, fish 23
Sources: Alaska Game Commission, 13th Annual Report of Alaska Game Commission to the Secretary of Agriculture, 
July 1, 1936 to June 30, 1937 (Juneau, 1937) 17–27; Alaska Game Commission, 20th Annual Report, July 1, 1958 
Through December 31 (Juneau, 1959), 34–35.
tain the camps until the men served their one-year jail terms. The court ordered 
arrangements for the boy to attend school.7
To collect Alaska bounty payments, men smuggled wolf and coyote skins in 
from Canada. In 1937–1938 agents apprehended a fur dealer who had imported 
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42 coyote skins. He paid a fine of $350 and returned $850 in bounty money.8 
The next year, in cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, agents 
Sam White and Clarence Rhode set out on a month-long, 3,500-mile sortie 
into northeast Alaska during March and early April. Flying a rented four-seat 
Curtiss Thrush they patrolled the border region between Snag Creek and the 
Arctic Circle at temperatures of minus 30 to minus 40 degrees. Accompanied 
by Constable W.W. Sutherland they arrested a dozen men involved in taking 
furbearers by strychnine poison and smuggling wolf and coyote skins into Alas-
ka. In quick trials seven men received convictions. Stopping at Fairbanks on the 
return trip, the agents discovered a cracked propeller hub that, if the plane had 
flown for another hour, would likely have caused a fatal crash. Nevertheless, 
Rhode concluded that
this trip has further proved that airplanes are the only possible means of 
properly patrolling our districts. Likewise, they offer the cheapest method. 
The inspection that can be given the ground from a low altitude is almost 
unbelievable. The tracks of nearly every type of game or fur can be readily 
distinguished and it is easily possible to note where sets have been made 
along trails. All types of game can be observed from the air that would 
never be seen from the ground and such things as hidden cabins or caches 
are easily discovered. With hundreds of miles of remote country in all of 
our interior districts and the short period when patrol is essential for results, 
we can never fully police this country until we have our own planes to 
depend on.
Rhode suggested that lighter planes such as that flown by agent Grenold Collins 
would enable more flexibility in monitoring the ground and landing for quick 
action.9
The interior, vast and relatively inaccessible by water or land, made law en-
forcement far more difficult than in the coastal regions. Sam White, stationed 
at Fairbanks beginning in 1927, pioneered the use of aircraft in law enforce-
ment. Taught to fly by Ralph Wien in 1928, he bought a TP Swallow and flew 
it on duty from 1930 to 1937. Thereafter he piloted aircraft rented by the 
Game Commission. A strong advocate of aerial law enforcement, he incurred 
the wrath of executive director Frank Dufresne in the mid-1930s by criticizing 
the purchase of expensive but poorly built boats instead of light planes. Frus-
trated by the slow pace of change, he resigned in 1941.10 The commission ac-
quired five planes for patrol by 1943 and escalated aerial activity in 1948 under 
the predator control program (Chapter 13).
Agents rendered assistance in wildlife censuses and in the work of other fed-
eral agencies. They helped private parties in emergencies such as plane crashes. 
Edible meat from law enforcement seizures and railroad and automobile colli-
sions went to Native villages or charitable institutions. In 1955, a typical year 
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for the 1950s, the Game Commission donated (in pounds): moose, 106,500; 
caribou, 2,000; deer, 500; and game fish, 258.11 When not in the field, agents 
engaged in public education and goodwill by attending fairs, meetings of out-
door sporting groups, school assemblies, and other gatherings. They showed 
films, gave radio talks, and visited Native villages.
World War II, a time when the military comprised one-third of Alaska’s 
population, inexorably changed the territory. Wildlife law enforcement reflect-
ed the new conditions of population increase and demand for access to wildlife. 
Military personnel wanted outdoor recreation and found hunting and fish-
ing opportunities far superior to what they had seen in the States. When they 
gained the full right to take fish and game during the war, problems multiplied. 
Wildlife managers had feared that a quantum increase in the number of hunt-
ers would put intolerable stress on big game at the expense of local subsistence 
hunters. Congress passed a bill, signed into law in July 1943, permitting armed 
services personnel to buy resident hunting and fishing licenses after living in 
the territory for a year. Anticipation of the law may have motivated the Interior 
Sam White (left), Noel Wien, and White’s TP Swallow, Valdez, 1931. Noel Wien coll. 60-
959-35, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. White learned 
to fly in 1928 and pioneered airborne wildlife law enforcement in 1930.
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Department’s 1941 decisions to designate the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge 
and the Kenai National Moose Range. Military and related civilian workers 
provided justification for the wildlife managers’ concerns in 1945 and 1946. 
Seeing their last chance to kill an Alaskan game animal before going home, large 
numbers engaged in unnecessary, wasteful, and often illegal slaughter. In one 
locale near a highway they left the bodies of twelve cow moose.12
Wartime activities created hundreds of miles of new roads and numerous 
airports. Proliferating numbers of aircraft, both civilian and military, transport-
ed people to far corners of the territory. Trappers flew to their traplines, hunters 
to big game, and waterfowl shooters to flocks of ducks and geese. Pilots some-
times used their planes to drive the birds to waiting hunters. Wardens needed 
aircraft to seal beavers, curb violations, and perform other field tasks.13
The war, and requests from Alaska’s congressional delegate Anthony Dimond, 
prompted construction of the Alcan (Alaska) Highway. Arguably, the mili-
tary neither wanted nor needed it to prosecute the war, although it provided 
valuable support for the air supply route to Russia.14 Strategic matters aside, a 
highway link to the States removed some of the isolation felt by Alaskans and 
embodied in stateside perceptions of Alaska. Tourists quickly seized the oppor-
tunity to travel the highway. When it opened to the public in 1948 it carried 
18,604 travelers and, in 1951, 49,564 drove it. War construction had left roads, 
airports, seaports, railroad improvements, housing, and other facilities. It also 
added people; many former GIs stayed in Alaska. The territory’s nonmilitary 
population nearly doubled, from 75,000 in 1940 to 138,000 in 1950. Cold 
War events continued the effects of World War II; Alaska’s strategic position at-
tracted $250 million annually in combined military and nonmilitary construc-
tion from 1949 to 1954. Greatly enlarged cash flows and road access accelerated 
and dispersed economic development.15
After the war, hunting activity rose faster than the population. Resident 
hunting/fishing licenses (Table 11.2) escalated from 28,316 in 1941–1945 to 
124,836 during 1951–1955. Nonresidents bought 1,149 licenses in 1941–1945 
and 11,141 in 1951–1955. Trapping fell off, however; resident fur dealer licens-
es declined from 1,249 to 792 in the same period. More roads, vehicles, and 
aircraft carried more people into wild areas. Sport hunting by aircraft climbed 
rapidly, greatly simplifying big game kills. Wildlife managers responded by em-
ploying aircraft and radio, increasingly complicated regulations, and research.16 
In 1948 the Game Commission fielded 9 enforcement agents working out of 
Ketchikan, Petersburg, Juneau, Seward, Fairbanks, and Dillingham. By 1950 
permanent posts had been added at Craig, Wrangell, Sitka, Cordova, McGrath, 
and Kotzebue, and enforcement staff totaled 21. More aircraft, boats, and auto-
mobiles, most of them radio- and telephone-equipped, improved the reach and 
efficiency of field operations.17 Agents increasingly traveled by aircraft and au-
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tomobile (Table 11.3). As competition for fish and wildlife intensified, predator 
control, previously a matter of helping trappers and reindeer herders catch raid-
ing wolves and wolverines, changed into a widespread and systematic undertak-
ing conducted by aircraft.
Federal agents retained control over fish and wildlife management until 
the transfer of most responsibility to the new state on January 1, 1960. At 
Alaska’s Constitutional Convention, wildlife management sparked one of the 
salient controversies. Outdoor sporting groups lobbied vigorously for a bipar-
tisan commission to manage sport and commercial hunting and fishing. The 
commission would be established in the constitution rather than created by the 
legislature and managed by the governor. Proponents argued that it would pro-
tect natural resources by taking them out of the realm of politics. Opponents 
believed the commission would usurp the proper role of the people and their 
legislature. The proposal lost 35-20, and a Board of Fish and Game, divided in 
1975, managed the state’s fish and wildlife.18 The commission would probably 
have enhanced the power of the outdoor sporting groups in wildlife manage-
ment, regardless of whether it would have better promoted conservation.
FRANK DUFRESNE
The Alaska Game Commission owed much of its success to strong person-
alities in leadership positions. Edward W. Nelson had set the stage for profes-
sional wildlife management by hiring competent agents such as Olaus Murie, 
Lawrence Palmer, Seymour Hadwen, and Frank Dufresne. Dufresne (1896–
TAble 11.2. Alaska Game Commission License Sales, 1926–1959
 1926–30 1931–35 1936–40 1941–45 1946–50 1951–55 1956–59
Res. hunt/fish/trap  12,209  19,225 26,191  17,663 26,521  28,122 23,710
Nonres.hunt/
  fish/trap 456  420 517  478 1,868  2,128 3,959
Alien special 467  202 216  106 93  53 114
Res. hunt/fish —  — 22,627  28,316 59,970  124,836 114,313
Nonres. hunt/fish 86  69 135  1,149 4,897  11,141 6,969
Res. fish —  — —  2,793 10,017  28,254 34,355
Nonres. fish —  — —  2,021 22,678  61,671 46,695
Alien fish —  — —  19 124  447 854
Res. fur dealer 1,843  1,637 1,567  1,249 1,322  792 490
Nonres. fur dealer 17  70 81  51 68  27 16
Alien fur dealer 29  11 2  8 4  — —
Guide 336  397 396  293 688  832 450
Source: Alaska Game Commission, 20th Annual Report, July 1, 1958 Through December 31, 1959 (Juneau, 1959), 
36.
Note: Does not include export permits, fur farm or walrus licenses, or 1,063 special bear licenses in 1959.
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1966) became one of the best known of the warden-naturalists. Like Nelson he 
came from New England. As a boy in the White Mountains of New Hampshire 
he learned to love Nature. Following a stint in the trenches in France, he struck 
out for Nome on an adventure trip. He hoped to find an uncle who had left 
for the Gold Rush and never returned. His uncle turned out to be the mayor of 
Nome and still had gold fever. Attempts to get young Frank interested missed 
the mark. In Dufresne’s words, “The more I thought about it, the more con-
vinced I became that the real gold of Alaska had wings and fins and hair on it.” 
He had planned a short visit but, when offered a job as a deputy U.S. marshal, 
he stayed. His investigations of the outdoors produced an article that caught the 
attention of Nelson, who wrote to offer him a position as wildlife survey agent. 
Dufresne accepted enthusiastically. His reports to Nelson aided the writing of 
Alaska’s 1925 Game Law.
Dufresne’s extraordinary zeal for exploring Alaska’s wild almost cut short 
his career on his first winter dogsled journey. Nelson had instructed that he 
travel with a companion. Inspired by Roald Amundsen, in Nome training for 
a solo dogsled and plane trip to the North Pole, Dufresne thought, “If Captain 
Amundsen can do it, so can I.” He departed full of confidence until traveling 
down a remote stretch of the Aghiapuk River, where he and the team went 
through overflow ice into armpit-deep water. Soaked, he and the dogs man-
aged to get to shore, and immediately his feet, hands, and face began to freeze. 
Struggling to the top of the bank, he beheld a trapper’s cabin and entered. 
Dunc McBain, an old trapper and the only person living on the river, had not 
seen anyone for months. He continued to cook flapjacks as he absorbed the 
situation. Then he rushed out, retrieved and fed the dogs, and insisted that the 
young man stay to thoroughly dry his clothes and gear. Their friendship lasted 
many years.19
TAble 11.3. Travel by Alaska Game Commission Agents, 1937–1959
 FY 1938 FY 1943 FY 1948 FY 1953 FY 1958
Commercial steamer 12,313 4,157 — — —
AGC patrol boat 31,073 22,580 25,433 23,552 17,563
Outboard motor 9,869 5,571 n.d. 9,046 13,302
Automobile 35,377 37,680 78,352 184,559 254,514
Railroad 2,657 3,824 1,362 897 775
Airplane 25,349 120,031 112,046 315,037 325,754
Dog team 1,161 675 n.d. 3 —
On foot 4,879 4,299 3,551 7,255 5,202
Horseback — — — 762 —
Sources: Alaska Game Commission, 14th Annual Report of the Executive Officer to the Alaska Game Commission, July 
1, 1937 to June 30, 1938 (Juneau), 2; Alaska Game Commission, 4th, 9th, 14th, and 17th Annual Reports, 1943, 
3; 1948, 23; 1953, 29; 1958, 45 (all Juneau).
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As an administrator Dufresne hoped to be away from the desk and in the 
field as much as possible. As a lover of wild creatures he preferred research to law 
enforcement. He believed persuasion rather than arrest and conviction would 
be the most effective means of instilling obedience to the law. In the early years 
around Nome he became known for meetings in Eskimo villages in which he 
explained game regulations, warned of the consequences of violation, and gave 
elders the responsibility for monitoring compliance.20
Dufresne worked for sixteen years in the northwest, north central, and 
Southeast as a warden and surveyor of wildlife species. In 1936 he received ap-
pointment as executive director of the Alaska Game Commission and in 1946 
as director of information for the Fish and Wildlife Service in Washington.21 
Upon retirement he signed on as West Coast editor for Field and Stream and 
wrote several popular books on his experiences in Alaska.
As did most other game managers, Dufresne articulated a predominantly 
utilitarian environmental philosophy. He passionately loved wild creatures but 
advocated predator control, particularly against wolves. He voiced deeply felt 
Frank Dufresne (left), Corey Ford, Alistair MacBain, and Field & Stream editor Dan 
Holland examining rainbow trout, upper Newhalen River, Bristol Bay drainage, June 
1940. By Dan Holland. Courtesy Jean T. Holland and National Park Service/Lake Clark. 




concern for the grizzly bear’s future in the face of aircraft hunting, logging, 
and other threats.22 Yet he saw hunting as not only permissible but as actually 
beneficial. He protested the 1964 Wilderness Act and “raids” on national for-
est lands to create national parks, where hunting would be prohibited.23 Of 
Admiralty Island and other brown bear country in the Southeast, he wrote, 
“Because Alaska’s abounding fish and game resources are a resource needing 
to be cropped to hold them in bounds, National Park status is seldom recom-
mended. Instead it is recommended that the region be managed with an eye 
to its recreational features in the years that lie beyond our own scope of life.”24 
In a more private moment he told friend and writer Corey Ford, in reference 
to wild animals, “They were on earth long before we were, they have the prior 
right, and now that we’re on top after millions of years they deserve our respect 
and help.”25
Dufresne made two notable contributions to the Alaskan environment. He 
popularized wildlife, issuing somewhat ambiguous pleas for its protection. He 
nurtured the growth of and respect for game laws and their enforcement. His 
broad personal experience and connection to people in the bush fostered a co-
operative relationship between citizens and game officials. On the other hand, 
Dufresne’s person-to-person approach to law enforcement did not comfortably 
fit the coming age of air and radio. Preferring the riverboat and dogsled, Dufresne 
resisted the development of an air wing, thereby losing the services of such tal-
ented officers as Sam White. Nevertheless, the Game Commission began to pur-
chase aircraft for law enforcement before the end of Dufresne’s term in 1946.
CLARENCE RHODE
Wildlife management took a new direction under one of Dufresne’s succes-
sors, Clarence Joseph Rhode (1913–1958). Rhode hailed from Colville, Wash-
ington, the son of a state fish hatchery operator. A deputy warden at age fifteen, 
he attended business college but never completed a degree. Deciding to devote 
his life to wildlife management, he left for Alaska in 1934 and became a warden 
and Dufresne’s assistant in 1936. He picked up the idea of flying patrol from 
Sam White. Eventually, Rhode would encourage all wardens to do flying, and 
most did so. In 1948 he advanced to regional director for the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and executive director of the Alaska Game Commission.26
Rhode viewed the airplane as the key to effective law enforcement in the 
bush. On one occasion while flying his west-central district, he spotted five 
bull moose resting in the snow. They had been killed illegally and propped 
up so a flying warden would think they were sleeping. Rhode banked, passed 
over again, landed, and arrested Smoky Nikita, the violator. Rhode had noticed 
magpies perched on the antlers, something a live moose would not permit.27
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Flying agent Jim King described the day-to-day work of airborne wardens:
The pilot agents learned to monitor the activities of people by reading their 
tracks in the snow. This required the ability to identify suspicious activity 
from the air and then to pick safe landing spots in the wilderness so appre-
hensions could be made. Agents had to be prepared to land at any location 
used by airborne hunters, including high lakes, ridge tops, sand bars, glacial 
 rivers, beaches, and so on. Agents had to be prepared to snowshoe long 
distances, camp overnight, and heat up their airships after letting them stand 
in subzero temperatures. A successful flying warden had to master landings 
on skis, floats and tires.28
While crossing his territory during closed season on martens, agent Grenold 
Collins spied marten tracks and indications of an active trapline. Passing the 
trapper, he flew ahead to the cabin, entered, and prepared supper. When the 
trapper arrived Collins advised him that the situation had been radioed to base. 
The two sat down and ate, swapped stories, spent the night, and went out the 
next day to snap the traps shut. Then they loaded the illegal skins and flew back 
to the base where the trapper would face trial. In cold weather, pilots had to 
drain the oil soon after landing and heat it up in a pot and pour it back into 
the engine to restart it. Sam White witnessed a flyer who, having lost his oil 
through a leak, boiled down moose and bear fat. He poured it into the engine 
and returned to base.29
“No other pilot traveled so widely or monitored activities on the ground 
so closely,” King wrote of the wardens. In addition to investigation of fish-
ing activities and smuggling of wolf skins over the Canadian border, “USFWS 
[U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] pilots delivered letters and messages, provided 
supplies to those in need, took the sick to medical help, reported medical emer-
gencies, and saved lives. By the time of statehood, the ‘flying game wardens’ 
were regarded not as an outside and unwelcome force inflicted on the country 
but rather as an element of local society that provided a local service.”30 Citizens 
responded by assisting the agents, such as when they experienced mechanical 
troubles.
Aircraft changed the nature of hunting as well as law enforcement in Alaska. 
Transportation from other parts of the world and to hunting sites grew far easier 
after the war. Reflecting on the changes, Russell Annabel wrote that, in prewar 
years, “you used to see the same men year after year in the northern game ranges. 
. . . The Alaska game lands, because of the outrageous cost of getting into them, 
were virtually the private preserve of this group.” Traveling to and from hunting 
sites typically required three weeks to a month by a pack train of horses that had 
to be purchased and shipped to Alaska. “Now, however, the war-hastened de-
velopment of aviation here has made the entire length and breadth of the north 
. . . wide open to you.” The first postwar polar bear hunter’s Kotzebue guide 
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had spotted bears in the vicinity and “radioed his customer to come north at 
once. It was a pleasant trip. Luxury liner from Detroit to Seattle, from Seattle to 
Nome; Alaska Airlines feeder-line plane from Nome to Kotzebue. Comfort all 
the way. Meals served aloft. No delays.” Within three days of leaving home the 
sportsman had been flown out over the ice and landed near a bear. Assisted by a 
hired Eskimo, he had taken possession of his long-dreamed-of trophy. Annabel 
welcomed the changes in hunting and fishing convenience “because so many 
more gunners and anglers can take part in it.”31
Aircraft-facilitated hunting drew a different response from a National Re-
search Council committee chaired by Olaus Murie and including Aldo Leopold 
and Robert F. Griggs. They considered the airplane “an intrusion on the wilder-
ness” that could destroy “the incomparable sense of remoteness which comes to 
those who, upon entering the wilderness, place themselves beyond the ‘sights 
and sounds’ of civilization.” Ease of entry by motorized vehicles would cause a 
loss of “self-reliance and a series of skills and woodsmanship which have social 
values as antidotes for mechanization.”32
Moreover, Murie’s panel believed aircraft could be a threat to fish and wild-
life. They cited an outdoor sporting magazine advertisement guaranteeing a 
polar bear for $1,500 and promising “transportation to bear by airplane.” En-
trepreneurs planned a 44-room luxury resort at Kotzebue Sound for hunting 
polar bears, whales, walrus, seals, waterfowl, and ptarmigan. “Similar reports 
have come from the field,” noted the panel, “pointing clearly to: New problems 
in law enforcement; the danger to wildlife species, especially such as walrus 
and polar bear, which obviously cannot survive the new refinement in hunting; 
and a new factor in the character of field sports, tending to reduce further the 
element of woodsmanship and sportsmanship already otherwise deteriorated.” 
The committee recommended that aircraft and other motorized transportation 
be banned in wilderness or wild sections of federal lands, that private inhold-
ings in wildlands be purchased, and that no hunting or shooting by aircraft be 
permitted.33 Hunting of polar bears and killing of wildlife from moving planes 
ended in 1972. The luxury resort at Kotzebue did not materialize.
Regardless of whether aircraft diminished the “sport” of hunting, they 
could immediately jeopardize populations of some species. Over a two-day pe-
riod in the spring of 1955 one of Rhode’s flying agents followed the tracks of 
twelve brown bears in the Anchorage vicinity. Each trail ended at a skinned 
bear carcass. Airborne hunters had simply followed the highly visible tracks 
of bears emerging from their winter dens into the spring snow, landed, and 
dispatched the animals. A February 1957 regulation by the Game Commission 
closed brown bear hunting in April and May to end the practice.34 Controversy 




Clarence Rhode at controls of Grumman Goose, Nome, 1949. FWS 1115, Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services. Game Commission director Rhode built an effective air 
wing for law enforcement.
Rhode’s views typified those of the game warden–conservationists of the 
era. He felt a strong commitment to the protection of game through vigorous 
law enforcement against all violators, the worst being commercial killers and 
those who wasted wildlife. Predators—wolves and coyotes at least—did not 
qualify as “game” and needed to be controlled. Politics, in his estimation, sub-
verted the agent’s work by failing to appropriate adequate enforcement funds 
and by interfering in professional game management.35
Rhode’s Euro-American perspective and law enforcement orientation in-
evitably grated against hunting practices by Alaska Natives. Having seen and 
heard of wildlife waste by Natives, he determined to apply the law. Little or 
no enforcement had been done previously in the Arctic. At Shungnak in 1949 
agent Ray Woolford and his partner apprehended some Eskimos for leaving 
piles of caribou in the woods after killing them. They required the Eskimos to 
bring in the caribou. The Eskimos argued that the caribou had been left for 
one day pending pickup and that, meanwhile, federal agents had found the 
carcasses and spread poison on them to kill wolves. The incident, and attempts 
to enforce the law at Anaktuvuk Pass and elsewhere, created enmity between 
Natives and the wildlife management community. It lent impetus to the move-
ment for Alaska Native land and subsistence rights in the 1960s and 1970s.36
Rhode professionalized Alaskan wildlife management to a high degree. For 
a time he accepted only 2 percent of applicants as agents. He hired university-
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trained wildlife biologists and helped institute a department of wildlife manage-
ment at the University of Alaska.37 An intense, competitive, and highly capable 
organizer and manager, Rhode induced strong loyalties and resentments. His 
administrative interests lay much closer to law enforcement than to wildlife 
biology. Territorial fisheries biologists disliked him; they felt he short-changed 
fisheries research to build his air-based program. The belief that the federal 
government had mismanaged the salmon fisheries, and weak cooperation be-
tween the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Territorial Department of Fisheries, 
generated negative feelings between federal and territorial officials. Rhode did 
care about wildlife habitat, however, and firmly endorsed the proposed Arctic 
National Wildlife Range (ANWR) and Izembek and Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta 
wildlife refuges.38
In August 1958 Rhode took off in a Grumman Goose accompanied by 
his son Jack and Fish and Wildlife officer Stanley Fredericksen, preparing for a 
visit by Wildlife Management Institute leaders Ira Gabrielson and Clint “Pink” 
Gutermuth in furtherance of the effort to establish ANWR. On their return 
trip south they planned to cross over the headwaters of the Ivishak River, one 
of the highest mountain passes in the eastern Brooks Range. Twenty-one years 
later hikers found the wreckage of their aircraft on a rocky slope below the 
pass.39 Agency officials memorialized Rhode in the Clarence Rhode National 
Wildlife Range along the Bering Sea, absorbed in 1980 by the Yukon Delta 
National Wildlife Refuge.
JIM BROOKS
Boone and Crockett member James Washington “Jim” Brooks (1922– ) ca-
reered as an official of both federal and state wildlife agencies in Alaska. Raised 
in Detroit, Brooks gained an interest in Nature through outdoor forays and the 
books of Ernest Thompson Seton. He left home at age seventeen without bene-
fit of a high school diploma and headed west for adventure, riding freight trains 
and staying in hobo jungles. Arriving in Alaska in 1940, he worked at a Civilian 
Conservation Corps camp, an airport, a gold ore processing mill, and on the 
Alaska Railroad; washed dishes, cut wood, did farmwork, and fished commer-
cially for salmon. In 1941 he took over a trapline in Kantishna country.40
Later that winter, Brooks heard about Pearl Harbor from Indians. He con-
tinued trapping until three of his four dogs ganged up on the other, his favorite, 
and killed it. Returning to Nenana, he met the U.S. marshal, who accused 
him of draft dodging. When Brooks proved his age of nineteen, the marshal 
apologized and insisted he stay for dinner. But the invitation suffered from 
unfortunate timing. In an overheated house, Brooks wore thick long underwear 
and he had not bathed for some time. He could not enjoy the food as he sat 
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there roasting and growing riper by the minute. Nor did it help matters that 
the marshal’s attractive daughter sat close by. Never had he been so happy to hit 
the trail again.41
In Fairbanks, Brooks worked at the airport where he met many of the 
early aviators. He drove trucks and heavy equipment for the construction of 
the Alaska Highway. In September 1942 he joined the U.S. Army Air Corps 
and applied successfully for flight training. In January 1945 he began piloting 
15th Air Force B-24s out of southern Italy on seventeen missions through the 
flak clouds of Austria and northern Italy. After the war he did bush flying for 
a year around Bristol Bay and then entered the University of Alaska, intending 
to study pre-dentistry. A weather service position at Wales rekindled his inter-
est in sea mammals. While at Wales, in 1949 he made a hazardous January 
flight in a snowstorm to rescue an Eskimo whose two companions had per-
ished on the Bering Sea ice. After accompanying him two years later on a trip, 
during which he gave all the leftover food and fuel to an old trapper, outdoor 
writer Jim Rearden remarked, “I learned what it is to be an Alaskan from Jim 
Brooks.”42
Returning to the University of Alaska in 1949 Brooks majored in wild-
life management, writing a master’s thesis on walrus in 1954 that became a 
standard work on the subject. He then entered the Territorial Department of 
Fisheries, where he conducted research on sea lions and belukhas to determine 
their impact on salmon. Put in charge of predator control of harbor seals, a 
program he did not favor, he helped phase it out. In 1957 he transferred to 
the new Alaska Department of Fish and Game. An appointment as director 
of the newly organized game division, a post he held from 1959 to 1967, cut 
short his doctoral study in wildlife management at the University of British Co-
lumbia. In addition to the game program, his duties included establishing the 
state complex of game refuges. From 1967 to 1972 he served in the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, where he designed the polar bear research program and 
engaged in planning for the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and the trans-
Alaska oil pipeline. He held office from 1972 to 1977 as commissioner of fish 
and game and, until retirement, as director of enforcement in the Alaska office 
of the National Marine Fisheries Service, managing ocean fisheries involving 
Canada and other nations.43
In his travels throughout much of Alaska and innumerable contacts with 
people of every station, Brooks absorbed what he termed a “generalized sour-
ness” toward the federal government. He had witnessed unfair treatment of the 
Inupiat at Wales, heard of favoritism toward the outside-owned salmon canning 
companies, and regarded the reindeer industry as an example of federal mis-
management. Unlike most wildlife managers in the territory he looked forward 
to statehood and state control of fish and wildlife.
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Jim Brooks conducting polar bear research, Chukchi Sea northwest of Cape Lisburne, 1971. 
Courtesy Jim Brooks. Trained in a modern ecological perspective, Brooks headed the game 
division of the new Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
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Empathetic toward both wild creatures and people, Brooks steered a course 
midway between the conservationists and the advocates of vigorous exploita-
tion of wildlife. He recoiled at the extravagant waste of walruses by his Little 
Diomede hunting companions, who killed large numbers only for the ivory. 
He proposed a bill that passed in 1956 permitting sport hunting of walruses, 
hoping that guiding would help the local economy. It did, but ivory hunting 
continued to increase. This and other experiences made Brooks skeptical to-
ward claims of subsistence hunting rights. He regarded much of the predator 
control by both territory and federal governments as excessive and used his 
influence to limit it.44
Brooks represented the ecologically trained wildlife managers, increasingly 
from the University of Alaska, who replaced the traditional law enforcement–
oriented agents. Professors John Buckley (a student of Aldo Leopold), Neil 
Hosley, Brina Kessel, and Jim Rearden initiated the university’s program. Their 
students, who set the direction of Alaskan wildlife management from the late 
1950s through the 1960s, included Brooks, John Hakala, David R. Klein, Cal-
vin J. Lensink, Jack Lentfer, A. Robert Rausch, and Ronald O. Skoog.
Brooks disliked the bounty system and the wolf control effort. He stopped 
the program of predator poisoning in 1960 and worked to get rid of bounties. 
He hired other ecologically oriented agents, encouraged research, and estab-
lished a habitat division, giving the Alaska Department of Fish and Game a 
nationwide reputation for progressive research and management. Though not 
a strong supporter of parks and game refuges, Brooks personally moved the 
selection and designation in 1960 of the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary 
and furthered the establishment of the McNeil River State Game Sanctuary as a 
fishing site for Alaskan brown bears.45 In 1989 he received an honorary doctor-
ate from the University of Alaska. During the wolf controversy in the 1990s he 
facilitated ballot initiatives in which the public opposed the use of aircraft to 
pursue wolves, land, and shoot them.46
JIM KING
One federal wildlife manager, James Gore “Jim” King (1927– ), carried on 
his environmental activities into the 21st Century. Born in Portland, Maine, 
where his father wrote for newspaper editor and future Alaska politician Er-
nest Gruening, King grew up in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Following 
Marine Corps service he attended Harvard and eventually completed a degree 
in wildlife management at the University of Alaska–Juneau in 1958. His first 
wildlife management position consisted of summer employment in 1950 as a 
park ranger at Mt. McKinley National Park, and in 1951 he began a Fish and 
Wildlife Service career. As an Alaska Game Commission agent out of Fairbanks 
AlAskAn Wildlife MAnAgers
256
he performed wildlife studies, waterfowl banding, and law enforcement. Dur-
ing 1962–1964 he managed the first Fish and Wildlife Service station at Bethel, 
overseeing the Clarence Rhode refuge on the Yukon Delta and adjacent Bering 
Sea islands. Between 1964 and 1983 he supervised Alaska bald eagle and wa-
terfowl surveys, compiling 33 years of accident-free flying. As a retiree he did 
aerial surveys on a part-time and contract basis for the Fish and Wildlife Service 
and published numerous articles on eagles, ducks, geese, trumpeter swans, and 
other birds. His waterfowl investigations, including work on the North Slope 
and investigation of a large oil spill in lower Cook Inlet in 1970, generated 
awareness and protective measures by public agencies.47 Not least of the accom-
plishments of King and other waterfowl biologists, their work on the Yukon 
Flats helped defeat the Rampart Dam project that would have destroyed one of 
North America’s topmost waterfowl breeding areas.
Most of King’s work consisted of waterfowl surveys, but his early warden 
years produced some memorable moments in law enforcement. On a spring 
day in 1957, he and agent John Klingbiel investigated an allegation of illegal 
goose shooting at Kotzebue. Refused entry to the suspect’s house, they returned 
bearing a warrant. The suspect departed in a jeep, waving at them. Pursuing the 
jeep, they found a stash of white-fronted geese in a snowbank. They carried the 
geese to the marshal’s house next door to that of the suspect, who tried to bar 
their entry until the marshal emerged, ordering him away. At the trial the pros-
ecutor, allergic to feathers, had to stand in the back of the courtroom and shout 
questions at the agent holding the evidence. The court convicted and fined the 
suspect, a non-Native guide.48
Typically, though, King flew over waterways and nesting sites the length 
and breadth of Alaska—the Southeast islands, the ponds of the interior and 
the Yukon Delta, the river courses, the Aleutians and the Bering Sea, the Arc-
tic tundra—to band or census ducks, geese, and swans. Managers needed the 
numbers to control hunting and conserve the various species. Survey agents 
got to know people, Native and white, in nearly all the cities and villages; some 
dated from the Gold Rush and others came from Oklahoma for oil. When male 
agents declined to ride in the plane flown by the first female survey pilot, King 
volunteered to be her assistant. She proved a fully competent flier.49
While manager of the Clarence Rhode refuge, King proposed the reserva-
tion of Cape Newenham to protect nesting seabirds. This resulted in action 
by Interior Secretary Stewart Udall in 1969, and the tract became part of the 
Togiak National Wildlife Refuge in 1980. King and agent Jim Bartonek formed 
a Pacific Seabird Group that contributed to the expansion of the Alaska Mari-
time National Wildlife Refuge. In 1975 King and agent Calvin Lensink went 
to Washington to brief Interior Department officials and members of Con-
gress on lands appropriate for wildlife refuges. Lands settlement bills envisioned 
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vast acreage under federal jurisdiction, enabling the two agents to draft liberal 
boundaries for the refuges. Their proposals for waterfowl habitat at Innoko, 
Kanuti, Koyukuk, Nowitna, Tetlin, Yukon Flats, and other lands largely deter-
mined their 1980 designation as national wildlife refuges.50
In the private sphere, King helped organize the Trumpeter Swan Society 
(1968), the Pacific Seabird Group, and the Steller Society (renamed Juneau 
Group of Audubon Society); served on the boards of Alaska Conservation 
Society and Territorial Sportsmen; and presided over the state chapter of the 
Wildlife Society. On the state and Juneau parks advisory boards he played a 
leading role in preservation of the Mendenhall Wetlands and 2,000 acres of 
Juneau beach properties. He and his wife, Mary Lou, led efforts to establish the 
2,800-acre Point Bridget State Park (1988) and the 13-acre Ernest Gruening 
State Historical Park (1989). The Kings helped create bike and forest trails and 
other recreational facilities in the Juneau vicinity. In the 1990s King initiated 
an effort to establish a Juneau Icecap International Park. He received many 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service agent Jim King and Nunamiut Eskimos examine a wolf pelt, 
Anaktuvuk Pass, mid-1950s. By J. Malcolm Greany. Alaska Game Commission, 18th An-
nual Report, July 1, 1956 Thru June 30, 1957. A waterfowl expert, King remained active 
in environmental concerns for half a century.
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conservation citations and, in 1989, an honorary doctorate at the University of 
Alaska–Southeast.51
Dufresne, Rhode, Brooks, and King exemplify the many territorial era of-
ficials—wardens, researchers, managers, and others—who carried the effort to 
safeguard Alaska’s wildlife populations during the long period between the hey-
day of influential private elites and the rise of national environmental public 
opinion in the 1960s. Paralleling the Bureau of Biological Survey–Fish and 
Wildlife Service directors who in some cases had been their agency superiors, 
they promoted the evolution of environmental management values in Alaska. 
All supported species protection, although Dufresne and Rhode expressed a 
traditional view of predators. They saw their main objective as ensuring a stable 
supply of game, fur, and fish for residents and, to a lesser extent, for nonresident 
sportsmen.
Schooled in more modern concepts of wildlife management, Brooks and 
King perceived their goal as something closer to ecological sustainability. Rhode, 
Brooks, and King all actuated this value through protective land designations. 
All four of these leaders articulated the necessity of a strong and responsible 
government role in wildlife management backed by sound research. As men-on-
the-scene they also believed in grassroots participation in policy. In the absence 
of environmental groups in pre-statehood Alaska, most participation involved 
settlers, sport hunters and fishers, trappers, and guides. The success of Game 
Commission and fisheries agents in bridging the gaps between government and 
settlers gradually reinforced utilitarian conservationist values in Alaska, a step 
toward later and broader ecological concepts.
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Grizzly Bears in Politics
no More PoWerFUl eMBleM oF tHe alasKan Frontier eXisteD tHan tHe Griz-
zly bear. It drew forth intense feelings of fear and admiration in its detractors 
and sympathizers. To those who wished to meet one or, to the vastly greater 
number who preferred to imagine doing so, the bear stood as a manifestation of 
Nature’s raw power; of the mystery, vigor, honesty, and freedom of wilderness; 
of beauty, excitement, and danger. Some sought to transfer the power to them-
selves through elemental (if unequal, given the capacity of modern fi rearms) 
combat against the bear. Some settled for purchase of a hide. Others, empow-
ered through contemplation of Nature, endeavored to preserve the bear and 
its habitat. Those immersed in the settlement dream sought not excitement, 
danger, or beauty but stability, security, comfort, and material gain. They per-
ceived the bear as a pest, a challenge, a threat, even an insult. For more than half 
a century before statehood the competing elements—hunters, preservationists, 
wildlife managers, settlers, developers—fought for the hearts and minds of the 
American public; in essence, for the soul and future of Alaska. During most of 
this period, their quarrel revolved in part around the grizzly bear.
12
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Brown and grizzly bears, now considered varieties of the same species, are 
found throughout mainland Alaska and some adjacent islands and occurred as 
far south as Mexico in the early 20th Century. Adults vary in facial features, in 
size from about 400 to 1,500 pounds or more, and in fur color from pale yellow 
to nearly black. The 1902 Alaska game law classified them as big game. They 
are also predators: of salmon, moose, caribou, deer, and, sometimes, livestock. 
They occasionally attack humans, almost always as a result of some provocation. 
Among the most magnificent of the world’s land carnivores, the bears occupied 
a unique position in pre-statehood Alaskan wildlife management. Their special 
character and ambiguous status between “big game” and “predator,” or menace, 
guaranteed them endless trouble in Alaska, as it had in the States. Controversy 
over their status persisted throughout the territorial period and gave rise to 
sanctuaries for their protection. The debates articulated and implemented mod-
els for the values of unlimited exploitation, utilitarian conservation, species and 
ecosystem preservation, and nonconsumptive use.
BROWN BEAR HUNTING
Eskimos, Athabaskan Indians, and other Alaska Natives traditionally killed 
brown bears for meat, skins, and fat. The fat served as food and as fuel for stone 
lamps. Hunters employed long spears to brace against the ground and impale 
a charging bear or to drive into the neck of a bear standing upright. They also 
attacked bears in hibernation or at night on fishing creeks or bear trails. An es-
timated total pre-contact population of 71,000, many of whom hunted brown 
bears, may have been a significant determinant of the size of brown bear popu-
lations as well as their fear of humans.1
Alaska Natives also hunted bears for the Russians as early as the start of 
the 19th Century. Between 1803 and 1822, Russian fur-trading vessels car-
ried away 2,650 bearskins, many or most presumably of brown bears.2 In the 
1842–1860 period another 2,280 bearskins left Alaska.3 Commercial harvest 
apparently slackened in the early years of American rule. Ivan Petroff related in 
his 1880 census report that
their skins are not very valuable, and, owing to this fact and to the fierce 
disposition of the animals, they are not commonly hunted. All natives of 
Alaska respect them, and it is the universal custom of hunters to address a 
few complimentary remarks to the intended victims before attempting to kill 
them. Perhaps the skins of fully one-half of the brown bears of Alaska are re-
tained by the natives for bedding and to hang before the entrances of houses 
in the place of doors. The smaller skins are tanned and cut up into strips and 
lines, and the natives of the interior utilize them for manufacturing sledge 
fastenings and the net work bottoms of snow shoes, because this leather does 
not stretch when exposed to moisture, as moose and deer skins do.4
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Beginning in the late 1880s, brown bears on Kodiak Island and the Alaska 
Peninsula underwent intense hunting for their skins, fashionable in Europe. 
Observing the Iliamna-Katmai region, federal biologist Wilfred Osgood de-
scribed brown bears as scarce in 1902, whereas “not more than fourteen years 
ago it was not uncommon to see eight to fifteen bears scattered about on one 
mountainside.” A prime bearskin brought $75 from Russian nobility in 1904, 
Brown bear at Karluk Lake, Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge, 1958. By Earl Fleming. 
FWS 4863, Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. As a symbol of wilderness, 
the bear evoked powerful but conflicting reactions from its admirers and detractors.
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and skins adorned military hats in Russia, Germany, Austria, and England. The 
Gold Rush era kept the bears under fire well after the turn of the century, by 
which time their numbers in some areas had been greatly reduced.5
English sportsman Charles R.E. Radclyffe, who hunted the Kenai Penin-
sula in 1903, noted that the law forbade the sale of heads and skins of game 
animals. Nevertheless, he said,
[T]he natives bring in regularly a supply of brown bear skins to all the local 
stores, and if not already sold to the shopkeepers, they offer these skins to 
any one who visits the local settlement. . . . [A]t three of the largest stores on 
the coast of Alaska . . . I saw a total of 120 brown bear skins sold by the na-
tives to the shopkeepers, and afterwards shipped out of the country openly, 
and with the full cognizance of the authorities. One only needs to pay a 
visit to the sale-rooms of Messrs. Lampson in London, where hundreds of 
Alaskan brown bear skins are always on offer, to see how loosely this portion 
of the game law is enforced.6
A woman who lived on the Alaska Peninsula for three years ending about 1910 
related that “my husband shot during the three years over one hundred of the 
big brown bears for the hides.”7 Yet Harold McCracken, who traveled around 
the western end of the Alaska Peninsula in the spring and summer of 1922, 
stated, “I saw 190 brown bears. The fact that we saw 28 bears in one day, and as 
high as 12 in sight at the same time, is in itself good evidence of the numbers to 
be found.”8 Almost certainly bears stood a better chance of survival in remote 
than more accessible locations.
Adding to the impact of commerce in skins, sport hunters began to seek 
brown bear heads and hides shortly before the end of the 19th Century. Brit-
ish gentleman-hunter Claude Cane, in the summer of 1902, felt disappointed 
when for the second time he lost an opportunity to shoot a mother and her 
two cubs on the Alaska Peninsula. Bears in the vicinity had become wary of 
humans. Cane had already downed two adult bears elsewhere on the coast of 
the peninsula and another on the Kenai. His friend Frances Paget bagged five 
brown bears that summer.9
Charles Sheldon, as a Boone and Crockett hunter-naturalist, walked an 
indistinct line between conqueror of fearsome big game and scientific observer, 
collector, and preserver of that game. He shot females and cubs but felt ambiva-
lence about it. In his first Alaskan brown bear hunt on Montague Island in May 
1905, he unsuccessfully pursued a mother and cub on two occasions. Eventu-
ally, he caught up with a pair on a steep mountainside just below the snowline. 
Creeping up to them,
I saw the cub pushing its head into the body of its mother. The mother, 
stretched at length in a slight depression among the spruces, was distinctly 
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visible, and I saw that her left forefoot was raised. The cub was nursing. It 
seemed excited with hunger and moved its head about in a wild frenzy, all 
the time bawling in a low, strange tone. . . . [T]he bear half rose, her head 
turned in my direction. I quickly fired at her foreshoulder. With a woof and 
a jump she came to her feet and I fired again. In savage fury, she slapped at 
the point where the bullet had struck, rushed a few feet in the direction away 
from me, then a few up and a few down, all the time woofing in pain or 
fright. . . . I fired three more times, and at the fifth shot she dropped. . . . The 
cub soon emerged from the bushes and started running to follow its mother. 
I shot it before it had gone three feet.10
As he lit his pipe to relax, Sheldon mused,
I was burning with the glow produced by that rare glimpse of animal 
life—the very essence of wild nature. I could not resist a strong feeling that I 
had intruded on sacred moments in that old bear’s life, moments forbidden 
to the members of the human race by some deep law of nature. Faithfully 
she had fulfilled her duties. Her last hours had found her still performing 
them, having hidden so well, on such difficult ground, in a spot high and 
secluded—taking every precaution to give food to her young. It seemed to 
me that I had a right to kill her, but not thus to detect her at the time she 
was giving her breast.
Looking back on the experience, Sheldon reflected that “one thing stands out 
more vividly than all the rest—that sight of the mother bear nursing her moan-
ing cub. . . . Wounded once, she had taken every care of her offspring. . . . But, 
in spite of all, fate had overtaken her.”11
During the hunt of several weeks’ duration, Sheldon killed at least five 
bears and continued to look for more. One of the five fell into a canyon where 
it could not be retrieved. A wounded male escaped. In recounting the hunt 
Sheldon wrote more as a ritual sport hunter than as a collector for science. Yet 
his discourse differed considerably from that of popular sport magazines. After 
a bear accidentally ran into him and knocked him down, he commented that he 
“could have written a fine story about a vicious, charging bear.” In that case and 
most others, though, bears ran away from the perceived source of danger. He 
concluded that “every experience I have had with them . . . leads me to doubt 
most of the stories of their aggressiveness in times past.” Later in life he told an 
outdoor sporting writer that over a period of 35 years he had killed more than 
500 big game animals including 70 to 80 brown or grizzly bears.12
Other well-educated hunters seemed oblivious to their contributions to 
the depletion of wildlife species. George Mixter, his brother, and a friend, all 
influential men from the East, conducted a spring hunt for brown bears on the 
north side of the Alaska Peninsula in 1908. They killed eighteen bears shortly 
after the animals had emerged from hibernation. They captured three orphaned 
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cubs to be taken to the National Zoological Park. Immediately after his narra-
tion of the hunt in National Geographic and without apology, Mixter quoted 
Wilfred Osgood: “The brown bears of Alaska will undoubtedly become very 
rare or extinct at no distant date. . . . Already they have become scarce on 
Kodiak Island, where formerly very abundant, and on the Alaska Peninsula, 
though still fairly numerous, they are being killed at a rate probably greatly in 
excess of their increase.”13
Some including Sheldon collected their kills for museums or other scientif-
ic purposes. Most seemed to want trophies for their dens and for status among 
their peers. Russell Annabel aptly described the phenomenon, rating the grizzly 
bear, which he distinguished from the brown bear, as
tops among American sportsmen. . . . The animal’s legendary courage, 
craftiness, and willingness on occasion to charge hell-bent into gunfire 
makes its pelt more than a souvenir of a hunting trip; it is a trophy certify-
ing you have accomplished just about the ultimate in American big game 
shooting. The old-time Indians felt the same way about the grizzly when 
they rated a necklace of grizzly claws or teeth as the badge of a hunter who 
had been places and done things. Then, as now, it was the spice of danger, 
the possibility of getting batted down and chewed up, plus the primary 
difficulty of finding a grizzly and maneuvering yourself into position 
for a shot at it, that made hunting the animals an outstanding he-man 
behavior.14
POLITICAL CONFLICT OVER BEARS
As a result of Boone and Crockett’s work, two provisions of the 1902 Alaska 
game law protected the grizzly bear: no sales of hides beyond fifteen days after 
close of the season and an annual per-person limit of four adult bears. These 
measures provoked a strong reaction from Alaskans opposed to federal restric-
tions. They enlisted Vermont senator William P. Dillingham, convincing him 
that bears would put livestock ranchers out of business and that the 1902 game 
law should be abolished. Settlers named a town after Dillingham, but Boone 
and Crockett fought off the attack on the game law.
A revised 1908 game law authorized the territorial governor to hire game 
wardens and control the licensing of nonresident hunters and export trophies. 
It reduced the annual limit of brown bears to three per hunter and required 
permits for hide exports but bowed to Alaskan critics by abolishing the season 
on brown bears north of 62 degrees. Hunters could still sell brown bear skins 
in or outside Alaska on a very limited scale. The 1902 and 1908 laws may have 
saved the species from extinction in parts of its range. Boone and Crockett went 
on advocating sanctuaries for the bears.15
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Resentment of the 1902 and 1908 game laws persisted. Asserting the po-
tential of Kodiak Island and the Kenai Peninsula as “great cattle ranges” if the 
bears could be cleared away, F.E. Kleinschmidt complained in a 1913 Outdoor 
Life article, “Men who formulated laws for us called us the riff-raff of the West-
ern Federation of Miners; of low intelligence, unable to govern ourselves or to 
make our own laws suited to our own needs. . . . One of the great monuments 
of stupidity erected to this, our great Northern Territory, is The Alaska Game 
Law.” Kleinschmidt charged that outsiders protected the brown bear so they 
could hunt it themselves.16 Beyond the normal frontiersman’s resistance to out-
side interference, his remarks reflected the class difference between local citizens 
and outside conservationists.
Warden Charles Madsen, asked by territorial governor J.F.A. Strong to ad-
vise on the status of wildlife on the Alaska Peninsula, assessed the brown bear 
in anthropocentric terms:
Its flesh is useless as food; its pelt is of no great value; and it destroys any-
thing and everything that comes within its reach. It even seems to enjoy 
an opportunity of getting into a trapper’s or prospector’s cache or place of 
residence, and tearing to pieces his supplies. . . . They help materially in 
destroying caribou, and make the raising of domestic stock in the peninsula 
an almost impossibility. . . . Were it not for the bear this peninsula would be 
a quite ideal range for both reindeer and domestic stock.
When among domesticated animals, said Madsen, the bear’s typical behavior 
is “killing and maiming without discretion or other intent than demonstrating 
its power as a mighty slaughterer.” Madsen recommended that “the protection 
now being given the brown bear be abolished.”17
Alfred H. Brooks, pioneer geologist and name source for the Brooks Range, 
stated the settler philosophy regarding brown bears in broad terms:
If the farmer, sheep-herder, and cattleman make progress at the cost of 
driving out the moose, the caribou, the big bear, and the wolf, it is but an 
evidence of the progress of civilization. A fundamental principle of advance-
ment of civilization is that the land must be put to its best possible use for 
the benefit of mankind. Our people have never taken kindly to the European 
system of game preserves which benefit the few at the expense of the many. 
All this does not mean that we shall not make every effort to preserve wild-
life so long as it does not conflict with the legitimate demands of the settlers.
There have been some wise restrictions put on the killing of game and 
fur-bearing animals, but some actions taken have been regarded by Alaskans 
as of more benefit to the non-resident hunter and the occasional visiting 
naturalist than to the residents of the Territory. For example, some of the 
game laws indicate a desire to preserve for the use of the large brown bear 
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areas which might be used for cattle or sheep. So far, these laws have worked 
few hardships, as the land is but little settled. As soon as the settlers demand 
it, such laws will inevitably disappear before advancing civilization, and the 
bear will be relegated to haunts not available for better purposes.18
Governor Strong spoke for the cattle and sheep ranchers in his 1915 and 
1916 annual reports to the secretary of the interior: “[T]he Brown Bear is a seri-
ous menace to the live-stock industry on Kodiak Island. . . . If these conditions 
are continued, it will be necessary to abandon the live-stock industry altogether 
on Kodiak Island and other places where this pestiferous brute is protected by 
law.”19 A year later, probably having read Madsen’s report, he heated up the 
rhetoric: “[The brown bear] is rapacious and predacious, and he is esteemed to 
be worthy of a congressional iron cross, presumably because of his fierce and 
warlike disposition. This animal should not be given protection. . . . It is safe to 
say that an Alaskan Legislature will not protect the brown bear.”20
In 1919 Governor Thomas C. Riggs Jr. echoed his predecessor. Taunting 
his buffalo-loving opposition, he alluded to big game hunters who took trophies 
and wasted meat, venturing, “It seems to me that the brown and grizzly bears 
are being protected for the sole benefit of the nonresident sportsmen. They have 
no place in the economic development of the territory any more than the herds 
of wild buffalo would have in the wheat fields of Minnesota and the Dakotas.” 
A year later he rated brown bear protection by the federal government as “prob-
ably the most serious difference of all” in federal-territorial relations concerning 
wildlife. He added, “I advocate not only the removal of all restrictions covering 
them, but a bounty for their destruction. I also believe that protection to brown 
bears can be found to be unconstitutional.” He offered no explanation of the 
alleged constitutional violation.21
Alaskans condemned the brown bear not only as a danger to livestock and 
human life but also as a predator of valuable game. Governor Walter Clark 
noted in 1912 that on the Kenai Peninsula “the moose are not menaced by 
overhunting, but their calves are killed in large numbers by the brown bear.” 
Governors Strong and Riggs also mentioned bear predation of game but cited 
no details.22 The difficulty of observing and measuring such predation, and 
expressions of sympathy for the bears, forestalled bounties and other territorial 
government efforts to remove brown bears.
In his 1921 summary, Bureau of Biological Survey (BBS) representative 
Alfred Bailey commented, “Alaskans kill bear at every opportunity regardless 
of law, and I venture to assert that it would be impossible to find an Alaskan 
jury which would convict a man for killing a brown bear during the closed 
season.” He recommended that protection of brown bears be lifted to retard 
the momentum of an attempt by the territorial legislature to gain control over 
Alaskan wildlife.23
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The grizzly bear functioned as a scapegoat for Alaskan frustrations. Gover-
nor Riggs gathered and publicized accounts of bear attacks on humans, citing 
several in his 1920 game report. He then discovered a vulnerable spot in the 
position of the bears’ New York and Washington friends. Former BBS director 
C. Hart Merriam, a “splitter” mammalogist, had published a study identifying 
up to 86 species of grizzly and brown bears, most of them found in Alaska. It 
treated grizzlies and browns as separate species. BBS chief Edward W. Nelson 
had publicly endorsed the classification.24 Aware that the 1908 game law men-
tioned only “brown bears,” Riggs threatened to lift restrictions on the export of 
grizzly bear hides. Nelson, Charles Sheldon, and George Bird Grinnell strove 
to refute the bear attack stories, arguing that in each case the bear had been 
provoked. Riggs’s move put them in a weak position to combat market hunting, 
a threat that could have eliminated bear populations in some locales.25 Boone 
and Crockett mobilized its allied groups and put a stop to Riggs’s attack. Riggs 
responded by threatening court action to test the 1908 law. Madison Grant, 
who had defended the bears for twenty years, and Grinnell met with Riggs 
in Washington and persuaded him to withhold the lawsuit. They calmed the 
waters between Riggs and William T. Hornaday, who had publicly insulted 
one another during the debates and both threatened libel suits. Soon thereafter 
the 1920 elections brought Republicans into office and ended the contest over 
brown bear definition.26
Defense of the Brown Bears
Feeble enforcement of the 1908 Alaska game law induced Nelson and the 
Eastern nature and sporting groups to work for a new law. Hornaday cooper-
ated in this effort, as did Dan A. Sutherland, a candidate for Charles Sulzer’s 
congressional delegate seat. “A vote for Sutherland is a vote for Hornaday and 
the Alaskan Brown Bears,” suggested the Juneau Daily Alaska Empire. But 
Sutherland won.27
Largely as a result of Nelson and Sheldon’s diplomacy, the furor over the 
bears and the meat hunting issue quieted enough in the early 1920s to en-
able smooth passage of the 1925 Game Law. But more trouble lay in wait for 
the bears. The new Alaska Game Commission received numerous complaints 
about bears, mostly from residents objecting to their protection or demanding 
a bounty on them. The loudest protest came from the Kodiak Island cattlemen. 
The commission responded. Its most politically useful argument consisted of 
an incident involving a brown bear encountered by Forest Service surveyor Jack 
Thayer on Admiralty Island in 1928. Thayer and his companion Fred Herring 
surprised the bear at close range in thick cover. Herring climbed a tree and 
Thayer fired at the bear, which proceeded to terminate Thayer’s career. Herring 
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did not see whether the bear charged before being fired upon. Whatever the 
case, Thayer had used a light rifle and steel-jacketed ammunition, inadequate 
for stopping a brown bear.28 Effective in mid-1930 the commission adopted a 
regulation permitting citizens “to kill a bear at any time when such animal is 
considered a menace to person, livestock or property” or appears within one 
mile of any human residence. The regulation exempted most coastal brown 
bear habitat.29
Outside environmentalists reacted in dismay. Hornaday weighed in with 
acid commentary:
The present flurry of demand for the “extinction” of the big brown bears of 
Kadiak Island and other points north . . . is like the breaking out of heat rash 
on children. It is to be cured by a salve of equal parts of Truth and Reason. 
. . . There is no such thing as the “edge of civilization,” and the wild beasts 
of New York and Chicago annually kill and maim about 50 times more in-
nocent people than do all the wild beasts in Alaska.30
Letters poured in to the Game Commission, many from nature enthusiasts in 
the States. Executive director H.W. Terhune dismissed those from outside as 
“written for purely sentimental reasons.” The Hoonah Alaska Native Brother-
hood chapter sent a petition declaring that “both the black and brown bears are 
a menace to human life and safety and there is no particular reason for protect-
ing them.” Thomas Gardner of Petersburg wrote, “I have been on the frontier 
for sixty years and have yet to see the bear that would bother you if you left 
him alone. The cannerymen say the bear destroy a lot of salmon, but don’t say 
anything about the salmon they take and cannot can. . . . All the bears in Alaska 
wouldn’t eat the salmon wasted that way.”31
John Pegues, a reporter who had attended every meeting of the Game Com-
mission, held that the new regulation would not be a threat to the grizzly bear 
population. Introducing another argument unlikely to be well received by the 
preservationists, he noted that “hundreds of hunters come here annually because 
of [the bear’s] presence. They spend many thousands of dollars in outfitting, 
hiring guides, on transportation, hotel bills and otherwise. Men have become 
interested in Alaskan industries directly as the result of hunting trips. The peo-
ple of Alaska . . . have no desire to exterminate their biggest attraction to the 
sportsmen.” “In fact,” he added, “the Alaska Game Commission has since its 
creation adopted a policy of encouraging big-game hunters to come north.”32
Brown bears faced guns pointed at them by sport hunters, by settlers who 
feared them, by ranchers guarding cattle and sheep, by salmon fishers who per-
ceived them as competition, and by loggers who entered their forests. In the 
Southeast, especially on Admiralty and Chichagof islands, plans for clearcut 
logging menaced the bears’ protective habitat. John M. Holzworth, who passed 
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three summers and falls in the late 1920s studying and filming brown bears in 
the Southeast, wrote The Wild Grizzlies of Alaska in their defense. He attacked 
the claim of Alaska’s officials characterizing Jack Thayer’s death as unprovoked. 
He had personally encountered brown bears on more than 250 occasions, he 
said, frequently at close range. They had charged twice but not touched him. His 
guide Al Hasselborg had lived among the bears for 30 years and been charged 
twelve times, all by bears he had wounded. “The bear’s criminal offense, appar-
ently,” Holzworth concluded, “is in defending himself. . . . Decimate the bears 
in Alaska and a great part of the appeal of adventure and the wilderness, the 
charm of romance which surrounds its islands and mountains, will be gone.” 
He accused the Game Commission of assisting a land grab by grazing interests 
and called for retraction of the offending regulation and the setting aside of 
Admiralty and Chichagof islands as bear sanctuaries. For the consideration of 
prospective hunters he suggested:
Good photography requires far more skill and ingenuity than hunting with 
the modern high-power rifle. . . . I also hope that such success as I have had 
in taking motion pictures, particularly of the grizzly bear, may help to stimu-
late the use of the motion picture camera rather than the rifle. It affords a 
much better thrill, and one is soon weaned away from the rifle, with benefi-
cial results both to the hunter and to what remains of the fast dwindling big 
game animals of the wilderness.33
Indeed, photographers began to supplement sport hunters in quest of the most 
interesting wild creature in Alaska, adding to the employment of guides and 
outfitters and helping to moderate local attitudes toward the brown bears.
Holzworth chaired the Alaskan Bear Committee organized by the Ameri-
can Society of Mammalogists and the New York Zoological Society. He received 
the endorsements of Madison Grant, C. Hart Merriam, and Edward W. Nelson 
and enlisted a large number of conservation groups, magazines, and newspa-
pers. One prominent nature writer, Stewart Edward White, authored numerous 
articles demanding protection for the bears. In the April 12, 1930, Saturday 
Evening Post he declared, “There is no doubt in the world that if the regulation 
is permitted to remain in effect, our unique brown bear of Alaska is doomed to 
as complete extinction as the California grizzly.” He called for retraction of the 
1930 regulation, defended the bear involved in Thayer’s death, and ridiculed 
the notion that the bears constituted a threat to the salmon industry.34
In the 1935–1936 Alaska Game Commission report, director Frank Dufresne 
mentioned the continuing tendency of coastal fishers and old-timers in the 
interior to shoot brown bears on sight and the
frequent but oftentimes exaggerated reports of persons being attacked 
without apparent provocation. While there are no authentic cases of death 
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or severe mutilation from this source during the past year, it is significant 
to note that several of these so-called “charging brownies” were found to be 
carrying pieces of old bullets—mute testimony to a former painful but non-
fatal encounter with man. This condition, which often produces a crazed 
and dangerous animal, is largely unwarranted and directly attributable to 
careless sniping by thoughtless persons.35
Apart from hunting regulations, brown bear advocates hoped to establish 
Admiralty and Chichagof islands as bear sanctuaries. But the Forest Service cov-
eted the voluminous stands of timber on the islands. Accordingly, the agency 
supported the National Park Service in protecting bear habitat elsewhere. This 
understanding facilitated the 1931 expansion of Katmai National Monument 
and the 1939 additions to Glacier Bay National Monument.36
On the question of logging on Admiralty and Chichagof islands, Arthur 
Newton Pack seconded White’s views in Nature Magazine: “Alaskans of the pro-
moter type, and some government officials, like to talk in terms of ‘Economic 
Development.’ They envision employment in lumbering and paper manufac-
ture and the industrialization of Alaska for all Alaskans, all a very fine-sounding 
theory.” Pointing out the failure of pulp industries in British Columbia hun-
dreds of miles closer to markets, Pack asked, “Should Alaska run the risk of 
destroying the unreplaceable asset of its wildlife and trading this birthright for a 
mess of pottage? . . . Alaska will do better by preserving the forests on [Admiral-
ty Island] as a public recreation area and wildlife refuge than cutting it.”37 Pack’s 
argument would be heard for decades to come, eventually winning the day.
Shifts in Americans’ attitudes had begun to transform the grizzly bear from 
feared predator to valued symbol of wilderness and integral element of ecosys-
tems. Ecological science and animal rights concepts brought the BBS policy 
of predator control under critical scrutiny. Nature writers such as White and 
Holzworth reacted to reports that the Forest Service had tried to arrange for 
Crown Zellerbach Corporation to log off most of Admiralty Island at low tim-
ber rates, for pulp. Senator Frederick C. Walcott, chair of the newly formed 
Committee on Conservation of Wild Life Resources, visited Alaska to investi-
gate brown bear killing and held hearings in Washington, DC, in 1932. First 
of the major federal agencies to reflect the attitude changes toward wildlife, the 
National Park Service in 1931 adopted habitat and species protection as an 
explicit component of its mission. Joseph S. Dixon, a Park Service biologist and 
former student of leading ecologist Joseph Grinnell, conducted surveys of the 
Glacier Bay environs. To institute the brown bear as the premier wildlife species 
of Glacier Bay National Monument (Chapter 8), he recommended widening the 
boundaries to take in surrounding forests and the grasslands near Gustavus.38
Responding to bear advocates, in 1925 the Alaska Game Commission had 
designated much of the forest bordering Glacier Bay National Monument as a 
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bear sanctuary. In 1927 Game Commission director Terhune approached the 
Forest Service to suggest adding the bear habitat to the monument. Eventu-
ally, the Forest Service reached an agreement with the National Park Service: it 
would transfer jurisdiction over the habitat from the Tongass National Forest 
to the monument in exchange for Park Service cooperation in heading off the 
drive to make Admiralty and Chichagof islands national parks. To avoid a clash 
over mining, Park Service leaders decided to seek a presidential proclamation 
expanding the monument rather than a law creating a national park. President 
Roosevelt signed the document on April 18, 1939. While making no specific 
reference to the brown bear whose welfare had been its central purpose, the 
proclamation made Glacier Bay National Monument larger than any other in 
the national park system and incorporated virtually all bordering lands neces-
sary for the bears’ protection.39 But it did not end the effort to designate Admi-
ralty Island a bear sanctuary.
Brown Bears and Livestock 
Livestock raising, primarily on Kodiak Island, endured as the outstanding 
reason or excuse for opposition to the brown bear. The industry had a long and 
troubled history. Russians first introduced cattle in 1794 and maintained small 
herds on Kodiak and other islands. American ranchers began operating in the 
late 19th Century. The Department of Agriculture set up an experimental sta-
tion and cattle herd at Kodiak in 1906 to facilitate a ranching industry in the 
region. It moved the herd to Seattle for two years following the Katmai eruption 
and transferred everything to the Matanuska Valley in 1931. Private individu-
als owned a total of 349 cattle on Kodiak in 1939, 974 in 1956, and 1,350 in 
1965.
American settlers also imported sheep. They introduced a flock of 300 to 
Kodiak Island in 1883; none remained in 1898. Of 9,000 imported in 1902, 
only 80 survived in 1904.40 Like beef ranching on Kodiak, sheep ranching never 
did well, and the brown bear received a large share of the blame. Governors’ 
reports on game conditions repeatedly complained about the threat of brown 
bears to ranching. Warden Charles Madsen noted in 1916 that “brown bears 
killed during the fall of 1915 every one of the sheep kept at the U.S. Agricul-
tural Experimental Station at Kodiak.”41 Investigating such complaints, warden 
Homer Jewell judged in 1930 that losses of large numbers of sheep on Kodiak 
Island attributed to bears had actually been caused by loose dogs or by starva-
tion and cold.42
Beginning in 1927 the Interior Department’s General Land Office, attempt-
ing to promote economic development, had issued leases for cattle ranching on 
Kodiak Island. Within a year leaseholders launched a campaign for removal of 
Grizzly Bears in Politics
272
the brown bears. Complaints of cattle kills by bears in the 1920s precipitated a 
1930–1931 investigation, finding that most cattle deaths resulted from starving 
and from accidents such as falls and entrapment in bogs. Bears often ate the 
cattle upon finding them dead. Wardens Clarence Rhode and Jack O’Connor 
drew similar conclusions in 1937.
Meanwhile, a 1933 survey by warden Hosea Sarber had indicated large 
numbers of brown bears being killed on Kodiak and Afognak islands. Sarber 
investigated in 1938–1939 and found a maximum of 9 bear-killed cattle, 3 of 
them questionable, among a total of 74 lost cattle blamed on bears. The rest 
had died of starvation and accidents. Kodiak Island, he advised, did not suit 
livestock, and cows had to eat seaweed to survive. He observed that “cattlemen 
will often go to any extremes to kill or injure the bear. They have extermination 
first on their minds and state that every bear on the island should be killed. 
They strongly advocate the bounty system and feel that the Kodiak bear should 
be destroyed, the government, of course, to pay the bounty.”43 Attempting to 
target problem bears, Game Commission agents shot eleven on Kodiak Island 
in 1939.44
Alaska Game Commission policy could hardly satisfy all claimants simulta-
neously—ranchers who wished to eliminate the bears, guides and sport hunters 
who wanted access to them, salmon fishermen who viewed them as competi-
tion, settlers who feared them, and conservationists who insisted on preserving 
them. The territorial legislature seized upon the issue, accusing the Game Com-
mission of mismanagement and calling for Alaskan jurisdiction over natural 
resources. Congressional delegate Anthony Dimond introduced a bill to effect 
the change, but it died.45 Control over natural resources remained in federal 
hands until statehood, generating recurring displays of resentment among Alas-
kans, who pointed to the fact that other territories had been given control. 
Federal officials, in part beholden to exploitative industries such as salmon can-
ners, also felt reluctant to grant power over a sixth of the nation’s land to a very 
small, largely transient group of people who often behaved irresponsibly in their 
treatment of the resources.
In 1939, legislation transferred the Bureau of Biological Survey from the 
Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior, effective in 1940, 
and renamed it the Fish and Wildlife Service. Immediately upon assuming ju-
risdiction over mainland Alaskan wildlife in 1939, Interior investigated the sit-
uation on Kodiak Island. Two inspectors from the San Francisco office visited 
Kodiak Island in 1939–1940. Ranchers told them that in their five locations 
they had lost a total of 202 cattle since 1928. Several ranchers had allegedly 
been driven out of business. Bears in the ranching area appeared to be few 
but active, and the ranchers claimed an increase of bears since 1935. In their 
appraisal the inspectors stated that the supply of vegetation and mostly mild 
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Cow killed by brown bear, Pagashak, Kodiak Island, August 1952. In Russell R. Hoffman, 
Refuge Narrative Report: Kodiak Wildlife Refuge, May to August 1952, Kodiak: Fish 
and Wildlife Service, 1952. Bears killed some cattle, but ranchers exaggerated the numbers 
and treated the bear as predator or vermin.
winters could permit a substantial increase in the numbers of cattle on the 
island. Moving the ranches to the mainland would not work because of harsh 
winters and bear or wolf predation there. As for Kodiak Island, the inspectors 
commented, “If the bears are not to be controlled, it will not be possible to raise 
cattle at a profit.”46
Fish and Wildlife Service director Ira Gabrielson’s recommendation for 
a Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge succeeded in 1941. The executive order 
marked off most of the southwestern two-thirds of the island for bears but 
excepted a vital one-mile coastal strip for commercial fishing and homestead-
ing.47 This strip, frequented by bears, bred endless tension. A land trade in 
1958 added the strip to the refuge in exchange for giving up the Shearwater and 
Kupreanof peninsulas to be leased for cattle ranching. After the deal, the refuge 
took in 1.6 million acres of Kodiak and Uganik islands.48
Stepped-up conflict over the Kodiak bears followed the 1951 organization 
of the Kodiak Stock Growers Association, whose leaders badgered the Alaska 
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Chamber of Commerce and the legislature for resolutions requesting with-
drawal of protection for the bears. Guides, sportsmen, and conservationists re-
sisted and persuaded the Alaska Game Commission not to end the protection.49 
Wildlife Management Institute director Ira Gabrielson declared, “If it comes to 
a choice between killing off the bears and trying to develop the optimistically 
estimated herd of 3,800 range cattle, it is my belief that this country ought to 
set aside the entire island to preserve the splendid Kodiak bears.” He questioned 
whether people who would kill off the Kodiak bear for the sake of minute gains 
for the cattle industry possessed the qualifications for statehood.50 The Bureau 
of Land Management, holding jurisdiction over ranch leases, permitted cattle 
ranching in a few more bear-intensive areas during the 1950s. It set minimal 
leasing fees—60 cents per animal per year—and required no fencing to keep 
bears out or cattle in. Responsibility for leasing shifted to the state in 1966 after 
it selected the ranch areas as part of its land quota.51
The Kodiak Island bear-cattle issue went on unresolved. In its final report 
the Game Commission noted 23 head of cattle killed by a bear in 1959. “Such 
losses,” it stated, “seriously slow down the building up of cattle numbers on 
the Kodiak ranches.”52 At a Kodiak airport in the fall of 1963 a light plane ap-
peared, a gun on its top. Investigation revealed its owner as cattle rancher Joe 
Zentner, who had used the plane to kill about 100 bears during the previous 
decade. The pilot, Dave Henley, presided over the Kodiak Stock Growers As-
sociation. His gunning partner during the spring, Kodiak representative Gilbert 
Jarvela, had done the shooting from the back seat. The operation had been 
covertly organized and paid for by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
(ADF&G).
When the scandal broke, bear hunting guides and conservation and sport-
ing groups protested. Jim Rearden investigated for Outdoor Life and pieced the 
story together. Cattlemen had been claiming losses to bears and complained to 
the governor and game officials. One rancher cited a loss of 61 cattle in 1963 
and Zentner claimed 30, although he could find only 10. ADF&G initiated the 
airborne control program in 1962, killing 15 bears; at least 35 died in 1963. 
Thirteen of these had been gunned down by a semiautomatic M-1 Garand rifle 
affixed to the top of the plane. Whereas the law permitted killing in defense 
of property, gunners dispatched some of the bears at least ten miles from the 
nearest ranch.
Ranchers, who leased the land from the federal government for twenty-year 
periods, had eliminated approximately 200 bears on Kodiak Island over the 
previous ten years, about half by the use of aircraft. Nine ranches sat so close 
to bear country as to experience recurring problems. The economics, Rearden 
reasoned, did not make good sense. An average cow sold for $250–$400. Sport 
hunters, on the other hand, contributed over $2,000 to the Alaskan econo-
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my for each bear killed and shot more than 100 annually on Kodiak-Afognak 
islands.
Embarrassed ADF&G offi cials halted the aerial gunning immediately, but 
neither this nor the economics of the matter deterred the ranchers. “With our 
expanding population, people are looking for a place to live, such as Kodiak 
Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge, 1958 and 1980. Courtesy Jason Geck
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Island,” one reasoned. “The Indians didn’t stop them in the West, the moun-
tains didn’t stop them. They pushed on because they were pioneers. The same 
thing will happen around here, and the bears will have to give. It’s only a matter 
of time.”53
A 1964–1965 ADF&G survey indicated that 1,350 adult cattle grazed on 
Kodiak Island on eight ranches covering 180,000 acres. Over a fourteen-month 
period bears killed at least 33 and injured 6 more. One bear that killed 5 cattle 
traveled twenty miles through deep snow in a region of steep hills. Most preda-
tion occurred in June, a time of food shortage. Adult males appeared to be the 
most frequent cattle killers.54 Focusing on specific animals thought to be kill-
ing cattle, ADF&G continued to control the Kodiak bears. Between 1964 and 
1969, agents killed 43 more bears. Thereafter, they left control to the ranchers, 
authorized to use deadly force only after exhausting all other methods.55
SPORT HUNTING OF BROWN BEARS AFTER 1925
Sport hunting of Alaskan brown bears never approached the point of 
threatening regional extinction. It may have supplemented other killing or dis-
ruption in depleting local populations and, for better or worse, it may have kept 
the bears in fear of humans. To achieve sustainability, the Alaska Game Law 
of 1925 ended market hunting of bears by prohibiting all sales of bear hides 
within or outside the territory. The new Game Commission kept the annual 
per-person bag limit at three in 1925, during specified seasons and subject to 
trophy hide export fees. The commission reduced the limit to two in 1927 and 
to one in 1942. Fifteen years later it prohibited killing females accompanied by 
cubs. When the State of Alaska assumed responsibility for wildlife management 
in 1960, it employed similar regulations.56
Harvest figures from the prewar era are imprecise. On Kodiak Island, the 
most popular destination for brown bear sport hunters, the annual kill aver-
aged about 25 between 1930 and 1940. A larger but unknown number fell to 
salmon fishers, cattle ranchers, and to Koniag Eskimos for subsistence purposes. 
Hunting dropped off during the war and then rebounded rapidly. It peaked at 
225 bears in 1953, inducing tightened regulations. By the late 1950s, both legal 
and illegal kills fell off because of fewer local military personnel and of stream 
guards protecting the bears from salmon fishers. A flourishing guiding business 
earned the town of Kodiak more than $100,000 annually. Koniags harvested 
about 10 to 12 bears each year for food.57
Sport hunting may have done genetic damage to bear populations on Ko-
diak Island and elsewhere. Warden Jack O’Connor noted in 1937 that “Kodiak 
reports mostly all large brown bears have been killed off and a plentiful supply 
of smaller bears.” High kill rates in the 1950s and perhaps later also reduced av-
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Hunter and brown bear trophy, Kodiak Island, 1957. By Will Troyer. Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services. Throughout the 20th Century, sport hunters from around 
the world came to hunt the great bears.
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erage bear size because hunters wanted the biggest bears they could find. Once 
attaining a possible 1,600 pounds, large Kodiak bears seldom weighed 1,200 
pounds in the mid-1970s. At that time biologists estimated a total of 3,300 
bears on the island, 2,000 in the refuge. Game officials set the sustainable level 
for Kodiak bear kills at 63 to 127 in the early 1970s.58
Reported statewide annual kills of brown or grizzly bears averaged approxi-
mately 757 between 1945 and 1966 (Table 12.1). The figures showed a signifi-
cant reduction in the toll between the late 1940s and early 1960s. This may 
have reflected a change of sentiment along the lines suggested by Holzworth 
or that of former Game Commission chairman and bear admirer Will Chase: 
“The primitive instinct and inclination of youth to hunt down and kill for sport 
diminishes until it is fairly absorbed in the knowledge of truth that creeps into 
the life of every man that is privileged to go out into the great open places and 
virgin forests and commune with nature.”59 Data from 1961–1984, however, in-
dicated an average annual kill of 772, 56 percent taken by nonresident hunters. 
Stable populations existed in the protected ranges of Admiralty, Chichagof, and 
Kodiak islands and in other national parks and wildlife refuges. But the brown 
bear population as a whole faced the prospect of decline from a range of human 
activities including oil and gas activity, logging and other habitat destruction, 
agriculture, and miscellaneous conflicts related to human settlement.60
RESERVES FOR BROWN BEARS
Madison Grant and John Holzworth’s dream of an island-wide Southeast 
bear sanctuary did not materialize during the territorial period; however, Gla-
cier Bay National Monument protected bears and the Forest Service designated 
81 square miles of bear management areas in the Pack Creek and Thayer Moun-
tain locales of Admiralty Island in 1935. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes favored 
designation of Admiralty as a national park for preservation of bears. However, 
Alaska’s delegate Anthony Dimond objected to the idea, as did National Park 
Service officials. The U.S. Geological Survey resisted closing off mineral explo-
taBle 12.1. Estimated Harvests of Brown or Grizzly Bears in Alaska, 1945–1966
Year Harvest Year Harvest Year Harvest Year Harvest
1945 543 1951 1,080 1957 830 1963 568
1946 789 1952 952 1958 600 1964 627
1947 996 1953 830 1959 550 1965 771
1948 1,107 1954 800 1960 505 1966 856
1949 854 1955 615 1961 473
1950 886 1956 890 1962 547
Source: Alan M. Courtright, Game Harvests in Alaska (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, June 1968), 31.
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ration, Hoonah Tlingits wanted tribal control, and loggers, hunters, trappers, 
and fur farmers sought entry rights. Budgetary limitations also influenced a late 
1941 decision by Interior officials to drop the proposal for monument or park 
status.61 In part because of the sanctuary lands, no imminent danger threat-
ened the bears. Frank Dufresne and Ralph Young conducted counts of bears on 
Admiralty, Baranof, and Chichagof in the 1930s, finding healthy populations. 
No cattle existed on the three islands, and sport hunting left no significant 
impact.62
By the mid-1940s grizzlies enjoyed some protection on Afognak Island 
(1892), Unimak Island (1913), Mt. McKinley National Park (1917), Katmai 
National Monument (1918), Glacier Bay National Monument (1925, 1939), 
the two reserves on Admiralty Island (1935), the Kodiak National Wildlife Ref-
uge (1941), and the Kenai National Moose Range (1941). The Alaska Game 
Commission had also protected bears on Kruzof and Partofshikof islands in the 
Southeast, at Eyak Lake near Cordova, and in Keystone Canyon near Valdez.63 
Sport hunting could occur by permit on some of these reserves, as in nearly all 
other parts of Alaska.
After World War II, logging reappeared as the foremost hazard for grizzly 
bears in Alaska. Decades of efforts by the Forest Service to stimulate a timber 
industry in the Southeast paid off in 1947 through the Tongass Timber Sales 
Act, designed in part to defer competing Native claims. Chief forester and later 
governor B.F. Heintzleman crucially assisted the passage of the law.64 He had 
consistently opposed park or monument status for Admiralty Island and other 
repositories of wood, arguing that “the harvesting of timber from the island will 
not materially affect the bear.”65
Pulp companies received uniquely generous long-term contracts. Ketchi-
kan Pulp Company opened its mill in 1954, and the Alaska Pulp Company 
commenced operations at Sitka in 1959. The contracts committed huge tracts 
of Tongass National Forest land to logging, much of it prime brown bear habi-
tat. Field and Stream editors Frank Dufresne, Corey Ford, and others called for 
measures to safeguard the Southeast bears. On a 1956 trip to inspect the effects 
of the lumber and pulp industry, Ford and Dufresne witnessed, among other 
impacts, the devastation of a clearcut at Whitewater Bay. They delivered a pow-
erfully negative judgment:
The menace is the pulp mill, destroyer of essential timbered watersheds, 
polluter of clean waters so necessary to the life cycle of the salmon, enemy of 
all wildlife including the brown bear, ruthless despoiler of a nation’s recre-
ational heritage. The progress of the pulp industry in Alaska—a progress 
that appears to be the pet pride of the Territory’s present governor—does not 
represent a vague threat lurking somewhere in the future. Its shadow hangs 
over Admiralty Island at this very moment.66
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Dufresne wrote his popular book No Room for Bears (1965) to support bear 
preservation on Admiralty.67 But the Forest Service had only begun to build up 
the timber industry in Alaska. Logging in the Southeast precipitated one of the 
longest-running environmental conflicts in the American experience, lasting 
throughout the century and beyond. The quest for a bear sanctuary at Admi-
ralty Island continued until the island became a national monument in 1978 
and a designated wilderness area in 1980.
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 increased 
the size of most existing national parks and wildlife refuges, added many more, 
and classified 56 million acres as wilderness in which no hunting would be al-
lowed. Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge took in part of northwestern Afognak 
Island. But Native land selections created hundreds of thousands of acres of 
land inholdings within the boundaries of Kodiak and other refuges and parks, 
threatening their natural integrity. These inholdings, added to mining and oth-
er claims, necessitated a lengthy and expensive effort to purchase them back.
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE BEAR
Alaska’s tug-of-war over brown bear policy evoked local and national reac-
tions ranging across the spectrum of environmental values. Some economic 
boosters would gladly have seen the beasts extirpated; most tolerated the bear 
as long as it did not bother humans in any way; others called for species or eco-
system preservation through bear reserves; a few argued that the bear deserved 
to live as much as or more than some humans. Perhaps because of the confu-
sion of images of the bear as predator, pest, game trophy, wilderness monarch, 
and winsome furry creature, many private organizations shied away from the 
debate. Scientific data made a difference, but probably less than sentiment did. 
Critics called government and corporate interests to account on Kodiak Island 
and, to a lesser extent, on Admiralty Island. All participants save those favoring 
extinction got some of what they wanted.
Over time, policy and values shifted toward the preservationist end of the 
spectrum. Educated members of the Boone and Crockett Club and related 
groups, while retaining elements of sport hunting as a manhood ritual, could 
see inherent value in such creatures as the grizzly bear. They also knew that, 
without safeguards, bear populations could be cut down by commercial or mass 
sport hunting or by the numerous encroachments of civilization. Thus they 
encouraged management for sustainable use of the bears and, to some degree, 
nonconsumptive use. Hornaday, Holzworth, and Stewart Edward White open-
ly insisted on a measure of rights for the bears.
Wildlife managers, in large part brought into being by interest groups led 
by Boone and Crockett, responded to conservationist appeals. Not beholden to 
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commercial market hunters, they endorsed laws to curb such use of the bears. 
Notwithstanding their ties to agricultural interests, Bureau of Biological Sur-
vey officers did not view brown bears as such serious predators of cattle and 
sheep as to warrant systematic removal. Rather, wildlife managers felt closest to 
hunters and trappers, who wanted a reliable store of game and fur. Unlike the 
wolf, the grizzly bear escaped being targeted as a significant predator of moose 
and caribou. And the bear itself rated as big game. The managers accordingly 
applied utilitarian conservation values to the bear, to the end of sustainability. 
Knowing that, in the case of the grizzly bear, species sustainability necessitated 
ecosystem protection, they instituted bear sanctuaries at Katmai, Glacier Bay, 
Kodiak Island, and elsewhere.
After statehood, valuation of the grizzly bear continued to evolve. Wildlife 
managers still catered to resident and nonresident sport hunters who treasured 
the ritual of slaying a large and savage beast. Settlers and even hikers could 
legally kill bears they perceived as a threat. In the 1990s, conservative legis-
lators passed a measure to suppress bears, by shooting them from aircraft if 
necessary, to enlarge stocks of moose and caribou.68 Meanwhile, hunting and 
conquest of wild animals faded as a national pastime, in part because of nature 
shows and advancing ecological science. Environmentalists grew more numer-
ous and effective in translating their values into public policy. Both federal and 
state governments designated or enlarged bear sanctuaries. The McNeil River 
and Katmai parks attained world status as bear viewing sites. Television nature 
shows elevated bears to iconic status as exponents of the wild. Ecotourism in-
stitutionalized nonconsumptive uses—aesthetic, recreational, spiritual—as the 
brown bear’s prime value.
Grizzly bears had won important rounds in the struggle for legitimacy. Yet 
swelling human population and development left open the question of whether 
in the long run this magnificent wilderness mammal could survive in more than 
a few isolated refuges.
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Frontier Justice: Predator Control
last aMong tHe territories to Hold Viable PoPulations oF large PredatorY 
mammals, Alaska became a battleground over predator control. As a nearly 
intact ecosystem it also offered a chance to examine natural predator-prey rela-
tionships. Beginning in the 1930s the studies and disputes helped reverse tradi-
tional attitudes toward predators on the national level and, ultimately, in the far 
North as well. They helped move policy toward more enlightened utilitarianism 
and preservationist nonconsumptive values.
Alaska’s 1925 Game Law constituted “an Act to Establish an Alaska Game 
Commission to Protect Game Animals, Land Fur-bearing Animals, and Birds 
in Alaska, and for other Purposes.”1 It “protected” the species considered most 
immediately useful to people: the game as food supply and object of sport 
hunting and the furbearers as a source of cash income. Six species held prom-
inence among the inland wild game mammals: moose, caribou, Dall sheep, 
mountain goat, Sitka deer, and brown bear, the last acquiring a tenuous status 
between game animal and predator. Black bear joined the “big game” list in 
1938. Among land furbearers, beaver and marten enjoyed the most insistent 
13
Frontier Justice: Predator Control
283
13
protection. Game and furbearers needed safeguarding against abuse and over-
exploitation by humans, as well as from predators. “Predators” meant animals, 
excepting the superpredator, who appropriated “game” and “furbearers” for 
themselves, thereby contesting humans for the resource. Predators needed to be 
“controlled,” a word interpreted by different people to mean everything from 
limited cropping to extermination. The law permitted the use of poison against 
wolves, coyotes, and wolverines, regarded as the most troublesome predators.
Predation existed from time immemorial, but it did not spur humans to 
action until it visibly impinged on their interests and until they felt capable of 
doing something about it. Such conditions might have applied to the valuable 
fur seals in the late 19th Century. Capt. A.W. Lavender, Treasury agent on St. 
George Island, depicted attacks by killer whales on fur seals in the 1880s. His 
journal entry for September 15, 1881, related, “A school of apparently 10 or 
12 killers ran into the [swimming fur seals] around the near rookery to-day 
and soon made havoc among the pups. It was estimated from the manner in 
which the seal were thrown up out of the water that 20 or 30 were eaten by 
their greatest enemies.” Similar notations appeared through the decade. Writing 
to Henry W. Elliott, Lavender recommended that “this species of whale must 
be destroyed or the seal rookeries will be something of the past in a short time. 
. . . The next Congress should make an appropriation suffi cient to furnish two 
whale boats and crews with all the modern implements for the killing of whales, 
and to . . . destroy this whale whenever an opportunity is afforded.”2 Elliott 
endorsed the idea, although he may have differed as to who rated as the seals’ 
greatest enemy. Nevertheless, the government abstained from any systematic 
effort to suppress the whales.
As a government policy, predator control sprang primarily from Progres-
sive Era conservation, which emphasized effi cient management of natural re-
sources to benefi t the public. Long before the science of ecology demonstrated 
the benefi cial roles of predators, scientists and the public considered them a 
threat to resource supplies analogous to thieves or murderers in the human so-
cial sphere. Progressive conservationists therefore expected the federal govern-
ment to take the lead in suppressing predators. As agencies of the Department 
of Agriculture, the Division of Economic Ornithology (1886–1905) and its 
successor Bureau of Biological Survey (BBS) (1905–1940) oriented their con-
cerns largely to the demands of farmers and ranchers. Accordingly, agency chief 
C. Hart Merriam initiated a program of prairie dog poisoning in 1901 to clear 
the way for cattle grazing in the West. In 1906 the BBS began functioning as an 
information center for state bounty systems, and a year later it supervised the 
killing of 1,800 wolves and 23,000 coyotes on national forest lands. By 1915 
BBS fi elded a well-organized and well-funded contingent of federal predator 
control offi cers.3
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For several decades the BBS war against predators reflected the will of the 
people, most natural scientists, and even many nature writers. Antagonism to-
ward “bad” or “immoral” species stemmed not only from competition for game 
and zeal for efficiency but also from the revulsion of humanitarians and others 
against cruelty and violence wrought by predators. It seemed obvious that get-
ting rid of them would improve both wildlife abundance and justice. Among 
his lengthy list of villainous species, the respected William T. Hornaday regard-
ed the wolf as a “black-hearted murderer and criminal” and the mountain lion 
an “intolerable pest” that “must be hunted down and destroyed regardless of 
cost.” Theodore Roosevelt termed the wolf “the beast of waste and desolation.” 
Few appreciated John Muir’s reverence for all creatures or his 1910 observation 
that plagues of jackrabbits in California had been caused by the elimination 
of hawks, coyotes, and other predators.4 Institutionalized in BBS policy, the 
anti-predator campaign devastated several species in the States before it lost the 
sanction of science and public opinion.
INITIATION OF ALASKA WOLF CONTROL
Wolves headed the predator list in Alaska. Bearing the burdens of old Eu-
ropean fairy tales, a recent experience of persecution by livestock interests in the 
West, and the fear, resentment, and, perhaps, envy of the human mammal, wolves 
ran into trouble before the turn of the 20th Century. Commercial game hunters 
regarded the wolf as a threat to their business during the Gold Rush era. Trap-
pers slew large numbers, using poison illegally to acquire fox furs. An unknown, 
perhaps substantial number of wolves died from diseases brought in by miners’ 
dogs.5 In his 1912 report to the secretary of the interior, Governor J.F.A. Strong 
complained, “In certain portions of southeastern Alaska deer have become very 
scarce as a result of the depredation of wolves.” Calling for a bounty, he made 
no mention of the slaughter and waste of deer by meat and skin hunters.6 Two 
years later fisheries official E. Lester Jones reported deer “rapidly disappearing 
on many of the islands. I observed a number of instances where the wolves had 
killed deer, and in others I saw specimens of deer that were thin because of the 
ceaseless chasing.”7 The territorial legislature placed a ten-dollar bounty on the 
wolf in 1915, although wardens had reported no decrease in game over the 
previous several years.8 In 1922 Governor Scott Bone declared, “Wolves and 
wolverines are ruthless destroyers of game and fur animals. Predatory and de-
structive by instinct, they are a menace to game life. The Territory has shown 
liberality in providing a bounty on wolves and this should be supplemented by 
the Federal Government in aid of the necessary extermination.”9
This “liberality,” accompanied by requests for federal funds, reappeared 
throughout the territorial period. Bald and golden eagles acquired bountied 
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status in 1917, hair seals in 1927, coyotes (which entered Alaska in numbers 
around 1912–1915 and spread rapidly in the 1920s) in 1929, the Dolly Varden 
in 1931, and wolverines in 1953.10 Letters streamed in to the Game Com-
mission calling for bounties on these animals, black and brown bears, hawks, 
falcons, owls, and ravens. A 1928 letter asked, “What are you going to do about 
coyotes? They have cleaned up everything here in this section, rabbits, grouse, 
local ducks, foxes and now ptarmigan and muskrats.” A 1935 letter from Cache 
lamented, “About all there is around here now is owls, chicken hawks, ravens 
and some eagles. There should be a bounty on them.” Except for bears, Alas-
kan writers expressed virtually no sympathy for predators. Trappers favored the 
bounties but objected to poison because it killed small furbearers in addition to 
targeted predators.11 Bounties won popular approval not only as predator con-
trol but also as a source of income for hard-pressed local residents, particularly 
during the Depression.
Agent Alfred M. Bailey recommended to the BBS in 1921 that the wolf 
bounty be increased from $10 to $25. He requested that BBS hire trained 
predatory animal destroyers “to protect deer from wolves in the Southeast” 
while acknowledging that excess hunting had wasted the deer.12 Catering to the 
powerful stock-raising interests, BBS had practiced wolf control in the States 
since 1907. It felt little compulsion to do so in Alaska prior to the 1940s, in 
part because of the heavy kill of wolves by poison during and after the Gold 
Rush era. Rising concern within Alaska, however, resulted in a $10,000 ap-
propriation by the 1927 territorial legislature for the hiring of a “predatory 
animal hunter,” to be under the joint control of the governor and the Alaska 
Game Commission. Underwritten by territorial and later federal funding, R.K. 
Stewart, followed by Harlan P. Gubser, Frank Glaser, and others, operated 
in various regions of Alaska from 1927 through the late 1950s. Their work 
consisted primarily of instructing trappers in wolf and coyote trapping and 
poisoning techniques. The commission assigned additional personnel to the 
Southeast in the 1940s. It sought to protect traplines, reindeer herds, and deer 
and other game populations.13
Stewart reported in 1929 that wolves seriously menaced reindeer at St. 
Michael and big game in McKinley Park. Wolverines, he said, engaged in tra-
pline robbery and property destruction. He offered an honest interpretation of 
his job: “All nature strives to keep uniform balance. . . . Man’s killing of the vari-
ous so-called game animals tends to keep the balance tipped against them per-
manently. The only possible thing to do, therefore, other than enforcing game 
and fur laws, is to control the predatory animals.” BBS biologist Olaus Murie, 
who researched caribou in the 1920s, saw it differently: “The caribou’s greatest 
menace is not the wolf, not the hunter, but man’s economic developments, prin-
cipally the raising of reindeer.” He suggested setting limits on reindeer grazing 
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areas and avoidance of mixing the herds, which might alter the genetic purity 
of the caribou.14
DEFENSE OF PREDATORS
Predator control raised biological and ethical questions about the proper 
role of humans in relating to Nature. On either plane, viable policy called for 
a sound understanding of predator-prey ecology. But emotion and perceived 
short-term gain, not science, dictated policies toward predators well past the 
mid-20th Century. The beginnings of a sympathetic view of the wolf accom-
panied its scarcity and the passing of the frontier. Ernest Thompson Seton fea-
tured a wolf as the protagonist in his popular story “The King of Currumpaw: 
A Wolf Story” in 1894. Seton and some others based their nature writing on 
a degree of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, large predatory mammals had 
almost no organized defense. The new Forest Service hired its first wolf killers in 
1905, and BBS began field efforts culminating in its permanent predator pro-
gram in 1915. The receipt of money from private groups and states encouraged 
BBS to elevate its predator control program to a top priority.15
By the mid-1920s the wolf and mountain lion had been actually or practi-
cally eliminated in nearly all their habitat in the contiguous United States. Relief 
for predators awaited the advancement of ecological science to dispel fears and 
deflate excessive claims of harm to prey species and economic loss to ranchers 
and sheepherders. Accumulating knowledge led to publication of the first ecol-
ogy book in 1913. Aldo Leopold, teaching at the University of Wisconsin, coau-
thored the first text on ecologically based wildlife management in 1933. The BBS 
and its successor Fish and Wildlife Service, tied to their anti-predator clientele 
but staffed by some officers dubious of predator control programs, remained con-
flicted from within and without well past midcentury. The National Park Service, 
hosting swelling flocks of visitors looking for closeness to Nature, assumed the 
lead among national agencies by halting predator control in its parks in 1935.
Scientists’ objections to predator killing had begun to surface by the 1920s. 
Joseph Grinnell and other members of the American Society of Mammalo-
gists confronted the BBS at the society’s 1923 meeting, accusing it of “modern 
poison warfare.” The society persisted as the main institutional adversary of 
the bureau’s policy for about three decades. The bureau responded by shifting 
its goal from extermination of predators toward more restrained forms of con-
trol. Some BBS leaders modified their attitudes, but field operations, driven by 
funding and ties to farming and ranching, carried on until their demise in the 
early 1970s. Most critics argued for an ecological view of predators, citing their 
useful functions in the balance of nature. A few such as Olaus Murie main-
tained that predators had a moral right to exist.16
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Murie wrote a tactful memo in 1929 to his chief, BBS director Paul Red-
ington, conveying some of the concerns of the agency’s critics. He asserted the 
existence of a dynamic, although not well understood, balance of nature. In a 
desirable balance, “[O]ur native animal life may be represented in a reasonable 
way in our woods and fields.” Regarding predators, “The public is more and 
more pleading for a place in our Nature scheme for our predatory animals. 
Unfortunately, a number of the sportsmen are not willing to sacrifice some 
of the ‘game.’. . . Many people, as you know, are advocating a certain balance 
between predatory species and the game, merely that the predatory animals 
may have some small place in our fauna.” Projecting a decline of sport hunt-
ing, Murie commented that “ ‘manliness’ is no longer acquired by the pursuit 
of game; it is too absurdly easy. ‘Sterling qualities’ must assuredly be gained in 
some other manner.”17 Wildlife appreciation would be the trend of the future, 
he predicted.
Murie gently suggested that the BBS change its priorities. In contrast to 
its excellent research work in some endeavors, he argued, the predatory animal 
division indulged in
constant effort to produce hatred . . . to kill offending creatures in a spirit of 
hatred, calling them “murderers,” “killers,” “vermin,” in order to justify our 
actions. . . . Glaring posters, portraying bloody, disagreeable scenes, urging 
some one to kill, are working against the efforts of our other selves, who are 
advocating conservation, appreciation of wild life. Stirring up any part of our 
population to kill in a spirit of hatred has no part in a government program.
Murie recommended concentrating on research rather than being “a police-
man, a sort of handy man.” Other agencies needing wildlife data, he noted, had 
begun to look elsewhere.18 Murie’s prescient views would find wide acceptance 
30 or 40 years later.
The BBS, Murie’s employer for more than a quarter-century, did not feel 
ready to adopt his views and declined to publish his studies. But the ecological 
perspective slowly gained ground. Aldo Leopold, once an enthusiastic killer of 
predators, co-founded the Wilderness Society in 1935. By the time of his death 
in 1948 his thinking had evolved to the position that humankind should act as 
a member of the natural community and had no right to arbitrarily kill other 
species. Animal rights philosophy, however, possessed weak prospects in a world 
of vested material interests. Ecological science began to take hold in the 1930s 
and 1940s, partly as a result of Leopold’s work. But rather than casting humans 
as citizens of the natural community, it moved toward management and control 
of complex ecosystems.19
Studies in Alaska furthered the science of predator-prey relationships. In 
1941 Fish and Wildlife Service wildlife biologist Lawrence J. Palmer produced 
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a report identifying fire, not wolves, as the prime cause of diminishing caribou 
herds in the interior. Fires tended to destroy lichens totally, and full recovery 
took decades. Overgrazing had an effect similar to fire.20 Palmer’s study drew 
little attention. A 1952 survey by biologists A. Starker Leopold and F. Fraser 
Darling corroborated Murie and Palmer’s findings. “We seriously doubt that 
wolves have played any major role in the decrease of caribou which started far 
back when wolves were very scarce,” they said. Caribou attrition in the central 
region resulted from fires that destroyed the slow-growing lichens: “One fire 
easily could outdo the work of decades in protecting a local caribou popula-
tion from man and wolves.” In the west coastal region they found reindeer 
overgrazing to be the main cause of the caribou’s downward trend as well as 
that of the reindeer itself. They also concluded that wolves did not significantly 
affect moose or deer populations. They did not flatly reject predator control, 
acknowledging that it might be a necessary means of restoring specific game 
populations. But they cautioned that excessive predator removal could create 
game overpopulation, exhausting the food supply and leading to parasitism, 
lowered fertility, starvation, and damage to the range.21
WOLVES IN McKINLEY PARK
Disagreement over the status of the wolf found its first national public 
expression in a lengthy quarrel centering on Mt. McKinley National Park. 
Wildlife protection, particularly for the Dall sheep herd, had been a prime ra-
tionale for the park; other national parks had been established for scenery or 
tourism. Notwithstanding the continuation of commercial meat hunting in 
McKinley Park until 1921, the sheep herd numbered in the thousands. Few 
wolves existed in the region, possibly because of the widespread use of poisons. 
But in the spring of 1929 and winter of 1932, heavy snows cut the sheep herd 
to 1,500. The National Park Service, although leaning toward an ecological 
view of predators as recommended by the American Society of Mammalogists 
and other scientists, felt increasing pressure to control wolves and coyotes in 
the park. Alaska’s governor George Parks, the legislature, congressional delegate 
Anthony Dimond, and the Alaska Sportsman and its allied outdoor sporting 
community all insisted on predator control. So did the Alaska Game Com-
mission, most BBS officials, and the Camp Fire Club. A 1936 Fairbanks Daily 
News-Miner editorial demanded, “If Alaska is to preserve her game and fur 
animals she—with the aid of the federal government—must wake up and carry 
relentless warfare into the ranks of the enemy—not tomorrow but today—not 
at some convenient season but in this hour of emergency.” Like other Alaskan 
critics of the Park Service, the editors believed coyote and wolf predation in the 
park threatened game outside as well.22
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Highly vocal elements demanded wolf control but, as in other resource 
disputes in the territory, some silently held more moderate opinions. Hjalmar 
“Slim” Carlson, a Swedish immigrant who trapped alone on the fringes of 
McKinley Park for several decades beginning in 1924, viewed wolves sympa-
thetically. Once he caught a beautiful black wolf by two toes in a trap. He tried 
to let it go but it seized his leg in its jaws, holding but not biting. He talked to 
the wolf, and it wagged its tail and made a whining sound. But he dared not 
approach it again and, reluctantly, decided he had to kill it. He did not favor 
bounties and refused to blame the wolves when the caribou herds receded in the 
1930s. In his judgment, the caribou had migrated elsewhere.23
McKinley Park officials occupied uncomfortable ground between National 
Park headquarters and Alaskan citizens. They monitored sheep and wolf popu-
lations in the park. They regarded wolf predation claims as exaggerated but shot 
a few wolves in an attempt to quiet the critics. A 1935 order, however, directed 
them to stop killing wolves. Superintendent Harry Liek wrote the Alaska Game 
Commission in 1936 relating the results of four surveys he had personally con-
ducted. He had found the remains of sheep killed by wolves, but no evidence 
of an unusual number of wolves. Three sheep had been killed by coyotes, which 
Liek believed to be on the increase and a danger to the sheep. “The coyote,” 
in his estimation, “is an exotic animal, and we are endeavoring to eliminate 
coyotes.”24
Support for the Park Service came from the American Society of Mam-
malogists, Ecological Society of America, New York Zoological Society, Boone 
and Crockett Club, Audubon societies, and prominent biologists including 
Olaus Murie. Responding to a Camp Fire Club critic in 1938, Assistant Park 
Service Director Arthur Demaray proposed that “if sheep, wolves and caribou 
have lived together for many thousands of years without one exterminating the 
other, then, other things being equal, there seems no reason why they cannot 
now.” In the future, he predicted, people would want to “see and hear a timber 
wolf in its natural state.” Nevertheless, to fend off the political assault, officials 
killed 37 wolves in the park between 1930 and 1938.25
Battered by pugnacious opposition for nearly a decade, in 1939 the Park 
Service hired biologist Adolph Murie to study predation in the park. Adolph 
had assisted his brother Olaus in researching caribou in 1922–1923 and had 
completed a master’s degree and a PhD in wildlife ecology at the University 
of Michigan. During 1937–1939 he investigated coyote-elk predation in Yel-
lowstone National Park. Applying more modern scientific methods than had 
Olaus, who carried out a similar study at Yellowstone a decade earlier, he nev-
ertheless reached the same conclusion—that coyotes had no detrimental effect 
on the elk population. From April through October 1939 and April 1940 
through July 1941, Adolph examined wildlife in McKinley Park. Based on this 
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experience—a landmark study in predator-prey ecology—he judged, “It ap-
pears that wolves prey mainly on the weak classes of sheep, that is, the diseased, 
the young in their first year. Such predation would seem to benefit the species 
over a long period of time and indicates a normal predator-prey relationship in 
Mt. McKinley Park.” Few coyotes lived in the park, grizzlies ate mostly vegeta-
tion and carrion, and golden eagles, accused of taking young sheep, fed primar-
ily on ground squirrels, he noted.26
Murie’s book The Wolves of Mt. McKinley came out in 1944. It heartened 
naturalists, scientists who believed in ecosystem integrity, and National Park 
Service leaders. But critics of wolves in the park interpreted it as propaganda on 
behalf of the Park Service. Meanwhile, apparent shortages of game intensified 
demands for wolf control. Governor Ernest Gruening led a chorus picturing 
McKinley Park as a breeding ground for wolves that spread out to attack game 
elsewhere. They characterized wolf protection in the park as an egregious exam-
ple of federal mismanagement of Alaska. The Park Service responded by send-
ing Murie back to survey the sheep in August-September 1945. Murie found 
only 500. He recommended that 10 to 15 wolves be killed to help the sheep 
recover, and the Park Service agreed.27
The alarmingly low sheep tally in 1945 and the buildup of sentiment for 
wolf control prompted a congressional hearing in 1946. At the urging of the 
Camp Fire Club, the House Committee on Public Lands debated a bill to re-
quire the secretary of the interior to act against predators in McKinley Park. 
Marshall McLean, chairman of the Camp Fire Club, reminded the committee 
that
it was the purpose and intent of those men who initiated this project to have 
the area set aside as a national park, to provide there a sanctuary and refuge 
for the home and breeding grounds of the game, in particular for the white 
mountain sheep and caribou, from which they could spread to the sur-
rounding territories. . . . [T[his purpose has failed because of the predators 
which have moved into the area, and because of the refusal of the National 
Park Service to recognize this area as a refuge and sanctuary for these game 
animals.28
Belmore Browne also spoke for the club. He pointed out that the enabling bill 
identified the park as a “game refuge” and opined that wolves did not qualify as 
game. To save the sheep, he argued, “a most terrific effort has to be made right 
away.” He recommended that professional wolf killers be employed.29 H. Bradford 
Washburn of the New England Museum of Natural History and James R. Clark 
of the American Museum of Natural History in New York both testified in firm 
support of the bill. Appended letters from the Boone and Crockett Club, former 
National Park Service director Horace M. Albright, and Alaska Game Commis-
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sion game management supervisor Jack O’Connor concurred. O’Connor stated 
that “personally, I can see no place in the scheme of things for wolves in the 
future of game in Alaska.”30
Notwithstanding the reduction of the sheep herd to 500, Murie had stated 
in his 1945 report that “in a national park, the objective is to preserve a piece 
of primitive nature where natural relationships may prevail.” Browne, who sub-
scribed to the game refuge concept, energetically attacked Murie’s approach 
to park management: “[T]he only persons in America who could take an in-
terest in Murie’s ideal would be a handful of biologists. It was on account of 
the Park Administrators being misled by these theories that the park has been 
depleted of its game.” To Murie’s hypothesis that predation benefited sheep by 
removing the weak, Browne replied that “the killing of the young . . . is, in real-
ity, the race murder of the sheep of tomorrow—the slaughter of the species.” 
Browne speculated that fear instilled by being chased aggravated sheep losses. 
He rejected Murie’s positing of a beneficial balance of nature: “The only way 
that equilibrium will be obtained in the Mt. McKinley National Park is by the 
practical elimination of the wolf.”31
Further congressional hearings planned for 1947 did not take place, but a 
national debate on wolf policy evolved. Park Service officials organized a coun-
teroffensive, writing articles and encouraging wolf sympathizers to back their 
position. Nearly every prominent conservation group objected to legislation 
requiring wolf control in the park. Living Wilderness articulated the ecological 
view, while Field and Stream and Outdoor Life featured primarily anti-wolf ar-
ticles. Further debate within the Boone and Crockett Club caused withdrawal 
of its anti-wolf resolution and adoption of a neutral stance.
In August 1948 an inspection team visited McKinley Park. It included park 
superintendent Frank Been, full-time park biologist Adolph Murie, Camp Fire 
Club representative Belmore Browne, American Museum of Natural History di-
rector and Boone and Crockett member Harold Anthony, and Anthony’s friend 
Ralph Friedman. At the end of a ten-day survey the team signed a compromise 
statement approving wolf control pending recovery of the sheep herd. The Park 
Service reinstated control measures. Murie counted 1,200 sheep in 1951 and 
1,500 in 1953. Sheep recovery and an aggressive federal wolf control program 
elsewhere in Alaska allowed the McKinley Park issue to fade away. Since 1930, 
at least 76 wolves had been killed in the park.32
Realizing that wolves could become a tourist attraction that would dampen 
criticism without harming the ecology, the Park Service permitted Herb and 
Lois Crisler to film a wolf family in the park in 1952. To support the filming 
the service halted wolf control and never renewed it. Lois Crisler’s book Arctic 
Wild came out in 1956, portraying wolves sympathetically and in detail. The 
Disney film White Wilderness appeared in 1958, containing wolf footage by the 
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Crislers. The film and book made decisive contributions to the changing image 
of the wolf.33
Adolph Murie’s studies in Wyoming and Alaska advanced the science of 
ecology by providing some of the first quantitative data on relations between 
large predators and their prey. The emerging field of ecology put conservation 
groups and the National Park Service on firmer ground. Evidence that preda-
tors performed useful functions enabled their admirers to avoid reliance on 
unproven concepts of the “balance of nature” or attempts to persuade others to 
preserve predators because of their beauty or spiritual values. The Park Service 
renewed its commitment to protection of all species in McKinley Park, Katmai 
National Monument, and other park units.34
ESCALATION OF WOLF CONTROL
Scientific assessments did little to diminish Alaskans’ devotion to predator 
control. Increased human population and hunting following World War II, 
and an apparent revival of wolf numbers, generated demands for an intensified 
predator control program. Four ungulate species received primary attention: 
moose, caribou, Dall sheep, and reindeer. Coyote numbers had plunged since 
1940;35 therefore, officials placed the dominant emphasis on wolf control. In 
the prevailing view, wolves needed to be thinned out to the point where they 
would no longer be a detriment to the meat supply. Virtually no conspicuous 
private individual or group in Alaska regarded wolves as valuable in their own 
right or as an integral part of an ecological balance. The negative image of 
the wolf had a firm hold in the legislature and the Alaska Game Commission. 
Describing his work in caribou country, predator control agent Frank Glaser 
declared that “wolves had overrun the country” and that a great herd of caribou 
“was being slaughtered. . . . I was waging war on the wolves, a war that began 38 
years ago when I went to Alaska. For 17 of those years I was a government wolf 
hunter, and I figure I’ve personally accounted for over 500 of the killers.”36 Frank 
Dufresne termed the wolf “the villain in Alaska’s pageant of life.”37 Clarence 
Rhode’s official pamphlet on Alaskan wildlife stated that “wolves prey on the 
valuable big-game animals, except bears, and have contributed to the great de-
cline of the caribou herds.”38
Outdoor sporting interests generated strong momentum for action against 
wolves. Russell Annabel cited numerous instances of alleged wolf atrocities in 
his 1948 book, Hunting and Fishing in Alaska. In the Chickaloon-Knik dis-
trict, “Everyone traveling through the mountain passes has reported finding 
the wolf-torn remains of sheep piled in the valley heads where the animals 
come in winter for browse. . . . The district has been reduced by wolves to a 
fifth-rate hunting ground.” Of moose in the Matanuska-Susitna range, “[E]ach 
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returning guide, trapper, or hunter has reported finding anywhere from five to 
twenty carcasses indisputably killed by wolves.” On the north side of the Alaska 
Peninsula, “[T]rappers told me the heavy-antlered caribou are being ‘piled up 
in windrows’ by wolves.” Caribou migrations in Broad Pass near Mt. McKinley 
“were wiped out by wolves. Dotting the tundra flats and the willow thickets 
are the whitening bones and antlers of the grand animals that fell victim to the 
blood-lust of the packs.” As for the western mainland, “At Nome, officials of the 
Reindeer Service reported that virtually all the caribou along the rim of Bering 
Strait and the Arctic Sea have been killed by wolves and that the predators are 
now in a fair way to exterminate the reindeer.” Supervisor Sidney Rood told 
Annabel that during his eleven years of service, “[W]olves destroyed more than 
1,000,000 reindeer, each of which had a wholesale value of $22.” Waterfowl 
also suffered according to Annabel: “At Unalakleet, on Norton Sound, gunners 
for years have complained that wolves were killing countless ducks, geese, and 
swan in the vast nesting grounds.” Annabel painted the game situation “as grim 
and sickening a composite picture of destruction, with nothing being done to 
prevent it, as a sportsman could imagine in a nightmare.”39
Not every commentator shared such an alarmist view of the situation. Re-
turning from an inspection trip in 1946, Ira Gabrielson reported to the Fish 
and Wildlife Service that “everywhere I went people were talking about the 
decrease of the reindeer herds” and “wolves were widely blamed.” Seeking out 
Eskimos displaying reindeer killed by wolves, mid-1950s. By Maurice W. Kelly. Alaska 
Game Commission, 19th Annual Report, July 1, 1957 Thru June 30, 1958. Claims of 
heavy losses of reindeer added impetus to wolf control.
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those he thought better informed, Gabrielson noted that “they and others gen-
erally believed that poor herding and the reckless killing of the reindeer for dog 
food by the Eskimos were both more important factors than wolf predation in 
their reduction. Frank Glaser, the Service trapper, is very strong in this belief. 
. . . Some of the Eskimos and a few of the Indian Service employees expressed 
the same point of view, one or two quite enthusiastically.” Gabrielson termed 
wolf predation “a convenient alibi for carelessness and mismanagement” of the 
reindeer.40
Annabel also fixed coyotes in his crosshairs. Clarence Rhode advised him 
that coyotes, not wolves, bore the main responsibility for the atrophy of Dall 
sheep herds. Annabel considered the coyote an even more formidable threat 
to nesting waterfowl. A chairman of Ducks Unlimited in Alaska told him in 
military terms that “the coyotes are spreading westward toward the mouths of 
the Yukon and the Kuskokwim. If they once get a foothold there, some of the 
finest duck-shooting grounds of America will be affected. In time they’ll cut off 
a good share of the western migration at its source, and then they’ll work north 
and raid the nesting areas of the ducks and geese that swing across Canada into 
the big Mississippi flyway.”41
Annabel demanded corrective action:
[T]he wolf menace to Alaska’s game exists throughout the territory and 
is past exaggeration. All woodsmen with whom I have discussed the mat-
ter believe that unless immediate and drastic steps are taken to control the 
predators, the sheep, moose, and caribou populations will soon be reduced 
to the point where Alaska’s great hunting grounds will be mediocre and their 
rich promise to the next generation of American hunters gone.
He shamed sport hunters for their “almost unbelievable apathy” and territorial 
and Washington legislators for failing in their duty. Pointing to an estimate 
valuing Alaska’s game at $300 million, he belittled the 1947 congressional bud-
get item for predator control as grossly inadequate to “hire pilots and maintain 
airplanes for patrolling and aerial wolf hunting, and for hiring and training 
wardens and year-round wolfers.”42
Responding to such appeals in 1948 and again in 1949, Congress made 
two $104,000 appropriations for Alaska. In September 1948 a Branch of Preda-
tor and Rodent Control set to work under the Fish and Wildlife Service in 
Alaska. By 1950 the branch fielded nine agents.43 A survey identified the areas 
of greatest apparent need: reindeer ranges on the Seward Peninsula, the Alaska 
Peninsula and Nelchina caribou herds, mountain sheep ranges in the interior, 
and Sitka deer habitat in the Southeast. Some of these ungulate populations had 
sunk to low levels. Relying on aircraft travel, agents spread poisoned seal blub-
ber in open areas crossed by wolf or coyote trails. Alaska Game Commission 
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agent Hosea Sarber had discovered in 1943 that small furbearers like mink and 
martens disliked the blubber, whereas wolves and coyotes loved it. This afforded 
the control effort a measure of selectivity.44
Territorial Sportsmen, Inc., of Juneau participated actively and financially 
in wolf control in hopes of increasing the deer population in the Southeast. 
Maurice Kelly, a club member and director of the Predator Control Branch, 
wrote the group in 1951, “It does appear that the wolf pack on the Taku was 
wiped out as well as the three wolves ranging in the Dyea Valley. . . . I feel it 
was a very successful operation and one which I feel was possible only through 
the cooperation of your organization.”45 Territorial funds supplemented federal 
funding beginning in 1953, appropriated through the endorsement of “most 
sportsmen’s clubs, farm organizations, women’s clubs, civic organizations and 
many individuals.”46
Predator control agents and private wolf hunters employed three meth-
ods against wolves during the 1948–1960 period: strychnine-laced carcasses 
and blubber cubes, “getters” that fired cyanide into the victims’ mouths, and 
Seal blubber cubes used in wolf control, ca. 1956. By J. Malcolm Greany. Alaska Game 
Commission, 18th Annual Report, July 1, 1956 Thru June 30, 1957. Each cube, dipped 
in seal oil and fish sauce to attract wolves, contained a pellet of strychnine.
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Wolves recovered from poison bait stations, ca. 1957. By J. Malcolm Greany. Alaska Game 
Commission, 18th Annual Report, July 1, 1956 Thru June 30, 1957. A storm of com-
plaints from hunters and settlers about loss of game set off an intensive wolf control effort in 
the late 1940s and 1950s.
buckshot fired from light aircraft. Each method accounted for an approximate-
ly equal number of wolves and coyotes taken by agents.47 Strychnine had the 
side-effect of poisoning foxes and other furbearers, although agents normally 
placed it on frozen lakes while bears hibernated. “Getters” used in the summer 
and early fall sometimes killed black bears, and an occasional wolf would run 
as much as a mile before dying. In 1951–1952, wolf and coyote control acci-
dentally killed at least 70 furbearers in addition to 374 wolves and 57 coyotes 
(Table 13.1).48
Shooting from aircraft normally involved a pilot, who flew over the wolf 
or the pack, and a gunner, who fired a 12-gauge shotgun out a door or side 
window. This procedure, done in late winter and early spring, could be danger-
ous to both wolves and fliers. Private bounty hunters obtained aerial shooting 
permits beginning in the late 1940s, and several died in accidents.49 One pair 
experienced two accidents in a single day. As they chased a wolf over a hilltop, a 
ski struck the creature, disabling the landing gear. After repairing it in Fairbanks 
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they returned to the North Slope and, while pursuing a wolf, crash-landed the 
plane. Uninjured but without food or sleeping bags, they snowshoed 60 miles 
to Chandler Lake.50 The Predator Control Branch obtained its first aircraft in 
1949 and lost at least one plane during a wolf control operation.51 While firing 
at a wolf on the North Slope, director Maurice Kelly shot the tip off a propeller. 
Pilot Bob Burkholder landed; they sawed off the opposite tip for balance and 
resumed the hunt.52
Aerial wolf control reached its apex in a quasi-military event on the North 
Slope titled Operation Umiat. Pilots, wardens, traders, and military personnel 
in the Arctic had formed a consensus that a large population of wolves threat-
ened to eradicate a shrinking caribou herd. Clarence Rhode explained that “my 
dream is to do enough wolf work in the Brooks to see if we can build that herd 
to the point where it will move back into the Yukon-Kuskokwim-Tanana areas 
where they [caribou] have been absent for so long.”53 During several weeks 
beginning in March 1952 all seven Fish and Wildlife predator control agents 
in Alaska participated in Umiat, flying two Piper Super Cubs and a Piper J-5. 
Flying mainly out of the airfield at Umiat, the agents destroyed a total of 259 
adult wolves and pups, keeping 102 for their skins or for research.54 Agent 
Frank Glaser described the process:
In the ski-equipped planes we searched for wolves at an altitude of about 
400 feet. When we found a wolf or a pack of wolves (generally from five to 
ten animals) we circled a mile or so away, dropped to within 40 or 50 feet of 
the ground, and flew directly toward them. The wolves usually ran straight 
away in single file. We’d fly on their left, and the gunner, using a shotgun 
loaded with buckshot, shot the wolves out the right side of the plane, often 
at ranges of 20 or 30 feet.
table 13.1. Furbearers Purposely and Accidentally Killed in Predator Control, 1951–1952
 Trap Getter Poison Snare Shooting
targeted
   Wolf — 44 80 — 250
   Coyote — 32 5 1 19
accidental
   Fox 1 30 21 — —
   Wolverine — 3 4 — —
   Black bear — 8 3 — —
   Lynx — 1 — — —
Source: Alaska Game Commission, 13th Annual Report to the Secretary of the Interior, July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952 
(Juneau, 1952), 15–17.
Note: Includes 223 wolves shot and 36 poisoned in Operation Umiat and one wolverine collected for the Coopera-
tive Wildlife Unit.
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A few wolves learned to weave back and forth in defense, and some darted left 
under the plane out of the gunner’s sight. The operation nearly claimed the 
life of Glaser, who had killed a wolf on a mountain near the Killik River. Pilot 
Joe Miner landed the plane in a precarious spot, and Glaser got out to skin the 
wolf. The skis slipped and the plane took off before Glaser could get to his seat; 
Miner pulled him into the climbing aircraft.55
In a sequel to Operation Umiat, private bounty hunters using caches of gas-
oline left by the military flew the area throughout the 1950s. They boosted the 
North Slope wolf toll to at least 1,500.56 Considering that almost no research 
had been done on the Arctic caribou herds and plenty existed for consumption 
by Eskimos, some critics regarded Operation Umiat as a bureaucratic excess and 
an excuse for killing large numbers of wolves rather than an exercise of needed 
predator control.57
Jay Hammond, who flew one of the planes at Umiat, summed up the Game 
Commission’s justification for wolf control:
To those of us who live in Alaska our game means food, money and recre-
ation. Big business! Last year hunters, trappers and sport fishermen spent in 
the vicinity of $13,000,000 here in the Territory. This, by the way, is more 
than is derived from Alaska’s fabled mining industry. . . . In an effort to 
maintain adequate game herds in the face of a snowballing population, it is 
obviously necessary to reduce the numbers of animals killed by factors other 
than hunting. One of the few positive steps we can take toward this goal is to 
reduce the number of animals cut down by wolves. I wish there were enough 
game to go around for everyone—the wolf included. The big fat truth is, 
however, there isn’t!58
A gunning team set a record of eighteen wolves in a single day in the Steese-
Fortymile district in 1957.59 In that same year the new Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game initiated a limited wolf control and research project as part of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service program. Near Wrangell and Ketchikan, agents set 
out poison stations to reduce predation of Sitka deer.60
Between 1927 and 1958 the territory paid bounties on approximately 
25,000 wolves and 20,000 coyotes at a cost of about $1.5 million (Table 13.2). 
Predator control officers added a minimum 2,000 wolves and 1,000 coyotes 
(Table 13.3).61 Although game officials believed wolves increased in most re-
gions during the 1950s,62 the controls appeared to be drawing them down by 
the end of the decade. Efforts to reduce wolf populations gained force from 
recurring complaints of their killing reindeer and from their apparent slaughter 
of over 200 moose (about 75 percent of the local population) during a period of 
hard snow crust in the Koyukuk River Valley in the spring of 1957.63 Officials 
claimed success in restoring herds of caribou to the point where hunting could 
resume. Control of the Nelchina wolves may have been overdone: a population 
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of about 200 shrank to only a dozen by 1953, and by 1956 the caribou herd 
swelled to 36,000, nearly triple the normal size. In the spring of 1957 the Game 
Commission protected Nelchina wolves and coyotes and initiated a long-term 
predator-prey study.64
Anecdotal reports from residents, guides, and agents, followed by brief sur-
veys, identified bears as predators of moose on the Kenai Peninsula. Wolves 
had been exterminated there by 1915, and black bears had increased as a result 
of protection from 1935 to 1945. A more thorough study in 1949 produced 
stronger evidence that black bears frequently killed moose calves. Brown bears 
did also and sometimes took down adult moose. More than three decades later, 
a study in east-central Alaska showed that grizzly bears had killed more than 
three times as many moose calves as wolves had.65 Only after statehood did 
bears receive general recognition as part of the picture of wild ungulate popula-
tion dynamics.
The Predator Control Branch invested considerable energy in speeches to 
community groups and other public relations efforts.66 In its final reports the 
branch proudly cited community backing for its predator control program, 
then employing 22 persons. It predicted, “Under statehood it is not anticipated 
table 13.2. Alaska Bounty Expenditures, 1927– 
1958
Wolves and coyotes $1,530,743
Bald eagles  164,561
Hair seals  1,174,084
Dolly Vardens  96,344
Wolverines  31,875
Total  $2,997,607
Source: Donald E. McKnight, The History of Predator 
Control in Alaska (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and 
Game, February 1973), 4.
Table 13.3. Species Bountied and Taken in Pred-
ator Control Programs, 1927–1958




Hair Seals 358,023+ 36,000
Sea Lions — 90
Belukhas — 128
Grizzly bears — 16+
Foxes — n.d.
Bald eagles 129,273 —
Sources: Donald E. McKnight, The History of Predator 
Control in Alaska (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and 
Game, February 1973), 2–5; Alaska Game Commis-
sion, Annual Report of the Executive Officer, 1927–
1946; Alaska Game Commission, Report of Wolf and 
Coyote Bounty Payments, 1940, 12+; Annual Report of 
the Alaska Game Commission, July 1, 1956–June 30, 
1957, 33; Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, Annual 
Report for 1958, 95–103; Alaska Dept. of Fisheries, 
Annual Report for 1955, 100–101; 1956, 50–51; Wil-
lard A. Troyer and Richard J. Hensel, “The Brown 
Bear of Kodiak Island” (Typescript, Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Service, 1969), 193–196; 
Amos Berg, “Alaska’s Bald Eagles,” Alaska Fish and 
Game Trails (January-February 1971): 11.
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that there will be any great change in the operations or organization of the 
Branch of Predator and Rodent Control.”67 But ecologically oriented biologists 
in the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, eager to assume jurisdiction over 
Alaskan wildlife, opposed most predator control as unwarranted interference 
in Nature’s balancing mechanisms. When they took over in 1960 the branch 
nearly expired. Its emphasis shifted to foxes and rats in the Aleutians, feral dogs 
in the towns, and a small-scale wolf control effort in the reindeer range of the 
Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta.68
PREDATION OF SALMON
As Alaska’s most economically valuable natural resource, salmon warranted 
conservation. But it would not be easy to control the behavior of fishermen ag-
gressively seeking to maximize their catches. They blamed one another and wild 
creatures for salmon declines. Deputy U.S. commissioner of fisheries E. Lester 
Jones related the findings of his 1914 inspection trip:
Those engaged in the great fishing industry say the blame for the dimin-
ished number of salmon is due largely to natural enemies, which includes 
bears, wolves, eagles, gulls, terns, mergansers, hair seals, trout, and sculpins. 
These enemies undoubtedly destroy enormous numbers of salmon and their 
eggs. But this condition has gone on for years, and would continue without 
serious detriment to the supply if it were not for the added drain resulting 
from heavy fishing. . . . [M]an has as much to do with the waning supply of 
salmon now apparent in some sections. Of course, this great resource was 
made for man’s use, and . . . the fish are there to be taken, but properly and 
with discretion, so that the future supply will not be jeopardized.69
Jones “saw hundreds and hundreds of humpbacks, silvers, and chums that had 
been thrown out of the water” by brown bears. Most lay untouched except for 
paw marks and missing cheeks, a part favored by the bears. Wolves, said Jones, 
“play a part similar to the bears in the destruction of salmon, but to a less 
extent.” He rated gulls and terns as the most destructive birds. He watched a 
huge flock of gulls pick the eyes out of humpbacks ascending a shallow stream. 
About 5,000 fish flopped helplessly when Jones flushed the gulls. He described 
eagles as a “contributing cause” of loss of salmon, and terns and mergansers as 
significant consumers of eggs and young fish. Hair seals destroyed salmon and 
fishing gear; and sculpins, Dolly Vardens, steelhead, and rainbow trout ate large 
numbers of eggs. Jones recommended removal of protection of gulls and bears 
and a bounty on wolves.70
An array of fish, birds, and mammals consumed salmon eggs during the 
spawning runs or, later, ate the salmon fry. Lack of scientific evidence resulted 
in a hit-or-miss system of predator control. The Dolly Varden, a char found in 
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the coastal salt and freshwaters of the Northwest, embarrassed territorial and 
federal officials alike. Under the assumption that it laid waste to young salmon 
and eggs, fisheries agents systematically trapped, killed, and discarded it. Fed-
eral hatcheries used it for fish food, and dams or racks prevented its ascension of 
spawning streams. Seines or gillnets captured it below the dams or in upstream 
lakes, and dynamite preceded release of fry in the lakes. Its numbers dropped off 
sharply in West Coast streams from Oregon to Alaska. Then fisheries biologist 
William Morton discovered that two species of Dolly Varden existed: one anad-
romous, or sea-run, and the other lake-dwelling. The sea-run char that had been 
targeted ate virtually no salmon or eggs; the lake dweller turned out to be the 
predator. A more mundane consideration ended the bounty, however. Payment 
called for turning in the tails, but checkers had difficulty identifying species. In 
one group of 500 examined, 355 proved to be salmon, 94 rainbow trout, and 
only 51 Dolly Vardens.71 Between 1931 and 1941 when it freed the Dolly Var-
den from bountied status, the territory paid out $96,344 in bounties.72
Bears caught salmon as they ascended rivers and creeks to spawn. Inevi-
tably, some commercial fishers perceived the bears as competition and cited 
them as a reason, or used them as an excuse, for salmon scarcity. A study done 
at Karluk Lake in the mid-1940s suggested that Kodiak brown bears took com-
mercially significant numbers of sockeye salmon. Follow-up research over the 
next eight years convinced biologists that the brown bear did not pose a threat 
to fish supplies.73
Sea lions, hair seals, and belukhas (white whales) also qualified as predators 
because they ate salmon, halibut, black cod, and herring. Sea lions ranked close to 
wolves in the negative reactions they inspired. Commercial fishers accused them 
of taking excessive amounts of salmon at sea, stripping fish off trolling and deep-
sea lines, raiding traps or nets, and damaging gear. Salmon trap watchers kept 
guns onboard to shoot sea lions whenever possible. Captain Casper Hollingstad 
of Petersburg, longlining for halibut in 1946, filed a typical report: “Sea lions 
took lots of fish from us. Seemed like there was 2 or 3 around most of the time. 
We shot and killed one at close range. We could often feel them on the line, 
and one came up with a large halibut in his mouth. We lost a good many fish to 
them this trip but don’t know how many.” Sea lions reputedly learned to strip 
the lines underwater, swim out of shooting range, and eat the catch.74
Interior Department researcher Ralph H. Imler and Alaska Game Com-
mission agent Hosea Sarber carried out a 1945–1946 investigation of sea lion 
predation in response to the widespread complaints. They found that, while 
fishers exaggerated their losses, sea lions at times extracted 5 percent or more of 
halibut and sablefish catches. Of salmon trollers, “[V]ery few . . . lost more than 
six or eight salmon per year to sea lions.” Sea lions could be damaging around 
nets and traps, but elsewhere, stomach analyses showed only about 14 percent 
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salmon and halibut by volume. Overall, the researchers judged, sea lions needed 
to be controlled where found in large numbers near important fisheries. Rifle 
fire could not effectively suppress them because of the time required and the 
difficulty of hitting them from moving boats. But “any rookery of 200 or more 
sea lions located in areas of extensive commercial fishing could be reduced to 
fifty percent . . . with a great saving of food fish, and without jeopardizing the 
sea lion population.”75 Subsequent research found evidence of greater predation 
of halibut by sea lions—approximately $270,000 loss in the Gulf of Alaska in 
1958. But stomach analyses again revealed no significant amount of commer-
cial fish, and uncertainties remained.
To combine predator control and commerce the Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries arranged for a vessel to experimentally harvest sea lions from five rook-
eries between Kodiak Island and Unimak Pass in 1959. From the 616 sea lions 
killed, over 200 tons of meat went to mink farms.76 But commercial use of sea 
lions did not prove economically viable, and the 1972 Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act banned most sea lion killing.
Harbor seals closely rivaled sea lions as nuisances to commercial fisheries. 
They specialized in raiding the nets and eating or biting the salmon caught in 
Silver salmon damaged by harbor seals while in gillnet, Stikine River, 1946. By R.H. Imler. 
RG22 Box 71, National Archives at College Park. Nearly 2 percent of the gillnetted salmon 
examined by fisheries biologist Imler showed such wounds.
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Government seal hunter and harbor seals he killed, mid-1950s. Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game, 1957 Annual Report No. 9, Juneau, 1958, p. 52. The Territorial Department 
of Fisheries conducted a vigorous campaign to suppress seals under the assumption that they 
significantly predated salmon.
them. Ralph Imler visited the two main problem sites, the Copper and Stikine 
rivers, in 1946. He estimated that about 2 percent of the spring red salmon 
run in the Copper, and a similar percentage of the fall silver salmon run at 
the Stikine, had been damaged by harbor seals. The annual monetary loss at 
the Copper tallied about $30,000. Rifle shooting to collect bounties effectively 
controlled harbor seals in the 1940s. In “pass shooting,” hunters waited onshore 
in the spring at a point where seals swam by to or from their feeding grounds. 
Commonly, men cruised along the shore in a powerboat until they came to a 
haulout site, pulled ashore, and shot as many seals as possible before they swam 
away. A few hunters approached the faces of glaciers where seals bore their pups 
on icebergs. Many seals could be shot but could easily sink or disappear in the 
moving ice. Men, two to a boat, also approached haulout sites at high speed and 
fired buckshot at mothers and pups.77
Bounty hunters and Alaska territorial fisheries employees systematically 
shot harbor seals in the 1950s. Beginning in 1951 the Department of Fisheries 
hired marksmen to shoot seals along the Stikine River. In one year a department 
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hunter in Wrangell killed 998 before being stopped by a trigger finger infection 
contracted from a seal.78
Near the Copper River, another major salmon gillnetting locale, the de-
partment used depth bombs at haulout sites. A description of this method ap-
peared in the department’s report for 1951, the first year of its harbor seal control 
program:
The two skiffs were to run abreast at high speed in order to reach the rook-
ery before the herd was able to disperse. As soon as the seal went into the wa-
ter the dynamite charges, lit from a blow torch, were dropped overboard one 
after the other. The hunt would usually terminate one-half hour from the 
time of contact and the seals not killed migrated from the immediate area.
In the initial effort at Aukley Spit 50 seals were killed. Later in the day a 
small herd of 25 seals was located and killed at Edwards River. On October 
18 another hunt was conducted at Aukley Spit and an additional 175 seal 
were killed. The most successful hunt was at the Big Softuk Bar where 250 
seal were killed bringing the total estimated kill to 500.
Agents constructed bombs of 30 to 50 or more sticks of dynamite tied together. 
Canneries and fishing organizations, particularly the Cordova Seal Committee, 
donated a portion of the territory’s costs.79 Between 1951 and 1958, agents 
dispatched an estimated 37,600 harbor seals and 90 sea lions in the Copper, 
Stikine, and Taku river sectors. Both shooting and bombing methods proved 
effective, noticeably reducing the damage to salmon caught in gillnets. Control 
measures had to be taken just before the fishing season and near the fisheries 
to work efficiently. Before the following season, seals moved in from elsewhere 
and replaced much of the lost population. In addition to those taken by agents, 
in the 31 years following 1927, a total of 358,023 hair seals of all species had 
been bountied at a cost of $1.175 million.80 The organized seal control program 
ended in 1959,81 and bounties continued through 1967.
In the wake of complaints of salmon predation by belukhas, the territory 
initiated a research program in 1954 at Bristol Bay. During 1954–1956, agents 
killed 128 belukhas for study. They gave the bodies to Eskimos, who tradition-
ally used them for food. Researchers concluded that the local concentration of 
1,000–1,500 whales consumed 70,000–130,000 young red salmon each June 
and larger salmon later. Nevertheless, they calculated that the whales ate only 1.0 
to 2.7 percent of the young salmon run, and “there would probably be no detect-
able increase in salmon entering the commercial catch or reaching the spawning 
grounds if predation by belukhas on adult fish were eliminated completely.” In 
the late 1950s experiments began on means of frightening away belukhas by 
playing killer whale recordings. Studies proceeded on salmon predation by be-
lukhas, seals, sea lions, lake fish, gulls, and other birds.82 Researchers examined 
20 more belukhas at the Kvichak River in 1958–1959 and a final 7 in 1965.83
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FOX PREDATION OF SEABIRDS
Foxes, while not subject to bounties, presented problems for other wildlife 
and for sheep ranching. Fur traders put Arctic foxes (primarily the blue phase) 
and red foxes (the more valuable cross and silver phases) on islands from Attu 
to the British Columbia border. Prior to the commercial fur era, Arctic foxes 
existed only on the Commander and Pribilof islands and north of the Alaska 
Peninsula. Russians introduced them to Attu in 1750 and, in the late 1700s and 
early 1800s, throughout the Aleutians and eastward. Introductions occurred 
systematically by government order after 1819. Americans began stocking Arc-
tic foxes about 1880, eventually placing them on islands all along the south 
and southeast coasts. Red foxes, native only as far west as the Fox Islands in the 
eastern Aleutians, were let go by Russians and Americans on islands in the Aleu-
tians, the south, and the southeast. Between 1750 and 1920, fox farming efforts 
stocked a recorded 455 islands: 86 in the Aleutians, 63 on the south coast of the 
Alaska Peninsula, 51 in the Kodiak Island region, 73 in the Gulf of Alaska, and 
182 in the Southeast.84
The 1911 Fur Seal Treaty restricting the harvest of fur seals and sea otters 
stimulated the fox fur industry. Despite the Aleutians’ status as a wildlife refuge, 
Seal faces collected for bounty, Chukchi Sea, May 1967. By Ken Ross. Over 40 years be-
ginning in 1927, Alaska paid bounties on upwards of 1 million seals, partly as a welfare 
program.
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entrepreneurs received licenses for fox farming on the islands. When the value 
of foxes rose in the 1920s, fox farms reached a pinnacle of 391. Top Arctic fox 
pelts sold for $460 and silver foxes for up to $2,800 in London. During the 
Depression the market crashed; the industry nearly expired in the mid-1930s. 
Island trapping essentially ceased in the late 1940s.85
Wild birds, mostly seabird colonies, afforded a natural food supply for the 
free-running farm foxes. Natural balances soon deteriorated. Aleuts protested 
in 1812 the loss of seabirds whose skins they made into clothing; they turned 
to fish skins as a substitute. Russian navigator Vasilev, wintering at Atka in 
1811–1812, mentioned that “the Aleuts complain that the foxes drive away 
the birds, which formerly were numerous and served as a source of feathers for 
clothing. Nowadays, to get birds they must travel to other islands.” Living in 
extreme poverty, the Aleuts had no footgear and few clothes. Foxes, said Vasilev, 
had been brought to Atka about twenty years previously and multiplied; a fe-
male could produce ten to twelve young annually.86
Modern observers noted the work of red foxes placed on Big Koniuji Island 
in 1916: in less than three months a group of thirteen foxes killed about 100 
horned puffins and 800 crested auklets. Foxes sharply reduced or eradicated 
surface-nesting birds except on inaccessible cliffs. Ground-burrowing species 
including tufted puffins, Cassin’s auklets, Leach’s and storm-petrels, ancient 
murrelets, and rhinoceros auklets virtually disappeared. Other species includ-
ing rock and willow ptarmigan, common eiders, winter wrens, glaucous-winged 
gulls, and Aleutian terns steeply declined or vanished. Aleutian Canada geese, 
once widespread and found in the thousands on Agattu in 1910, survived only 
on three small islands. Later investigations showed that the loss of bird guano 
caused the vegetation of most of the Aleutian Islands to change from grasslands 
to tundra dominated by shrubs and forbs. Mammals introduced as fox food 
supplemented the effects of fox predation. Arctic ground squirrels, voles, lem-
mings, house mice, and deer mice ate eggs and young birds, as did Norway 
rats from supply ships. European rabbits, Arctic hares, and hoary marmots, 
in addition to the smaller rodents, sometimes overgrazed vegetation, creating 
erosion and damaging underground bird nests.87 Feral cattle survived on seven 
islands where some had existed since the 1890s. They caused erosion, reduced 
protective vegetation needed for bird nesting, and trampled both surface and 
subsurface bird nests.88
As the reservoirs of nesting birds evaporated and the fur market lapsed, 
many fox populations died out. Insufficient natural food and unfavorable cli-
mate worked against them in the Southeast. Various other phenomena may have 
caused fox disappearance: interbreeding; predation by brown bears, wolves, and 
otters; and natural disasters—a 90-foot tsunami cleared foxes off several small 
islands in 1946. Trappers using poison inadvertently exterminated foxes on 
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Shuyak and Dark islands, but in 1970 cattlemen freed Arctic foxes on Sanak 
Island, whence they spread to nearby islands.
U.S. officials had first expressed concern for the fox impact on birds in 
1930. The 1936–1938 Murie-Scheffer expedition reiterated the need for pro-
tection of seabird colonies.89 Examining 1,800 fox scats from 22 islands, they 
found that birds, predominantly seabirds, accounted for 57.8 percent of the 
diet of blue foxes. The canines easily caught nesting birds and would also wait 
for the birds to dive near the shoreline and then jump in and seize them when 
they surfaced. On small islands and in the case of smaller nesting colonies, the 
foxes nearly eliminated the birds.90
The new Fish and Wildlife Service, under the Department of the Interior, 
placed more emphasis on ecosystem restoration and land protection than it had 
under the Department of Agriculture. Aleuts protested a 1944 decision by the 
Interior Department to prohibit further placement of foxes on Carlyle Island, 
which had yielded $6,000 in furs in 1940.91 But fox farming and trapping lost 
their economic appeal in the 1940s.
Blue fox at den next to seabirds it killed, Gareloi Island, Aleutians. By Victor B. Scheffer. 
RG22 WB Box 59, National Archives at College Park. Russian and American fur traders 
introduced foxes to hundreds of islands, endangering populations of breeding birds.
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Aleutian Islands refuge manager Robert Jones began a fox removal effort 
in 1949 on Amchitka Island. Fish and Wildlife agents broadcast poisoned bait 
over the island from a DC-3 aircraft, and no foxes (or feral dogs and cats left by 
the military) remained in 1960. The agency cleared Agattu between 1963 and 
1969; beginning in 1986 it redid an unsuccessful 1963 attempt at Kiska. By 
1992 the agency had freed 21 islands of foxes. It planned to complete 19 of the 
remaining 46 mostly Aleutian islands containing Arctic foxes.92
Several difficulties accompanied the removal program. Rats, which thrived 
on several islands, appeared not to be affected by the control effort. They also 
preyed on bird eggs and young and may have eradicated song sparrows and 
winter wrens on Amchitka Island.93 Removal of foxes increased rat populations. 
Both ravens and foxes disappeared on Amchitka.94
A 1972 presidential order barred the use of poisons in predator control 
except by special permission for rehabilitation of endangered species. Agents 
employed this exception only for the Aleutian Canada goose, whose breed-
ing populations they reestablished on Agattu, Alaid, and Nizki following fox 
removal. After 1986, regulations prohibited all poisoning, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service had to rely primarily on trapping and shooting, methods ef-
fective only on small islands. Agents restored two islands by the introduction 
of sterilized red foxes, which killed off the Arctic foxes and then died out.95 
They removed feral cattle from three islands in 1985 but could find no effec-
tive method for getting rid of rodents.96 Many fox removal efforts succeeded, 
but bird species nesting in burrows recovered very slowly. Surface-nesting birds 
tended to rebound dramatically.97
OTHER EXOTICS IN THE ALEUTIANS
Fox introduction to Alaskan islands illustrated the economic orientation and 
ecological ignorance of the conservation era. It must have seemed logical that 
producing valuable crops on near-barren islands represented an improvement, 
a “conservation” achievement. And ideas for improvement ranged well beyond 
fox farming. In 1910 the Bureau of Fisheries sent biologist Walter L. Hahn to 
St. Paul Island to investigate prospects of introducing reindeer, sheep, poultry, 
muskrats, mink, river otters, crayfish, mussels, water lilies, and other potentially 
useful animals and plants. Hahn’s death by drowning brought the plan to an 
end.98
A few years later scientists from the Bureau of Fisheries observed that swine, 
chickens, and cats had been brought to the Pribilofs. The cats had a negligible 
effect on the unwelcome community of house mice. Rats, however, had not 
gained a foothold. Attempts to establish muskrats and ground squirrels failed 
either in transit or after release. The scientists recommended against bringing 
Frontier Justice: Predator Control
309
in mink and river otters lest they eat the birds, or ptarmigans lest they be killed 
off by the native Arctic foxes.99
Subsequent importations to the Aleutians included more Arctic foxes until 
the 1930s, sheep (on Umnak and Unalaska), reindeer (on Atka, Umnak, and St. 
Paul), and caribou (on Adak). Foxes greatly reduced the native ptarmigans on 
Amchitka but less so on mountainous Adak. Blackflies found their way to Adak 
and eventually to Shemya and Amchitka, bearing the potential to harm birds 
through the blood parasites they carried. Placement of rainbow trout on Adak 
and Shemya and of Sitka spruces on several islands probably entailed fewer pos-
sibilities of ecosystem disruption.100 Increased ecological awareness eventually 
phased out most exotic transplants by government agencies.
Securing permits from the Bureau of Land Management, sheep ranchers 
multiplied their flocks on Umnak and Unalaska islands from 1,300 to 6,000 
in the late 1950s and planned for expansion to 20,000. They lobbied for 
fox control; the Game Commission initiated a program in 1957. Ranchers 
claimed the loss of 400 lambs prior to the 1958–1959 control efforts and very 
Red foxes and predated lamb, Unalaska or Umnak Island, ca. 1958. By Lee Ellis. Alaska 
Game Commission, 20th Annual Report, July 1, 1958 Thru December 31, 1959. Foxes 
interfered with sheep raising in western Alaska and the Aleutians.
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few afterward.101 The fox control program continued under federal jurisdiction 
after statehood.
PREDATION BY EAGLES
Unlike most other territorial predator control efforts, the eagle bounty sul-
lied Alaska’s image in the States. An American national symbol, the bald eagle 
lived mostly along the coasts. It courted trouble by feeding on salmon and, 
allegedly, by stealing pups from fox farms. On Umnak and Unalaska islands, 
upon installing their sheep herds, ranchers demanded eagle control.102 Alaskans 
commonly believed eagles took significant numbers of game mammals as well. 
Governor Strong reported in 1915 that “the natural enemy of the mountain 
sheep is the eagle, very numerous on the Kenai Peninsula, which destroys the 
lambs.” In his 1918 report on game, Governor Thomas Riggs attributed the 
decrease of deer in the Southeast in part to “the greatly increasing depredation 
from wolves and eagles. The Territory provides a bounty of $15 on each wolf 
and 50 cents on each eagle. . . . It is my opinion that if the bounty on wolves 
were placed at $50 and on eagles at $5, in a very few seasons these menaces 
would be removed.” Riggs noted in 1920 that “from the upper Chitina come 
reports of a great many [mountain goat] kids having been killed by eagles, and 
one man reports having found the skulls of five kids in one aerie.” Riggs called 
attention to stateside conservationists who had proposed federal legislation to 
override the territorial eagle bounty. He rated the issue as one of three main 
points of territorial-federal dispute over game, next to restrictions on the sale 
of game and protection of grizzly bears. He warned that if the eagle protection 
law succeeded, “there will be a veritable crusade not only against eagles, but also 
against all laws of so-called conservation.” Riggs again called for higher boun-
ties, to be paid by the federal government.103
Some observers regarded the eagle bounty as less vital a measure. Bureau 
of Biological Survey representative Alfred Bailey noted in 1921 the comment 
of Fairbanks area warden Protzman that in the vicinity of the Wood, Johnson, 
and Tanana rivers “there are many eagles, bald eagles also, in the sheep hills, and 
it is stated that a pair of eagles will account for at least 50 lambs in a single year. 
. . . In my estimation, the eagle bounty should be fifteen dollars, the same as on 
wolves.” Less convinced of the eagle menace, Bailey thought the fox ranchers 
“have no evidence that these birds bother the foxes.” His recommendation to 
the bureau:
Remove the bounty on eagles, using such money as is in that fund for 
increasing the bounty on wolves. Hundreds of dollars have been paid out 
on eagles which have been living entirely on herring and dead fish. I believe, 
however, that it might be of advantage to have a zone system, allowing boun-
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ties for birds killed away from the sea coast, for such birds must necessarily 
live entirely on game birds and animals. The majority of these birds would 
undoubtedly prove to be the Golden.104
T. Gilbert Pearson, president of the National Association of Audubon Soci-
eties, visited Alaska in the summer of 1927 to assess the evidence of predation 
by eagles. Traveling 2,000 miles in the interior, he saw about six pairs of golden 
and one pair of bald eagles. Twice he witnessed a golden eagle swoop toward a 
Dall sheep lamb accompanied by its mother. Officials at Mt. McKinley Park 
said they had no proof of significant sheep predation by eagles. In the Southeast 
where most bald eagles lived along the coast, Pearson watched them catch fish. 
He heard scattered claims of eagles taking young deer, furbearers from traps, 
or foxes from fox farms. Very few people had personally observed such events, 
however. A sheep ranch manager told Pearson he had seen eagles take dead 
lambs or wait for dying lambs but not carry off live ones. Pearson found a small 
number of people to be violently anti-eagle, an even smaller group defending 
the birds, and a large majority neutral, passively accepting the bounty, or unin-
terested. People variously attributed the motives behind the bounty to conser-
vation of fish and wildlife, seeking votes of fox farmers, and diverting attention 
from the predations of commercial salmon fishers.105
The bounty, raised to one dollar in 1923, markedly affected the eagle popu-
lation. Former Alaska Game Commission executive director Ernest P. Walker 
noted in 1927 that “the Eagle bounty system has considerably reduced the 
eagles in southeastern Alaska in the ten years that it has been in effect, and to 
a lesser degree it has reduced Eagles along the southern coastline as far west as 
the Kadiak region.” Comparing his impressions in the pre-bounty period to 
conditions in 1936, ornithologist George Willett stated that “[t]he eagles had 
decreased to such an extent that the destruction by them must be very small. 
This was admitted by many Alaskans with whom I talked. . . . Unfortunately, 
the question has stopped being one of conservation and has become economic, 
in that many Indians and some whites . . . have come to consider the eagle 
bounty as part of their income.”106
Alaska’s treatment of the eagle and the brown bear hatched a great measure 
of distrust among outsiders, who held the upper hand in deciding the fate of 
resources in Alaska. In a 1935 issue of American Rifleman, sport shooter Lucius 
Burch waxed eloquent over his Alaska experiences:
Eagle-shooting, of all the forms of rifle shooting, is a type of sport that is 
most attractive to the finished rifleman. . . . Unfortunately, there are few 
spots left where the eagle abounds in quantities sufficient to furnish consis-
tent shooting. . . . [It is the] purest of all the rifle sports; a sport wherein the 
thorough shooter may have the fun of the game and incidentally pay his way 
as he goes.107
Frontier Justice: Predator control
312
On his most successful day Burch gathered 31 pairs of eagle feet for one-dollar 
bounties. Frank Dufresne and other game officers, he said, assured him of the 
bounty’s validity “despite the howl of the sentimentalists back in the States.” 
In a lengthy discourse on the relative merits of rifles, bullets, scope sights, and 
other equipment, Burch decided that, in the case of his Winchester 54, “the 
killing properties are also excellent; in fact it is too good a killer, as eagles hit 
solidly are torn up to such an extent that they have a tendency to hang in the 
trees.” His 30-06, he said, “is too much gun for eagles. The great amount of 
shooting done each day is sure to cause flinching by all but the stoutest.” He 
added that “the eagle is at all times a large and tough customer . . . and he takes 
some killing.”108
Reacting to the article, Aldo Leopold wrote president Karl Frederick of 
the National Rifle Association: “We gun enthusiasts are constantly complain-
ing of restrictive legislation on firearms. Is it likely that the public is going to 
accord us any more respect and consideration than we earn by our actions and 
attitudes? . . . I would infinitely rather that [the author] shoot the vases off my 
mantlepiece than the eagles out of my Alaska.”109
For years to come, Alaska retained its eagle bounty. A bounty hunter de-
clared, “Alaskans have many definite reasons for their dislike of the great, soar-
ing bald eagle of the craggy mountain fastnesses. They go in for the elimination 
of this destroyer in no uncertain terms.”110 Hunters climbed nest trees for chicks 
Bald eagle shot for bounty, held by Jim Dolan, Valdez, ca. 1940. Core coll. 01-3891, Alaska 
State Library. Hunters killed more than 100,000 eagles, ostensibly to protect salmon stocks.
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whose feet brought a dollar a pair.111 Legislator and later governor William Egan 
won the nickname “Eagle Bill” for his sponsorship of a measure doubling the 
bounty on eagles.
Adolph Murie’s research exonerated the golden eagle, and separate studies 
by his brother Olaus and by warden Hosea Sarber determined that bald eagles 
nearly always fed on spawned-out salmon, not edible by humans. In 1940 a fed-
eral law banned molesting of eagles outside Alaska, which suspended its bounty 
in 1941, repealed the bounty in 1945, and reinstituted it and raised it to two 
dollars in 1949. An Alaska Game Commission regulation in 1952 permitted 
killing of eagles only when in the act of taking fish, wildlife, or domestic birds 
or mammals. The territorial legislature repealed the bounty after federal legisla-
tion outlawed the killing of Alaskan eagles in 1952. Over a period of 28 years 
between 1915 and 1952, Alaska had paid bounties for 129,273 (almost entirely 
bald) eagles.112
EVOLUTION OF PREDATOR POLICY
Predator control policy in pre-statehood Alaska evolved as did ecological 
awareness: slowly, but ultimately responsive to accumulating scientific informa-
tion. Bureau of Biological Survey–Fish and Wildlife Service ties to agricultural 
interests supplemented pre-scientific attitudes in Alaska to perpetuate the sup-
pression of wolves and other creatures. Similarly, Game Commission ties to 
hunters and trappers inclined it to kill wolves to ensure a game and fur supply. 
Few officials viewed predators as necessary elements of ecosystems. Field experi-
ences of game agents tended to be anecdotal and often reflected settlers’ biases 
toward predators. Attitudes varied according to the species and its prey, the 
being the most resented. Some government officials and many settlers excepted 
the wolf from the generally held notion that species should not be extermi-
nated; almost all thought it should at least be reduced numerically. The fight 
over wolves in McKinley Park turned the issue into a national debate in which 
the Park Service, enjoying widespread support, essentially held its ground in 
defining the wolf as a positive element. Studies by Adolph Murie, Lawrence J. 
Palmer, and Leopold and Darling constructed a base for a shift to an ecological 
view of the wolf, which informed policy in the early statehood period.
In the 1960s, attitudes changed toward most predator species. The wolf 
quickly gained a state and national constituency through popular literature and 
television nature shows. It became the centerpiece of Alaskan debates ending 
the bounty system by 1972. When the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
renewed wolf control programs in the mid-1970s to raise moose and caribou 
numbers, it met intensifying opposition. But the need for more research, the 
persistence of Alaskans’ image of the wolf as predator competing for their meat 
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supplies, and the dramatic rise of sympathetic and nonconsumptive uses of the 
wolf blocked any consensus on its environmental value for the remainder of the 
century. Protectors and prosecutors of the wolf engaged in ongoing conflict.
Coyotes, almost as frequently killed as wolves in control efforts, won mini-
mal sympathy in Alaska. Perhaps, considering their recent arrival, people classi-
fied them as exotics as did Harry Liek. It would have been difficult to argue that 
they formed an ancient and integral part of natural balances in the North. Their 
reputation as a common nuisance in the States did not engender fears that they 
might be exterminated. And perhaps their smaller size and less noble bearing 
compared to the wolf gave them less potential to win the public’s admiration.
Bald eagles proved infinitely easier to rescue from predator status, in part 
as a consequence of their status as the national bird. Unlike the wolf they bore 
no significant legacy of threatening economic interests in the States. Studies 
by Olaus Murie and Hosea Sarber confirmed common-sense suspicions that 
eagles did not harm Alaska economically. Stateside opinion, expressed through 
citizen groups, precipitated a shift in national government policy. Essentially no 
agitation for eagle control endured in Alaska after 1952. While the eagle may 
not have been thought of as an element of a healthy ecosystem, opinion at least 
accepted the validity of its preservation as a species.
Sea lion and hair seal control elicited no noteworthy response from the 
stateside public. It continued in the form of seal bounties until the late 1960s. 
Federal and state research rationally assessed the belukha and exonerated it. The 
complexity and unfamiliarity of marine ecosystems acted as impediments to an 
ecological perspective on these mammals.
Foxes had no significant public following after the fur market declined in 
the 1930s. Eradication of introduced foxes denoted ecosystem sustainability: 
the restoration of seabird colonies on subarctic islands. Research as well as casu-
al observation exposed the substantial damage done by foxes. Olaus Murie and 
other federal officials knew what needed to be done. Remoteness of the islands 
and the near-total absence of economic stakes permitted them to act without 
much interference, but not without mistakes. Yet difficulties of exterminating 
rodents, and modern restrictions on chemical use, deterred final victories for 
sustainability of the island ecosystems.
Predator control in Alaska represented a similar, belated version of earlier 
practices in the States. Numerous wild creatures inevitably threatened settlers’ 
economic interests. Large mammals such as wolves and bears elicited fears for 
personal safety, rarely warranted by the facts. Any challenge to the economic 
or personal well-being of American pioneers triggered a violently aggressive re-
sponse. Whereas predators did not vote, politicians responded readily to the 
emotional demands of hunters, trappers, and settlers. Bounties proved popular 
regardless of whether they had any meaningful connection to predator-prey 
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relationships. Advancing ecological science could not easily make headway 
against sentiments based on fear or economic advantage and among people who 
held little respect for science. Widespread understanding of predators relied on 
scientific proof but awaited social and economic changes in which the pioneer 
experience gave way to modern education and to a leisure-oriented society that 
valued nonconsumptive uses of wildlife.
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Game and Fur Mammals
conFlicT oVer alasKan land mammals, liKe THaT oVer sea mammals, caTa-
lyzed changes in thinking about natural resources. Treatment of “game” and 
predator species informed the national debate on wildlife management. Efforts 
to protect mammals motivated the creation or expansion of Mt. McKinley, 
Katmai, and Glacier Bay national parks. These lands in turn served as models 
for ecological concepts in natural resource policy. Utilitarian values predomi-
nated in Alaska, but wildlife management evolved slowly in the direction of 
ecosystem preservation.
Mammals, in various ways, ranked high in pre-statehood Alaskan affairs. 
For aboriginal Natives they provided spiritual sustenance as well as food, cloth-
ing, and other implements. Settlers also sought them for food. Russians, Na-
tives, and Euro-Americans engaged in fur trade that at times amounted to a 
high portion of Alaska’s income. Around the beginning of the 20th Century, 
Native and white entrepreneurs killed for hides and horns, and commercial meat 
hunters supplied miners, railroad workers, and settlers. Sport hunters arrived to 
take advantage of some of the world’s fi nest remaining shooting grounds, and 
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Table 14.1. Estimated Harvests of Big Game Species in Alaska, 1945–1963
Year Deer Moose Caribou Sheep Goat Black Bear Polar Bear Walrus
1945 7,204 1,547 4,897 300 229 1,127 76 n.d.
1946 9,077 2,028 1,852 553 320 1,219 117 n.d.
1947 11,280 3,215 5,522 685 493 1,634 110 n.d.
1948 10,922 3,369 6,337 572 660 1,709 102 n.d.
1949 7,476 3,319 6,946 488 580 1,970 105 n.d.
1950 4,520 3,000 4,150 200 580 1,970 69 n.d.
1951 4,600 3,900 5,000 400 600 1,870 60 (1,337)
1952 4,200 3,700 5,600 500 650 1,870 39 (1,337)
1953 3,300 2,880 3,900 420 450 1,500 50 (1,337)
1954 5,100 3,500 16,000 510 430 1,410 100 n.d.
1955 4,600 3,800 17,000 532 500 1,300 128 n.d.
1956 5,900 4,280 17,000 540 420 1,250 135 n.d.
1957 7,800 5,300 19,000 700 470 1,280 206 n.d.
1958 8,000 4,000 16,000 600 250 1,300 128 n.d.
1959 11,000 4,000 13,500 500 125 1,500 225 1,453
1960 12,000 5,500 22,500 1,000 250 1,100 163 2,300
1961 15,000 12,000 30,000 1,000 600 1,100 156 1,486
1962 12,000 9,000 20,000 666 600 1,200 196 1,353
1963 12,000 8,861 21,000 977 600 1,200 167 1,725
Source: Alan M. Courtright, Alaska Big Game Harvests Data (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, November 
1964); Courtright, Game Harvest in Alaska (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, June 1968).
Note: Grizzly/brown bear fi gures in Table 12.1. Walrus fi gures do not include those struck and lost.
outfi tting and guiding them boosted the local economy. But Alaska’s remote-
ness and the seeming abundance of wildlife invited excesses. Settlers and Native 
and non-Native trappers and hunters poisoned and gunned local populations 
of some species out of existence. Alarmed at the losses, conservationists in the 
States took action resulting in the game laws of 1902, 1908, and 1925. Prior 
to the emergence of ecological science, conservationists joined in the suppres-
sion of wolves as a means of conserving game. Different groups valued different 
mammal species for different purposes, and controversy often surrounded at-
tempts at enforcement of wildlife laws.
A turbulent 35 years passed between the implementation of the Game Law 
of 1925 and the assumption of wildlife management by the new state in 1960. 
For a combination of reasons all Alaskan land mammal species including preda-
tors survived the period, some restored in numbers. Relatively light hunting 
activity during the Depression and World War II affected mammal popula-
tions, as did fi re and weather. Between 1945 and the early 1960s, harvests of 
most big game species rose moderately (Table 14.1). Observers agreed that the 
outlawing of commercial meat hunting by the 1925 law and the enforcement 
of hunting and trapping regulations by the Alaska Game Commission helped 
conserve several species. Caribou, moose, and deer populations rose in part as 
14
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a result of wolf control. The Alaska Game Commission accomplished most of 
what it set out to do.
UNGULATE POPULATIONS
Ungulates, often thought of as “prey species” and generally referred to 
as “game,” supplied necessities of life for both Alaska Natives and terrestri-
al carnivores. In the near-absence of agriculture, Euro-Americans also relied 
on them for meat and skins, and some wanted their conspicuous horns and 
antlers. Human population grew and technology evolved, raising the rate of 
consumption of ungulate stocks. Disagreements over hunting rules, predator 
control, and access to game persisted throughout the 20th Century. Most of 
the debates focused on caribou, reindeer, Sitka black-tailed deer, Dall sheep, 
and moose.
Caribou
Game management officials made recurring efforts to understand the cari-
bou, a migratory deer inhabiting Arctic and subarctic Alaska and Canada and 
including a few relict populations in the late 19th Century in several northern 
tier states. Alaskan herds waxed, waned, and wandered, for reasons not well 
understood by biologists. A staple resource for predators, Natives, miners, and 
settlers, caribou stirred anxiety and recrimination when they declined locally. 
One of the earliest disputes involved the herds of northwest Alaska. During the 
last quarter of the 19th Century and well into the next, few caribou appeared 
along the Arctic coast and in the Kobuk and Koyukuk river valleys. Sheldon 
Jackson and others found Eskimos in a condition of starvation and popula-
tion loss and blamed the absence of caribou on meat hunting for the whal-
ing industry. Caribou researcher Ronald Skoog determined that the herds had 
dwindled prior to the high demand for meat and the introduction of numerous 
guns among the Arctic coast Eskimos. Similarly, Skoog rejected the notion that 
caribou had been pushed out by reindeer, first introduced to northwest Alaska 
in 1892.1 Scarcity of caribou along the northern and western coasts may at least 
have been exacerbated by excessive killing by Native hunters during the whal-
ing era. Whaling crews each consumed an estimated 10,000 pounds of caribou 
annually while operating near Herschel Island.2 In 1878 Eskimos bearing rifles 
exterminated the herd on Nunivak Island.3
Gold seekers, and commercial meat hunters catering to them, further re-
duced the caribou herds. Bureau of Biological Survey agent Wilfred Osgood, 
who surveyed the Alaska Peninsula at the turn of the century, addressed hunt-
ing’s impact on caribou:
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Nearly the year round they are brought in regularly to all the mining camps 
along the peninsula, being hunted not only for their flesh, but also for their 
skins, which are in great demand. The mail steamer which runs along the 
south side of the peninsula takes on a supply of caribou meat on nearly 
every trip. The animals are usually killed in the Port Moller region, and 
the carcasses taken to the village of Unga, where the steamer makes regular 
stops. On the October run, when I was a passenger, caribou chops, roasts, 
and stews were a feature of the bill of fare. . . . In September, 1902, a trading 
post was established at Unangashik . . . for the express purpose of trading for 
caribou skins. . . . [A]pproximately 500 caribou were killed by the natives 
of Unangashik between October 1, 1902, and May 1, 1903, and the skins 
disposed of to the trader. . . . The trader pays about $1 in trade for a skin, 
which is worth to him $2 to $5. The skin of the body is widely used for 
clothing and bedding material. The short-haired skin of the legs is especially 
desired for making the tops of the skin boots which are very extensively used 
by natives and whites alike.
Osgood warned that “if the wholesale traffic in meat and hides . . . is not 
checked, the animals are surely doomed to speedy extinction.”4
As of the early 20th Century no caribou survived in the Kenai and Seward 
peninsulas, the Kuskokwim and Kilbuck mountains, or the Nulato Hills. But 
at least one large herd existed in the 1920s.5 Olaus Murie, the game biologist 
who attempted the first counts, estimated the Yukon-Tanana population at be-
tween 500,000 and 1 million.6 By the late 1940s this enormous assemblage had 
completely disappeared, but the Kobuk-Noatak herd not seen since the 19th 
Century now numbered about 100,000. The Yukon-Tanana caribou may have 
migrated northwestward in 1943.7
At the time of statehood biologists estimated the Arctic caribou total at 
230,000, and the Nelchina herd south of the Alaska Range had swelled to 
50,000. Smaller aggregations of caribou existed in most other regions. Roads, 
railroads, and airfields made them increasingly available to hunters. Grant’s 
caribou on the Alaska Peninsula had been greatly diminished in number and 
possibly diluted by interbreeding with reindeer. Assuming the herd had been 
under siege by wolves, the Game Commission cited its survival as one of the 
beneficial results of predator control.8
Ecologists A. Starker Leopold and Frank Fraser Darling, based largely on 
their 1952 survey, offered a broader perspective on the causes of caribou popu-
lation trends. In their view, wolf predation played little or no part. They at-
tributed the decline of the Alaska Peninsula herd to overgrazing of the range by 
reindeer. They cited fires as the primary cause of caribou losses. Fire destroyed 
the lichens on which caribou depended as a winter food source. Lichens grew 
at the rate of one-sixteenth of an inch per year, taking decades to reach even 
part of their full sixteen-inch height. Gold Rush era and settlement activity had 
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continued on next page
accelerated the frequency of fires compared with the number set earlier by light-
ning and Natives. An estimated 80 percent of the white spruce forest, where li-
chens grew in abundance, had been burned in the first half of the 20th Century. 
A climatic warming trend over the same period aggravated the fire problem, 
and forest clearing and reindeer grazing further cut back the lichens. Hunting, 
accelerated by the availability of guns and access by roads, also shrank caribou 
populations. These combined pressures eradicated some herds, separated most 
remaining groups and, in general, concentrated the species in the Arctic tundra 
regions resistant to fire. The researchers saw no prospect of reversing the trend. 
They recommended fire suppression as a management tool for maintaining 
caribou populations.9
Skoog concluded in the 1960s that, aside from human activity,
Alaska’s caribou population has fluctuated widely during the past 100 years 
or more. . . . Individual herds have expanded and declined in size; few have 
remained stable for very long. As the herds increased, their movements have 
become increasingly complex, more erratic in timing, and more extensive 
in scope, with the opposite occurring as the herds declined. Major emigra-
tions from one region to another have taken place when peak numbers 
were reached; other emigrations have occurred when animals from adjacent 
regions have intermingled during the winter.10
Uncertainty about the causes of caribou population shifts infused decades of 
controversy over predator control.
Moose
Moose protection emerged as one of the Alaska Game Commission’s quali-
fied success stories. For flying wardens, the size of moose made them difficult to 
hide and relatively easy to count in winter. Kenai moose increased as a result of 
the extermination of wolves and from tightened law enforcement, but lost feed 
and population as the number of forest fires tapered off. In the wake of fire in a 
spruce forest, birches, willows, and aspen—crucial winter feed for moose—pro-
liferated. Eventually, in the absence of additional fires, these trees would be 
succeeded by spruce and moose would decline.
Moose populations gradually increased in the interior for three reasons, 
according to Leopold and Darling. Since the turn of the century the warming 
trend had eased their movement northward, even to the Arctic coast, by stimu-
lating the growth of willows. Second, fires usually generated moose browse. 
Third, on a lesser scale, the clearing of spruce forests for roads, settlements, and 
other purposes caused more deciduous tree growth. All of these factors, they 
argued, favored moose and hurt caribou.11 Other wildlife managers contended 
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that Leopold and Darling gave insufficient credit to the enforcement of bag 
limits and the prohibition on shooting cow moose as reasons for recovery.12 
Whatever the causes, and despite concerns about wolf predation and excessive 
hunting by burgeoning numbers of military personnel and civilians, a healthy 
and widespread moose population greeted the new state. Excepting temporary 
circumstances in a few locales, moose remained numerous throughout the rest 
of the century.
Dall Sheep
Mountain sheep, often considered the most desirable game for human 
consumption, experienced overexploitation by both Natives and non-Natives. 
Their visibility and herding behavior made them relatively easy to count and, 
given political will, to protect. Their localized nature allowed Native and Euro-
American hunters to reduce or eradicate some of the herds. To supply miners, 
railroad workers, and other recent immigrants, commercial hunters decimated 
sheep herds on the Kenai Peninsula (Chapter 16) and in parts of the Alaska 
Range. Poachers killed them through the 1920s, even in Mt. McKinley Park. 
Governor Gruening explained the McKinley herd’s slow decline in the 1930s 
and 1940s as “due to predatory animals, and some type of disease may be a 
contributing factor.” Leopold and Darling considered weather, hard winters in 
particular, the main determinant.13 To some extent, sheep died from snowslides 
and predation by wolves, coyotes, and wolverines. Regardless of whether the 
park sheep benefited from predator control efforts, they gradually rebounded in 
the 1950s and generally maintained their numbers thereafter.
Mountain Goats
Unlike sheep, mountain goats did not hold wide appeal as a food sup-
ply. Neither did they gather in large bands in their steep and rocky mountain 
habitats along the coast from the Kenai Peninsula southward. Their dispersal 
made them difficult to count but also difficult to hunt. Except for local areas, 
particularly along the Southeast coast, they never became seriously threatened. 
Predation by wolves, coyotes, and wolverines claimed a few goats, and many 
died in snowslides. In the early 1950s sport hunters killed about 500 annually 
and Natives about 100, from an estimated statewide population of 11,150 to 
13,550.14 Agents transplanted goats (Table 14.4) to Baranof Island in 1923 and 
to Kodiak Island in 1952–1953, places where they had not been known to exist. 
In the statehood period, formation of national and state parks, wildlife refuges, 
and wilderness areas afforded protection to mountain goats as it did for sheep 
and other species.
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Sitka Black-Tailed Deer
Sitka deer, a variety of mule deer located in the Southeast rainforest, suf-
fered nearly uncontrolled carnage between the 1880s and the 1920s. Prohibi-
tion of hide export, and law enforcement generally, relieved pressure on them. 
Population levels rose and fell according to available food. Heavy winter snows 
forced them to the beaches where many starved in times of overpopulation. 
Mild winters allowed more to survive, and wolf control increased the number 
available to humans. They numbered an estimated 123,000 in 1958–1959 
and may have been too numerous in some ranges.15 Over the second half of 
the century, logging depleted old-growth forests to the detriment of the deer. 
Bag limits and protective land designations helped keep the deer populations 
viable.
UNGULATE TRANSLOCATIONS
For several reasons, government officials and private entrepreneurs or ex-
perimenters attempted to introduce wildlife species into various corners of 
Alaska. Goals included food supply, sport hunting opportunity, commercial 
profit, and restoration of populations eradicated by humans. Two of the efforts, 
stocking of foxes (Chapter 13) and importing of reindeer, probably had the 
greatest environmental impact.
The Reindeer Experiment
Reindeer introduction, an economic, social, and incidentally ecological ex-
periment, got its start when Sheldon Jackson first visited the Arctic in 1890. 
Jackson, a prominent and charismatic Presbyterian missionary then serving 
as general agent of education for Alaska, traveled to the northwest coast to 
set up schools at Cape Prince of Wales, Point Hope, and Barrow. He learned 
that Eskimo settlements had been depopulated, in some cases entirely, since 
the coming of whalers and traders. He attributed the losses principally to the 
commercial killing of whales and walruses and to the extermination of caribou 
herds by Eskimos using guns. Adopting an idea suggested by U.S. Fish Com-
mission biologist Charles H. Townsend in an 1885 report, Jackson proposed 
that the government import reindeer from Siberia and establish an agricultural 
school to teach the Eskimos reindeer husbandry: “To reclaim and make valu-
able vast areas of land otherwise worthless; to introduce large, permanent and 
wealth-producing industries where none previously existed; to take a barbarian 
people on the verge of starvation and lift them up to a comfortable self-support 
and civilization, is certainly a work of national importance.” Jackson pointed 
out that in Lapland and Siberia, people depended on reindeer as a source of 
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meat, milk, clothing, and other useful 
implements. Moreover, he argued, 
reindeer could draw sleds much more 
efficiently than dog teams could.16
Realizing no action from Con-
gress on his request for funds to im-
port reindeer, Jackson raised $2,146 
from private sources. He went to the 
Siberian coast in 1891 on the revenue 
cutter Bear, made available by the Trea-
sury secretary. To assess the feasibility 
of reindeer purchase and transport, he 
bought sixteen from Native herders. Upon return he released the reindeer on 
Amaknak and Unalaska islands. All the deer had survived the trip and, a year 
later, the total increased by two.
Anticipating congressional backing, Jackson made five 1892 trips to Siberia 
on the Bear, bringing back 175 reindeer and assembling a herd at Teller near 
Port Clarence on the Seward Peninsula. He also brought along four Siberian 
herdsmen and assigned a few young Alaskan Eskimos to learn herding. In his 
report to Congress Jackson expanded on his earlier appeals for rehabilitation of 
the Eskimos. Pointing out that whalers regularly wintered on the Arctic coast, 
he suggested a “reindeer express” to carry the mail to ice-free ports: “It would 
enable the owners of the whaling fleet to avail themselves of the latest commer-
cial news and keep a more perfect control over their business.” He added that 
reindeer skins could be made into commercial products such as gloves, military 
trousers, book bindings, and carriage robes to replace those once derived from 
buffalo herds.17
Jackson’s project received funding from Congress after 1892, and he con-
tinued to ship reindeer. The additions and the natural increase swelled the Teller 
herd. Finding the Siberian herders too cruel and otherwise unreliable, Jackson 
brought in seven Lapps and their families from Norway to train the Eskimos. To 
improve management efficiency he placed mission stations in charge of herds. 
Eskimo apprentices received food, clothing, housing, and education and could 
earn up to 37 deer to start their own herds after five years’ training.
Rev. Sheldon Jackson, ca. 1880. Portrait 
file PCA 01-3279, Alaska State Library. 
An assertive and charismatic figure, Jackson 
publicized Alaska and drew attention to the 
needs of the Native population.
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Jackson enlarged his vision in the mid-1890s. Partly to replace the dying sea 
otter industry, he advocated stocking reindeer along the entire Aleutian chain. 
To meet the food and transportation needs of miners, “[R]eindeer should be 
widely distributed throughout all northern Alaska.”18 He pictured “400,000 
square miles of territory” on which “9,200,000 head of reindeer will support 
a population of 287,500, living like the Lapps of Lapland.” Besides helping 
Eskimos, reindeer would assist the “opening up of . . . northern and central 
Alaska to white settlers and civilization.” A “vast commercial industry” of rein-
deer products would benefit all, and to spread herding skills, a “migration” of 
families from Lapland should be encouraged.19
Reindeer entered the 1897–1898 drama (Chapter 3) in which a fleet of 
whaling ships became trapped in the ice off Point Barrow. News of the event 
prompted an emergency cabinet meeting chaired by President McKinley. Jack-
son, invited to attend, suggested the revenue cutter Bear be sent to Cape Prince 
of Wales. A nearby reindeer herd could be driven overland as a food supply for 
the crew members. The cabinet agreed, and the Bear left Port Townsend, Wash-
ington, on November 29. Ice forced it into Cape Vancouver, 800 miles short 
of its goal.20 Lts. David H. Jarvis and Ellsworth Bertholf and vessel surgeon Dr. 
Samuel J. Call made the overland trip by dogsled. On the way they borrowed 
448 reindeer, including 292 from a herd managed by missionary W.T. Lopp 
Reindeer loaded aboard revenue cutter Bear, Siberia, 1891. Bear 1891 Cruise Album 95-
034-58, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Sheldon Jackson 
envisioned a large-scale reindeer industry to sustain Eskimos and develop Alaska’s economy.
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and 133 owned by Eskimo herder Charlie Antissarlook. Written agreements 
promised repayment in reindeer in 1898 or as soon thereafter as possible. More 
would be added to compensate for expected natural increase. Call, Jarvis, An-
tissarlook, and seven other Eskimos drove the herd 750 miles north through the 
Arctic winter, reaching Barrow on March 29. Thanks to Charles Brower’s relief 
effort, the whalers slaughtered only 180 of the animals for food. About 382 
reindeer had survived the trip, and new fawns left a total of 439 by fall 1898.21
Antissarlook, the first Eskimo herd owner, had been lent 100 reindeer in 
1895 by Sheldon Jackson. They increased, but Jackson recalled the loan in 
1897, well before the contract deadline, to start another missionary herd. After 
the drive to Point Barrow in 1898, the surviving reindeer went to missions 
in Barrow and Point Hope. Left without their herd, the Antissarlook family 
experienced food scarcity. They received replacement animals in 1899.22 Such 
incidents reinforced an impression that Jackson placed the interests of missions 
ahead of the welfare of Eskimos.
Eskimo mail carrier, ca. 1905–1910. Lomen coll. 72-71-3557, University of Alaska Fair-
banks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Reindeer served as transportation, but dogsleds 
proved more effective. The reindeer industry held the potential to massively alter the ecosys-
tem of northern Alaska, but it peaked in the 1930s.
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Reports of starvation among miners in the upper Yukon in 1897–1898 in-
duced Congress to appropriate $200,000 to transport reindeer from Lapland. 
Jackson traveled to Norway to convey the request to his agent William Kjellman, 
in the process of recruiting more Lapps for the reindeer service. They purchased 
539 reindeer and shipped them to the East Coast, to Seattle by train, to Haines 
by boat, and overland to Circle. Only 114 survived the arduous journey ending 
on February 28, 1899.23
Between 1891 and 1902, when the czar halted reindeer exports, 1,280 had 
been shipped from Siberia to Alaska. By 1905 natural increase had boosted the 
total to 12,828. Eskimos owned 38 percent of the herds, the federal govern-
ment 30 percent, missions 21 percent, and Lapps 11 percent.24 Critics of the 
program felt non-Native private parties should not own reindeer herds, and 
many objected to Jackson’s mixing religious instruction and herd maintenance. 
They suspected his top priority lay in supporting the missions. A 1905 investi-
gation resulted in Jackson’s resignation.
Reindeer proliferated and herders found more uses for them. The animals 
supplied meat, mail service, and freight hauling in the turn-of-the-century 
Nome gold rush. Beginning in 1911 the Bureau of Education assisted Natives 
in sales of meat and antlers in Seattle. As a result of the change in government 
policy, Eskimos owned 66 percent of the 70,000 reindeer by 1916. Over the 
objections of officials who questioned its legality, the Lomen family of Nome 
commenced buying reindeer in 1914 from missions and other private owners. 
They amassed a large herd and sold more than 14,000 carcasses annually to 
stateside buyers in 1929 and 1930. Both Lomen and Eskimo herds multiplied 
rapidly, but neither realized much success in securing outside markets. When 
miners left the Nome goldfields in the 1910s, away went an important source 
of income for Eskimo herders. The 1918–1919 influenza epidemic dealt the Es-
kimos another blow by devastating western and northwestern Alaskan villages, 
claiming the lives of several leading herders and superintendent Walter Shields, 
who had advocated Native ownership of reindeer.25
Participants and commentators carried on a vigorous debate over who 
should own reindeer herds and whether their purpose should be a means of sub-
sistence for Eskimos or an economic resource for the development of Alaska. 
The Department of Agriculture attempted to achieve both goals. In 1920 its 
Bureau of Biological Survey (BBS) set up a reindeer experiment station at Un-
alakleet on Norton Sound. Dr. Seymour Hadwen, chief veterinarian, estimated 
in 1922 that Alaska had enough grazing land for 3 to 4 million reindeer but 
that care must be taken to avoid overgrazing or undergrazing. He believed that 
“it is evident that the development of the reindeer requires white supervision, 
with proper markets.” BBS and the Lomens jointly carried out breeding experi-
ments for several years at Nunivak Island and Fairbanks.26 In 1920, 98 caribou 
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had been placed on Nunivak Island. Breeding by 10 caribou bulls conducted in 
1925 apparently created hybrids larger than average reindeer.27 But the experi-
ments revealed no significant economic potential in crossbreeding.
Enthusiasm and optimism accompanied the growth of reindeer herds. One 
of Jackson’s successors declared in the early 1920s that
within less than a generation the reindeer industry has advanced through one 
entire stage of civilization, the Eskimo inhabiting the vast grazing lands from 
Point Barrow to the Aleutian Islands. It has raised them from the primitive 
to the pastoral stage, from nomadic hunters to civilized men, having in their 
herds of reindeer assured support for themselves and opportunity to acquire 
wealth.
It was the earliest and perhaps only government action providing, by the 
introduction of a new industry, practical vocational training adapted to com-
munity needs, and resulting in training a primitive race into independence 
and responsible citizenship.28
Over the ensuing decades, experience would make this assessment appear more 
like an extravagant hope.
Bureau of Education officials and other critics continued to oppose pri-
vate ownership of reindeer herds, the Lomen operation being by far the larg-
est. Other problems beset the reindeer industry: weak markets, swelling herds, 
overgrazing, poor management, mixing of herds, confusion over ownership, 
and charges of theft.29 Eskimos preferred to be near the ocean and found the 
work of tending herds boring in comparison to hunting. When Eskimo associa-
tions assumed ownership of herds, hired herders felt less responsibility toward 
herd maintenance. To take advantage of more far-flung, less depleted grazing 
ranges, the Reindeer Service advised a change from “close herding,” a method 
that called for constant watch on small herds, to “open herding” of large, free-
ranging herds of mixed ownership. Open herding eased the way for predators 
to seize reindeer and for caribou to entice them to run away. Uncertainty over 
ownership and responsibility for reindeer in open herds worked to the disad-
vantage of individual Eskimo owners and generated tension between Natives 
and non-Natives.30
Reindeer provided meat and skins for local and regional use, but this fell 
far short of the hopes of reindeer visionaries. They planned to sell meat in the 
States as well as in Alaska. Such a trade, however, would necessitate refrigeration 
facilities from regional stations to outlets in San Francisco and the East Coast. 
It needed docks near shipping stations, but no docks existed on the Bering Sea. 
Infrequent and seasonal boat schedules in the North added to the costs and in-
stability of potential markets. And some states, possibly influenced by the beef 
industry, banned the sale of reindeer meat on grounds that it constituted wild 
game. Not least, the vast majority of Americans preferred beef.31
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A 1933 Interior Department report, one of several investigations in the 
1930s, found that Eskimos lacked the facilities to operate a long-range market-
ing system, that they preferred hunting to herding, that the reindeer population 
had reached 600,000 to 800,000, that range damage had occurred, and that 
some herds had wandered out of reach into remote areas. It cited persistent 
claims that the Lomens had unfairly taken possession of Eskimo reindeer.32 A 
court decision had affirmed the Lomens’ right to own herds, but it did not stop 
the criticism. By 1934 the Lomens determined that their commercial venture 
would not work in the absence of outside markets. Three years later, Congress 
passed a bill transferring the Reindeer Service to the Interior Department’s Of-
fice of Indian Affairs. The act authorized the government to purchase all private 
herds and marketing facilities, a transaction completed in 1940.33
World War II interrupted any possibility of immediate revival of the failing 
reindeer industry. But the Reindeer Service reinstated close herding, discouraged 
herd ownership by associations, and tried to develop market niches for hides, 
such as gloves, jackets, and boots. Government agencies continued research on 
parasites and range conditions and conducted vigorous predator control. But 
only a fraction of the reindeer survived the war years. Compared to 51 herds in 
1932, 22 existed in 1949 totaling 27,920 reindeer (Table 14.2).34
Table 14.2. Ownership, Size, and Locations of Reindeer Herds, 1949
  Number of 
Ownership Location Reindeer
Native association Wainwright 270
 St. Lawrence Island 450
U.S. government Kotzebue 3,500
 St. Michael 150
 Hooper Bay 400
 Nunivak Island 4,500
 Atka Island 1,700
 Umnak Island 1,400
 Pribilof Islands 700
Individual Barrow (3 herds) 3,000






 Igloo (Seward Pen.) 750
 Candle 650
 Alitak (Kodiak I.) 2,500
Total  27,920
Source: Margaret Lantis, “The Reindeer Industry in Alaska,” Arctic 3 (April 
1950): 38.
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Table 14.3. Reindeer in Alaska, 1892–1977
Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number
1892 171 1917 98,582 1942 169,000 1967 33,150
1897 1,466 1922 259,000 1947 n.d. 1972 27,399
1902 5,148 1927 n.d. 1952 26,700 1977 24,100
1907 15,839 1932 641,000 1957 39,800 
1912 38,476 1937 544,000 1962 40,000
Source: Richard O. Stern, Edward L. Arobio, Larry L. Naylor, and Wayne C. Thomas, Eskimos, Reindeer, and Land. 
University of Alaska Agricultural Experimental Station Bull. 59 (Fairbanks, December 1980), 103.
A highly optimistic projection by the Bureau of Land Management in 1952 
foresaw a dramatic restoration of the reindeer industry. Grazing on 200,000 
square miles of tundra, up to four million reindeer would supply meat and hides 
for the nation.35 On the ground, reindeer herding increased somewhat in the 
1950s but did not succeed in becoming more than a regional industry. Many 
of the same problems—lack of commitment to the arduous and isolated task of 
herding, lack of adequate winter range, and opportunities elsewhere—retarded 
the growth of the industry. From a high of 641,000 in 1932, the reindeer total 
stood at 40,000 in 1962 and 24,100 in 1977 (Table 14.3).36
Shortly after statehood, resource economist Arthur D. Little analyzed the 
prospects for a viable commercial reindeer industry. In a summary issued in 
1963 he identified several obstacles: (1) lack of interest in herding, (2) poor 
winter range, (3) lack of a range management plan, (4) poor animal husbandry, 
(5) the existence of caribou herds on potential reindeer range, (6) poor nutrition 
of existing reindeer, (7) the narrow market for reindeer meat, and (8) herder re-
liance on government grants. Little remarked, “We are not so presumptuous as 
to believe that we can suggest a program that will resolve all these difficulties. 
Persons have been working on these problems in Alaska for over sixty years, 
and the Government for at least thirty years without finding a solution.” Little 
recommended restricting operations to the few highly motivated herders and 
training them in animal husbandry and marketing.37 Except for the sale of ant-
lers, nothing more than local use emerged. Reindeer introduction ended in 
commercial failure, but, in Ernest Gruening’s judgment, by saving thousands of 
Eskimo lives it turned out to be “the most important single contribution made 
to the natives . . . in the first half-century of U.S. rule.”38
Some environmental impact flowed from the reindeer experiment. BBS 
chief Edward Nelson, concerned that multiplying reindeer might threaten the 
existence of the caribou by appropriating their grazing lands or by interbreed-
ing, had assigned Olaus Murie to survey the caribou in Alaska. Research dem-
onstrated that overgrazing in the form of eating and trampling caused significant 
deterioration of the range. BBS range scientist Lawrence J. Palmer estimated 
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from his 1920–1935 survey that recovery of lichens, the preferred food for 
reindeer and caribou, required 20 to 40 years if left undisturbed. He found 
the 1944 reindeer population on Nunivak Island to be 30,000, far above the 
sustainable level of 8,000.39 Experimenters had placed reindeer on Nunivak 
and several other islands where no predators existed. On St. Matthew Island, 
devoid of wolves and caribou, the Coast Guard released 29 reindeer in 1944. 
They intended the animals as food for a U.S. Army weather station and a Coast 
Guard loran station that operated during the war. After the herd reached 6,000 
in 1963, 99 percent died of starvation and cold the following winter, and none 
remained by 1985. A similar population on St. Paul Island crashed upon attain-
ing a density of 49 per square mile. Palmer had recommended a maximum of 
10 to 16 per square mile.40
Other environmental impacts included the loss of predators and possible 
dilution of the caribou gene pool by escaped reindeer. To protect their stock, 
herders shot or trapped wolves, grizzly bears, coyotes, wolverines, and foxes. 
Federal predator control agents shot wolves from planes and, in some cases, 
dropped poisoned bait.41 Had the BBS expectation of three to four million rein-
deer (much less Jackson’s projection of nine million) eventuated, environmental 
disruption would have been widespread. Hundreds of square miles would have 
become pastureland, displacing caribou and altering their gene pool. Predator 
control would have greatly reduced carnivores and disrupted the ecosystem. 
Human population buildup, roads, and other facilities would have vastly de-
graded wilderness quality in Alaska.
The Reindeer Trek
An attempt to introduce reindeer into Canada begot an epic five-year strug-
gle against the elements. Impressed by the seeming success of the Alaska experi-
ment, Canada’s Department of the Interior investigated prospects for starting a 
reindeer industry in the Northwest Territories. The recent introduction of the 
rifle had heightened killing of wildlife by both Eskimos and whites. Increasingly 
reliant on goods from trading posts, the Eskimos nevertheless had only the Arc-
tic fox as a source of income. Foxes, in turn, could easily fluctuate in population 
and market value. A Royal Commission on the Reindeer and Musk-ox institut-
ed in 1919 sought to conserve wildlife and find a stable means of sustenance for 
the Eskimos. In 1926 the Dominion government decided to acquire reindeer 
from Alaska. It sent Erling Porsild and his brother Robert north in May to do 
feasibility surveys, purchase the animals, and oversee the transfer.
The Porsilds evaluated grazing conditions in the Mackenzie River Delta 
and dog-teamed thousands of miles through Alaska to examine reindeer herds. 
Primarily through the Lomen company they bought 3,515 reindeer and as-
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sembled them at Kotzebue Sound to be driven overland 1,600 miles through 
the Arctic by a crew of Eskimos and Lapps.42 To lead the expedition the Lomens 
called out of retirement a former employee and native of Lapland, Andrew 
Bahr. Bahr interpreted the project as a mission of mercy for the Canadian Es-
kimos. More than 60 years old and despite life-threatening illness during the 
trek, he endured throughout. Once, in the winter of 1931–1932, he spent five 
months backtracking to find lost reindeer, but by the time he returned to the 
main herd, as many more reindeer had been lost as he found.43
Departing in November 1929, the trek ran into a host of daunting ob-
stacles: deep winter snows in the Brooks Range, plagues of mosquitoes in sum-
mer, harsh living conditions causing crews to quit, bands of reindeer trying to 
return home or otherwise wandering off, and attacks by wolves that “continu-
ally harassed the herd, at times taking a great toll and compelling the herders 
to remain on watch day and night.” Calving and rutting season, dark nights, 
blizzards, and open rivers restricted travel to about four months per year. The 
herd reached the eastern Mackenzie Delta in February 1935 and put rein-
deer in the corrals at Kittigazuit on March 6. Only a minority of the original 
reindeer remained, but births had left the total at 2,370.44 For reasons similar 
to those encountered in Alaska, however, reindeer herding did not spread in 
Canada.
Muskoxen
The muskox, a partial success story in the territorial period, originally re-
sided on the Arctic tundra from northwest Alaska to Greenland as well as Si-
beria. Explorers, traders, and whalers found it relatively easy to subdue because 
of its habit of forming and holding a defensive arc. They valued the animal for 
food and for its exceedingly fine wool coat. Muskox hides from Canada served 
as warming robes on cutters when buffalo skins grew scarce. Hunters killed 
adults so the calves could be captured and sold to European zoos. Traders gave 
cheap guns to Eskimos in return for furs, causing more muskoxen to be killed 
for sale. As game grew less plentiful this practice made the Eskimos more de-
pendent on the traders.45 A Stefansson expedition to Melville Island slaughtered 
400 muskoxen, and by 1930 only about 500 remained in mainland Canada. In 
1927 Parliament created the Thelon Game Sanctuary in Northwest Territories 
for the muskoxen.46
In Alaska, muskoxen appear to have been uncommon or rare at the time 
Euro-Americans arrived. Inuit hunters (Chapter 9) had apparently eliminated 
nearly all the scattered herds. Virtually none of the animals survived to the 
second half of the 19th Century. Barrow trader Charles Brower found muskox 
skulls at various sites on the North Slope and knew an old Eskimo who had 
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killed the beasts with bow and arrow. Another of his Eskimo acquaintances 
told of a hard winter about 1858 when few seals appeared and people starved. 
His father took the family overland about nine miles southeast of Wainwright 
to Oo-Ming-Muc (“Muskox”), a tributary of the Kuk River. They discovered a 
band of muskoxen and killed, by one account, all thirteen.47
In the eastern Brooks Range far from the coast, muskoxen probably hung 
on for several more decades. Irving McKinley Reed, a former member of the 
Alaska Game Commission, related that
the last two musk ox herds in Alaska had both been wiped out in the general 
area of the Chandalar River. One slaughter occurred in 1892 or 1893 when 
a band of Chandalar Kutchin and other Indians destroyed a herd of these 
animals on the height of land between the Christian and Sheenjek Rivers; 
the other took place in 1897 or 1898 when two French-Canadian trappers 
killed an entire herd of 18 muskoxen somewhere to the east of their cabin on 
Chandalar Lake (on North Fork of Chandalar River).
Whaling captain Hartson Bodfish, who wintered at Herschel and Baillie islands 
between 1890 and 1900, recalled, “While we wintered in the Arctic [Natives] 
killed all the musk oxen in an area of 150 miles.”48 These may all have come 
from Canada, however.
Hunter-naturalist Andrew J. Stone made a point of inquiring about mus-
koxen during his travels in northern Alaska and northwestern Canada between 
1897 and 1899. He noted that “specimens of Musk-Ox are reported to have 
been recently brought, by Camden Bay” from the Romanzof Mountains of 
northeastern Alaska. He interviewed Eskimos, Indians, whalers, traders, and 
others along the Arctic coast and in the upper Yukon drainage. But he could 
find no knowledge or evidence of surviving muskoxen in Alaska or even closer 
than 300 miles east of the Mackenzie River.49
Some muskoxen may have lasted beyond the turn of the century. Hunter-
explorer L.L. Bales wrote in 1908 that, based on information from Natives fa-
miliar with the region, the few remaining muskoxen lived in “that section north 
of the Endicott range of mountains, beginning at a point about 200 miles east 
of Point Barrow near the Colville River, and extending eastward to the bound-
ary line. They do not range on the low, flat tundra near the Arctic sea coast, 
but are found on the moss-covered ridges and in the hilly country one hundred 
miles or more inland.”50 Researchers found no physical evidence of muskoxen 
living in Alaska after the mid-19th Century.
Vilhjalmur Stefansson and Nome entrepreneur Jafet Lindeberg proposed 
to Governor Riggs in 1918 that muskoxen be imported from Greenland. Riggs 
responded positively, seeing an opportunity for economic development in the 
form of a wool and meat industry:
Game and Fur Mammals
333
Here is an animal which seems to be designed by nature to make a produc-
tive country out of barrens now serving no purpose. In the musk-ox are 
combined all the qualities most to be desired by a pioneer people of a deso-
late region. The northern portion of Alaska can never serve a better purpose 
than in becoming the grazing land of vast herds of reindeer and muskoxen, 
and when so utilized will become one of the great sources of meat supply for 
the United States.51
Edward Nelson and Charles Sheldon endorsed the idea of transplanting 
the animals, but it attained no action. In 1929 President Herbert Hoover des-
ignated Nunivak Island a reserve for reindeer breeding experiments. Bureau of 
Biological Survey officials used it for reestablishment of the muskox. A con-
gressional appropriation enabled them to bring 34 from Greenland in 1930 
and keep them at the reindeer experimental station at the University of Alaska. 
The Alaska Game Commission moved the remaining total of 31 to Nunivak 
Island in 1935 and 1936. By 1965 the band had grown to 500.52 Anticipating 
overpopulation at Nunivak, wildlife managers established several groups on the 
mainland between 1967 and 1970 (Table 14.4), and one group crossed on the 
ice. In 1975, following a 1972 agreement, 40 of the muskoxen went to Wran-
gel Island and the eastern Siberia mainland where they had been eradicated. 
Beginning in 1974, sport hunting by permit kept the Nunivak population at a 
sustainable level and gave Eskimos an opportunity to earn income by guiding 
or transporting hunters.53
Muskoxen, College, early 1930s. Keys coll. 88-174-17, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 
Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Extirpated from Alaska in the 19th Century, muskoxen 
were successfully reintroduced.
Game and Fur mammals
334
Muskoxen survived the Arctic winters in large part by the insulating qual-
ity of their wool, or qiviut. One of the finest, warmest, and most valuable hairs 
known, it gave rise to the idea of cottage industries producing fabrics from do-
mesticated muskox herds. In Canada and Alaska the income could supplement 
the largely subsistence economies of Arctic and subarctic villages. As a result of 
urging by Stefansson, the Institute of Northern Agricultural Research brought 
3 muskoxen from the Thelon sanctuary in Canada to Vermont in 1954. Satis-
fied that the animals could be successfully domesticated, the institute arranged 
for 33 to be captured on Nunivak Island in 1964 and 1965 to comprise a herd 
at the University of Alaska in Fairbanks. In 1975–1977 the institute placed 
the herd in the Eskimo village of Unalakleet.54 Small-scale commercial weaving 
proceeded at several locations.
Other Translocations
Bureau of Biological Survey agents conducted transplants of several species 
of game as early as 1917 (Table 14.4). In most cases they intended to introduce 
a species to a new area where it could be hunted rather than restore it to a loca-
tion where it had become scarce. Agents successfully moved caribou to Adak 
Island in 1958–1959 and reintroduced them to the Kenai Peninsula in 1965. 
They released moose on the Copper River Delta between 1949 and 1957, at 
Berners Bay in 1958 and 1960, at the Chickamin River in 1963–1964, at Ko-
diak Island in 1966–1967, and at Kalgin Island in the late 1950s. The Chicka-
min and Kodiak efforts did not succeed. Dall sheep were taken to Kodiak Island 
without success in 1964–1965 and 1967 and mountain goats to Baranof Island 
in 1923, Kodiak Island in 1952–1953, and Chichagof Island in 1952–1954. 
They did not survive at Chichagof. Agents successfully moved Sitka deer to the 
islands and mainland of Prince William Sound between 1917 and 1923, to Ko-
diak Island in 1924 and 1934, to Yakutat Bay in 1934, and to Afognak Island, 
among other locations. Eight Roosevelt elk from Washington, placed on Afog-
nak Island in 1929, prospered. Other attempts to relocate elk came to naught. 
Legal hunting on Afognak in most years between 1949 and 1963 yielded an 
average of 73 elk per season.55
In the 1920s, when hunting pressure had cut back the moose popula-
tion, interior Alaskans petitioned the Bureau of Biological Survey for game 
transplants. They suggested elk, white-tailed deer, and antelope. The bureau 
appeased them in 1928 by transporting plains bison from the National Bison 
Range at Moiese, Montana. They set nineteen free near Delta Junction.56 One 
of the bulls injured its leg in transit. Frank Dufresne, who had charge of the 
relocation operation, returned with his wife, Klondy Nelson, to check on the 
bull’s status. Separated from Frank, Klondy came face-to-face with the ema-
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ciated and angry animal, which immediately began to chase her. As the bull 
bore down on his wife, Dufresne shot it.57 The bison proliferated and became 
the source of herds at Copper River in 1950, Chitina in 1962, and Fairwell in 
1965. Hunters filled permits for bison in the early 1950s and most years after-
ward. Severe winters and limited food supply kept a lid on population growth. 
Beginning in the 1950s and again in the 1970s, bison in the Delta herd ate 
and trampled crops on farms that had sprung up in their range. To mitigate 
the problem, game officials attempted to steer the bison away from farms and 
toward alternate food sources.58
Wood buffaloes, a separate subspecies, once inhabited Alaska in large num-
bers. Of many bones found, the most recent carbon-dated at 140 to 200 years. 
Table 14.4. Successful Transplants of Wild Terrestrial Mammals in Alaska, 1916–1970
Species Number Date Destination
Sitka deer 24 1916–23 Prince William Sound
Sitka deer 16 1924, 1930 Long Island, Kodiak Archipelago
Sitka deer 9 1934 Kodiak Island
Sitka deer 4 1951–54 Sullivan Island, Lynn Canal
Mountain goat 18 1923 Baranof Island
Mountain goat 18 1952–53 Kodiak Island
Roosevelt elk 8 1929 Afognak Island
Plains bison 19 1928, 1930 Big Delta
Plains bison 17 1950 Copper River
Plains bison 35 1962 Chitina
Plains bison 38 1965, 1968 Farewell
Muskox 21 1935–36 Nunivak Island
Muskox 23 1967–68 Nelson Island
Muskox 63 1969–70 Camden Bay & Kavik River
Muskox 72 1970 Seward Peninsula & Cape Thompson
Moose 15+ 1949–58 Copper River Delta
Moose — 1958, 1960 Berners Bay
Moose — 1957–59 Kalgin Island, Cook Inlet
Caribou 24 1958–59 Adak Island
Caribou 44 1965–66 Kenai Peninsula
Arctic & red fox — 1750–1950s 455 islands
Beaver 24 1925 Kodiak Island
Marten — 1934 Prince of Wales & Baranof Islands
Muskrat 60 1925 Kodiak-Afognak islands
Varying hare 576 1934, 1952 Kodiak-Afognak islands
Red squirrel 145 1930–31 Baranof & Chichagof is.; other Southeast sites
Red squirrel 77 1948, 1952 Kodiak-Afognak islands
Sources: Alaska Game Commission, 9th Annual Report to the Secretary of the Interior, July 1, 1947–June 30, 1948, 
21–22; W.A. Elkins and Urban C. Nelson, “Wildlife Introductions and Transplants in Alaska” (Presented at Fifth 
Alaska Science Conf., Anchorage, September 7–10, 1954), 3–16; Oliver E. Burris and Donald E. McKnight, Game 
Transplants in Alaska (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, December 1973), 6–29; Albert W. Franzmann, 
Review of Alaskan Translocations, Appen. 1 (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, 1986).
Note: Does not include small-scale introductions not sanctioned by government. “Successful” denotes a viable re-
maining population.
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Elders in the upper Yukon River Valley described in detail buffalo hunts by their 
ancestors. Athabaskans prized the meat and skins and used the hair for thread or 
left it on the hide for warmth. Oral history consistently indicated that buffaloes 
had been numerous in the early 1800s and that a few had been seen or killed in 
the 1900s. In 1917 some buffaloes appeared near Eagle and became tangled in 
moose snares. They had likely come from remnant herds in Canada whose total 
population had been cut to a minute fraction of the original. Wildlife managers 
made no move to reinstate the wood bison in Alaska during the 20th Century.59 
Within the context of modern ecology and politics, such a move would be a 
lengthy process requiring research, interagency cooperation, and consultation 
of interest groups.
Many transplants happened before ecological perspectives had taken hold 
within the game management community, and they typically stemmed from 
demands by hunters or others seeking personal advantages. Single individuals 
or private groups released organisms without authorization from government, 
Mountain goat released at Hidden Basin, Kodiak Island, 1952. In Russell R. Hoffman, Ref-
uge Narrative Report: Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge, January to April 1952, Kodiak: 
Fish and Wildlife Service, 1952. Game officials tried to introduce several species into new 
localities. Goats survived on Baranof and Kodiak islands.
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including raccoons on several islands in Southeast Alaska. The 1925 Alaska 
Game Law forbade such actions without a permit, although the Game Com-
mission itself actively engaged in transplants it considered beneficial. So did 
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. 
Guidelines in the 1950s emphasized introduction of species to former habitat 
or across physical barriers to similar range and avoidance of injury to native 
species.60
The disastrous consequences of fox introduction to seabird nesting islands 
(Chapter 13) suggested that serious ecological questions needed to be answered 
before executing transplants. One of the few to question the practice as it re-
lated to game mammals, Olaus Murie, urged caution. Reacting to a proposal 
to release elk in interior Alaska, he pointed out that elk would eat lichens and 
might compete for food and reduce populations of caribou, mountain sheep, 
and moose. Exotic species, said Murie, tended to proliferate beyond the hab-
itat’s carrying capacity and then die out.61 Beyond biological considerations, 
introductions of exotic species involved questions of maintenance of wilderness 
integrity.
Unloading first buffalo, College, ca. 1928. Keys coll. 88-174-11, University of Alaska Fair-
banks, Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Alaska Game Commission officials established 
plains buffaloes in Alaska. Wood buffaloes, a separate subspecies, had been native to the 
territory.
Game and Fur mammals
338
TERRESTRIAL FURBEARERS
Land furbearers in Alaska occupied for the most part a more modest posi-
tion among political controversies than did ungulates, sea otters, and fur seals. 
Alaska Natives caught some for clothing and food. In the 18th Century or 
earlier, European demand for furs projected the trading routes across Siberia 
into Alaska and perhaps Arctic Canada. Eskimos relayed goods such as seal oil, 
baleen, tobacco, and copper or iron implements to more easterly Eskimos and 
interior Indians. In return, the skins of fox, marten, wolf, wolverine, beaver, and 
river otter moved westward.62
The Russian Period
To supplement the profits from sea otters and fur seals, Russian fur traders 
directed attention toward land mammals. They forced Aleuts and Koniag Es-
kimos to trap foxes and river otters. Employing what coercion they deemed ex-
pedient, they acquired furs from the Tanaina Indians in the Cook Inlet vicinity 
and from other coastal Natives. The Tanainas, in turn, conveyed Russian trade 
goods to the Gwitch’in and other Athabaskan Indians in exchange for furs. Mo-
tivated in part by a desire to shut off the Eskimo-controlled flow of furs across 
Bering Strait, Russians erected forts in 1818 on the Nushagak River at Bristol 
Bay, in 1833 at St. Michael on the lower Yukon, and in 1839 at Nulato at the 
juncture of the Koyukuk and Yukon rivers. Construction of a trading post at 
Fort Yukon by the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1847 posed a threat to Russian 
fur profits as well as their control of Alaska. Indians could acquire more guns, 
ammunition, sugar, tobacco, tea, and other desired trade goods in exchange for 
furs at Fort Yukon than from the Russians.63 Moreover, the Russian hold on 
the interior proved tenuous. By one account, in a dispute among Native groups 
over control of fur territory, Koyukon Indians attacked the Nulato fort in 1851 
and killed nearly all its inhabitants, including the manager.64
During the 1860s the Russians sent the more valuable land furs—river ot-
ter, beaver, lynx, and red, silver, black, and blue fox—to Siberian trading centers 
for sale in Russia where buyers prized the silver and black foxes above the sea 
otter. Some beavers went to Shanghai and some to the United States, which also 
took white foxes. Aleut workers sewed mink, muskrat, and marten skins into 
parkas to be sold at Sitka. Bearskins, about 120 annually, went to St. Petersburg. 
Russians kept the few wolf and wolverine skins for use at St. Michael, their 
trading post on Norton Sound.65 In all, they exported a large quantity of land 
mammal furs from Alaska (Table 14.5), but the total made up a small portion 
of profits.
Except locally and temporarily, and possibly excepting the beaver, trapping 
apparently did not endanger any species of land furbearer prior to the 20th 
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Century. Russians considered the marten inferior to its Eurasian relative, the 
sable, so rather than ship it out, the Russian-American Company made the 
skins available to its higher-placed employees. Russians valued the river otter for 
trim on army officer uniforms as a substitute for the more prestigious sea otter. 
Beaver rose to the height of fashion in the mid-19th Century and then faded. 
Russians sold castoreum (beaver musk) in Asia for medicinal purposes. Some 
Indians and Eskimos considered the beaver’s flesh a delicacy and fashioned chis-
els and other tools from its teeth. Severe winters in the late 19th Century killed 
off many beavers. Alaska Natives used muskrat, mink, and wolverine for cloth-
ing trim; traders accepted few of these. Wolves comprised little of the fur trade, 
and traders bought lynx skins for carriage robes and clothing trim. Darker color 
phases of the red fox held higher value, the jet-black and silver far more prized 
than the cross and standard red varieties. Of the Arctic fox variations, traders 
much preferred the blue to the white. Alaska Natives, Asians, Europeans, and 
Americans all made fox fur into clothing.66
Post-1867 Trapping
In the American period, control of the Alaska fur trade by the Treasury De-
partment passed to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Fisheries in 1903 
and to the Agriculture Department’s Bureau of Biological Survey in 1920. Re-
striction of trapping rights between 1868 and 1899 to Alaska Natives, relatively 
conservative in their treatment of furbearer populations, limited the harvest. 
But many non-Natives came to prospect or trade during the Gold Rush era and 
supplemented their incomes through trapping.67 Increasingly common forest 
fires lowered the numbers of foxes, lynx, ermine, and martens available to both 
Natives and non-Natives.68
The Alaska Commercial Company and smaller independent traders took 
command of the fur business in the interior. Individual trappers could go di-
rectly to them, bypassing the Indian chiefs who had controlled the trading un-
der British and Russian arrangements. Family-managed trapping territories thus 
evolved and spread to white trappers in the 20th Century. An influx of trade 
goods increased Natives’ material wants and dependence on outside industrial 
society. Prospectors took up trapping for extra income or as a way of remain-
ing in the bush after giving up the full-time search for gold. They and Natives 
therefore competed in the fur trade, but trapping continued to be an important 
income source for Natives in the 20th Century.
Historian William Schneider described the trapping seasonal cycle of many 
Natives and non-Natives prior to midcentury:
Leaving the village in the fall before freeze-up with the winter’s “grub stake,” 
families headed up a tributary stream until they reached the main cabin. 
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Before snowfall, wood had to be cut, and the winter supply of meat gotten. 
Soon after freeze-up the traps and snares would be set and from then until 
Christmas the trapper was moving, checking his trapline, then back to the 
cabin to skin and stretch fur. Some families traveled by dog team to the vil-
lage at Christmas time to visit with friends, celebrate the holiday, and trade 
furs to the trader in exchange for store goods.
After the holiday the families returned to the trapline routine until 
spring when the orientation shifted from the major fur animals to beaver 
and muskrat. Most families stayed out on their trapline until spring breakup, 
then returned to the village by boat. After a short visit in the village the 
family had to go to fish camp where they remained until they had sufficient 
fish dried for their own needs and for dog feed. Then it was fall and time to 
resupply for trapping.69
To get started, a lone trapper had to spend the summer transporting sup-
plies into the interior, usually by poling a boat upriver. Then he would build a 
main cabin and several smaller ones along the trapline. Trapping commenced in 
mid-October. If the trapper had no dog team, he would check the traps twice a 
week on snowshoes, covering up to fifteen miles a day. Naturalist Lee R. Dice 
Trappers and their catch of furs. Core coll. 01-20-34, Alaska State Library. From left: ermine, 
mink, marten, lynx, wolf, river otter, and wolverine. Land furbearers, trapped throughout 
the Russian and American eras, did not suffer any species extinctions.
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figured that in 1912 a hardworking trapper typically sold his seasonal fur catch 
for less than $500, barely enough for subsistence.70
Besides the loneliness, cold, and other discomforts, a single trapper con-
stantly risked accidents. In the Southeast around the turn of the century, a man 
stepped into a bear trap he had set. Despite crushed shinbones he managed 
to open the trap and free himself. He dragged himself to the shore, got into 
his boat, and rowed several miles to his cabin. A day or two later another man 
found him. The leg needed to be amputated and they had no prospect of reach-
ing a doctor, 100 miles away, in time. They sterilized a hunting knife and an old 
saw, cut off the leg, and the trapper survived.71
As the 20th Century progressed, technological advances changed the trap-
ping industry. Metal snares replaced the work-intensive deadfall; motorboats 
and eventually airplanes increased outreach. So did snowmobiles, succeeding 
dogsleds, which had replaced travel on snowshoes. A variety of related imple-
ments, such as chain saws and nylon fishing nets, boosted trapping efficiency. 
At the same time, trappers grew more dependent on outside sources for their 
supplies, and the desire for schooling and other services dampened families’ 
willingness to stay in remote locations.72
Aircraft enabled trappers to operate great distances from home, and in the 
late 1930s whites from Fairbanks began to fly to better territory. In doing so, 
they encroached on Native traplines. To protect their rights and their prime 
source of income, the Chandalar Gwich’in Indians requested a reservation un-
der the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, 
who had witnessed the success of the Metlakatla reservation and the degrada-
tion of other Alaska Native towns, favored reservations as bases for economic 
viability for Native Americans. In 1943 he approved a 1.8-million-acre Chan-
dalar reservation.73 The remote location, lack of known valuable mineral re-
sources, and near-absence of white settlers enabled Native ownership of such a 
large block of land.
Fox Farming
Fox farming, an alternate means of acquiring furs, began when Russians 
introduced blue-phase Arctic foxes to various Aleutian islands. The rapidly 
reproducing creatures ran free and fed on native fauna, primarily seabirds 
(Chapter 13). They constituted a semicaptive population for trapping when-
ever convenient. Americans followed suit in the 1880s and learned to attract 
foxes to feeding pens for regular meals of fish and sea mammal meat. Having 
eliminated the wild birds, the foxes adapted to the pens. An attached trap 
house allowed the operators to sort out the foxes for breeding purposes or to 
be slaughtered for the market. On the mainland, fur farmers kept the animals 
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permanently in pens to prevent escape. They also raised mink and martens on 
a minor scale.
American fox farmers obtained permits from the Treasury Department or, 
later, the Commerce, Agriculture, or Interior departments. The Forest Service 
leased islands under its jurisdiction, mainly in the Southeast. Until the 1940s 
or later the agencies viewed their objective as generating industry on otherwise 
useless islands. They lacked scientific data or concern for the ecological effects 
of fox introductions. Farmers stocked two species: Arctic (nearly always in the 
blue rather than the white color) and red (preferably in the silver or black rather 
than the red or cross varieties). Black and silver fox pelts reached high peaks of 
value at various times in the late 19th Century through the 1920s.
Well-publicized top prices for fox furs attracted numerous hopeful en-
trepreneurs to Alaska. The furs they produced tended to saturate the market 
and bring down prices, making it difficult for them to realize a profit. Success 
depended on a substantial capital investment for the license, breeding pairs, 
buildings, food, and other supplies. It called for knowledge of fox behavior and 
diligent attention to the details of operation. One also needed the patience to 
live in a distant location and wait several years before making any monetary 
gain. Island-raised blue foxes in particular presented a host of problems. Feed-
ing them required money and work. Males often killed pups, and eagles oc-
casionally did. Adults fought one another and sometimes killed and ate others. 
Breeding for quality could not be well controlled. On the rainy islands in the 
Southeast, fur became matted and less desirable. Pups died of pneumonia, and 
dampness aided internal and external parasites. Given the number of obstacles, 
few fox farmers made any money in Alaska. Licenses hit a high of 356 in 1929 
and entered a continual slide accelerated by the Depression and World War II. 
By 1960 virtually no fox farms remained.74
Like commercial fisheries and other enterprises controlled by white people, 
fox farming worked a hardship on Alaska Natives. In the Southeast, the Forest 
Service had leased 140 islands to fox farmers by 1923. In apparent violation 
of the 1884 Alaska Organic Act, the service issued leases without determining 
use of islands by Indians. In 1925 the Alaska Native Brotherhood, dedicated 
to improvement of the social and economic well-being of Natives, issued a 
complaint that fox farmers had “driven the Indians of southeastern Alaska from 
their homes on many islands. The home of at least one Indian widow with six 
children has been destroyed and her garden products actually used by the ben-
eficiaries of the Forest Department officials in Alaska. Another Indian, a very 
old man, was forced out of his island and his home and smokehouse actually 
made to serve as fox pens.”75 The Indians received little sympathy from the 
Forest Service and fought for decades more before winning recognition of their 
land claims.
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Outside economic forces dictated the fortunes of fox farmers, trappers, 
and furbearer populations. Whereas a shift in fashion accelerated trapping of 
a species of furbearer, it could soon change course and remove the pressure. 
High prices induced periodic influxes of trappers (post–World War I, the mid- 
to late 1920s, the late 1930s, post–World War II), and then competition and 
falling prices would lower the number of trappers.76 Fur prices plummeted 
in 1949, remained low through the 1950s, and revived in the 1960s and 
1970s.
Snowmobiles appeared in interior villages in the 1960s and replaced dog 
teams by the end of the 1970s. They permitted trappers to cover far wider 
areas while living in the villages, but they necessitated increased cash income. 
Sales of trapping licenses peaked in the 1980s and fell off steadily. Protests by 
animal rights groups influenced fashion trends. Effective in the mid-1990s the 
European Union banned importation of pelts from a list of furbearer species 
originating in nations that permitted leg-hold traps or otherwise failed to adopt 
internationally recognized humane standards. Banned Alaskan species included 
beaver, ermine, coyote, fisher, lynx, marten, otter, and wolf.77
Law Enforcement
Conservation measures, and the wide distribution and secretive nature of 
many species of terrestrial furbearers, protected all from extinction. Furbear-
er harvest (Table 14.6) could be controlled more readily than most hunting, 
in part because fur sales, unlike poached meat, left a paper trail. Methods of 
killing normally went unrecorded. The beaver, a prized animal easily located 
by its dams and houses, experienced the greatest abuse. Early white trappers 
caught beavers with dynamite, poison, netting, and shooting and by destroy-
ing dams and houses. Scarcity of beavers prompted a series of trapping bans. A 
1927 regulation stipulated that all beaver and marten skins must be inspected 
and “sealed”—accompanied by signed statements that they had been legally 
caught.78 Some trappers avoided regulations by smuggling beaver and marten 
pelts into Canada.79
Flying wardens performed effectively in monitoring the take of beavers. 
According to writer Russell Annabel, Clarence Rhode told of a fearsome rogue 
trapper named 30-30 John who boasted that no warden dared interfere in his 
rascally operations. One day an exhausted, bedraggled man appeared at a war-
den station. The puzzled agent in charge investigated his case. Several weeks 
earlier a warden, while flying over a beaver pond, had spotted a man illegally 
setting nets. Finding no place to land, he scrawled on a piece of paper, “Turn 
yourself in to the nearest Fish and Wildlife Station,” then flew back over the 
pond and dropped it out the window. He expected no response.
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The man had come to turn himself in. “Well, here I am,” he said. “I couldn’t 
git here no sooner, on account of I had to build a raft, an’ the damned raft hit a 
rock an’ busted up, an’ my outfit went down the river. I had to walk in, livin’ on 
squirrels an’ stuff, an’ the mosquitoes like to et me alive. Your airplanes are too 
much for me; I know when I’m licked,” lamented 30-30 John.80
Martens grew scarce because they could be caught easily and because their 
pelts sold for high prices. Officials decreed closed seasons in the 1910s, the 
1920s, and the 1940s.81 Mink, solitary and widely distributed creatures, never 
atrophied as a species. Neither did lynx or foxes, whose numbers paralleled the 
cycles of rabbits and ptarmigan. Coyote numbers climbed in the 1920s and fell 
off in the 1940s, possibly because of the increase in wolves. Wolves dwindled in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries from poisoning and again in the 1950s 
following the federal poisoning and aerial shooting campaign. Wolverines, se-
cretive and wily, could not be easily counted, nor could they be greatly imper-
iled before the snowmobile era without a widespread suppression effort. Their 
durable fur served for parka ruffs but not fur coats in the fashion world. A brief 
period of predator control may have made inroads in their population. But 
their low density and nocturnal nature protected them except in open country.
Black bears existed throughout forested areas except for some islands in the 
Southeast. They have not been commonly taken for food, in part because din-
ing on salmon gives their flesh an unpleasant taste. They have been less feared 
or sought after for furs or trophies than grizzly bears, and the commercial value 
of their pelts dropped precipitously in the 1920s and 1930s. They encountered 
no serious risk of depletion during the territorial period.
Table 14.6. Reported Fur Exports From Alaska, 1912–1964
 1912– 1921– 1931– 1941– 1951– 1961–
 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1964
Land otter 13,779 25,399 29,767 24,583 29,050 9,982
Arctic fox – 116,299 153,059 52,617 11,875 5,534 
Other fox 116,051 187,716 170,879 75,530 10,122 3,449
Beaver 1,571 96,839 219,072 164,479 173,937 74,046 
Marten 34,769 29,957 60,971 77,095 48,035 23,172
Lynx 76,040 51,606 14,820 7,776 15,430 9,200
Wolf 1,191 3,178 5,427 3,326 7,923 2,351
Coyote – 1,772 8,827 3,170 2,979 369 
Wolverine 3,341 4,839 2,931 1,489 2,982 1,133
Mink 266,925 346,575 455,712 440,778 242,256 83,484 
Muskrat 934,486 2,579,317 2,919,799 2,096,306 1,208,852 260,822 
Weasel 75,451 110,202 132,765 72,272 34,807 5,541
Source: Alan M. Courtright, Alaska Big Game Harvest Data (Juneau: Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, November 
1964).
Note: Many or most foxes came from fox farms. Many wolf and wolverine pelts remained for use in Alaska.
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Grizzly or brown bears, less amenable to civilization, lived in wilder regions 
of forest, mountains, and tundra. Support in the States helped them survive the 
era of hide marketing and won them some protection in reserves and wildlife 
refuges. Their numbers increased after the 1925 Game Law prohibited the sale 
of their skins, and educational efforts by the Alaska Game Commission reduced 
the number killed by commercial fishers who regarded them as competition for 
salmon. But cattle interests, loggers, settlers, and others often treated them as 
a menace to human safety and enterprise. Conflicts recurred for decades after 
statehood.
VALUING WILDLIFE
From the onset of control by the United States to the time of statehood, 
management of Alaskan land mammals rested predominantly on utilitarian 
conservation values. Government attempted, often feebly, to assure an ongoing 
supply of each species to the extent that it provided desirable meat and fur. Di-
Wolverine in leg-hold trap, Anchorage vicinity, 1949. By Fred Humes. FWS 6674, Alaska 
Resources Library and Information Services. Trappers pursued this uncommon and secretive 
wilderness creature both for its fur and as a predator. Note patch of skin chewed off.
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vision of jurisdiction among the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture depart-
ments hampered management efficiency before 1924. But the frontier mentality 
of salmon fishers, miners, settlers, and some Natives posed the greatest barrier. 
They operated on an assumption of unlimited natural resources or, if limits 
existed, on the principle that they should grab the resource before someone 
else did. Early whites in Alaska felt free to kill wildlife wherever and whenever 
they pleased, and Natives often slaughtered without any sense of conservation. 
Government, mainly through the Bureau of Biological Survey, strove to shift 
wildlife utility values from frontier exploitation to sustainable utilitarianism. 
While some officials appreciated wildlife for aesthetic or spiritual reasons, their 
public statements focused on sustainable consumptive use.
Alaskan wildlife represented much more than an amenity; it lay at the core 
of Alaska’s economy and identity. The territory, more than any of the 48 states, 
held relatively intact wildlife populations. But World War II and its aftermath 
accelerated the assault on wildlife through rising human population, more ver-
satile transportation means, and other modern implements. If wildlife and wil-
derness were to be retained, greater recognition of their economic and social 
value would be necessary. John Buckley, research director at the University of 
Alaska, attempted a quantification of economic values of wildlife in the early 
1950s (Table 14.7). He concluded that wildlife yielded nearly three times as 
much economic value as mining, agriculture, and forestry combined.82
Resource analysts projected a 30 percent increase in Alaskan wildlife eco-
nomic value by 1961, including a disproportionate rise in recreation. National 
Park Service planner Lowell Sumner expected a rapid increase of wilderness-
oriented tourists and believed tourism could become the major industry. Alas-
kans, he thought, needed to adjust their attitudes toward wildlife accordingly:
Surely, greater ultimate prosperity and happiness will come to Alaska’s people 
through deliberately accepting and adjusting their way of life to their unique 
resources of climate, scenery, wildlife, and wild spaces. This is most likely to 
happen if they take pride in and consciously hold on to the best features of 
the frontier way of life for its own special values, rather than thinking of it as 
something to get rid of as rapidly as possible.
To be successful the future economy will have to use, without using 
up, all of Alaska’s renewable resources, from seal skins to scenery, under a 
program which will perpetuate these resources indefinitely and retain more 
of the income at home. It is within the framework of this picture of the 
future—in which the frontier remains a living background—that leading 
persons in Alaska believe the infant tourist industry may outstrip all others 
in its potentiality.83
Sumner’s assumptions about tourism increase proved valid. But a year after 
his article appeared, Alaska entered an oil era that would last well over half 
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a century and generate multiple impacts on Alaskan culture, wildlife, and 
wilderness.
Partially excepting the grizzly bear, which enjoyed somewhat of a public 
following, the pre-statehood game laws did not protect species for noncon-
sumptive purposes. Yet a range of intangible values, while difficult to quantify, 
remained important to many people in Alaska as well as in the States. Sumner 
argued that if the time spent in wildlife recreation were converted into dollars, 
it might double the value of wildlife. In the absence of proper measuring sticks, 
he advised, it would be unwise to diminish wildlife resources. “Many, possibly 
most, permanent residents,” he thought, “would not care to make Alaska their 
home if the fighting trout and yearly salmon runs were gone except in old 
pictures, if the trails of bear and moose had faded from the river banks, if the 
bands of wandering caribou were only a legend handed down from a vanished 
frontier.”84
Elements of ecosystem preservation as a valued goal appeared before state-
hood, as in parks and refuges and in Leopold and Darling’s work on caribou, 
Table 14.7. Values of Wildlife and Other Natural Resources 
in Alaska, 1952
Resource Dollar Value Employment
WildliFe
   Commercial value
      Commercial fish $ 39,260,240 31,623
      Subsistence 3,250,000 24,000
      Raw land fur 1,942,291 10,500
      Raw fur seal 2,702,959 a
      Raw ivory 8,000 a
      Reindeer 115,000 250
      Fur farms 40,000 19
   Subtotal 47,318,490
   Recreational value 12,394,000 43,421
   Scientific value 50,000 ?
   Aesthetic value 1,600,000 ?
   Gross wildlife value 61,362,490 50,000 b
   Management expenditures –2,474,256




Source: John L. Buckley, Wildlife in the Economy of Alaska. Biological 
Papers of the University of Alaska No. 1 (Fairbanks, February 1955), 
33.
a= under Subsistence and Raw land fur
b= people may be in more than one category; figures are not additive
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moose, and wolves. Advocating the Arctic Refuge, Sumner pointed out that 
several wilderness species including caribou, muskoxen, grizzly bears, and wol-
verines needed large expanses of land not degraded by development: “Looking 
ahead 50 years, it is becoming clear that the only opportunity for maintaining a 
pure wilderness area large enough for the indefinite preservation of the caribou 
and other space-requiring animals, lies in northeast Arctic Alaska.”85
Most ungulate transplants, carried out before statehood, violated principles 
of ecosystem sustainability. Reindeer in particular held the potential for vast 
ecological damage. The new ecological approach to research did not make its 
presence felt in the field much before the late 1950s. Biological science ad-
equate for understanding population and ecosystem dynamics, especially for 
such mobile species as caribou, would take many additional years of work be-
yond statehood.
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Journey of the Salmon
amonG alaSKan WIlDlIfe ControVerSIeS, only the Salmon GenerateD aS 
much heat as the fur seal did. Its mysterious life at sea confounded attempts to 
manage the salmon, yet its value led men to fi ght ceaselessly over it. Confl ict 
over the salmon altered Native culture, strained relations between the territorial 
and federal governments, and even contributed to tensions that exploded into 
World War II.
Salmon ranked fi rst among economically valuable resources in Alaska near-
ly every year from the 1880s until oil took the lead in 1969. As elsewhere, 
people viewed fi sh in utilitarian terms, as a resource to be eaten by humans or 
perhaps by other animals. Salmon underwent some of Alaska’s most blatant 
episodes of misuse in the pre-statehood period, suffering damage to or destruc-
tion of numerous populations. Both federal government overseers and Alaskans 
who wanted local control of the fi sheries invoked conservation to justify their 
positions. But the high monetary value of the salmon, the remote settings of 
the fi sheries, and the lack of information on salmon ecology combined to un-
dermine rational control of the harvest.
15
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Salmon in the eastern Pacifi c spawned in rivers from Kotzebue Sound to 
the Monterey Peninsula.1 Five species swam in Alaskan waters. Pinks or hump-
backs, the most numerous, averaged 4 pounds and emerged from streams 
north of Washington. Sockeyes or reds, cumulatively the most commercially 
valuable because of their numbers, reddish fl esh, and oil content, ranged from 
Washington to the Bering Sea. They averaged 6 or 7 pounds, lived four to eight 
years, and preferred rivers connected to lakes. Chums or dogs, the least valu-
able, came from rivers between California and the Arctic. They weighed 8 to 
15 pounds and lived three to fi ve years. Cohos or silvers ranged from central 
California to Kotzebue Sound. They averaged 7 pounds and lived only about 
two years. Kings or chinooks, the largest and individually most valuable, aver-
aged 20 pounds and could reach 100 pounds or more. They originated in rivers 
from California to the Arctic and lived three to fi ve years. Commercial fi shers 
caught all species as they returned to the rivers and streams where they had been 
hatched. Canners might use all species, but sport fi shers favored kings, cohos, 
and pinks. Kings and cohos supplied the bulk of the cured, frozen, and fresh 
salmon market.2
Aboriginal Alaskans depended heavily on salmon, catching them by hand, 
in traps, or with spears or sinew nets and drying them for year-round con-
sumption. They built dams across streams but are said to have let fi sh continue 
upstream after catching enough. Russians opened a saltery the year after they 
built their fi rst permanent settlement on Kodiak Island in 1784. Dried or salted 
salmon fed Native sea otter hunters, Russians, and their servants. An attempt 
to export salmon to California and the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands failed eco-
nomically. After 1867 the Alaska Commercial Company bought salmon for 
sea otter hunters. Limited sales to the West Coast began in the early 1870s. 
Canneries, to preserve salmon fl esh in cans as opposed to packing in salt, fi rst 
appeared at Sitka and Klawock in 1878. This signaled the commencement of 
a highly intensifi ed and politically contentious period in the exploitation of 
salmon in the eastern North Pacifi c.3
CANNERY OPERATIONS
Success in a salmon cannery called for a supply of fi sh of desirable quality 
and suffi cient quantity to keep production lines going day and night as long as 
the salmon run lasted. Four methods of fi shing accounted for the vast bulk of 
cannery salmon in pre-statehood Alaska: (1) beach seines (nets tied by one end 
to the beach, the other end paid out offshore in a loop and pulled back by hand 
or winch); (2) traps (on piles driven into the bay fl oor or fl oating and anchored 
offshore) into which salmon funneled as they migrated along the shore; (3) 
gillnets (supported by fl oats and either tied at one end to the shore of a lake 
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or estuary and extending offshore or free-floating in the ocean; fish swam into 
the net and became entangled, often by the gills); and (4) purse seines (pulled 
by boats in a circle, to be closed at the ends and bottom). Methods depended 
on local conditions, but all could be very effective: in the early years at Karluk 
River on Kodiak Island a 40-fathom beach seine could yield 100,000 salmon in 
a single haul. One trap in Southeast Alaska captured over a million in a season. 
Purse seiners made lucrative hauls by intercepting offshore schools before they 
could enter rivers.4
Trolling, or fishing with lines and hooks from moving boats, provided salm-
on for the salted, cured, frozen, and fresh fish markets. Trolling for chinooks 
and cohos took place mainly in Southeast Alaska, although most of the fish 
returned to rivers in British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon. The practice 
originated at the turn of the century in small boats powered by oars, a method 
called hand trolling. By the 1920s it had evolved into a mechanized operation. 
A motorboat crewed by one to three people dragged steel lines and multiple 
baited hooks or lures, to be retrieved by power winches. Catches by all methods 
topped out in the late 1930s and dropped by more than half before statehood. 
Dams, pollution, irrigation diversions, and overfishing in the home rivers has-
tened the downward trend.5
Fish trap, Thlinket Packing Company, Funter Bay, 1907. Core coll. 01-2385, Alaska State 
Library. Traps efficiently captured salmon migrating along shorelines, harming some salm-
on runs, deepening the industry’s recession, and intensifying the political controversy over 
fishing.
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As soon as feasible after capture of the cannery salmon, independently or 
company-owned boats transported them to the factory. Workers removed the 
heads, entrails, and tails and packed the bodies in cans for sealing and cooking. 
English officer Claude Cane, visiting the Kasilof cannery in 1902, observed 
that of the five Alaska salmon species, canners normally used only two: “The 
rejected fish are not let loose to swim away, but every fish in the trap is killed 
and carried off to the cannery, where the selection is made, those for which 
they have no use being simply thrown over the side of the staging into the river 
to lay there and rot.”6 Before the turn of the century, canners in central and 
western Alaska often treated chums and humpbacks as commercially worth-
less. Discarded humpbacks could be seen piled knee-deep on Kodiak beach-
es. By 1901 they sold for 50 cents per dozen cans, half the price of sockeyes. 
Government purchases in World War I to feed troops elevated the less desired 
fish to general acceptance.7
Packing companies sent vessels to Alaska to prepare for the fishing sea-
son. The ships delivered supplies, small boats, cannery workers, and fishers; 
waited out the fishing and canning; and loaded the crews and canned salm-
on for return. Companies chose old sailing vessels because of low cost and no 
need for tight scheduling. This gave the great oceangoing ships their last role 
in American commerce, keeping some in service into the 1930s. Sailor Harold 
Gill related his experiences in the square-rigger Berlin on a six-month round-
Brailing a salmon trap. Core coll. 01-3330, Alaska State Library. Alaska salmon replaced 
those of the ravaged rivers of California and the Northwest.
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continued on next page
trip voyage between Astoria and the Nushagak River in 1912. The ship arrived 
in time to witness the Katmai eruption in June: “burning jewels of fire . . . great 
glowing rubies dripping fire for an instant and then snuffed out.” Loud booms 
and earthquakes shook the buildings 100 miles from the volcano, and a change 
of wind brought “showers of ashes, as fine as flour.”8
Summer storms drowned several men off the mouth of the Nushagak River 
and kept crews busy repairing damage. After loading, the Berlin departed in late 
August. On a rare warm and sunny day as the vessel passed Amak Island east of 
Unimak Pass, Gill and his friends climbed to the fore topgallant yardarm:
It was glorious to sit there on the sharply braced yard, leaning against the 
backstays, with our legs lying out on the swelling cheeks of the to’gan’sl. 
The sky was blue above us and the sea was blue beneath, and all around us 
wheeled the screaming white seagulls. At the foot of the weather-beaten cliffs 
the swells broke in foamy surges, and we could dimly hear their roar. Close 
to the lee-beam was a large outlying rock where some walrus had crawled up 
to take a sun bath. Looking down we could see the sailors walking deck.
Normally, though, fog and cold predominated:  “Nothing on earth can you 
imagine more lonely than those Aleutian Islands, with their sheer brown lava 
cliffs towering above the sea and capped with snow.” Returning home, Gill 
Naket Packing Company’s Waterfall Cannery near Craig, Prince of Wales Island. Core coll. 
01-2217, Alaska State Library. About 159 salmon canneries operated in Alaska during 
their peak in 1929. They furnished low-cost, high-protein food, especially welcome during 
the Great Depression.
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allowed that “there is not a man but would give a hundred Alaskas for one 
Oregon.”9
Between 1872 and 1903 Alaska fisheries came under the jurisdiction of 
the Treasury Department’s Commission of Fish and Fisheries, best known as 
the Fish Commission. An era of aggressive profit seeking got under way as 
the canneries multiplied in the 1880s. Competition waxed fierce: companies 
sometimes sabotaged others’ catches to reduce their profits. Greed ran free: 
fishers dammed or blocked off streams and caught every salmon. Regulation 
treaded lightly: weak laws went unenforced.10 Complaints by government in-
spectors roused Congress to action in 1889. It outlawed damming and blocking 
streams or placing weirs in them and appropriated money for salmon-related 
research. It authorized the Fish Commission to enforce the law, but lack of 
funding limited the commission to a staff of two enforcement agents. As a 
result, fishers continued their underhanded tactics. One cannery supervisor 
ordered his men to illegally net the spawning grounds of a nearby river; they 
pulled out 225,000 salmon. Men openly violated the ban on fishing in the 
Afognak reserve.11
Alaska Packers Association ship Santa Clara. Greely coll. PCA-66-846, Alaska State Library. 
Launched in Bath, Maine, in 1876, the 1,474-ton vessel sailed from the East Coast to the 
Orient and California until 1896, carried salmon until 1922, and served in movies until 
1939. The Alaska salmon trade gave the square-riggers their last major economic use.
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In his official report on the Fish Commission’s 1889 survey, ichthyolo-
gist Tarleton H. Bean had predicted that, in the absence of effective federal 
regulation,
we shall have repeated in Alaska Rivers the story of the Sacramento and the 
Columbia; and the destruction in Alaska will be more rapid because of the 
small size of the rivers and the ease with which salmon can be prevented 
from ascending them. For a few years there will be wanton waste of that 
marvelous abundance, which the fishermen—concerned only for immediate 
profit and utterly improvident of the future—declare to be inexhaustible. 
This season of prosperity will be followed by a rapid decline in the value and 
productivity of these fisheries, and a point will eventually be reached where 
the salmon-canning industry will no longer be profitable.12
Bean’s prophecy rested on common experience in the nation’s treatment of nat-
ural resources. In part it came true, although it took longer than Bean probably 
expected.
Marine scientist William H. Dall repeated the warnings of Bean and oth-
ers that “unless more effectively supervised the [salmon] will meet with the 
Dam on salmon stream, Helm Bay, ca. 1898. In Jefferson B. Moser, The Salmon and 
Salmon Fisheries of Alaska, Washington, DC: GPO, 1899, plate 10. Early commercial fish-
ers blocked streams to maximize their catch, damaging salmon populations in the process.
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same fate as the fisheries of California and the Columbia River.” Noting the 
northward progression of the fisheries, he worried that “the natives of the up-
per Yukon will go hungry.”13 George Bird Grinnell, who observed the canning 
industry during the 1899 Harriman Expedition, commented, “The salmon of 
Alaska, numerous as they have been and still are, are being destroyed at so 
wholesale a rate that before long the canning industry must cease to be profit-
able, and the capital put into the canneries must cease to yield any return.” The 
practice of salting the bellies of some species and throwing away the remaining 
80 to 90 percent reminded him of his experiences in the West: “This practice 
may fairly be compared with the old time method of killing buffalo for their 
tongues alone, and the more recent one of killing elk and deer for their hides or 
heads or hams.” A 1909 law banned discarding salmon backs.14
Laws enacted between 1896 and 1903 mandated weekly closed periods for 
traps and prohibited all commercial fishing above tidewater in streams less than 
500 feet wide and setting nets more than one-third of the way across tidewater 
streams or within 100 yards of another net. The 1896 act authorized the hiring 
of three inspectors. In practice, until 1912 two agents shared responsibility for 
policing the far-flung fishing sites. Territorial governor John G. Brady branded 
the fishing regulations “a farce.” Hearing that lack of funds forced federal in-
spectors to rely on the canneries for transportation, he quipped, “As well send a 
man to the front without arms and ammunition.”15
Congress transferred Alaska fish management from the Department of the 
Treasury to the Bureau of Fisheries, Department of Commerce and Labor, in 
1903. This move strengthened regulatory sympathy for the packing compa-
nies because of the agency’s close ties to business interests. An inspection of 
34 fish traps in the Southeast in 1908 showed 29 in violation of the weekly 
closed period. A second check a week later disclosed 24 still in violation. Courts 
levied fines in 54 convictions that year, and some supervisors lost their jobs.16 
Dependent on the companies for transportation and sometimes for food, the 
inspecting agents found it next to impossible to enforce the law. The boats they 
employed in 1912 lacked the necessary speed to catch violators. Stream guards, 
introduced in 1918, could be subject to bribery. Should violators be caught, 
prosecution would be uncertain given the cost, difficulty of showing proof, and 
lack of will within elements of the judicial system.17
SALMON AND ALASKA NATIVES
The salmon business in some respects detrimentally affected Alaska Natives, 
as did other forms of commercialization of Alaskan resources. Treated as wards 
of the government, Natives could not stake natural resource claims under U.S. 
laws. Tlingits and Aleuts honored family rights to fishing grounds and hoped 
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these rights would be respected. At first, canneries in Southeast Alaska recog-
nized Tlingit claims; some bought construction sites from the Natives or paid 
them royalties based on the number of fish taken. When competition intensi-
fied, canneries ceased the practice.18 In a reversal of the usual cultural clash, the 
Southeastern Indians tried to defend what they regarded as private rights against 
the European concept of fish as common property and available to everyone.19
By prohibiting dams and weirs, the 1889 law overrode Native claims to 
stream ownership and measurably increased the difficulty of their catching fish 
to supply canneries. Minimum distances between traps and nets mandated by 
the 1896 amendments further disadvantaged Natives and benefited trap own-
ers. Natives lacked the capital, technical skills, and heavy equipment necessary 
to build stationary pile traps or the more versatile floating traps that came into 
use in 1907. Natives able to purchase or lease boats could engage in purse sein-
ing that began shortly after the turn of the century.20
Governor Lyman Knapp, attempting to curb the canneries’ behavior, draft-
ed a document for use by the Tlingits. One, circulated in Juneau in 1891, 
read,
This is to notify all persons interested, that . . . Suk-ta-han and his father 
Kitch-noch claim exclusive right of possession of river at Sitkok bay for fish-
ing purposes. . . . Any white persons desiring to negotiate for privileges there 
must either satisfy ALL CLAIMANTS or have the matter of controversy 
settled by getting the parties claiming the rights together before me or some 
magistrate and have a hearing and determination of the questions at issue.
The Juneau Mining Record ridiculed the “valuable document” of the “noble si-
wash” as “worthy of preservation in a museum for rare curiosities” and accused 
the “heap big governor” of attempting to “create a small sized siwash land office 
as well as a sort of court for the adjudication of siwash difficulties.” Governor 
James Sheakley, who held office from 1893 to 1897, did not sustain Knapp’s 
efforts.21
Chief Johnson of the Taku wrote to a Treasury Department official, “This is 
the country of my people, who must have salmon to live. Five cannery compa-
nies catch salmon last summer in Takou River, and will take all the salmon from 
my people. . . . The book you gave me when I last saw you . . . you marked the 
page where the law say no man can catch fish with net in the river. . . . The can-
neries do not keep that law, they fish in river and fish all the time.”22 Lt. Cmdr. 
Jefferson Moser, a Naval officer who investigated the salmon fishery for the Fish 
Commission, explained in 1898 that
a native, whose ancestors have lived on a certain stream for generations, and 
whose rights are respected by other natives, supplies a certain cannery with 
his catch, as possibly he has been doing for years. A rival cannery tells the 
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native he must sell his catch to it, and that otherwise the men will fish the 
native’s stream. The result is overfishing, bad feeling, complaints, blows, 
and threats of bloodshed. So far as can be learned, there are now no legal 
rights or title to any fishing grounds in Alaska except what force or strategy 
furnish.23
Some cannery operators, Moser stated, paid chiefs a fee for the use of streams, 
whereas others reneged on payments. Tlingits resented the appropriation of 
their resources by others to make a profit and could not understand why the 
whites, whose culture they admitted to be superior, would not respect tradi-
tional Native rights. They pointed out the irony of Natives being forbidden 
to stake mineral claims. Moser, sympathetic toward their plight, felt that little 
would be done to correct the situation. Natives had lost the contest over fish-
ing territories.24 A legal opinion issued by the Interior Department in 1942 
upheld the validity of aboriginal Native fishing rights, but officials refused to 
act.25
Appropriation of salmon streams by whites may have jeopardized Natives’ 
cash income rather than food supply per se. Fisheries agent George R. Tingle 
reasoned that even if whites fished a river to commercial exhaustion, enough 
salmon would return to the numerous tributaries to feed the Natives. When 
questioned, he said Tlingits objected to loss of the right to sell fish to the can-
neries and no longer wanted to catch and dry fish for food. They showed lit-
tle concern for their food supply, Tingle added, when they slaughtered large 
numbers of deer merely to sell the hides.26 Laws banning commercial fishing 
in streams benefited Natives who fished for subsistence. In the Yukon and 
Kuskokwim rivers the government heavily restricted commercial fishing begin-
ning in the 1920s. This helped guarantee a reliable supply of salmon for Native 
consumption.27
Canning companies sometimes directly assisted the Natives. On Kodiak 
Island in 1922, Alaska Packers Association set up housing and commercial fish-
ing facilities for the Aleuts at Karluk River. In 1944 the Aleuts won reserve status 
for 35,000 acres embracing the river, one of the most productive salmon waters 
in Alaska, thereby securing an economic base. The reserve boundaries extended 
3,000 feet offshore.28 Canning companies challenged the Aleuts’ exclusive right 
to fish in reservation waters and won in a close 1949 Supreme Court decision. 
For their part, Metlakatla Indians on Annette Island in the Southeast started 
a community-owned cannery in 1890 and established a reserve in 1891, both 
ultimately upheld by the courts.29
In the 1940s and 1950s the Bureau of Indian Affairs provided loans to 
Natives for purchase of boats and canneries. It advocated recognition of Native 
rights to traditional fishing territories. By contrast, the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
in control of Alaska salmon fisheries from 1940 to 1960, resisted Native land 
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claims. A lawsuit settled in 1959 acknowledged the validity of Tlingit and Haida 
land claims in the Southeast, for which they received $7.5 million in compensa-
tion in 1965. Comprehensive settlement of Native claims came in the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 and the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act of 1980.30
As soon as Alaska became a state, it abolished all commercial fish traps. The 
federal government took the position that Natives had the right to build traps 
on territory belonging to them. A 1962 Supreme Court decision upheld only 
the traps in the Annette Island Fishery Reserve authorized by executive order 
in 1916.31
Salmon fisheries benefited Alaska Natives by offering an opportunity to earn 
cash (Table 15.1). Indians worked at American-owned salteries in the Southeast 
in the 1870s. As soon as the first canneries opened in the region, Indians sold 
them salmon and provided cannery labor thereafter.32 At Karluk some Aleuts 
fished commercially and used equipment provided by canneries. Nonetheless, 
they felt ambivalent about wage work. Moser observed that “the complaint is 
made everywhere that Indian labor—that is, the labor of men—is uncertain. 
After making sufficient wages to supply their personal wants and getting a few 
dollars ahead, the desire for hunting and fishing seizes them and they are apt to 
leave when they are most wanted.”33
Athabaskan fish wheel, Tanana, 1918. By Charles H. Townsend. Fish and Wildlife Service 
coll. PCA 186-23, Alaska State Library. Commercial salmon fisheries could jeopardize 
Native food supplies, and most Alaskans believed the federal government favored the outside-
owned canneries.
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To the extent that Alaska Natives worked in the salmon industry, conversion 
to a cash economy hastened the dissolution of their subsistence culture. Rather 
than drying enough salmon for a winter food supply or for barter, they sold the 
fish to canneries. Unless they carefully managed their money, a practice not part 
of their tradition, they risked hardship.34 They craved Western goods, not least 
the ingredients for brewing liquor, which sold briskly. At the same time, many 
took pride in their aboriginal culture. Lack of industrially efficient behavior by 
the Indians and rapid growth of canning operations resulted in the importa-
tion of Chinese workers. A turn-of-the-century visitor noted, “In the skillful 
manipulation of the cans and machines within doors, neither [the Indian] nor 
the white man can approach the automatic dexterity of the Chinese, who, be-
ing paid by the piece, take no account of a day’s working hours, and keep the 
machinery moving as long as there are fish in the cannery.”35 Exclusionary laws 
forced the departure of most Chinese from Alaska by 1906, and workers of 
Japanese, Filipino, and Mexican origin replaced them in some canneries.36
table 15.1 Statistical Profile of Alaska Salmon Canning 
Industry, 1878–1897
Canneries (1897) 29
Salmon canned (cases of 48 1-lb cans, 1878–1897)
 Southeast 1,739,832 
 Kodiak/Chignik 3,286,505
 Prince William Sound 494,567
 Bering Sea 1,496,513
 Cook Inlet 490,941
 Total 7,508,358
 Annual average 375,418
 1887–1897 average 691,743
Workers (1897)
 White fishermen 1,148
 Chinese cannery workers 2,268
 Native fishermen 759
 Boat/hatchery workers 326
 White cannery workers 312
 Native cannery workers 439
 Total 5,252
Workers by Region (1897)
 Southeast 1,829
 Cook Inlet 173
 Prince William Sound/Copper River 364
 Kodiak/Chignik 1,577
 Bering Sea 1,309
Source: Jefferson F. Moser, The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries 
of Alaska: Report of the Operations of the United States Fish 
Commission Steamer Albatross for the Year Ending June 30, 
1898 (Washington: GPO, 1899), 49–50.
Journey of the Salmon
362
During World War I most Tlingit men worked seasonally on fishing boats, 
and women and children labored in the canneries. A 1935 survey in northern 
Southeast Alaska showed that of a total of 2,444 Tlingit residents, 862 worked 
on seine boats and 795 in canneries. By the 1940s many operated their own 
boats. Tlingits resented the competition from cannery-owned fish traps and 
imported labor. They continued to practice subsistence hunting and fishing, 
typically in the vicinity of the canneries, where they lived seasonally.37
HATCHERIES
Concern for sustainability of the salmon fishery implied a need for more 
constricted fishing zones or periods, limits on the amount or type of gear em-
ployed, or means of increasing the numbers of salmon. Upon its inception in 
1871, the U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries adopted fish propagation 
technology as its main conservation mechanism. Livingston Stone, director of 
hatcheries in California and Oregon, accompanied a Fish Commission team 
surveying Alaska for possible hatchery sites. He recommended upon return-
ing that Afognak Island be made a “Salmon National Park.” He presented his 
idea to the American Fisheries Society and in George Bird Grinnell’s Forest 
and Stream. The Afognak Forest and Fish Culture Reserve came into being on 
December 24, 1892.
Hatcheries might be owned by cannery companies, other private concerns, 
or the federal government. Companies, hoping to head off government restric-
tion, built and briefly operated a hatchery at Karluk River in 1891. Four others 
went into operation, one at Karluk and three in the Southeast, during the late 
1890s.38 At his own expense, trader John C. Callbreath ran a hatchery opera-
tion on Etolin Island in Southeast Alaska from 1892 through 1907. He used 
methods as natural as feasible, penning the salmon in the stream. He did not 
succeed in getting return runs of fish, possibly because of overfishing near his 
stream. His request for protection went unanswered, and the reasons his experi-
ment failed could not be determined.
Prompted by warnings of fish scarcity and recommendations that hatcher-
ies be government operated, Congress acted in 1900 to require packing compa-
nies to maintain hatcheries. Some compliance ensued, but costs and inexperi-
ence yielded avoidance and poor results. Congress repealed the requirement in 
1906.39
Fish culture experts who dominated the Fish Commission and its successor 
Bureau of Fisheries emphasized fish propagation rather than regulation as the 
way to maintain stocks. Canners also preferred weak regulations and wanted to 
gain title to their cannery and trap sites. The Fish Commission resisted private 
ownership of sites and hoped to lease them and set catch quotas for each. It of-
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fered government hatcheries and no catch quotas as a compromise that canners 
accepted.40 In 1905 Congress authorized Alaska’s first federal hatchery, opening 
that year at Yes Bay in the Southeast. A second went into operation at Litnik 
Lake on Afognak Island in 1908.
In Alaska a typical salmon hatchery collected fish returning to spawning 
rivers and removed eggs and milt. Inside the hatchery, fertilized eggs incubated 
in protected enclosures. Hatchlings remained in pens in flowing water until old 
enough to release. Pinks and chums went back to the ocean as fry, and sockeyes, 
cohos, and kings lived in the pens or in lakes for about a year to be released at 
smolt size. Growing to maturity in the ocean, salmon returned to the hatchery 
stream but did not belong to the hatchery owners.41
Canneries continued to operate a few hatcheries in the 20th Century, re-
ceiving tax rebates supposedly equal to their costs of producing fingerlings. 
However, inspectors pointed to release of fry as one of the weaknesses in the 
hatchery approach to conservation. Dumping them directly into lakes, some 
frequented by Dolly Varden char, exposed fry to undue levels of predation. 
Hatchery operators often lacked technical training and made numerous mis-
takes. Cannery officials and both government and private hatchery operators 
claimed success for the operations. Between 1906 and 1920 the government 
spent far more on hatcheries than on fishery regulation and salmon research 
combined. Yet no solid evidence of hatchery effectiveness existed, and salmon 
runs continued to shrink.42
The two federal hatcheries remained until 1933 when a new Fisheries com-
missioner, Frank T. Bell, visited and ordered them closed. Bell viewed them as 
unwarranted and generous subsidies for the fishing industry. A last remaining 
private hatchery, near Boca de Quadra Bay in the Southeast, shut down in 
1936.43 Rather than enhancing salmon stocks, hatcheries in the first four de-
cades may have functioned as an excuse for the government to avoid unpleasant 
regulation and for the packers to ignore conservation measures.
Before the 1950s, hatcheries achieved modest results at best. Between 
1919 and 1927 the Territory of Alaska operated four hatcheries, but uncer-
tainty regarding their benefits ended the program. During the 1940s the Bureau 
of Fisheries ran an experimental pink salmon hatchery at Little Port Walter 
on Baranof Island. It failed to produce useful data on the effects of hatchery 
salmon on natural pink salmon runs. Beginning in 1950 the new Territorial 
Department of Fisheries tried to establish chinook salmon runs on Alaskan 
streams by planting eggs from Washington. The experiment failed completely, 
but the department successfully initiated sockeye salmon runs. The department 
ran a research station to study sockeyes and cohos at Kitoi Bay on Afognak 
Island from 1954 to 1964. Research results were lost. A hatchery at Deer 
Mountain near Ketchikan, begun in 1955, again tried to create chinook runs 
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without significant results. It had mixed success in generating coho runs in lakes 
and streams.44 Pre-statehood experiments supplied vital knowledge of salmon 
ecology but could not compensate for the losses of salmon.
LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER WORLD WAR I
Application of effective fishing methods by competing parties threatened 
to erode salmon runs and generated conflict and temptation to fish illegally. 
Almost any government attempt to regulate gear drew fire from one or more 
of the interested groups. Ongoing complaints and projections of a salmon in-
dustry collapse created a widely shared consensus on the need for protective 
action. Sales dropped from the high of World War I, and companies shut down 
numerous canneries. The companies maintained a strong presence in Bureau 
of Fisheries deliberations, and the agency lacked the power to regulate fishing 
beyond the low-tide line.
Disaster along the Yukon River forced action by the federal government. 
A very low harvest of salmon in 1919 followed the introduction of commercial 
fishing in 1918. Many Yup’ik Eskimos and Athabaskan Indians died of starva-
tion. All parties including the canning companies agreed on the need for con-
servation to be overseen by the federal government. But they disagreed on the 
meaning of “conservation” as it applied to fisheries. In congressional hearings 
Dan Sutherland, representing Alaska’s small fishermen, interpreted “conserva-
tion” to mean open and equitable access for all citizens to natural resources 
and government regulation to ensure access. In effect, Sutherland’s conserva-
tion would call for abolition of permits, reserves, private ownership of sites, 
and fish traps, all of which disadvantaged small fishers. By contrast, Secretary 
of Commerce Herbert Hoover and the canning companies with which he em-
pathized defined “conservation” in terms of efficiency. The companies wanted 
to own the trap sites and be subject to weak regulation. The most economically 
and technically efficient means of stopping the falloff of salmon runs implied 
traps and permits and thus favored the companies. The technology of fisheries 
led to a split between “equity” conservation and “efficiency” conservation, and 
the latter won out in the 1920s.
To conserve fisheries the bureau revived the 1892 Afognak Island precedent 
of salmon reserves to safeguard important spawning rivers. According to this 
plan the government would set aside a series of reserves in which leases for ex-
clusive harvest could be granted. The plan would advance conservation of fish 
but would benefit the large companies who could afford the leases.45
In 1922 President Warren Harding designated fishing reserves (by permit 
only) on Bristol Bay, Kodiak Island, Cook Inlet, and the Alaska Peninsula and 
Aleutians. The battle between Alaska fishers and the canning companies con-
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tinued. Criticism of the reserves led to a compromise in the 1924 White Act. It 
empowered the national government, specifically the secretary of commerce, to 
bring Alaska fisheries under more complete control. It ended exclusive fishing 
rights, thereby abolishing the reserves. It set regulations on nearly all aspects of 
fishing and specified that 50 percent of the fish entering each stream must be 
allowed upstream. It extended Bureau of Fisheries jurisdiction to the three-mile 
limit. Canning company lobbyists tried in vain to kill the 50 percent escape-
ment provision but managed to stop Sutherland’s amendment to abolish fish 
traps. Alaskans had objected to fish reserves, favored by the large canning com-
panies, and they won stiffer restrictions on fish traps.46 Enforcement capacity 
improved from eight boats and 50 stream guards in 1923 to ten boats and 103 
guards after passage of the act.47
Regulations pursuant to the White Act aimed to achieve sustainable har-
vesting of salmon. By its nature, the fierce competition among fishers and can-
neries during the short spring and summer seasons led to excesses and would 
eventually exhaust the salmon runs if not curbed. Rules stipulated, among other 
provisions: (1) no wasting of salmon, (2) processing of salmon within 48 hours 
of death, (3) no driving of salmon from protected to unprotected areas, (3) no 
fishing during a specified period in each week, and (5) limits on the type, size, 
and placement of fishing gear; for example, traps in different regions had to be 
0.5 to 1.5 miles apart. Restrictions varied for each district, based on different 
salmon species and environmental conditions.48
After a post–World War I recession, the industry again grew rapidly. Debate 
ensued as to whether the increase in harvest could be credited to conserva-
tion measures or to advancing technology and exploitation of new locations in 
Alaska. Writer-conservationist Stewart Edward White, depicting fisheries in the 
late 1920s, subscribed to the latter thesis:
I have seen every regulation on the list flagrantly and repeatedly violated. 
Seine boats fish the mouths of streams whenever they get a chance. This is 
obviated to a certain extent by the recent installation of stream watchers. But 
sometimes one man must look after several widely scattered streams, and 
a lively seine-boat skipper is quick to seize the absence. And, though most 
watchmen are honest, there are some willing to wink the other eye, either 
through friendship or because they sympathize with the poor devil who has 
had a lean season, or, quite simply, because they are bribed. . . . No one who 
has not seen it can realize the intensity of the scramble for fish in the brief 
season. . . . [T]hose bringing in the salmon are quite aware of the fact that 
any salmon are more than welcome.
White considered the weekend no-fishing period to be discriminatory against 
the relatively visible seine boats and in favor of trap operators, who often left the 
gate open unless a patrol boat happened along.49
Journey of the Salmon
366
Enforcement, however inadequate, tightened in the mid-1920s. Using ten 
Bureau of Fisheries vessels and chartering eleven others, agents reduced the inci-
dence of trap robbery. Most violations involved fishing in closed waters, fishing 
out of season, or improper use of gear. Officers seized, for example, four traps 
for illegal fishing in the Southeast in 1925; the court ordered two sold, fined a 
watchman $100, and sent him to jail for 30 days. The Coast Guard seized two 
Canadian vessels for fishing in U.S. waters; the court released them after levying 
$100 fines.50
Aircraft, first employed in 1929, multiplied the range of agents’ surveil-
lance and gave them an additional measure of surprise. By 1935 the bureau 
fielded faster boats and a total of 170 stream guards. One trap owner paid a 
$750 fine for operating a trap during the weekly closed period; another paid 
$500 for using traps postseason. Two beach seiners paid $50 fines and forfeited 
the salmon they had caught in Petersburg Creek.51
Salmon scarcity in the 1940s and 1950s heightened fishing competition 
and the frequency of law violations. Alaska Game Commission agents and pi-
Salmon counting weir, stream watcher’s cabin, and Fish and Wildlife Service patrol plane, 
Red River Lake outlet, Kodiak Island, 1950. By Frank L. Beals. FWS 970, Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services. Aircraft measurably enhanced fisheries law enforcement.
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lots assisted the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in law enforcement. Of 50 
cases before U.S. Commissioner courts in 1945, 44 resulted in convictions. 
Normally, violators paid $100 fines and gave up their catches. In 1955 the 
commissioner courts pronounced 218 of 244 defendants guilty in 125 cases. 
Compared with 1945, fines increased for larger operators, but the small man 
usually paid $50 or $100 or won acquittal.52
TERRITORIAL-FEDERAL ANIMOSITY
Management of the salmon fisheries stirred virulent resentment among 
Alaskans during the entire territorial period. Alaskans believed the canning in-
dustry, concentrated largely in San Francisco, Seattle, and Astoria, had been 
instrumental in shaping the 1912 Alaska Territorial Act that created the terri-
tory but denied the legislature managerial control over fish and wildlife. The 
legislature retained the power to impose limited licensing and property taxes on 
fisheries, providing the bulk of the territory’s revenue for decades. The fishing 
industry lobbied Congress unsuccessfully for bills removing the territory’s right 
to tax but succeeded in forestalling the territory’s repeated attempts to gain 
management powers.53
Local feelings toward stateside fishermen and the federal government ran 
high. After passage of the 1924 White Act, fishermen complained that their 
boats and gear could be seized upon suspicion of their location, whereas most 
fish traps could not. For many years residents in some districts had difficulty 
being hired to fish for or work in the canneries, even if they joined an outside-
based union.54 Between 1927 and 1938 the Seattle-based Alaska Fishermen’s 
Union maintained a contract clause obligating some canneries to pay a four-
cent penalty (one-third of the value) for each fish purchased from an Alaska 
resident. Another contract set a ratio of thirteen nonresidents for each Alaska 
resident fisherman allowed to sell to the canneries.55
Researchers Homer F. Gregory and Kathleen Barnes of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations examined claims that canning companies exercised monopo-
listic control. They pointed out that large companies could better afford the 
modern vessels increasingly employed to transport workers and fish over long 
distances; could more effectively bargain with unions, influence policy, and 
market their products; and possessed the breadth and stability to survive down-
turns in prices or salmon runs. Moreover, the conservation regulations inci-
dentally favored them by spreading fish traps over a wider range, giving larger 
operators a relative advantage.56
Alaska Packers Association, a San Francisco–based group formed in 1893, 
put up as much as 80 percent of the salmon pack for most of the 1890s. By 
declining percentages it headed the Alaska industry until World War I.57 By the 
Journey of the Salmon
368
1930s, however, no company dominated. In 1937, near the all-time peak of 
production, 113 canneries operated in Alaska, owned by 75 companies. Most 
companies had 1 or 2 canning factories. In the Pacific Northwest as a whole, 
the largest company ran 11 factories and the 9 largest had a total of 52. Of 
453 traps in Alaska, the 5 largest companies controlled 171 and the 9 larg-
est companies 214. Traps in Alaska caught 46.4 percent of the salmon, seines 
(mostly owned by small concerns) 27.7 percent, gillnets 24.3 percent, trollers 
(for fresh or cured salmon) 1.4 percent, and fish wheels (used by Natives only) 
0.3 percent. Alaska Packers Association put up 11.5 percent of the canned 
salmon in 1937 and the leader, Pacific American Fisheries, Inc., somewhat 
more. Gregory and Barnes concluded that competition among the companies 
and the variety and mobility of gear prevented formation of a monopoly.58 
Working together, however, the companies exercised a powerful effect on regu-
latory policy.
Salmon Traps
Probably nothing more clearly focused local resentment of federal control 
than salmon traps. Alaska Natives had devised various means of trapping salm-
on, and the Russians built traps for the salted salmon trade. Americans followed 
suit, improving on the designs to supply large numbers of salmon to the can-
neries. The two most common forms, stationary and floating, ultimately caught 
more fish than any other type of gear. Fishers placed these devices in streams 
and estuaries until the 1889 law banned the practice, and they continued to do 
so until law enforcement tightened up. By 1901, 57 stationary traps existed: 
6 in Bristol Bay, 21 near Chignik on the Alaska Peninsula, 1 at Kodiak, 20 in 
Cook Inlet, and 9 in Southeast Alaska. Floating traps appeared in 1907 and 
proved cheaper to operate than stationary traps, which had to be pulled up after 
every season to reduce navigation hazards. Floating traps could be towed into a 
harbor for the winter.
A strike by fishers in 1912 caused the canners to increase their reliance on 
fish traps. Traps enabled companies to reduce labor costs, gain greater control 
over the fishing and transportation process, and obtain fresher fish to can. The 
number of traps peaked at 799 in 1927. Required minimum distances between 
traps cut the numbers steadily. Traps caught more salmon in times of plenty, 
but purse seines got more in times of scarcity.59
Fish traps sat strategically in the pathways of salmon returning to their 
spawning rivers. Fish swam into a pen from which they could not escape. Traps 
could be brailed (emptied) at leisure and the fish delivered to a cannery in rela-
tively unspoiled condition. Occupiers of a trap site held an exclusive right to 
that site by tradition and might sell the lease for a large sum. Those who fished 
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by other means strongly resented the fish traps, accusing the owners of putting 
them out of business by overexploiting the fish supply. Industry representatives 
interpreted the dispute as largely a labor issue in that fish traps required few 
workers. Government fisheries officials defended the traps as a legal and ef-
ficient means of harvesting fish.60
Between 1915 and 1958 more than 40 percent of the salmon catch came 
from fish traps, 75 to 90 percent outside-owned. In a 1948 nonbinding refer-
endum Alaskans voted by more than seven to one to abolish fish traps. Federal 
officials contended they could not legally discriminate in favor of local residents 
and that, compared to other methods, fish traps wasted less salmon.61 In any 
case, the secretaries of Commerce and Interior lacked the authority to abolish 
traps until 1949. Thereafter, federal reluctance to abolish salmon traps further 
convinced Alaskans that Washington overrode their wishes for the benefit of 
powerful outside interests. Critics cited the salmon decline as the outstanding 
proof of federal mismanagement of natural resources and called for territorial 
control of resources, or for statehood, as a remedy.
Salmon Decline and Statehood
A long and deep depression in salmon harvests began in the late 1930s 
(Table 15.2), intensifying mutual recriminations and resentment of federal 
management. At maximum in 1929 the canneries numbered 160, in the 1930s 
and 1940s about 110–115, and by 1960 about 50. The number of traps stayed 
at about 400 from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s. But gillnet boats increased 
from 3,000 to 7,500 and seine boats from 700 to 1,500 during the period. 
Average annual catches declined about 50 percent for traps, 80 percent for purse 
seiners, and 90 percent for gillnetters. Between the peak harvest year of 1936 
and 1959, the total catch fell from 8.5 million to 1.6 million cases, prompt-
ing President Dwight Eisenhower to declare Alaska fisheries a disaster area in 
1953 and 1954.62 The emergency resulted in increased federal enforcement and 
research funds, scarce prior to the mid-1950s. Higher salmon prices, however, 
tempted more people to fish and inspired more illegal fishing.63
The Interior Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service had assumed jurisdic-
tion over Alaskan inshore fisheries in 1940. As a wildlife management agency 
the service saw its main responsibility as maintaining a sustainable supply of 
salmon and not involving itself in questions of who should get the fish. In ef-
fect, this policy favored the large companies who possessed financial and tech-
nical advantages in access to salmon. It reinforced Alaskans’ impressions that 
the federal government favored the outside companies. Within the context of 
tightening competition for fewer salmon, federal-territorial relations worsened 
in the 1940s and 1950s.
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The service held annual hearings in Seattle and Alaskan fishing ports to 
discuss status of the stocks, report on research results, and hear comments be-
fore drafting regulations for the following year. But the meetings did not result 
in a mutual effort to conserve fish stocks. Despite annual decreases in salmon 
catches, the canning companies and labor unions united to demand weaker 
regulations. Fish and Wildlife director Ira Gabrielson confronted industry rep-
resentatives at a 1941 hearing, castigating them for their greed: “One is there-
fore to conclude that the governing motive is the desire to take as many fish as 
possible now without any regard to the future supply. No industry, no matter 
how potentially profitable it may be, can long endure if the partners engage in 
indiscriminate looting.” After each Seattle meeting the industry lobby went to 
Washington to seek more receptive ears. During the war they argued for relaxed 
regulations to feed the troops, and after the war they contended that restrictions 
prevented rebuilding the fishing fleet. Meanwhile, in most years the salmon 
harvest continued to go down.64
In 1949 the Alaska legislature created a Department of Fisheries in prepa-
ration for eventual statehood. Members of its governing board included three 
fishermen, a canning industry representative, and a member of the public at 
table 15.2. Commercial Salmon Catches in Alaska (thousands of fish), 1878–1982
Year Total Year Total Year Total Year Total Year Total
1878 56 1899 14,358 1920 64,066 1941 103,608 1962 62,801
1879 69 1900 21,546 1921 38,568 1942 80,844 1963 47,471
1880 68 1901 27,165 1922 72,273 1943 86,717 1964 65,717
1881 91 1902 31,794 1923 77,789 1944 70,128 1965 56,331
1882 177 1903 30,095 1924 82,181 1945 74,867 1966 64,033
1883 295 1904 28,631 1925 64,163 1946 72,454 1967 20,881
1884 429 1905 27,257 1926 96,785 1947 69,859 1968 62,292
1885 640 1906 31,312 1927 47,517 1948 58,160 1969 41,902
1886 1,273 1907 34,643 1928 87,737 1949 78,171 1970 68,445
1887 2,060 1908 42,296 1929 71,107 1950 44,816 1971 47,489
1888 4,183 1909 34,938 1930 80,076 1951 49,503 1972 31,950
1889 6,605 1910 33,365 1931 69,629 1952 48,032 1973 22,305
1890 6,625 1911 44,307 1932 72,196 1953 37,041 1974 21,873
1891 7,694 1912 63,169 1933 79,624 1954 44,296 1975 26,217
1892 5,117 1913 59,308 1934 113,433 1955 39,624 1976 44,416
1893 7,266 1914 54,975 1935 71,501 1956 50,591 1977 50,805
1894 8,506 1915 63,655 1936 126,439 1957 34,370 1978 82,281
1895 7,586 1916 69,742 1937 108,687 1958 41,000 1979 88,754
1896 11,536 1917 91,565 1938 100,710 1959 25,127 1980 110,004
1897 13,025 1918 102,041 1939 78,341 1960 42,484 1981 113,325
1898 12,898 1919 57,367 1940 84,800 1961 45,026 1982 111,572
Source: Doug Eggers and Michael R. Dean, Alaska Commercial Salmon Catches, 1878–1986. Alaska Dept. of Fish and 
Game, Div. of Commercial Fisheries. Regional Information Report No. 5J87-01 (Juneau, August 1987), 1–2.
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large, to be nominated by the governor and confirmed by the legislature. The 
department assisted the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries by fielding additional 
stream guards, improving spawning beds, and conducting research. The domi-
nant responsibility for salmon management, however, remained with the fed-
eral government until after statehood.65 Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton 
abolished fish traps effective in 1959, the last year of federal control.66
During and after his 1939–1953 tenure as territorial governor, Ernest 
Gruening kept up a steady criticism of federal jurisdiction over fisheries. The 
steep reduction in harvest reinforced his argument that territorial or state con-
trol would be better for conservation. In 1954 he wrote that
forty-two years ago, the Territory of Alaska, deprived as no other terri-
tory had been, of the control and management of its fisheries, through the 
intrigue and political manipulations of the same forces that have helped de-
stroy the resources, began to plead for that right of self-government. . . . But 
an absentee industry, wealthy and politically potent, little concerned with 
the morrow of Alaska’s resources, has been able to thwart this logical aspira-
tion and long-overdue change, abetted by a bureaucracy equally unwilling to 
yield an iota of its perquisites.
Gruening charged that in addition to jeopardizing a vital natural resource, the 
canning industry used its clout to oppose statehood because it would mean 
Alaskan control over the fisheries.67
Salmon symbolized the frustrations of Alaskan boosters, who strove to rep-
licate the American experience of taming the frontier and converting its natural 
resources into prosperous and self-governing communities. In the view of the 
business community, newspaper editors, and politicians, this normal and prop-
er goal required that local citizens control the resources. That meant the settlers, 
not the Native Americans. Yet very little capital existed in Alaska. The salmon 
industry, like large-scale gold and copper extraction, necessitated investment 
from outside owners who did not fancy living in remote and primitive condi-
tions. Managers and stockholders in faraway Seattle, New York, San Francisco, 
and other cities built and owned most of the canneries and the large vessels 
employed. Companies imported nearly all their supplies and many workers 
and needed very little from Alaskans. The territory functioned as an economic 
colony of the United States, its settler population sustained largely by federal 
expenditures.
Outsider control of natural resources and, to a high degree, of the gover-
nance system grated on the boosters. Rather than acknowledge the problem 
of remoteness, they blamed the canning companies’ political power for retard-
ing the growth of their communities. They viewed federal conservation mea-
sures in the same light and labeled most such moves “federal mismanagement.” 
Opposition to the federal government, to environmental protection, and to 
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recognition of Native claims became ingrained in the settlers’ political culture. 
Boosters looked for salvation in statehood. Then, they believed, control over 
natural resources and over their political affairs would at long last enable them 
to achieve their destiny.68
JAPANESE-AMERICAN COMPETITION
An ongoing quarrel between the United States and Japan affected world af-
fairs as well as Alaska salmon. A seafaring nation consuming a high quantity of 
fish, Japan turned its attention to North Pacific salmon. Victory in the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904–1905 gave it access to sites on the Siberian coast for 
cannery locations. Forced out by the Soviets after 1918, the Japanese designed 
cannery ships, enabling them to operate offshore.69 The vessels first appeared 
in the Bering Sea in 1930 and processed king crabs, a fishery not yet exploited 
by the Americans. Diplomatic talks produced an informal understanding that 
Japan would not fish there for salmon and the United States would not encour-
age a domestic crab fishery. Under the influence of its fishing industry, the 
Japanese Diet funded a 1936–1939 “study” of the North Pacific salmon fishery. 
A mother (cannery) ship and six fishing boats appeared in the Bering Sea in 
1936 and canned both crabs and salmon. At a meeting of fishery representatives 
in February 1937, a Japanese delegate proposed a joint venture to operate float-
ing canneries in Bristol Bay. American representatives rejected the plan.70
Tensions rose when a Japanese fishing fleet visited Bristol Bay in June 1937. 
A State Department inquiry evoked Japanese assurances that the fleet had no 
license to fish salmon there and was “presumably engaged in crab fishing.” 
American fishery companies chartered a plane and photographed the vessels 
catching salmon. In its response to Japan, the State Department argued that 
“as a sound principle of justice” no nation should destroy a resource being con-
served by another nation and that the United States had “the right or obligation 
to protect the salmon fisheries.” It did not claim legal jurisdiction over the fish 
as it had attempted to do in the case of fur seals. The Japanese government 
promised to discontinue the study after 1937.71
Japanese military advances in China and multiple indications of deterio-
rating U.S.-Japan relations transformed the salmon incident into a dramatic 
confrontation. A New York Daily News writer declared in August 1938:
Aside from commercial aspects, the plain implication of Japan’s position is a 
new definition of her sphere of influence in the Pacific, constituting a direct 
challenge to our sovereignty over waters hitherto considered exclusively 
within United States jurisdiction. It amounts also to a continuation of the 
aggressive policy of territorial expansion applied to Manchukuo and China, 
only this time by sea instead of land.
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The writer charged that the Japanese operated more than 1,000 vessels along 
the eastern Pacific Coast, crewed by naval reservists rather than ordinary fisher-
men: “They not only chart the waters off our shores and the channels leading 
into our bays, inlets, and harbors, between Nome and San Diego; they possess 
accurate knowledge of our naval bases, our coast defenses, even our gasoline 
and oil stores.”72
Rumors of a return of the Japanese fleet in spring 1938 prompted a Coast 
Guard investigation that found nothing. But the rumors inflamed fishermen 
and others suspicious of Japan. Newspaper and magazine articles, radio pro-
grams, and even movies magnified anti-Japanese sentiment and heightened de-
mands on the government to take action. Bills introduced in Congress declared 
the salmon to be U.S. property and called for widening national jurisdiction to 
waters over continental shelves.73 Almost certainly, the angry mood contributed 
to American military defense buildup in the Pacific.
World War II interrupted Japanese fishing in subarctic waters. During the 
postwar occupation, General Douglas MacArthur placed severe restrictions on 
Japanese fisheries, excluding them from the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands. 
The constraints remained in force until 1952 as a means of pressuring Japan 
to agree to boundaries favorable to the United States.74 Japan, Canada, and the 
United States signed a treaty in 1951, ratified in 1953, forming the North Pacific 
Fisheries Convention. Under its provisions Japan would refrain from catching 
salmon originating in North American rivers. Lacking certainty of where the 
fish went at sea, parties agreed that Japan could fish west of 175 degrees West 
Longitude, a line bisecting the central Aleutians. Meanwhile, research would be 
done to determine boundaries between eastern and western Pacific salmon so 
the jurisdictional line could be adjusted accordingly.
Japan stepped up its high seas fishing in 1954, and for the next three 
years sockeye salmon catches in Bristol Bay fell well below normal while Japan 
made record catches. As many as 20 percent of fish caught in Bristol Bay bore 
scars from small-mesh driftnets used by the Japanese. American research-
ers concluded that a majority of fish caught almost as far as 170 degrees East 
Longitude, near the tip of the Aleutians, came from North America. American 
and Canadian fishers, restricted to inshore fishing as a conservation measure, 
asked the Japanese to move their operations westward. At a 1957 meeting of the 
Fisheries Convention, the Japanese refused.75
Differing interpretations of research results prevented resolution of the fish-
ing boundary question for two decades. Effective in 1977 the United States and 
others adopted a 200-mile offshore zone for national jurisdiction over fishing 
rights. Japan and the United States then negotiated a treaty recognizing the new 
exclusion boundaries. In effect, the agreement moved Japanese fishing to 175 
degrees East Longitude and 200 miles away from American-owned islands. In 
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the Bering Sea foreign vessels could fish without permission only in a zone in 
the center.76 Even then, high seas fishing by Japan, Taiwan, and Korea inter-
cepted salmon from Alaskan waters.
Americans arrested vessels illegally fishing within the 200-mile limit. 
Pressured by environmentalists, the U.S. government prevailed upon Japan to 
stop the use of driftnets that stretched for several miles and captured a wide va-
riety of fish, birds, and mammals. Japan halted the practice in 1991, and subse-
quent agreements limited the length of driftnets and prohibited all salmon fish-
ing by gillnets on the high seas. In 1992 a North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries 
Commission, now including Russia, replaced the tripartite 1952 International 
North Pacific Fisheries Commission.77
RESEARCH ON SALMON
Effective conservation and government regulation suffered acutely from 
a lack of accurate information. Evidence appeared to justify the widespread 
opinion that overfishing did long-term damage, but proof did not come easily. 
Without sound research data, congressional committees could not readily be 
induced to vote for restrictions. Moreover, Alaska’s isolation and the territorial 
government’s weak position and emotional stance precluded high visibility or 
sympathy in Congress or in stateside public opinion. Vocal Alaskans displayed 
much more interest in improving their own take of salmon than in conserving 
the stocks.78
Federal research on Alaskan salmon began in 1899 when the U.S. Fish 
Commission vessel Albatross identified species and their locations in the 
Southeast. A year later, the ship surveyed Bristol Bay. The Bureau of Fisheries 
opened an office in Seattle in 1914 and conducted summer studies of salmon 
life cycles in Alaska. On a small scale the bureau carried on research into the 
1950s. The federal government transferred its research program to Southeast 
Alaska in 1956 and built the Auke Bay Laboratory near Juneau in 1960. The 
laboratory maintained stations at King Salmon, Brooks Lake, Karluk Lake, 
Kasitna Bay, Olsen Bay, Traitors Cove, and Little Port Walter. It concentrated 
mainly on pink, sockeye, and chum salmon. After the state gained control of 
inshore fisheries in 1960, the laboratory continued as a federal facility investi-
gating the biology of high seas salmon and other organisms.79
Shrinking harvests in the 1940s led the salmon industry to establish a 
Fisheries Research Institute. Located at the University of Washington, it began 
fieldwork in 1946. Increasingly through the 1950s, funding from the federal 
government supplemented that from private sources. The institute carried out 
thorough, long-term studies of salmon life cycles and focused on escapement 
as a key to biologically based salmon management.80 In the decades after state-
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hood, fisheries scientists steadily improved their ability to predict and enhance 
salmon runs.
Accumulating knowledge of salmon life revealed a host of complexities. 
Stream water quality and quantity, forest cover, ocean currents and tempera-
tures, weather patterns, hatchery production, escapement, fishing intensity, and 
other factors affected salmon abundance. Research on escapement showed each 
salmon run to be a distinct genetic unit, and thousands of such units existed in 
Alaska, intermingling in the ocean where most fishing took place. Earlier fish-
ing practices had seriously damaged many genetic units. Under the White Act, 
regulators thought it sufficient to allow fishing for half the season and close it 
for the other half to achieve 50 percent escapement. Because different units ran 
upstream at different times, overescapement occurred for some units and un-
derescapement for others.81 Underescapement could impair a unit by numerical 
loss, but overescapement could disrupt eggs and lower the survival rate, also 
weakening the unit. Perhaps for this reason, Tlingits sometimes faced starvation 
before the era of canneries.82
Further reflection on the controversial fish traps yielded a broader perspec-
tive. Historian Robert DeArmond observed that in addition to keeping the fish 
fresher than those caught by other means,
the salmon trap was an efficient machine for harvesting a natural resource 
[and] in good part responsible for the low cost of canned salmon when com-
pared to other sources of protein. During the years of the Great Depression, 
canned pink and chum salmon, No. 1 tall cans, commonly sold at a dollar a 
dozen wholesale, and in some years as low as 90 cents a dozen, and thou-
sands of poor people depended on it for their protein.
“It is interesting to note,” added DeArmond, “that while all Alaskan fisher-
men—seiners, gillnetters, trollers—united in their efforts to abolish the traps, 
each now puts an approximately equal effort into fighting the others for a share 
of the total catch.”83
Efficiency of the fishery did not concern the individual commercial fisher, 
who approached the business competitively. Between 1936 and statehood the 
average catch per operator continually fell, but high fish values balanced low har-
vests and kept fishermen afloat. Ever-more gear chasing ever-fewer fish meant a 
more rapid decrease of fish stocks and steadily lowered efficiency in the fishery 
as a whole.84 Advocates of statehood had chosen “federal mismanagement” of 
fisheries as their most potent rallying cry. At statehood Alaska acquired its own 
opportunity to tackle the increasingly complicated and politically loaded prob-
lem of who should have access to which fish under what conditions.
When the state assumed control of inshore fisheries on January 1, 1960, the 
salmon harvest had reached a low point. Yet the reviled traps had disappeared 
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and advancing research laid an ever-stronger foundation for management. It 
soon became apparent, however, that competitive fishing by small companies 
and individual boat owners did not work well either. It multiplied the dif-
ficulties of regulation, wasted resources, and put excess pressure on fish stocks. 
Alaska changed its constitution effective in 1974 to restrict commercial salmon 
fishing by issuing permits for exclusive fishing rights at specific times and loca-
tions. This approach built conservation into the process rather than leaving it 
an external force pleading for regulation.85
Low salmon harvests moved the state to reinstitute public and private 
hatcheries in the 1970s. Accumulated experience in fish culture brought about 
success in propagation. Hatchery-nurtured salmon, mostly pinks and chums, 
eventually comprised 25 percent of the overall catch.86 But the ecological impact, 
if any, of large-scale hatchery salmon production had yet to be determined.
Research in the late 20th Century demonstrated a clear connection between 
Alaska salmon population levels and a cyclical weather pattern called the Pacific 
Decadal Oscillation (PDO). The PDO appeared to be connected to, but not 
necessarily caused by, the El Niño phenomenon. PDO periods tend to last two 
to three decades and are characterized by high or low sea surface temperature, sea 
level pressure, and precipitation. During “positive” PDO phases, higher winter 
precipitation along the Gulf of Alaska coast causes high spring runoff, favoring 
survival of salmon fingerlings. Warmer near-shore waters enhance the growth 
of plankton, food for the young salmon. Farther south, from British Columbia 
to California, this climate phase appeared to lower rather than increase salmon 
production. Positive PDO periods existed from 1925 to 1947 and after 1977, 
generally corresponding to high salmon catches (Table 15.2).87 Applying six 
other indexes of climate, researchers confirmed the change dates of 1925, 1947, 
and 1977. A century of data suggested that salmon populations probably have 
fluctuated for centuries, before the era of modern fishing.88 Ocean changes, 
therefore, rather than overfishing or mismanagement per se, may have been the 
primary cause of the salmon decline beginning in the 1940s. To what degree, if 
any, overfishing may have worsened the downward trend is not known.
By the 1980s Alaska salmon harvests rose in some years to record levels. But 
the industry encountered new challenges. World price competition drove down 
profits. Pen-raised salmon from Chile, Norway, Scotland, and Canada seized an 
increasing share of the market. Alaskans realized they might be forced to aban-
don their expensive chases at sea and follow suit.89 Meanwhile, logging in the 
Southeast threatened to reduce salmon runs by degrading freshwater habitat, 
and the possibility of oil tanker spills loomed. Pen-raised salmon might spread 
disease to wild populations or interbreed and genetically dilute them. Perhaps 
not least, global warming posed uncertainties for salmon habitat, both freshwa-
ter and marine. A study of sockeye salmon indicated that an ocean temperature 
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rise of a few degrees could greatly contract the range of sockeyes and perhaps 
other species.90
Conservation proved difficult to apply to Alaska salmon. Unlike charis-
matic mammals, salmon stood little chance of acquiring a public following. 
Isolation from public scrutiny, a politically powerful fishing industry, the wide-
spread taste for salmon flesh, and the competitive nature of the industry in-
vited excess in Alaskan commercial salmon fishing in the pre-statehood period. 
Federal enforcement agents attempted to curb aggressively exploitative behavior 
and achieve goals and objectives of sustainable harvest of salmon while being 
accused of favoring outside fishing interests. Although conservation goals usu-
ally required generous measures of ecosystem sustainability, science understood 
too little of salmon ecology in the years before statehood. Treaties and conven-
tions introduced broader elements of stewardship, necessary for a fish traveling 
from international waters to inland destinations. A combination of tightening 
regulation, accumulating knowledge, and the uncertainty of annual fish hauls 
moved federal and state policy toward sustainable management of the salmon. 
Notwithstanding the achievements in salmon management, however, climatic 
warming might do more damage to salmon ecology and the salmon industry 
than all other negative factors combined.
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Gold and Oil on the Kenai
a PRoMinent PlaCe in alaSKa’S enViRonMental and PolitiCal annalS BelonGS 
to the Kenai Peninsula, a 9,000-square-mile region of surpassing beauty. Few 
other locales in the North experienced such contention over land use or such 
rapacious treatment of wildlife. At statehood the contest continued, leaving a 
partially protected ecosystem facing worrisome prospects for survival.
Bordered on the south and east by glacier-trimmed peaks, the center and 
west of the Kenai features lakes, muskeg, and low wooded hills. Dominant 
tree species are black and white spruce and, in burned-over areas, aspen, birch, 
cottonwood, and willows. Moose, black and brown bears, caribou, Dall sheep, 
mountain goats, wolves, coyotes, wolverines, lynx, beavers, red foxes, and small-
er mammals are sustained by the varied topography. About ten species of game 
fi sh are found in the lakes and streams.1 Whales, porpoises, sea lions, seals, and 
sea otters can be sighted offshore. Nearly half the land mass is reserved in the 
Kenai National Wildlife Refuge and Kenai Fjords National Park.
Endowed by fi sh and wildlife, agricultural potential, and timber and min-
eral wealth and accessible to the ocean, the Kenai Peninsula bred confl ict over 
16
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natural resources. Captain James Cook bade his men to survey the shores of 
his namesake inlet in 1778.2 Russians hunted sea otters along its coasts and 
erected one of their fi rst settlements, Fort Alexandrovsk at the southwest tip of 
the peninsula, in 1786. Others followed at the Kasilof and Kenai rivers in 1787 
and 1791 and at Resurrection Bay and Hinchinbrook Island in 1793. Russians 
Kenai National Moose Range/Wildlife Refuge, 1941 and 1980. Courtesy Jason Geck
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acquired land animal skins from Tanaina Indians on the peninsula. After 1867 
the Alaska Commercial Company operated several fur trading stations on and 
near the peninsula.3 Trapping ranked as an important industry during the ter-
ritorial period. Salmon canneries operated at Homer, Seward, Seldovia, and 
other locations. Settlers engaged in commercial gardening and dairying, and 
tourist ships visited the port of Seward.4 Compared with other parts of Alaska 
the Kenai possessed a more diverse economy and ecosystem.
CONFLICT OVER MINERALS
Minerals decisively affected events on the peninsula. Chugach Eskimos and 
Athabaskan Indians mined and fashioned implements from copper. Smelting 
iron from ore mined in the Kenai Mountains, Alexander Baranof ’s men built 
Alaska’s first sailing vessel, the Phoenix, at Resurrection Bay in 1794. Russians 
conducted their only significant coal mining venture at English Bay where an 
open pit mine operated between 1855 and 1860. They burned the coal in their 
steamships and in shipyards at Sitka. They lost money in 1857 on their sole at-
tempt to sell coal in California.5 Americans briefly operated mines at Kachemak 
Bay beginning in 1889. Like the Russians, they could not find a viable coal 
market in San Francisco. Coal mining took place at several Kenai Peninsula 
locations during the territorial period; the coal fired steamships and heated 
canneries and homes.6
Gold added color to the Kenai story. Russians explored the peninsula, find-
ing gold on the Kenai River in 1834 but not exploiting it. American prospec-
tors discovered economically valuable deposits under beaches at Turnagain Arm 
about 1890 and at Bear and Palmer creeks in 1894. A resultant gold rush in 1896 
immediately spawned boomtowns named Hope and Sunrise, whose heyday 
ended abruptly when word of the Klondike strike spread in 1897. Confidence 
man and criminal gang leader Jefferson Randolph “Soapy” Smith came to assess 
the prospects of the Kenai rush but decided not to stay. He went to Skagway in 
1897 to win infamy as one of Alaska’s most notorious criminals.
Prospecting activity in Cook Inlet gave rise to a supply route across the 
mountains from Resurrection Bay, where the town of Seward sprang up. Andy 
Simons, Alaska’s most famous and first licensed guide, got his start freighting 
mail by dogsled over Moose Pass to the goldfields.7 The Klondike Gold Rush 
magnified national interest in Alaska and spurred efforts to build a railroad 
into the interior. In their optimistic projections, economic boosters envisioned 
large-scale gold and other metal production, and exploitation of the Matanuska 
Valley coal deposits for locomotive fuel and agricultural and industrial develop-
ment. Congress passed an enabling act in 1898, and investors built a railway 
from Seward 47 miles north to Moose Pass in 1903–1906.8
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The Ballinger-Pinchot Affair
Alaska coal and railroad politics touched off one of North America’s most 
celebrated conservation fights. The Morgan-Guggenheim Syndicate (or Alaska 
Syndicate), owner of Kennecott Copper as well as a controlling interest in 
Alaska’s main steamship line and some of its fisheries, also owned a mine up the 
Copper River at Kennicott. Needing coal for its projected Copper River and 
Northwestern Railroad from Cordova to Chitina and for a planned extension 
into the Tanana Valley, it hoped to secure coal in Alaska. Coalfields of service-
able quality existed near the Bering River, but the syndicate had no direct legal 
access to them. A 1904 coal leasing law permitted individuals to file claims on 
160-acre plots or to combine claims for joint ownership of up to 640 acres. The 
law forbade conspiracy to combine claims in advance of their “location,” the 
first stage in processing a claim on federal land, but permitted it after “entry,” 
a later stage.9
Theodore Roosevelt disliked both waste and monopoly control of natural 
resources. He sought coordinated and rational resource use through planning 
and management by the federal government to achieve sustained-yield produc-
tion for the advancement of the nation. Resource giveaways and theft, the fruits 
of compliant laws and weak enforcement, did not fit into his notion of efficient 
scientific management. Congress responded to the appeals of interest groups 
seeking access to public lands and only partially and reluctantly accommodated 
the president. Although he considered conservation policy his most meaningful 
domestic achievement, Roosevelt had to conduct most of it through executive 
action.10 To bring coal leasing into line with market values and prevent it from 
becoming monopolized, he withdrew nearly all Alaska coal lands from com-
mercial activity in 1906.
One prospector, Seattle businessman Clarence Cunningham, set out to 
investigate the Bering River coalfields in 1902. He eventually staked out 33 
contiguous 160-acre claims on behalf of a group of Seattle-area acquaintances. 
Whereas observers believed that nearly all of the approximately 900 Alaska coal 
claims had been filed by stand-ins for companies in contradiction to law, the 
Cunningham group had no such record. A General Land Office agent investi-
gating the group’s claims approved their elevation to entry status. While final-
izing the claims in 1907, the group met Morgan-Guggenheim representatives 
and worked out an agreement to split profits and guarantee the syndicate an 
unlimited coal supply for 25 years. Morgan-Guggenheim would thereby gain 
dominant control over the Bering coalfields. A member of the Cunningham 
group, former Washington governor Miles Moore, went to see Land Office 
chief Richard Ballinger, who ordered the claims advanced to “clearlisting,” a 
near-final stage of government approval.11
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Ballinger, a former Seattle mayor known for integrity and devotion to 
public service, had been selected to reform the scandal-ridden General Land 
Office. This he proceeded to do before resigning to resume his law practice in 
March 1908.12 Louis Glavis, a zealous young official in charge of the Seattle 
branch of the Land Office, suspected that his chief had improperly favored the 
Cunningham group. He obtained a copy of Cunningham’s journal indicating 
that the latter’s group had agreed prior to the crucial date of location to com-
bine and sell their claims. The journal demonstrated violation of the law but 
no collusion with the syndicate. Recently resigned and unaware of the journal 
discovery, Ballinger met Cunningham group members and assisted them in 
processing the claims.13
When William Howard Taft assumed the presidency in 1909, he appointed 
Ballinger secretary of the interior. Prominent men interested in forwarding the 
Cunningham claims visited Ballinger and requested action. Disdainful of that 
form of influence and uncertain of the validity of the claims, Ballinger passed 
the men off to his assistants. Glavis met one of the assistants, told his story of 
the journal, and asked for an investigation of the claimants. Ballinger ordered 
the investigation suspended pending an attorney general’s opinion. As soon as 
Glavis and another agent had drafted a letter of evidence for the attorney gen-
eral as directed, the Interior Department decided to rely instead on the opinion 
of its own legal department. Its ensuing opinion upheld the coal claimants. 
Glavis then took it upon himself to send the evidence to the attorney general, 
who overruled the Interior Department’s decision. Convinced of undue favorit-
ism in Interior, Glavis went to former secretary of the interior James Garfield 
and his fellow conservationist and chief forester Gifford Pinchot. Adding other 
conservation issues, Pinchot wrote a letter of complaint to Taft. After investigat-
ing the matter, Taft upheld Ballinger.14
Pinchot had also arranged for Glavis to personally present his case to 
President Taft. The meeting took place in late summer 1909. Taft took the 
position that Ballinger had not known the details of the Alaska coal claims 
in question; therefore Glavis had been inappropriately aggressive in question-
ing Ballinger’s actions. Ballinger received Taft’s approval to dismiss Glavis, and, 
shortly thereafter, Glavis lost his job. Now more certain than ever of wrongdoing 
and a cover-up, Glavis wrote a lengthy and hard-hitting article for the muckrak-
ing magazine Collier’s Weekly. He insisted that Ballinger had indeed been aware 
of the details of the Cunningham leases because he had been fully informed 
by Glavis and another officer. Moreover, by representing the leaseholders after 
leaving office, Ballinger appeared to be violating a conflict-of-interest law that 
prohibited such action for two years. Glavis detailed a list of instances in which 
Ballinger or others in the Interior Department acted as if determined to validate 
the coal leases. Believing the department would soon transfer 100,000 acres 
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of valuable coal lands to private parties who in at least some cases had made 
fraudulent claims, Glavis asserted that he had no choice but to bring the case 
before the public.15
On his last day in office, Roosevelt had ordered an addition to the Chugach 
National Forest that took in four of the Cunningham claim sites, inciden-
tally creating a basis for Forest Service involvement. Chief Forester Pinchot, 
the principal architect of Roosevelt’s utilitarian conservation policy, hoped to 
keep that policy alive under the new Taft administration. His bureaucratic rival 
Ballinger had now been appointed secretary of the interior. Ballinger and Taft, 
while anti-monopoly Progressives, espoused a form of conservation emphasiz-
ing market-value sale of resources to private interests rather than ownership and 
leasing by the federal government. The new policy, the loss of Roosevelt’s direct 
involvement, and the upsurge of special interest activity threatened Pinchot’s 
conservation principles. In the Alaska coal claims case he found a means of 
reviving his plan: coupling an attack on his opponents in government to an 
appeal to the public’s anti-monopoly sentiments. He proceeded to nurture the 
impression that Ballinger personified the influence of the Morgan-Guggenheim 
Syndicate in government.16
Pinchot launched a public attack on Ballinger’s policies, and the press 
picked up Glavis’s story of the Alaska coal claims. Ballinger, believing in the 
integrity of his position and backed by Taft, proved no match for the combative 
Pinchot. Taft lost faith in Pinchot and fired him, adding fuel to the flames.17 A 
congressional investigation of extraordinary length—45 sessions—ensued be-
tween January and March 1910. Glavis attorney Louis Brandeis proved that 
the Taft document exonerating Ballinger had been backdated, a severe embar-
rassment to Taft. In a partisan vote the committee upheld Ballinger, but Glavis 
and Pinchot had won in the eyes of the public.18 Soon after the sick and weary 
Ballinger resigned in 1911, the Land Office cancelled the Cunningham claims. 
The coal deposits turned out to be far less valuable than imagined by partici-
pants on either side of the debate.
The Alaska scandal left lasting marks on American politics. Magazines 
and newspapers painted it as a triumph of the public interest in affirming 
Rooseveltian conservation and rejecting Taft’s approach. Roosevelt hoped to re-
vive his policy and his presidency through the Bull Moose Party. He had intend-
ed the party name to symbolize his brand of conservation in Alaska, suggesting 
that Taft favored monopoly capitalists. His campaign split the Republicans and 
ensured the victory of Woodrow Wilson. Louis Brandeis won fame that carried 
him to the Supreme Court.19
In Alaska, most magazine editors and business leaders assessed Pinchot’s 
brand of conservation as a barrier to economic progress. They believed Ballinger 
was sincerely interested in the welfare of Alaska, and Clarence Cunningham 
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epitomized the individual entrepreneur frustrated by federal regulations. 
Some Alaskans adopted Pinchot’s argument, portraying J.P. Morgan and the 
Guggenheims as a threat to Alaskan autonomy and individual enterprise.20 
They linked Taft to the syndicate, suggesting that his proposal for governance 
of Alaska by an appointed commission amounted to giving the syndicate access 
to Alaska coal. Taft relented in 1911 and signed a bill creating the Alaska ter-
ritorial government in 1912.21
Alaska Railroads
Notwithstanding the post-1902 gold rush to Fairbanks and some success-
ful agricultural activity in the Matanuska Valley, the planned Seward-Fairbanks 
railway went bankrupt after being extended to the 72-mile point on Turnagain 
Arm in 1910. Several factors contributed to the railway’s demise: mismanage-
ment, tight investment money, Roosevelt’s coal withdrawal, and resistance by 
the Morgan-Guggenheim Syndicate to a route that might rival their Copper 
River line.
Construction train of Alaska Central Railroad, north of Seward, June 1905. Alaska files 
11704, University of Washington Archives. The railroad project failed, but its publicly fund-
ed successor opened interior Alaska to land travel. Hunting to feed railroad crews put pressure 
on Kenai Peninsula wildlife stocks.
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Believers in Alaskan development redoubled their efforts for a government-
financed route to the interior. Taft, a sympathizer, asked Congress in 1912 to 
authorize an Alaska railroad, something the federal government had not done 
for other territories or states. A commission sent to the territory carried out 
a hasty survey and recommended in January 1913 that two routes be con-
structed to the interior: (1) extension of the Copper River route from Chitina 
to Fairbanks and a spur to the Bering coalfields, and (2) continuation of the 
Seward line across the Alaska Range to the Innoko-Iditarod gold mining dis-
trict and a spur extending to the Matanuska coalfields. President Woodrow 
Wilson took office in March and shared the enthusiasm for a government-
owned-and-operated railroad to catalyze Alaskan economic growth. Pushing 
aside skeptical questions about economical viability, both houses of Congress 
voted overwhelmingly in 1914 to give Wilson power to build a railroad from a 
port site to the interior and to use equipment from the Panama Canal project. 
Alaska delegate James Wickersham had struck a responsive chord in his call to 
“do something for Alaska” and in his argument that government involvement 
would end the syndicate’s monopoly plans. Some Alaska boosters promulgated 
the thesis that Matanuska coal would benefit the Pacific naval fleet, a claim 
rendered dubious by the shift to oil, among other conditions.22
Alaskan boosters wanted both of the railroads and full access to the coal 
lands. Coal-fueled railroads would open up the interior to mining of gold, cop-
per, and other metals, the presumed key to Alaska’s economic progress. The coal 
would also heat homes and other enterprises, and the railroads would connect 
to agricultural lands. Boosters interpreted the federal reservation of coal lands 
as an unconscionable denial of their rights. They received part of what they 
wished for in October 1914 when Congress made available for leasing nearly all 
Alaska coal lands. To prevent monopolization, the law limited leases to 2,560 
acres. Coal deposits could be exploited but not owned by private parties, and 
modest per-acre and per-ton fees would be due the federal government, provi-
sions the boosters considered unfair.23
A study team fielded by Wilson recommended a single railroad route, from 
Seward to Fairbanks. They probably sensed the political unwisdom of choosing 
the Copper River option that would link the administration to the syndicate. 
Moreover, the westerly route could make connections to Matanuska coal and 
agriculture, and Ship Creek (later Anchorage) afforded a good main construc-
tion site. Wilson rendered his decision in April 1915 for a Seward to Fairbanks 
route. He rejected or ignored Portage Bay as a port site. It would have shortened 
the railroad by 64 miles, and a spur eventually ran to it.
Soon after completion of the railroad President Warren Harding rode the 
train from Seward, making speeches along the way. He drove the golden spike 
at North Nenana on July 15, 1923. Like Taft and Wilson, he believed in an 
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active federal role in Alaska development and in resistance to monopoly con-
trol. Harding articulated these themes in his last major speech at Seattle on the 
return trip from Alaska. Dead of a heart attack in San Francisco on August 2, 
he did not live to see the flowering of the Teapot Dome scandal or its echo on 
the Kenai Peninsula three decades later.24
Notwithstanding the booster rhetoric of Wickersham and others, the Alaska 
Railroad failed to either pay for itself or create a rush of economic activity in the 
interior. It cost $56 million to build, far more than the $35 million estimated. 
By 1930 it had lost $8 million in operation. Senate investigators readily identi-
fied the shortcomings. Salmon fishing, the main industry, occurred along the 
coast and did not need the railroad. Neither did the fur industry nor, for the 
most part, gold mining. Not enough agricultural production existed to make 
use of the railroad; indeed, food from the States came in by railroad and under-
cut local prices, reducing the number of commercial farms. Settler population 
did not significantly increase along the route.25 Only World War II and the oil 
era would bring about economic development in the interior.
GAME MAMMALS
Besieged by fortune seekers, limited in size, and in geographical terms 
relatively separate from the interior mainland, the Kenai Peninsula incurred 
heavy ecological damage. Forest fires proliferated, converting spruce stands to 
deciduous forest. Agricultural scientist Hugh Bennett’s 1916 report stated that 
“most of the forest fires are started by homesteaders, timbermen, railroad con-
structors, prospectors, and hunters, generally through carelessness and without 
thought of the seriousness of the destruction done.”26 Fires generated side ef-
fects of increased moose browse and removal of the lichens preferred by cari-
bou. Commercial hunters slaughtered both moose and caribou for their antlers. 
Meanwhile, the mammals’ natural predator, the wolf, neared eradication by 
trappers setting out poison. Biologist Wilfred Osgood recorded in 1900 that 
“wolves are considered common in the Cook Inlet region. Mr. [George] Coon, 
of Hope told me that during the winter of 1899 he secured fourteen with poi-
son. Among these were six in the black phase.”27 By 1915 trappers had ex-
hausted populations of small furbearers on the peninsula and exterminated the 
wolves. Few commentators appeared concerned about the wolf, regarded as a 
competitor for fur and game.
Mammals on the Kenai, once depleted, took long to recover. The human 
population had relatively easy access to them, and the restricted and ruggedly 
mountainous connection to the interior inhibited migration. Caribou, de-
scribed in an 1890 report as abundant, began to disappear soon after the turn 
of the century. Andrew Stone reported in 1900 that they “are already scarce on 
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the Kenai Peninsula, and will doubtless soon be exterminated, the region be-
ing greatly frequented by visiting sportsmen, while native hunters kill moose 
and caribou for their heads, disposing of them at good prices for shipment 
to San Francisco.”28 Claude Cane noticed the scarcity of caribou in 1902 and 
mentioned hearing of several mass killings, one by a sport hunter who gunned 
down all thirteen of a band of caribou he encountered.29 Regulations based on 
the 1902 game law banned the hunting of caribou after 1904.30 Forest fires 
removed lichens, almost certainly hastening the demise of the Kenai caribou. A 
last officially confirmed sighting, of a lone bull south of Skilak Lake, entered the 
records in 1910.31 No caribou and virtually no wolves existed on the peninsula 
for more than half a century.
Meat hunting also changed natural balances on the Kenai. Sport hunter 
E. Marshall Scull described the pattern of moose exploitation:
Driven out of the southwestern end of the Peninsula by hunters issuing from 
Homer and Seldovia to supply the canneries there; forced to retreat from 
Kenai and Hope on the west and north, the moose had withdrawn near to 
the mountains. . . . Many hundreds were killed yearly by the Indians, the 
guides and the professional meat hunters, and the continued persecution had 
herded the remainder together into a comparatively small piece of country 
[near Skilak and Tustumena lakes].32
English hunter Col. Claude Cane and trophies, Kenai Peninsula, 1902. In Claude Cane, 
Summer and Fall in Western Alaska, London: Horace Cox, 1903, frontispiece. A relatively 
accessible source of big game, the Kenai attracted some of the earliest sport hunters.
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Special Game Warden L.F. Shaw related in 1915 that Hope and Sunrise at 
the north end of the peninsula
depended for a meat supply almost wholly on the moose and mountain 
sheep, and there was a wanton and wasteful killing of these valuable food 
animals. Indeed, some of the old-timers made it their boast that they killed a 
moose merely for what they considered the choice part—the tongue—leav-
ing the carcass to go to waste. The beginning of construction on the Alaska 
Central Railway in 1903, and continuing on until 1906, on which hundreds 
of men were employed during the greater part of the time, raised havoc with 
the moose and mountain sheep. Hunters were engaged at all times to keep 
the various camps along the line of work supplied with moose and sheep 
meat, it being cheaper than domestic meats shipped from the States.33
Entrepreneurs also shipped meat to the mining towns of Valdez and Cordova.34 
The 1908 Alaska game law curbed some of the practice, as did a 1912 regula-
tion prohibiting the sale of moosemeat outside the Kenai Peninsula and a 1916 
regulation banning sale on the peninsula.35
Illegal killing and sales persisted during the 1915–1923 construction of the 
Alaska Railroad. Mountain goats on the Kenai suffered relatively little because 
of their steep terrain and the fact that people did not prefer their meat. Sheep, 
estimated at 2,000 in 1916, had been severely diminished, particularly in the 
northern sector closest to the railroad. Officials thought moose numbered about 
5,000. Sport hunters rated them the world’s largest, but relatively few hunters 
journeyed to Alaska prior to World War II.36
Market hunting posed a threat to moose in the late 1910s and early 1920s. 
A twenty-year Kenai resident charged that, after the deletion of the warden post 
at Kenai,
our Anchorage warden is a clerk in a haberdashery, and he has not been off 
the railroad since he was appointed. Our restaurants are serving moose and 
other wild game meat, both in and out of season. One can find moosemeat 
at almost all times at the road houses, tie camps, and restaurants in and 
around Anchorage, Seward, and Seldovia. It is the hind quarters of moose 
which have been brought in by the market hunters, by natives and whites, 
and sold for whatever they will bring. In most instances the fore quarters 
have been left in the woods.
Kenai has a population of some 300 people, whites and natives, and 
that many more dogs. They all live on moosemeat. The government teacher 
there told me that the people there kill about 450 moose every year of which 
90 percent are cows. 
Bulls had remained inland on higher ground, whereas cows moved to lower 
elevations to bear and raise their calves. The resident estimated that hunting 
along the Alaska Railroad had driven moose 25 miles back, restricting their 
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range. Moreover, rabbits had caused starvation among moose calves by eating 
low-growing vegetation during a hard winter. The resident called for funding 
to cut birch trees to feed moose in winter and to better enforce the game laws.37 
Such complaints aided passage of the 1925 Game Law, which effectively pro-
scribed commercial meat hunting and alleviated pressure on ungulates on the 
Kenai. However, it worked a disproportionate hardship on Natives, who did 
most of the hunting.
Moose continued to be seen as the peninsula’s most important wildlife spe-
cies. Given the advantages of abundant feed and the absence of wolves, the 
moose increased until the mid-1920s.38 During rutting season they gathered in 
large herds, and a sport hunter could look over several hundred bulls within a 
few days to choose a trophy.39 The moose herd receded slowly in the 1930s and 
sharply in the early 1940s. Leading causes appeared to be predation by black 
bears and scarcity of browse as the forests recovered from the fires of the Gold 
Rush era. A 290,000-acre fire in 1947 helped moose recover.40
Concern over excessive taking of Kenai mammals gave rise to proposals for a 
wildlife preserve. William Langille, the first Alaska director for the Forest Service, 
so recommended in 1903. The Alaska Game Commission and the Bureau of 
Biological Survey made similar requests in 1931 and 1932. Governor George 
Parks and others disparaged the idea as an impediment to mining and home-
steading. Fish and Wildlife Service chief Ira Gabrielson secured a presidential 
Moose at Kenai River, 1920s. Romig coll. 90-043-835, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 
Alaska and Polar Regions Archives. Fires and the absence of wolves caused the moose to 
multiply.
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executive order in 1941 creating a Kenai National Moose Range. Gabrielson 
later resisted efforts to settle European refugees on the Kenai Moose Range or 
to use it as a military bombing range. The executive order declared the Kenai 
Moose Range “for the purpose of protecting the natural breeding and feeding 
range of the giant Kenai moose on the Kenai Peninsula, Alaska, which in this 
area presents a unique wildlife feature and an unusual opportunity for the study 
in its natural environment of the practical management of a big game species.”41 
Characteristic of pre-ecological thinking, it made no mention of wolves to help 
balance the moose population or of caribou to complete the ecosystem. Such 
concerns awaited the statehood period. A different Kenai question occupied the 
attention of conservationists in the 1950s: wildlife versus oil.
THE OIL ERA
Kenai oil made its presence known to visitors on the lands bordering Cook 
Inlet, where Russians noticed oil seeps by 1853. Oil prospectors staked claims 
on the west shore in the 1890s and drilled two wells, pumping small quantities 
of oil in 1902.42 At Katalla near Cordova southeast of the Kenai, according to 
Henry Lucas, Frank Dufresne, and Lawrence J. Palmer near Killey and Funny rivers, Kenai 
Peninsula, 1938. FWS 6994, Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. Palmer, 
an expert on vegetation, conducted research on caribou, reindeer, moose, and muskoxen.
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legend, Tom White fell into an oil seep while bear hunting in 1896. He set fire 
to it and watched it burn for a week, then tried to interest companies in drilling. 
A British consortium investigated and made Alaska’s first commercially viable 
strike in 1902. Chilkat Oil Company and others drilled 36 holes, and Chilkat 
built a small refinery in 1911. The field produced modestly until the refinery 
burned in 1934, terminating the venture.43
Taft withdrew Alaska oil lands from public access in 1910. After the re-
opening in 1920, prospectors showed minimal interest in the Kenai until about 
1950. Then, little more than a decade after the executive order creating it, the 
Kenai National Moose Range figured in two of the most profound changes in 
Alaskan history: the creation of the 49th U.S. state and the domination of Alaska 
by the oil industry. David Postman, an investigative reporter for the Anchorage 
Daily News, traced the Kenai oil story from Washington to Anchorage, where 
a group of local businessmen succeeded in helping an oil company gain a com-
manding position in Alaskan oil production. In the process, group members 
enriched themselves and moved Alaska toward statehood.
The Kenai Oil Strike
Oil politics soared to new heights during the Eisenhower years; oil com-
panies heavily financed Ike’s 1952 and 1956 campaigns. His western political 
operator and 1952 fund-raiser, Charles Stone Jones, presided over Richfield Oil 
Company. W. Alton “Pete” Jones (unrelated), chief of Cities Service Company, 
which owned 30 percent of Richfield, succeeded him in 1956. Both Joneses 
belonged to the group of businessmen who persuaded Eisenhower to run for 
president as a Republican. Soon after the 1952 election, Pete Jones led three 
oilmen in building a farm for the Eisenhowers at Gettysburg, supplying horses 
and cattle, paying its operating expenses, and renovating a nearby building as 
a home for the president’s son John and his family. Eisenhower counted the 
Joneses as friends and treated the oil companies as allies throughout his two 
terms.44 His first Interior secretary, Douglas McKay, demonstrated inordinate 
devotion to oil company preferences and successfully promoted a law granting 
ownership of offshore oil to the states, a measure that made the oil more avail-
able to the companies.45
In August 1953 Secretary McKay unexpectedly banned all oil exploration 
and leasing in wildlife refuges pending a study of their effects on wildlife, a con-
servation concern he had not previously evidenced. Of several companies explor-
ing in the Kenai Moose Range, all except one abandoned it.46 Richfield remained 
and, in late 1954, filed lease applications for 71,000 acres on the range. Locke 
Jacobs, leasing agent for fourteen Anchorage businessmen, noticed that some of 
Richfield’s leases had been topfiled (claimed by a later party) on those held by his 
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group. Representing the businessmen, Wilbur Wester, manager of the Westward 
Hotel, visited Richfield headquarters in Los Angeles in January 1955. He pro-
posed that in exchange for the leases Richfield agree to drill a well “somewhere 
in Alaska” during the next two years. The parties worked out a deal by which 
Richfield would purchase the leases, drill a well, and pay the group a 5 percent 
royalty if oil should be produced from the lands. At the same time, Jacobs filed 
for 52,000 more acres next to the Richfield leases. Later in 1955 Richfield paid 
the group for all the leases and guaranteed them 5 percent of royalties.47
The Anchorage businessmen comprised an elite segment of the Elks Club 
informally known to some as the “Spit and Argue Club.” Two of the most 
prominent men in Alaska belonged to the group: Robert Atwood, editor and 
publisher of the Anchorage Daily Times, and Elmer Rasmuson, president of the 
National Bank of Alaska and a brother-in-law whose father had lent Atwood 
the money to purchase his newspaper. Atwood and Rasmuson recognized oil 
development as a way to achieve statehood, and they stood to gain financially 
on the oil deal. As described by Alaska oilman Jack Roderick, “What Atwood, 
Wester, and other members of the leasing group were trying to accomplish was 
to gradually convert Anchorage, Alaska into Tulsa, Oklahoma.”48
Bureau of Land Management officials in Anchorage held the power to dis-
pense leases for oil drilling. Two of them, Chester McNally and Virgil Seiser, 
issued leases to members of the Spit and Argue Club for lands just outside the 
boundary of the moose range. According to Postman, McNally and Seiser de-
nied access to persons not connected to Richfield Oil Company. The Interior 
Department launched an internal investigation in the wake of allegations of 
bribery of McNally and blatant favoritism by Seiser. Fearing another Teapot 
Dome scandal involving leases in Louisiana as well as Alaska, Interior officials 
quietly transferred McNally and Seiser and declared that no corruption existed. 
Officials destroyed the records of the investigation.49
Alaska’s territorial delegate to Congress and later senator E.L. “Bob” Bartlett 
firmly and consistently defended the oil companies, particularly Richfield. He 
and Spit and Argue Club representative Wilbur Wester marshaled Alaskan sup-
port for the submerged lands oil leasing bill. Bartlett pushed for lifting of the 
wildlife refuge oil drilling ban and for other measures favoring Richfield and its 
Anchorage allies.50 The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
held hearings in 1956 and considered legislation to require congressional con-
sent for all drilling in wildlife refuges. It reported no bills.51 Bartlett and former 
governor and nonvoting Senate delegate Ernest Gruening had presented force-
ful testimony in favor of drilling in the moose range. Committee chairman 
Herbert Bonner (D-NC) stated that he had no objection to Richfield’s going 
ahead at Swanson River. Fish and Wildlife Service director John Farley and the 
U.S. Geological Survey also gave Richfield their approval.52
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Under fire from critics charging excessive subservience to the oil companies, 
Secretary McKay had resigned in May 1956. Fred Seaton, a former newsman 
and personal friend to Atwood of the Anchorage Daily Times and C.W. Snedden 
of the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, succeeded McKay. At Snedden’s suggestion 
Seaton chose Alaskan lawyer Ted Stevens as his congressional lobbyist. Within 
three months after taking office, Seaton approved 72,000 acres of noncompeti-
tive lease applications by Richfield and the Anchorage businessmen for land in 
the northern part of the Kenai Moose Range. Richfield proceeded to drill and 
on July 19, 1957, at Swanson River, made the first commercially significant oil 
strike in Alaska.
A boom atmosphere followed on the heels of the Richfield discovery. Seaton 
banned further leasing and drilling pending drafting of regulations to apply to 
all wildlife refuges. A heated debate ensued, focusing on the Kenai National 
Moose Range. Fish and Wildlife Service regional director Clarence Rhode 
quietly disapproved of drilling on the refuge, while higher officials endorsed 
it. The National Wildlife Federation stood against further drilling, as did Ira 
Gabrielson’s Wildlife Management Institute. One conservation organization, 
the Isaac Walton League, favored oil in the moose range. In a 1957 position 
paper it reversed its stance of a year earlier. The paper described the roads built 
through wild areas as a positive influence: “Driving over the oil-well road, one 
cannot help being impressed by the many beautiful lakes and recreation areas 
which the new road had made accessible to the ordinary sportsman—the man 
who cannot afford to charter a plane for his fishing or hunting trips.” The 
moose seemed to “enjoy browsing on the newly felled trees.” Switching to a 
soon-to-become-familiar political theme, the paper added, “Oil from Alaska 
could be the savior of Western civilization if the Soviet influence on the other 
side of the world continues to grow.” Burton Atwood, national secretary of the 
league and brother of Robert Atwood, authored the paper.53
Shortly after Burton Atwood’s visit in August–September 1957, the 
Anchorage Chamber of Commerce issued a statement on the drilling issue. It 
argued that oil wells and roads would likely occupy a total of about 699 acres, or 
“the permanent use of a land area equal to that now allocated for slightly more 
than one moose (a pregnant cow, perhaps). There are now 4,000 moose in the 
2,000,000 acre range which allows 500 acres for each moose.” The removal of 
large trees would spur new growth and “relieve the Fish and Wildlife Service of 
the present practice of sending crews of men onto the forest to cut down trees 
to provide moose forage. The oil companies would, free of government cost, 
maintain and improve the moose range.” The statement strongly emphasized 
the strategic value of a nearby source of fuel for military bases in Alaska. The oil 
would boost the national economy and “strengthen the position of the United 
States at a time when the major sources of oil for the Western World are in 
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jeopardy in the Middle East.” Appendixes to the chamber’s statement included 
Atwood’s paper and a letter from the Anchorage Sportsmen’s Association, self-
described as “the largest group of sportsmen in the Territory of Alaska,” approv-
ing of oil drilling in the moose range.54
Protection of the natural integrity of the moose range may have been the 
first priority of Gabrielson, Rhode, and others, but it stood little chance in the 
atmosphere of the late 1950s. In 1941, when even utilitarian conservation met 
opposition from Alaskan economic developers, the moose range had to be justi-
fied as a moose supply and hunting ground. The Fish and Wildlife Service man-
aged it largely to maximize moose. The absence of wolves and lack of knowl-
edge of bear-moose predation kept predator control out of the Kenai. As forest 
fires came and went, the quality of moose browse rose and fell. In times when 
the trees grew too high, the service cut down deciduous species so moose could 
feed on the tops. Oil advocates cited this practice, and the notion of moose sup-
ply as the main purpose of the refuge, to present their own cutting as a benefit. 
Even a semiurbanized area might not reduce the moose total. Whereas wildlife 
advocates opposed roads through the woods to lakes as destruction of wilder-
ness integrity, oil companies depicted them as improved access for the average 
Moose in browse cut, Kenai National Moose Range, 1955. Courtesy Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services. When post-burn deciduous trees matured, moose starved 
and refuge managers cut trees for feed.
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person. Adding national security and national economic benefit to their argu-
ments, oil advocates held a winning hand.
The Interior Department conducted a November 1957 hearing on pro-
posed regulations permitting restricted drilling on the Kenai Moose Range. A.W. 
“Bud” Boddy registered the support of the Alaska Sportsmen’s Council for the 
plan. All oil company representatives rejected any limits. Ernest Gruening went 
further, calling for abolition of the range and the Chugach National Forest as 
well.55 Gruening wanted to establish himself as the Father of Alaska Statehood. 
Despite his progressive record as a Democrat and editor of The Nation, Gruening 
turned to the oil companies as allies for the statehood effort and as a source 
of funding for his future Senate campaign. Moreover, his close friend and a 
Republican, Robert Atwood, strongly backed Gruening’s political ambitions, 
and vice versa. Describing himself as a “conservationist,” Gruening loudly ad-
vocated drilling in the moose range.56 He attacked the Interior Department 
and conservation organizations as obstacles to statehood and quoted Burton 
Atwood’s paper as evidence that the moose would not be harmed.57
Federal officials in late 1957 pondered the question of whether to open the 
moose range to oil development and, if so, whether leases should be granted 
on a competitive or on a first-come, first-served basis. Richfield and the Spit 
and Argue Club had lease applications pending on 100,000 acres; they al-
ready held 72,000 acres of approved leases where they had found oil. A ri-
val group of Anchorage businessmen, headed by developer Walter Hickel and 
First National Bank of Anchorage president Dan Cuddy, challenged first-come 
leasing, which would give further advantages to Richfield and its allies. Unable 
to work out a deal, the two groups agreed to prevent an exposé from appear-
ing in the newspapers.58 Ted Stevens warned Seaton that rumors of favoritism 
in the leases approved in 1956 could create a scandal. Bob Bishop, an aide to 
the worried and cautious Seaton, recalled, “We were watching the tracks of 
the noose, not the moose.” Seaton issued orders in January 1958 to prohibit 
all oil drilling in wildlife refuges except those in Alaska and left the decision of 
where to drill up to the Fish and Wildlife Service. Overriding the reluctance 
of its Alaskan officials, the service recommended that half the moose range be 
opened. Congress raised the annual Alaska leasing fee from 25 to 50 cents per 
acre to make it comparable to the Lower 48 but took no action on noncom-
petitive leasing.59
Oil companies began to subscribe to statehood for Alaska in the mid-1950s, 
anticipating greater influence in the new state than in the federal government. 
Their Alaskan sympathizers worked against higher state royalties for oil extrac-
tion, even though the money could help make the new state economically vi-
able. The companies may have hoped to purchase public lands, a prospect that 
never materialized. W.C. Arnold, veteran lobbyist for the Seattle-based salmon 
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canneries and previously the most active adversary of statehood, softened his 
position. He had purchased oil leases for himself after privately meeting with 
members of the Spit and Argue Club. He joined in their demands for opening 
of the moose range. The statehood bill passed in June 1958, and oil politics may 
have furthered the statehood effort.60
Federal regulations required competitive bids for leases on government land 
where oil had been found. Nevertheless, the Interior Department commenced 
noncompetitive leasing in its Anchorage Bureau of Land Management office in 
August 1958. It honored the 100,000 acres of Richfield–Spit and Argue lease 
applications filed in 1954 during the leasing ban and accepted them in prior-
ity to those of other applicants waiting first in line at the office. Several of the 
losing applicants took their case to the federal courts. They lost at the District 
Court level, won at the Appeals level, and lost in the Supreme Court, which 
ruled that the interior secretary had a right to ignore his own orders.61 The 
Richfield group had won an essential monopoly on the most valuable known 
oilfield in Alaska.
The Kenai During Statehood
Robert Atwood continued employing his newspaper to stoutly promote 
industrialization and the oil industry in particular. He and others had con-
tested the right of the interior secretary to close any of the Kenai Moose Range 
to drilling. They lost in the Court of Appeals in 1956 and chose not to appeal 
to the Supreme Court. Atwood and the thirteen other Spit and Argue Club 
members ultimately received about $3 million each from the Kenai leases. 
Gruening won election to the Senate in 1958 and carried on the demand for 
nullification of the moose range, succeeding in having it reduced by 270,000 
acres in 1964. Oil, gas, logging, and other commercial operations proceed-
ed in the northern half of the remainder.62 In 1965 the legislature passed a 
resolution calling for discontinuation of the moose range as a game reserve, 
arguing that it should be used for agriculture. It made no mention of oil.63 
Through the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, in 1980 the 
moose range became the 2-million-acre Kenai National Wildlife Refuge, near-
ly 70 percent designated the Andrew Simons Wilderness Unit. A new Kenai 
Fjords National Park encompassed 567,000 acres of the central east coast of 
the peninsula.64
Alaskans also sent to the Senate Bob Bartlett, succeeded after his death in 
1968 by Ted Stevens, a consistent and powerful opponent of environmental 
protection. All three senators maintained ties to the oil companies. Richfield 
(later Arco) went on to make the historic 1967 find at Prudhoe Bay that changed 
Alaska more than any other event.
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Kenai wildlife realized some gains in spite of the oil extraction in the moose 
range. Between 1915 and 1960 only a single proven sighting of a wolf occurred 
on the Kenai. As wolves rebounded from the intensive control efforts of the 
1950s, they began to reclaim their territory. The presence of an individual wolf 
inspired protective measures by the state in 1962. A pair appeared in 1967, and 
then a large pack arrived in 1968, multiplied, and reestablished the species on 
the Kenai.65
Successful transplant efforts in the 1960s and 1980s returned small caribou 
herds to the peninsula.  But the once-pristine Moose Range had been altered. 
Fish and Wildlife Service refuges director J.C. Saylor II described it in an in-
ternal memo:  
From the air, the area of oil development looks like a site of a major military 
conflict with cat trails running everywhere, frequent large gravel pits, un-
treated spoil banks, and sludge pits. . . . Every 80 acres of land has a road on 
Arco discovery well, Swanson River field, Kenai National Moose Range, late 1950s. 
B87.43.2, Anchorage Museum of History and Art. This well triggered an oil boom that 
helped bring statehood and economic development to Alaska. It and more than 100 others, 
plus 1,500 miles of roads and trails, disrupted the ecology of the refuge.
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Kenai National Moose Range supervisor David L. Spencer checking trumpeter swan nest, 
May 1957. By H.J. Johnson. Alaska Game Commission, 18th Annual Report, July 1, 
1956 Thru June 30, 1957. Protection of nests in Alaska aided recovery of the endangered 
swan species.
it and in most instances it is surrounded by roads on all four sides. Pipelines 
and power lines radiate to all points of the compass. School buses, kids, cats 
and dogs abound as in any stateside community. The new oil workers have 
all turned into moose hunters and the moose population has dropped from 
4,736 in 1959 to 2,719 in 1961. It is all one hell of a mess.66
About 1,500 miles of bulldozed trails could be seen by 1968, and a gas pipe-
line crossed the range on its way to Anchorage. By 1980, 115 oil and gas wells 
had been drilled on the Kenai and in adjacent Cook Inlet.67 Contamination of 
the earth and groundwater by toxic chemicals constituted a problem for decades 
after statehood. Trees cut down for seismic lines incubated beetles and may have 
aggravated an insect explosion, killing thousands of acres of trees. A 1985 Fish 
and Wildlife Service assessment stated that “populations of bald eagles, trum-
peter swans, mountain goats, Dall sheep, caribou, marten, wolves, lynx, brown 
bear and beaver have been or are now depressed due to human activities.”68 
Dave Spencer, Kenai Moose Range supervisor during the 1950s, summarized 
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the results of oil on the Kenai: “I know there have been a lot of benefits from the 
oil. But no benefits have accrued to the moose, or the Wildlife Refuge.”69
Another wildlife success story emerged from the Kenai episode. It involved 
the trumpeter swan, the largest bird native to North America and a nearly 
extinct species. Most trumpeters migrated to Alaska to build their nests and 
raise their young. Some nested on Kenai ponds, and wildlife managers worried 
about the effects of oil activity. Oil drilling regulations prohibited disturbance 
of nesting ponds.70 Within three decades, thanks to the efforts of environmen-
talists and the Fish and Wildlife Service, the trumpeter population rebounded 
dramatically.
In terms of wildlife goals and management objectives, the Kenai experi-
ence exemplified the shift from untrammeled exploitation to selected species 
(moose) protection by government experts for sustainable use by humans. 
Distance from Washington and aggressive frontier behavior forestalled decisive 
action to sustain Kenai mammals and habitat until the 1925 Game Law and 
the inception of the moose range in 1941. The naming of the moose range 
moved the goal closer to ecosystem preservation, although government offi-
cials presented it as a moose preserve (open to hunting) and avoided mention 
of the desirability of reintroducing wolves and caribou. Appreciation of the 
ecological role of the wolf finally became policy under the new state in 1962. 
Reappearance of wolves and reintroduction of caribou did much to restore the 
peninsula’s natural character.
Maintenance of the moose range in the face of demands for oil drilling 
proved more difficult by orders of magnitude than had its creation. As in the 
case of Bering River coal politics, elements of the federal government fought 
a seesaw battle for prevalence. In the Progressive Era government could claim 
enough public support to curb the powerful coal interests. The 1950s, by con-
trast, featured oil companies, a compliant Eisenhower administration, and a 
conservative public mood. Moreover, Alaskan business interests had acquired 
the ability to mold the decision-making process. Both government and corpo-
rate responsibility for environmental protection bowed to oil profits. The  rush 
for economic spoils swept aside the meager store of science indicating industrial 
effects on wildlife. Conservation groups participated modestly, helping to save 
some of the ecological integrity of the Kenai Moose Range.
From statehood into the 21st Century, a host of disruptive influences beset 
the wildlife refuge and other natural areas of the Kenai Peninsula: oil and gas 
operations, swelling tourism, and a perpetually rising resident human popula-
tion. Their multifarious negative impacts on the wild character of the Kenai 
energized an ongoing debate over the relative values of wilderness and develop-
ment in Alaska.
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Bob Marshall, Olaus and Margaret Murie, 
and the Arctic Refuge
as alasKa statehood aPProached, ecological science and eVolVing PuBlic 
sentiment made possible a more direct appeal for ecosystem preservation. A 
confl uence of events focused attention on a remote corner of the territory to be-
come the Arctic National Wildlife Range. Relatively unspoiled and rich in wild-
life, the land had not yet demonstrated industrial potential. Just as important, 
the campaign to save the land depended heavily on the talents of three uniquely 
qualifi ed conservationists: Bob Marshall and Olaus and Margaret Murie.
Ongoing losses of wildlife and wildlands gradually tipped the balance of 
American public values from aggressive exploitation toward preservation of 
some elements of Nature. Motives varied; some wanted to conserve water, soil, 
and timber, as in the Adirondacks; some to protect favored species of wildlife, as 
in the brown bear reserves; others to secure recreation sites, as in most national 
parks. A few in the 1930s, led by Aldo Leopold, began to acquire an ecological 
perspective on wildlands, seeing them as integrated complexes of life valuable 
both in themselves and for the well-being of human communities. Leopold 
and his colleagues launched a wilderness movement to safeguard large tracts of 
17
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wildlands. Several of the leaders had strong ties to Alaska, although, compared 
to the Boone and Crockett founders, they lacked high standing in Washington. 
Marshall and the Muries knew northern Alaska and envisioned preservation 
on a regional scale. Their efforts eventually paid off in protective legislation for 
much of the North, including the Arctic National Wildlife Range.
BOB MARSHALL, WILDERNESS ADVOCATE
John Muir’s view of Nature came alive in large measure during the 1930s 
through another prominent fi gure in Alaska’s environmental history. Robert 
Marshall (1901–1939) never met Muir, nor did he emerge from Boone and 
Crockett, Audubon, or other established conservation groups. His love for 
Nature fl owed from reading, hiking, mountain climbing, and exploring rather 
than from hunting, fi shing, or observing wildlife. Like most early environmental 
leaders Marshall grew up in privilege, his father, Louis, a prominent civil rights 
attorney in New York City. A conservationist who knew Theodore Roosevelt, 
Louis helped establish and fought to defend the state’s Adirondack Park.
While the family vacationed in the Adirondacks, Bob spent his leisure hours 
in the woods. At age eleven, confi ned to bed by pneumonia, he encountered 
Pioneer Boys of the Great Northwest, an adventure tale about the Lewis and Clark 
Expedition. It so absorbed him that he read it as often as three times a year for 
the next ten years. His sorties into the woods grew more frequent; he eventually 
climbed the 46 highest mountains in the Adirondacks. He climbed 28 Alaskan 
peaks (mostly fi rst ascents), went on more than 200 hikes of over 30 miles a day, 
and once hiked 70 miles without sleep.
By age fi fteen Marshall had resolved upon a career in forestry. Degrees 
from New York State School of Forestry and from Harvard, and a PhD in 
plant physiology from Johns Hopkins, followed. He joined the Forest Service 
and, at his request, received an assignment to the Northern Rocky Mountain 
Forest Experimental Station in Missoula, Montana, during 1925–1928. There 
he took full advantage of the opportunity to explore the mountains. Seeking 
ever-wilder areas to roam, he headed for Alaska. In summer 1929 he adventured 
and studied tree growth (in that order of preference) in the Brooks Range, en-
joying it so much that he returned for a year in 1930–1931 to live in the upper 
Koyukuk town of Wiseman. Arctic Village, his portrayal of the social lives of the 
sourdough miners and Natives, won literary acclaim. He wrote more than 100 
books and articles about Alaska, forestry, and wilderness preservation.1
Several aspects of Marshall’s upbringing appear to have set the pattern for 
his life work and philosophy. His father instilled a sense of social responsibility 
that showed in Bob’s earnest efforts to improve society. The family’s interest in 
art gave the boy an aesthetic orientation refl ected in his appreciation of natural 
BoB Marshall, olaus and Margaret Murie, and the arctic refuge
402
beauty. Louis read to his children the works of James Fenimore Cooper and 
other romantic writers who conveyed a message of the superiority of Nature 
over civilization in building character. Bob enthusiastically participated in ath-
letics. He adopted as a role model Verplanck Colvin, a scientifically oriented 
explorer of the Adirondacks who loved studying Nature and reveled in the hard-
ships of outdoor life. Bob Marshall evolved a pattern of activity that put him in 
the wilds as much as possible and combined activity, aesthetics, and benefit to 
society in his reverent views of Nature.2
The more he saw of wilderness, the more convinced Marshall became that 
it must be cherished. Large tracts of wild continued to disappear, not least 
through the Forest Service’s utilitarian conservationist emphasis on logging. 
Gifford Pinchot, the first Forest Service director, perceived “conservation” as 
requiring sustained-yield management of forests on a scientific basis for the 
benefit of the people as a whole—the greatest good for the greatest number—as 
distinct from uncontrolled exploitation. Also a Progressive, Marshall neverthe-
less saw that utilitarian “conservation” would put an end to wilderness. He 
found a solution in a theory enabling wilderness to rival other amenities by 
demonstrating its usefulness to modern humans. Wilderness, he asserted, is a 
source of health, physical independence from civilization, satisfaction of long-
ing for exploration, independent thought, rest and relaxation, and beauty. Such 
values are important for democracy, he argued; people need escape from the 
strictures of civilization, which, at its worst, transmutes the quest for adventure 
into war.
“In the wilderness,” wrote Marshall, “with its entire freedom from the 
manifestations of human will, that perfect objectivity which is essential for pure 
esthetic rapture can probably be achieved more readily than among any other 
forms of beauty.” By definition, wilderness could not be readily accessible to 
the masses, Marshall acknowledged. To avoid charges of elitism he presented 
the utilitarian-sounding argument that “fundamentally, the question is one of 
balancing the total happiness which will be obtained if the few underdeveloped 
areas are perpetuated against that which will prevail if they are destroyed.”3 
He believed that “quality as well as quantity must enter into any evaluation of 
recreation, because one really deep experience may be worth an infinite number 
of ordinary experiences.” He considered it appropriate to set aside areas to be 
visited by few people, considering that unrestricted access would demolish their 
unique values for everyone.4
Beyond the abuse of forests by government, Marshall expressed alarm over 
the status of those in private ownership. Private forests comprised the bulk of 83 
million acres in “ruin,” increasing by nearly a million acres annually, and of 200 
million acres in a state of “deterioration.” He concluded that the nation’s forests 
and their related values of recreation and soil and water conservation could be 
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guaranteed only through public ownership. Accordingly, he advocated public 
acquisition of 562 million of the 670 million existing acres of forest.5 Forests, 
he thought, constituted a national resource and should be treated as such: “The 
time has come when we must discard the unsocial view that our woods are the 
lumbermen’s and substitute the broader ideal that every acre of woodland in 
the country is rightly a part of the people’s forests.”6 In Alaska Marshall’s views 
informed a raging debate over the Tongass National Forest enduring through 
the second half of the century.
Applying his extraordinary zeal to government policy, Marshall set out to 
move government agencies to safeguard wildlands. As early as 1928 he pub-
licly advocated protective regulations. Regardless of whether he influenced the 
decision, the Department of Agriculture adopted rules in 1929 for specifying 
primitive areas. A swelling national interest in outdoor recreation made possible 
by automobiles and roads suggested that the Forest Service needed to accom-
modate it. The service undertook a comprehensive forest policy review in 1932, 
just as Marshall finished his PhD program. The survey coordinator, a friend 
of Marshall’s, invited him to participate in writing the sections on recreation. 
Marshall seized the opportunity and incorporated his idea that 45 million of 
the 506 million acres of national forest lands should be earmarked for recre-
ation. Between 1933 and 1939, 5.4 million acres received protective status, 
much of it probably as a result of Marshall’s persistent efforts.7
Marshall emerged as the government’s best-known wilderness proponent. 
In his position as forestry director in the Interior Department’s Office of Indian 
Affairs between 1933 and 1937, he succeeded in getting 4.8 million acres on 
Indian reservations designated as roadless or wild. He thought Indians, affected 
by whites in many negative ways, needed connections to their wildlands for 
economic reasons and to prevent the loss of cultural traditions. He pointed to 
the fact that before the Allotment Act of 1887, Indians had owned 138 million 
acres of reservations. The act, intended by proponents to help Indians become 
economically independent through ownership of individual plots, instead re-
sulted in land grabs by white men. By 1933 Indians owned 48 million acres of 
the poorest lands, not sufficient to support their populations. Environmentally 
unsustainable grazing and logging took place, degrading the lands and further 
impoverishing the Indians. Marshall advocated governmental purchase of land 
to be given to Indians, who would otherwise remain in a state of dependency at 
continuing cost to the government.8
In 1937 Marshall returned to the Agriculture Department to assume the 
directorship of the Recreation and Lands Division. Continuing to push for for-
est preservation, he proposed a set of revised rules known as the “U” regulations 
by which the secretary of agriculture could minimize damage to wildlands. 
Specifically, no logging would be permitted on tracts classified as wilderness 
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(over 100,000 acres) or as wild areas (of smaller size). Shortly before Marshall’s 
death in November 1939 the department adopted the regulations, eventually 
applying them to about 14 million acres of national forest lands. The process 
presaged the 1964 Wilderness Act.9
Alaska stirred exhilarating feelings within Bob Marshall. In the Brooks 
Range he fulfilled his dreams of tramping through unspoiled rugged wilds. On 
what he recalled as “in many ways the greatest one day I have spent,” in March 
1931 he and sourdough friend Ernie Johnson snowshoed to the pass between 
the Clear and Hammond rivers:
I do not know what may be the supreme exultation of which a person is 
capable, but for me it came that moment I crossed the skyline and gazed 
over in to the winter-buried mystery of the Arctic, where great, barren peaks 
rose into the deep blue of the northern sky, where valleys, devoid even of 
willows, led far off into unknown canyons. Below me lay a chasm so many 
hundreds of feet deep it seemed no sunlight could ever penetrate its depths. 
From its upper reaches, bathed in sunshine, a white pinnacle rose into the air 
for almost a mile at a slope of not less than sixty degrees.10
Returning from a climbing expedition accompanied by Nutirwik (also known 
as Harry Snowden) he wrote, “[N]o man by high-powered instruments and 
machines can get the thrill which we got with our pocket compass and our field 
glasses as we made the first rough map of an unknown empire.”11 He named 
dozens of mountains, creeks, and other places, but none for himself. Of the 
names he proposed, some of which he made up and some preexisting, the Board 
of Geographic Names adopted 167. Many names he chose may have replaced 
those given long ago by Eskimos and Indians. Marshall Lake on Mt. Doonerak 
became his namesake,12 as did later the Bob Marshall Wilderness in the North 
Cascades.
Reflecting on 20th-Century explorations, Marshall judged that they did 
not add to human happiness as a whole: “In fact, the net result of these activities 
is to make mankind a little poorer because in each case a slightly diminished 
possibility for the joy of exploration is left in the world after the exploration is 
finished.” His predominantly egalitarian views contradicted his justification for 
exploration, “a perfectly laudable pastime in spite of its selfishness because the 
competition is open, and one person is entitled to enjoy it as much as anoth-
er.”13 Nor did he confront another irony of his position: his conquest, mapping, 
and publicizing of wild places accelerated the utilitarian process of cataloging, 
exploiting, managing, and thereby eroding the mystery and integrity of wilder-
ness areas he so loved. But the mapping would have taken place anyway, and 
he far more than compensated for the discrepancy in his philosophy by his 
phenomenal success in wildland preservation.
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Marshall returned to the Arctic in the summers of 1938 and 1939. Life in 
Wiseman confirmed his belief that the simple life offered a surer path to happi-
ness than did modern civilization. Just as wilderness represented the last stand 
for outdoor adventure, Alaska offered the last chance to avoid the resource man-
agement mistakes made in the States. Its wild areas would become ever more 
valuable as recreation replaced minerals, fur, and fishing in Alaska’s economy. 
“Alaska is unique among all recreational areas belonging to the United States 
because Alaska is yet largely wilderness,” Marshall pleaded. “In the name of 
balanced use of America’s resources, let’s keep northern Alaska a wilderness.” 
He proposed that everything north of the Yukon, including Native villages and 
excepting Nome, be set aside as a park.14
Perceiving wilderness in anthropocentric rather than biological terms, 
Marshall valued it for its benefits to humans. The opportunity to experience 
primitiveness, or connection to unspoiled land, constituted its paramount ap-
peal. A frontier park in northern Alaska, he reasoned, would retain for local 
inhabitants the values of independence and self-reliance, recognition of the in-
dividual, and adventure he had observed on the upper Koyukuk. Visitors to 
the proposed park could seek adventure without disrupting the lifestyles of 
Nutirwik and Bob Marshall, upper north fork of the Koyukuk, 1939. Bancroft Library, 
University of California at Berkeley. Marshall’s Native and white friends in Wiseman, and 
the beauty of the land, inspired his leadership in land preservation.
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residents.15 Marshall believed or hoped these values, fast disappearing under the 
crush of civilization, could survive in northern Alaska.
Marshall participated in another, atypical, debate involving Alaska’s wilder-
ness. While the pre–World War II turmoil in Europe worsened, FDR asked 
the Interior Department to identify places where refugees might be resettled. 
Interior’s report suggested Alaska could play a large role and that the United 
States should help develop Alaska’s resources. Marshall’s response captured the 
essence of the debate over Alaskan development, both past and future:
World history for the last hundred years has been the story of the rapid 
development of untapped resources which represent the accumulated natural 
processes of eons, yet the opening of new frontiers has seldom brought 
more than transient prosperity for the vast majority of those engaged in it. 
The only reason we have as high a standard of living as we do today is that 
the more primitive people of past ages saw nothing immoral about leaving 
resources undeveloped. . . . Although lauding the fact that Alaska is perhaps 
the last country in the world where a hermit can build a cabin and never 
see a tax collector, the report fails to recognize that this is due to the scanty 
population which gives land almost no value, except around a few municipal 
centers, farming areas and mineralized zones. Furthermore, increasing the 
population would almost certainly lessen the contribution that wild life now 
makes to the subsistence of many Alaskans. It would also take away from 
people the unique possibilities of individuality found in scantily populated 
countries where men are few and each one is distinctive.
Viable growth, he argued, would be strictly limited by the combination of dis-
tance from markets and foreign competition.16
Proposals for settlement of European, mostly Jewish, refugees from Hitler’s 
Germany had first surfaced in early 1938. They met resistance from most po-
tential host nations, including the United States. In fall 1938 a Denver group 
put forward a plan to place refugees and unemployed persons in Alaska; it reap-
peared in essence in the Interior Department’s Slattery Plan of 1939. Alaskan 
newspapers voiced overwhelming disapproval, despite their repeated previous 
claims that Alaska possessed abundant resources needing exploitation. Boosters 
had vigorously objected to Marshall’s idea of prohibiting industry north of the 
Yukon. Marshall, himself Jewish, spoke against the settlement plan. He argued 
that Alaska could not accommodate large influxes of people, in contradistinc-
tion to the 48 states where resources and factories went underutilized. Resistance 
from Alaskans helped doom the settlement bill in Congress.17
Marshall felt an urgent need for a small and dedicated private group to 
spearhead an effort to maintain wilderness by applying outside pressure on 
government:
Bob Marshall, Olaus and Margaret Murie, and the Arctic Refuge
407
It will be only a few years until the last escape from society will be barri-
caded. If that day arrives there will be countless souls born to live in stran-
gulation, countless human beings who will be crushed under the artificial 
edifice raised by man. There is just one hope of repulsing the tyrannical 
ambition of civilization to conquer every niche on the whole earth. That 
hope is the organization of spirited people who will fight for the freedom of 
the wilderness.18
In 1935 Marshall and a few like-minded colleagues organized the Wilderness 
Society. Marshall financed it and provided its direction until a heart attack 
struck him down on November 11, 1939, at age 38. The society matured 
into a prominent actor in shaping the future of Alaska’s wildlands, above all 
through the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act of 1980. Part of Marshall’s dream of an Arctic park came true 
in the naming of the Arctic National Wildlife Range in 1960 and Gates of the 
Arctic and Kobuk Valley national parks and the Noatak National Preserve in 
1980. Not least, Marshall publicized Alaska’s wilderness assets and the necessity 
for their conservation, a central theme in debates over Alaskan priorities ever 
since his death.
Marshall echoed John Muir as a self-styled advocate of wilderness. Like 
Muir he cast his appeals more in the form of aesthetical, sociological, psycho-
logical, and spiritual values than in terms of ecological science. Unlike Muir, 
he envisioned a wilderness preserve including humans living at low levels of 
technology and consumption. This rather fanciful prescription for the Alaskan 
Arctic underwent an endless series of tests in the ensuing decades, centering on 
questions of land ownership and subsistence rights.
Also, unlike Muir, Marshall displayed little interest in wildlife, nor did 
he emphasize species preservation or nonhuman rights. Yet his family back-
ground and experience tied him to the relatively holistic concepts that inspired 
the Adirondack preserve, only a step or two away from modern ecosystem 
sustainability.
Marshall deeply treasured and promulgated nonconsumptive use of Nature. 
His government positions empowered him to act on his values, setting prece-
dents in wildland management. He argued that government should not only be 
responsible for but should be the direct steward of the nation’s great forests. In 
founding the Wilderness Society he added a significant element of public par-
ticipation, albeit somewhat elitist along the lines of Boone and Crockett. The 
society, in turn, employed and further popularized Marshall’s ideas in its central 
roles in the establishment of the Arctic Refuge and the 1964 Wilderness Act. 
National support for wilderness ultimately shaped Alaska land status outcomes, 
as Marshall hoped it would, and fortified notions of ecological sustainability 
and wilderness values within the Alaskan public.
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MR. WILDERNESS: OLAUS MURIE
“The out-of-doors is our true home, and being there gives us solitude and 
leisure to speak to ourselves and not to others. When we speak to ourselves, we 
are apt to be more honest.”19 A lifetime of immersion in Nature earned Olaus 
Johan Murie (1889–1963), a Wilderness Society colleague of Bob Marshall’s, 
the ability and right to speak such words. Another landmark environmental 
figure, Murie displayed wilderness skills rivaling the most experienced Alaskan 
outdoorsmen. Yet his philosophy and accomplishments measurably furthered 
preservationist values.
Murie grew up on a Moorhead, Minnesota, farm and worked hard from 
age eight because his father died. In his spare time he and his brother Martin 
built a canoe and traveled the rivers observing wildlife. Ernest Thompson 
Seton’s books kept him busy reading. After study of biology at Fargo College 
and graduation from Pacific University (Forest Grove, Oregon) in 1912, he 
served two years as a game warden in Oregon. Then he researched wildlife in 
Hudson Bay (1914–1915) and Labrador (1917) as a field naturalist and curator 
of mammals for the Carnegie Museum of Natural History. He over-wintered in 
1914–1915 and honed his skills of survival in the North. During World War I 
he served in the Balloon Corps but did not go to Europe. Bureau of Biological 
Survey (BBS) chief Edward W. Nelson noticed his Canadian work and thought 
he might be the right person to survey caribou in Alaska. By 1920 Murie found 
himself traveling the Arctic and subarctic by dogsled, making the first counts of 
the northern caribou herds. Other work focused on birds and grizzly bears.
Remaining in Alaska until the fall of 1926, Murie returned south to earn 
a master’s degree at the University of Michigan. At Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 
he conducted research on elk, coyotes, and other creatures. In 1936–1937 he 
returned to Alaska to direct the first thorough study of fauna in the Aleutians, 
where Murie Islets in the Shumagin Islands bear his name.20
Nelson, a sober and demanding taskmaster, expected much of Murie. He 
accompanied the young biologist to Alaska in 1920 and assigned him mul-
tiple tasks: collector of bird and mammal specimens, fur warden, and caribou 
researcher. Enforcement of fur laws, newly assigned to the BBS, did not go 
well for Murie. His first seizure of illegal furs alienated most of the Fairbanks 
community. Reflecting the Agriculture Department’s orientation, the bureau 
planned to capture caribou for an experiment to improve reindeer by cross-
breeding. A strenuous effort at Mt. McKinley Park in 1922 by Olaus and his 
brother Adolph (“Ade”) ended in failure. They caught three bulls, a cow, and a 
calf, but one bull died in a wire fence entanglement, a second died for unknown 
reasons, and the third escaped.21
However, Murie excelled as a field scientist and collector. Applying his 
dog-teaming experience from Hudson Bay and Labrador, he traveled exten-
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sively around northern Alaska. Often alone and through the winter months 
he carried out surveys of caribou. Usually he packed no stove or tent and 
slept in a rabbit-fur bag. Early trips took him around Fairbanks, Eagle, and 
Mt. McKinley National Park. From October 1922 through April 1923 he and 
Adolph ventured into the Brooks Range to Wiseman and the headwaters of 
the Alatna River. On his fall 1924 honeymoon trip, he and Mardy (Margaret) 
visited Wiseman and ascended the Koyukuk River. Earlier in 1924 he had dog-
sledded 700 miles to the Yukon Delta to study waterfowl. In 1925 he went to 
the Alaska Peninsula to observe and collect land and sea birds and mammals.22 
He visited Amak Island and recommended that it be set aside as a bird sanctu-
ary. President Herbert Hoover signed an executive order adding it, the Sea Lion 
Rocks, and other small islands to the Aleutian Islands Reserve.23
Murie contributed to the evolution of ecology as a biological science and 
core of an ecological ethic, and he disapproved of the BBS policy on predator 
control. A 1923 letter to Nelson expressed his doubts: “I have a theory that a 
certain amount of preying on caribou is beneficial to the herd, that the best 
animals survive and the vigor of the herd is maintained. Man’s killing does not 
work in this natural way, as the best animals are shot and inferior animals are left 
to breed.” The theory almost certainly influenced Adolph, with whom Olaus 
constantly shared perspectives on wildlife.24 In addition to the research of his 
colleague Lawrence J. Palmer and that of Adolph on coyotes and wolves, Olaus 
had observed the case of 700 caribou dying on Unimak Island after overgraz-
ing their range. No wolves had been present. His account of this case did not 
get published, nor did his later work criticizing federal coyote control policy. 
Resultant frustration contributed to his resignation from the Fish and Wildlife 
Service in 1945 to become staff director of the Wilderness Society, a position he 
occupied until 1962. He correctly predicted that ecological research would help 
create a shift in public opinion toward predators,25 and he worked to change the 
government’s policies.
Gifted with an intense, childlike curiosity, Olaus Murie forever observed—
questioning what animals were thinking, why they behaved as they did, why the 
world functioned as it did. In this mind-set he envisioned a form of salvation 
for humankind: “A poetic appreciation of life, combined with a knowledge of 
nature, creates humility, which in turn becomes the greatness in man.”26 Murie 
could hardly be described as a cheechako, or a naive “outsider,” yet he displayed 
a charitable, preservationist attitude toward unpopular animals: “I think we 
should go beyond proving the rights of animals to live in utilitarian terms. 
Why don’t we just admit we like having them around? Don’t we realize that 
something exciting and satisfying will be gone from the world if we no longer 
hear coyotes howling?” Asked whether he feared meeting grizzlies unarmed, he 
replied, “Not much—a little, sometimes. But I never let them know it. I respect 
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them and I meet them on equal terms. They are natural and good. I try to under-
stand them. They have never hurt me.”27 An acquaintance observed that Murie 
“exemplified the gentleness and natural wisdom that some sensitive people seem 
to derive from close association with the earth and its creatures . . . a highly 
civilized being who had acquired an aura of nobleness from the wilds that he 
loved.” Wilderness Society director Howard Zahniser, who also died just before 
he could celebrate the fruits of his labor on the Wilderness Act, described Murie 
as “the one person who best personified wilderness in our culture.”28
As did John Muir, Murie criticized materialism and its impact on Nature:
I would say that the dollar sign is out of place when it undertakes to ride 
roughshod over the sensibilities of people who have dedicated a piece of 
country for the inspiration of its wilderness. . . . It has been pointed out re-
peatedly that the most dangerous influence we have in our society is not the 
criminal. We can deal with him more or less. We need to fear much more 
the half truths, the rationalizations, and the business ethics that are just be-
low par but so universal that we shrug them off with a humorous remark.29
“Probably because of our exuberance in coming to a new continent,” he thought, 
“we have acted like children getting into a pantry well-stocked with goodies. We 
are still exploiting our resources wildly.”30
He regarded wilderness as “the material of poetry, art and science. Nature 
gives spiritual values none of us can live without. How can we measure the 
elation of being in high country in free surroundings?”31 Destruction of wilder-
ness represented more than the disappearance of wildlife; it also meant the loss 
of vital heritage: “It is a fragile thing, this natural wilderness, consisting of the 
material for poetry and art and vigorous clean living. It is easily degraded or 
destroyed by heedless men. It is not for a single agency, or a single organization, 
to make ruthlessly a decision which affects the future. Surely it is wisdom to 
guard the original material on which our culture is founded—and save some of 
it.”32 This did not mean all people should have access to all of Nature. Echoing 
Bob Marshall, he believed some wild areas should be reserved “for those who 
crave a true wilderness experience, for those who can stand weather, who have 
the stamina to deal with the vicissitudes of camp life, and still enjoy the experi-
ence. We surely need this element in American civilization. It should not be 
lowered to a common denominator to accommodate mass numbers.”33 The 
Arctic National Wildlife Range fit perfectly his ideal of a wilderness to be left 
in its natural state.
One of the original governing council members of the Wilderness Society, 
Murie presided from 1950 to 1957 and served on the council until his death. He 
wrote scientific and popular works on elk, coyotes, and caribou and on wildlife 
management, appreciation, and preservation.34 The activity of the Wilderness 
Society grew rapidly in the 1950s; through it Murie left a telling impact on the 
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future of Alaska lands. Tirelessly lecturing, testifying, and writing in the cause 
of wilderness preservation, he won a national and an international reputation.
Olaus Murie earned repute as a writer, artist, lecturer, and conservation 
leader, as well as a top field biologist. His wife, Margaret (1902–2003), shared 
his writing and conservation work. Born in Seattle and brought up in Fairbanks 
from age nine, she majored in English at Reed and Simmons colleges and be-
came the first woman graduate of the University of Alaska in 1924.35 Her fa-
mous book Two in the Far North told of dogsled travels with Olaus, including 
a winter honeymoon trip in the Brooks Range, and of their love for Nature in 
Alaska. Mardy accompanied Olaus on field expeditions, even after the birth of 
their son Martin.
Like Muir and Marshall, the Muries discovered in the North a vital connec-
tion between its isolation from civilization and a high spiritual quality of life:
[Mardy and I] often spoke of it even then, as we traveled among scattered 
villages, trading posts, missions, camps, associating with the men and 
women of several races—swarthy white men who hardly dared to speak in 
the presence of a woman for fear of what words might slip out, well-read 
prospectors who could discuss the classics and philosophy with wisdom, 
Indian youths (beyond the influence of liquor peddlers) whom we admired 
for their forth-right-ness and obvious integrity, Eskimos who contributed the 
brightness of laughter and optimism. I am speaking now of the time previ-
ous to the present industrial boom in Alaska.36
The Muries found “cold beauty and infinite warmth; physical hardships, as well 
as times of plenty and fun. We believe it is a life not to be ashamed of, a life of 
rugged endeavor and high spiritual reward, not to be lightly discarded in the 
modern reach for ease and gadgets. Surely somewhere in the north we should 
find it possible to dedicate an area or two to this kind of life.”37
In May 1926 BBS chief Nelson assigned Olaus to band waterfowl up the 
Old Crow River on the Yukon side, and Mardy went along. Friends advised 
against taking the eleven-month-old baby and described the Old Crow as “the 
worst mosquito place in Alaska,” warning that “even the Indians stay out of 
there in the summer.” The party set out up the Porcupine River. Upon ascend-
ing the Old Crow to Black Fox Creek they broke a propeller shaft. Undaunted, 
Olaus and boatman Jess Rust resolved to complete the journey. They trans-
ferred the gear, Mardy, and the baby to a barge and poled and lined it for more 
than 150 miles to the river’s headwaters in the Davidson Mountains, stopping 
to band birds all along the way. Recovering their boat on the way back, they 
poled it through a dangerous stretch of rapids, descended the Porcupine, and 
returned to Fairbanks.38
Mardy participated in Wilderness Society work as a partner to Olaus. She 
promoted the efforts to set aside the Arctic National Wildlife Range, a goal she 
BoB Marshall, olaus and Margaret Murie, and the arctic refuge
412
and Olaus had shared since 1924. Following Olaus’s death she grew more active, 
devoting most of her time to wilderness and wildlife preservation through the 
Wilderness Society and Sierra Club, working from her home at Jackson Hole. 
She stayed connected to Alaska, visiting in 1975 as a guest of the National Park 
Service and meeting people around the state to urge a strong Alaska Lands Act. 
The University of Alaska awarded her an honorary doctorate in 1976. During 
later visits she worked for the defense of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
from oil development.
In 1977 Mardy published Island Between, a work based on notes taken of 
Eskimo life at St. Lawrence Island by Alaskan scientist Otto Geist, whom the 
Muries had known since the 1920s. Four years later she put together The Alaska 
Bird Sketches of Olaus Murie.39 Her ongoing activity in environmental protec-
tion gave her national standing. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter 
invited her to the signing ceremonies for the 1964 Wilderness Act and the 
1980 Alaska Lands Act, respectively. President Bill Clinton phoned on her 93rd 
birthday to promise a veto of any congressional bill to open the Arctic Refuge to 
oil.40 The Grand Old Lady of the wilderness movement, Mardy Murie endured 
as the nation’s living icon of wildland advocacy.
Olaus Murie possessed a rare outlay of credentials relevant to Alaskan envi-
ronmentalism: biologist, frontier explorer, scientific researcher, government of-
ficial, writer, philosopher, artist, and political activist. He bridged several gaps in 
the evolving environmentalism of his time. Simultaneously he held the respect 
of hunters, settlers, government officials, and the publics of both Alaska and the 
States. He incorporated the hands-on knowledge of a Frank Dufresne and the 
aesthetic sensitivity of his colleague Bob Marshall. Well ahead of his time, he 
understood the value of predators and acquired an ecocentric view of the Earth. 
He articulated and gave force to nonconsumptive use values of the wolf and 
coyote and, in essence, affirmed the right of species to exist. He worked for eco-
system sustainability, as in his plea for the Arctic National Wildlife Range. He 
valued and practiced science as a building block for environmentally respon-
sible natural resource management. By no means least, he and Mardy success-
fully modeled public participation, through the Wilderness Society, in resource 
management. Their close ties to Alaska, and effective educational work in the 
Lower 48, registered in Alaska land designations and, eventually, environmen-
talism in the Alaskan public.
More than any other person, Olaus Murie made possible the Arctic National 
Wildlife Range. He arranged for the society’s 1963 annual meeting to be held 
in Alaska to focus attention on its wilderness issues and once again made a visit 
to the Arctic. Three months later he died, not living to see the adoption of the 
1964 Wilderness Act to which he had given years of effort.
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THE ARCTIC REFUGE
Few lands hold a more exalted ranking in the Alaskan environmental pan-
oply than the Arctic National Wildlife Range (ANWR). Encompassing the 
northeast corner of the state, it is one of the most remote regions of the United 
States. It cannot be reached by road; it is almost entirely unpopulated by hu-
mans. It contains at least two ecosystems divided by the Brooks Range: the 
tundra-covered Arctic and the heavily wooded lands to the south. Aborigines 
first appeared on the South Slope about 11,000 years ago and more recently 
on the North Slope. Two distinct cultures exist: the Tagmiugmiut Eskimos, 
who hunt sea mammals and caribou along the Arctic coast, and the Kutchin 
(or Gwitch’in) Athabaskan Indians, hunters of caribou who live on the South 
Slope. Both cultures traded along the Arctic coast, connecting the Canadian 
and Siberian Natives in the 17th to 19th centuries.41
Euro-American Explorers
In 1826 British explorer Sir John Franklin initiated the wave of Europeans 
to visit the coast. He traveled westward from the Mackenzie River Delta in 
the first of his Arctic expeditions that ultimately led to disaster in his quest 
for the Northwest Passage. Franklin named Camden Bay for a lord of the 
Admiralty and another bay for Admiralty hydrographer Captain (later Admiral) 
Sir Francis Beaufort.42 The Arctic Ocean above Alaska ultimately took on the 
name Beaufort Sea.
Later in the 19th Century came more Hudson’s Bay Company explorers, 
searchers for Franklin, and whalers. Advancing civilization left its mark on 
Arctic ecology. During the commercial whaling era, lasting from 1854 to about 
1916 along the north Arctic coast, traders introduced guns to Eskimos. To sup-
ply the whaling crews, hunters pursued caribou, mountain sheep, and other 
mammals far inland, to the point of scarcity. Ernest de K. Leffingwell, a U.S. 
Geological Survey officer posted to Flaxman Island between 1906 and 1914, 
reported, “The native hunters have long been furnished guns and ammunition 
in abundance by the whale ships wintering at Herschel Island. . . . [E]very na-
tive in the country has a modern repeating rifle and one or two thousand car-
tridges every year. As they have no better knowledge of conservation than white 
men, they soon drove the caribou out of the country.” Thereafter, Leffingwell 
noted, Eskimos sewed most of their clothing from reindeer hides imported from 
Siberia: “As the caribou decreased in numbers, the natives began to hunt the 
mountain sheep more energetically. Dall’s sheep formerly were abundant every-
where in the mountains, but they have already been cleaned out from the lower 
part of the larger rivers.” Eskimos regarded polar bears as pests and shot them 
as they attempted to make dens on the high banks ashore. Bear populations 
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dwindled.43 Whalers and other visitors to the Arctic killed polar bears for their 
fur or for sport.
Roald Amundsen crossed the divide in the Davidson Mountains by dogsled 
in 1905–1906 during the first navigation of the Northwest Passage. His ship 
froze in for the winter, and whale men in over-wintering vessels wanted to send 
and receive mail and request supplies. Not least, Amundsen planned to tele-
graph word of his achievement to the outside world. Without money to finance 
the 1,000-mile round trip to Fort Yukon and Eagle, he accompanied Captain 
Billy Mogg, who would lead the expedition. Mogg commanded the whaling 
vessel Bonanza, driven ashore by ice while wintering east of Herschel Island. 
He planned to return to San Francisco and sail another vessel north for spring 
whaling.44 A seasoned Arctic whaler, Mogg had wintered at Herschel Island 
almost every year since 1890. In 1892 he made a round trip by dogsled to the 
Yukon Valley, the first known traversal of the mountains by a non-Native.45
The mail expedition left Herschel Island in late October. Indian guides 
Jimmy and his wife, Kappa, known for their reliability and competence, served 
as guides and drove two dog teams. Mogg rode on Amundsen’s sled or trav-
eled on snowshoes; Amundsen used Norwegian skis. Mogg pointed out a place 
where deserting whalers had camped in midwinter on their way to the gold-
fields. When ordered to surrender they fired on the pursuing officers who re-
turned fire, killing two of them. Two more surrendered, and the rest fled toward 
Fort Yukon. Five got there, but several perished on the way.
Mogg and Amundsen’s party reached Fort Yukon on November 20. They 
hired another Indian guide, Charlie, to accompany them on the 200-mile 
trip to Eagle. Upon arrival Amundsen wired the historic news to the king of 
Norway over the newly installed Alaska telegraph system. On February 3, 1906, 
Amundsen left Eagle, rejoined the Indians at Fort Yukon, and returned north 
to his ship and crew, arriving on March 12.46 The following summer he sailed 
the Gjoa along the Arctic coast on the way to Nome. On that coastal plain, in 
oil seeps discovered by Eskimos and explorers, lay the seeds of future strife in 
the Arctic.
An Arctic Ecosystem
Cold, wild, and vast, the Arctic Refuge is a land of awesome beauty and 
vibrant life. In the words of Averill Thayer, refuge manager from 1969 to 1981, 
“No other refuge or park encompasses such a continuum of undisturbed, bio-
logically self-sufficient arctic and subarctic habitats—from the interior boreal 
forest and the central Brooks Range to the coastal plain bordering the Arctic 
Ocean. No other area affords habitat protection for so many healthy popula-
tions of national interest species.” He described the caribou herd migration as 
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“the most spectacular wildlife phenomenon on Canadian and American soil.”47 
Other mammals in the refuge include moose, Dall sheep, muskoxen, polar and 
grizzly bears, wolves, wolverines, lynx, porcupines, and Arctic foxes and hares. 
Offshore are ringed, bearded, and largha seals; occasionally walruses; and gray, 
belukha, and bowhead whales. Golden eagles, peregrine and gyrfalcons, rough-
legged hawks, snowy owls, geese, ducks, loons, and swans are among the 57 
species of breeding birds in the area; at least 135 bird species have been seen. 
Twenty-four species of fish—four freshwater, nine anadromous, and eleven ma-
rine—exist in the refuge.48 This wildlife is a vital source of food for the North 
Slope Eskimo village of Kaktovik and for Athabaskan villages near the caribou 
migration routes.
Central to the wildlife complex is the Porcupine caribou herd, named for 
the Porcupine River in its migration route. Often compared to Africa’s Serengeti 
plain, the coastal tundra of the refuge is the scene of caribou calving in mid-
Captain Roald Amundsen (left front) and crew of Gjoa, Nome, September 1, 1906, one 
day after arriving from completion of the Northwest Passage. Bancroft Library, University 
of California Berkeley. On his 1,000-mile overland trip from Herschel Island in midwinter, 
Amundsen traversed parts of the future Arctic Refuge.
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May. This culminating stage of the long spring migration provides abundant 
food and relief from predators and insects. In late summer the caribou return 
to the foothills to resume their annual trek of up to 2,700 miles between the 
coastal plain and their wintering grounds near the Chandalar River to the south 
or the Ogilvie Mountains in the Yukon.49 To natural and human predators their 
biannual journey is part of the pattern of survival. For the reflective observer 
privileged to behold, it could be a profound aesthetic and philosophical expe-
rience. Photographer Wilbur Mills portrayed a herd of advancing caribou at 
Camden Bay as
a tight seething mass so dense I could not see the ground beneath it. I heard 
the approaching thunder of their hooves pounding the tundra. It was more 
than a sound . . . caribou were coming toward me along an unbroken front 
perhaps a quarter of a mile wide. Their clicking hooves clattered in the air 
like a thousand castanets. The air was saturated with the energy of sound. 
The herd enveloped me. Cows and calves, and bulls with long, velvet-coated 
antlers reaching high above their heads, rushed by a few yards away as if I 
were not there.50
Bull caribou in forest, Arctic National Wildlife Range, October 1970. By Bob Henning. 
FWS 6281, Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. The great Porcupine caribou 
herd, the refuge’s central wildlife feature, migrated to the coastal plain for spring calving.
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Lois Crisler described the fall migration in the western Brooks Range as
a spectacle like none other left on earth now. It had power over the spirit. 
The power lay not only in what you saw—this slender column driving on-
ward into wilderness. It also lay in what you knew. Arctic night and hunger 
coming. In-gathering far away somewhere of individuals into this traveling 
column, driven by the great seasons. Knowledge of danger and darkness and 
fear, built into their tissues by the centuries. Life and the cold Arctic before 
you for a moment in one silent sweep of land and moving animals.51
Ecologist John Milton hiked 300 miles across the Brooks Range in 1967. 
At the junction of Green Willow Creek and the Aichilik River he found wolf 
tracks superimposed on those of caribou and mused, “I hope man has the vi-
sion to keep his civilization from at least a few such wildernesses as this—wil-
derness on the old, vast scale—so that wolf and caribou can continue to live as 
they always have; and for their sake, not ours. . . . And if this wilderness can 
also be an incidental reservoir for restoring man’s spirit, then fine. But that is 
not the purpose of this place. Its purpose it to be. Man’s role should be . . . let 
it be.”52
Wolf at Old Woman Creek, Arctic National Wildlife Range, 1966. By Averill Thayer. FWS 
4646, Alaska Resources Library and Information Services. To refuge advocates, the wolf 
symbolized wilderness; to many Alaskans, a threat to their game supply.
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Establishment of a Refuge
Such an ecosystem as described by Mills, Crisler, and Milton embodied 
part of Bob Marshall’s dream of a grand national park north of the Yukon. 
Similarly oriented National Park Service recreation officer George L. Collins 
and biologist Lowell Sumner investigated the region as part of a general rec-
reational survey of Alaska directed by Collins. Sumner visited the northeast 
corner in 1951 and wrote Wilderness Society director Olaus Murie suggesting 
that it be preserved.53 Collins went to see John Reed, a Naval Arctic research 
official who had explored oil prospects on the North Slope. Reed advised that 
any park be located “east of Pet 4,” the Naval Petroleum Reserve occupying the 
central North Slope. Collins and Sumner then flew around the northeast cor-
ner in 1952, assisted by the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory at Barrow. “The 
scenery was magnificent. It was simply stupendous, beyond description,” re-
called Collins. The two men began to draft boundaries for a proposed national 
park. They returned in 1953 accompanied by Starker Leopold and Frank Fraser 
Darling.54 They wrote to Murie requesting that he lead a campaign for a wildlife 
refuge. Collins then wrote to Alaska governor B.F. Heintzleman assuring him 
that the Park Service did not want to make the area a national park or monu-
ment, which would close the area to mining and other development.55 He and 
Sumner contacted Joe Flakne of the Arctic Institute of North America. Flakne 
in turn advised Murie, “If you fellows want to save some wilderness in Alaska, 
you had better begin to do something now.”56
In a 1953 Sierra Club Bulletin article Sumner and Collins highlighted the 
scientific value of the refuge. Nearly all other areas had been altered, they said. 
Northeast Alaska presented an opportunity to study the ecology of an essential-
ly undisturbed ecosystem and acquire knowledge applicable to land and wildlife 
management elsewhere. The refuge should be “planned and dedicated now for 
perpetual preservation as a scientific field laboratory and also for the education, 
enjoyment, and inspiration of all outdoor-minded people.”57 As government 
officials, Sumner and Collins could not freely organize a citizen support effort. 
In 1954 they formally proposed to the Interior Department the creation of an 
Arctic reserve, to extend into Canada and be jointly managed.
Olaus Murie and Sigurd F. Olson had flown over the Brooks Range in the 
fall of 1951. Accompanied by a U.S. Geological Survey official, Murie flew to 
the Arctic again in 1953. The Wilderness Society had committed itself to the 
Arctic refuge project, as would the Sierra Club. Others prominently involved 
included the Conservation Foundation, Isaac Walton League, and Wildlife 
Management Institute. Funded by the Conservation Foundation and the New 
York Zoological Society, Murie planned a trip to the region in 1954. His illness 
forced a postponement until 1956. He and Mardy then undertook an expedi-
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tion to the Sheenjek River Valley.58 It reminded them of their travels in the 
1920s, but the trip had a political purpose: to publicize the idea of a wildlife 
refuge. It proved an effective plan. Reporters and other well-chosen people in-
cluding Justice William O. Douglas and his wife, Mercedes, visited the camp-
site, and a short film full of life and beauty emerged to counter the image of the 
Arctic as an icy wasteland.59 Upon leaving the Arctic the Muries made a series of 
low-key presentations to Alaskan groups. Sensing the importance of local sen-
timent, they cautioned the national environmental organizations not to exert 
pressure prematurely. They returned in 1957, meeting all potentially sympa-
thetic groups and thousands of individuals around the territory. Their respect-
ful approach and solid Alaska credentials stood them in good stead. In the vital 
Fairbanks area they won the endorsements of the Tanana Valley Sportsmen’s 
Association, Fairbanks Garden Club, Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce, and 
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner.
Arctic reserve advocates knew that Alaskans would more readily accept a 
wildlife refuge than a national park. And a park meant roads and tourist fa-
cilities that would destroy wilderness preservation values. By 1957 the Interior 
Department publicly backed the creation of an Arctic refuge, and in 1958 it 
Mardy and Olaus Murie, Sheenjek River Valley, 1956. Courtesy Murie Center. The Muries’ 
ties to Alaska and return visit to the Sheenjek brought the proposed Arctic Refuge to the 
nation’s attention.
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filed a formal request to Congress. Alaska’s state and congressional politicians, 
however, tried to stop the refuge. So did the Anchorage Chamber of Commerce 
and the Territorial Department of Mines, which termed it “an effort to create a 
9,000,000-acre playground at the expense of possible industrial development.” 
The new Alaska state legislature adopted a resolution against the proposal in 
1959.60
National Parks Magazine ran a series of articles in 1958 touting the refuge 
proposal. Olaus Murie recounted the exhilarating experience he and Mardy had 
shared in the Sheenjek country two years earlier. He related vignettes of scenic 
beauty and wildlife encounters and expressed “a fervent hope that others, a few 
at a time, can enjoy the spiritual uplift of such a place. We human beings must 
muster the wisdom to leave a few places on earth strictly alone, to leave them for 
such esthetic adventures for the next generation.” Mindful of the importance of 
Alaskans’ approval, he paid tribute to garden clubs, outdoor sporting organiza-
tions, “certain groups of forward-looking teachers at the University of Alaska, 
and many individuals.”61
Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton, who moderately favored preserva-
tion of wildlands, contributed an article to the series. Having been shown the 
proposed refuge by Clarence Rhode, he firmly endorsed it. Adjacent to the 9-
million-acre refuge, he noted, the Canadians might set aside 5 million acres of 
their territory. Straddling the fence on industrial development, Seaton asserted 
that “no substantial mining or mineral values exist in the Wildlife Range” but 
added that mineral leasing might be permitted under guidelines protecting the 
land and wildlife. The refuge would be open to wilderness recreation, scientific 
study, and hunting and trapping. His recent modification of the 1943 order 
withdrawing the North Slope would permit oil and mining access to 20 mil-
lion acres west of the refuge. Thus, Seaton concluded, “it is likely that this 
American region near the top of the world will contribute as never before to 
the growth of the Alaskan economy and the recreational enjoyment of United 
States citizens.”62
Seaton possessed the legal power either to permit mining and oil and gas 
drilling under existing laws or to prohibit them entirely. But he wanted to keep 
the door open for oil and gas while banning mining that would more severely 
disrupt the surface. This third alternative required congressional approval, and 
bills to accomplish it appeared in Congress. In addition, he preferred the leg-
islative route to avoid having Alaskans blame the Republicans for an executive 
withdrawal and to divide the Democrats in Alaska. The designation itself would 
please environmentalists and reduce criticism of the Eisenhower administration 
for being too close to the oil industry.63
Before a sympathetic House Committee on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation in spring 1959, representatives of the Interior Department, Wildlife 
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Management Institute, Wilderness Society, National Wildlife Federation, Citizens 
Committee on Natural Resources, and Isaac Walton League testified in favor of 
the refuge bill. Alaska representative Ralph Rivers stated that, in light of the 
widespread approval in Alaska, he would withdraw his objections if a highway 
funding problem could be resolved. The distribution formula linked funds to 
the amount of unreserved lands in a state; therefore, reservation of the Arctic 
could reduce Alaska’s share.64
Testifying on June 30 before a Senate subcommittee chaired by Senator 
Bob Bartlett, refuge advocates received a polite reception. Speaking for himself, 
Senator Gruening, and many Alaskans, Bartlett said, “[W]e favor a conserva-
tion policy but we are increasingly, over the years, alarmed by the fact that the 
federal government . . . when it desires to make a withdrawal in Alaska, makes 
it of such a huge size.” Appended letters from Gruening, the Alaska Miners 
Association, Governor William Egan, and Alaska commissioner of fish and 
game Clarence Anderson registered opposition to the refuge. Anderson wanted 
to prevent federal control of fish and game: “The only real threat to the wildlife 
and wilderness of the Alaskan Arctic stems from a handful of wilderness extrem-
ists and federal officials.” The Juneau Chamber of Commerce objected to the 
refuge, but the National Audubon Society added its endorsement. Gruening’s 
letter cited five reasons for opposition: (1) the size of the refuge, (2) the pos-
sibility of losing highway funds, (3) interference with state selection of lands 
guaranteed by the Alaska Statehood Act, (4) loss of state control over fish and 
wildlife, and (5) lack of need to protect such a remote area.65
The Sierra Club’s biennial 1959 wilderness conference focused in part on 
the refuge issue. Robert A. Rausch of the Arctic Health Research Center point-
ed out that little true wilderness remained in Alaska and only a tiny percentage 
of it had been protected. Excepting the Arctic Wildlife Range, he said, “Nature 
conservation has enjoyed few advocates in Alaska, as compared with the many 
spokesmen for those who anticipate monetary gain from exploitation of natural 
resources.” He predicted that the state’s economy would increasingly depend 
on tourism and therefore on protection of natural assets.66 Notwithstanding 
the impacts of oil development, Rausch’s argument carried on into the 21st 
Century, slowly gaining force.
In the fall of 1959 hearings took place in Alaska. A.W. “Bud” Boddy of the 
Alaska Sportsmen’s Council, Dixie Baade, Celia Hunter, and Virginia “Ginny” 
Hill Wood, among others, spoke for the refuge. Hunter testified that “Alaska is 
considered to be a mining state—mining is our tradition and the first justifica-
tion for exploration and settlement,” and “the whole tone for our state adminis-
tration is set by the mining interests.” She called for recognition of the “decline 
in the importance of mining, and the increasing emphasis on tourism.” Wood, 
who had first publicly endorsed the refuge proposal in 1954, articulated the 
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environmentalist position that made up part of nearly every Alaska land dispute 
for the next several decades:
The rising cry for more wilderness areas, national parks, and recreation sites 
is more than the pleas of a few starry eyed nature lovers or bird watchers—it 
is a changing trend in values for a Nation that is finding material goods and 
higher standards of living not the whole answer to the quest for the good 
life. . . . Alaska’s wilderness and wildlife will become its most valuable asset 
economically as wild country disappears elsewhere—if we conserve it now. 
And we don’t have to invest vast sums to develop this asset, just maintain the 
status quo. . . . Always before in history there have been new frontiers to push 
onto: first the New Hemisphere, then the West, and finally the North, to 
which those who found life too crowded, exploited and regulated could go.
Now we have come to the end of the line.
We Alaskans must reconcile our pioneer philosophy of conquer, cut, 
shoot, plow, mine, and move on, to the realization that the wild country that 
lies now in Alaska is all that is left under the flag.
Otherwise, she warned, wild Alaska would “become a myth found only in 
books, movies, and small boys’ imaginations as the Wild West is now.”67
In early 1960 legislation to create an Arctic National Wildlife Range passed 
the House. In the Senate, Ernest Gruening and Bob Bartlett, assisted by Rep. 
Rivers, blocked it. They fought any move that might restrict mining or other 
forms of economic activity. Hearings had demonstrated local approval for the 
refuge; of Alaskans testifying, 73 favored and 53 opposed it. Bartlett stopped 
the bill in committee in August. Representatives from Alaskan conservation 
groups went to see him but failed to change his mind.68
Clinton “Pink” Gutermuth of the Wildlife Management Institute visited 
Seaton and demanded action. Sigurd Olson, Seaton’s most trusted contact in 
the environmental community, investigated the refuge site and conferred with 
Canadian officials at Seaton’s behest in the summer of 1960. He recommended 
action. On December 6 Seaton signed an order to create a 9-million-acre Arctic 
National Wildlife Range plus the 1.5-million-acre Kuskokwim and 450,000-
acre Izembek national wildlife ranges.69 The Izembek and Kuskokwim ranges, 
championed by the National Wildlife Federation, had been proposed at the 
time of the Arctic refuge. Essentially flat and known primarily for migratory 
waterfowl nesting, they received much less publicity and attention from envi-
ronmental groups than the Arctic refuge did.70 Gruening labeled Seaton’s move 
“a total usurpation and disregard for the rights of the state of Alaska.”71 Efforts 
by the Alaska delegation to persuade Seaton’s successor Stewart Udall to rescind 
the order went nowhere.
Secretary Seaton’s order ended surface mining but enabled oil and gas drill-
ing contingent upon agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and 
the Fish and Wildlife Service, subject to approval by the interior secretary.72 Oil 
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Ginny Hill Wood (left) and Celia Hunter, Fairbanks, ca. 1985. Courtesy Northern Alaska 
Environmental Center. Active in the Arctic Wildlife Range campaign, they helped organize 
the Alaskan environmental community.
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barrels and other litter and scars marked the sites of early oil exploration and an 
Air Force DEW (Distant Early Warning) station at Barter Island. But the vast 
bulk of the refuge ecosystem lay undisturbed.
The Arctic National Wildlife Range stood out among environmental events 
of its time. One of the fi rst federal land designations in post-statehood Alaska, 
Arctic National Wildlife Range/Refuge, 1960 and 1988. Courtesy Jason Geck
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it set precedents in being the first land designation issue to be settled largely in 
Alaska by Alaskans, and the first in the nation to be so openly dedicated to eco-
system preservation. Wilderness specialist Roger Kaye identified the dominant 
values sought by the proponents as “wildlife, ecological, scientific, recreational, 
heritage, and bequest values.”73 While the rules permitted hunting, trapping, 
and fishing by both Natives and non-Natives, the designation nevertheless im-
parted a signal victory and inspiration to national environmentalists that carried 
forth into the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the Alaska Lands acts of 1971 and 
1980. It also catalyzed modern environmentalism in Alaska. Celia Hunter and 
Ginny Wood helped found and lead the Alaska Conservation Society (1960–
1981), the state’s first such organization and pioneer of one of the nation’s most 
successful environmental communities.
Whither the Arctic Refuge?
In terms of environmental values, the Arctic National Wildlife Range rep-
resented a triumph for ecosystem sustainability, a goal consciously pursued by 
Sumner, Collins, Olaus and Margaret Murie, and other advocates of the refuge. 
Close behind, the designation embodied nonconsumptive use values; many of 
those favoring it placed a high spiritual value on a land they knew they would 
probably never see. Bob Marshall’s zealous writing, government activism, and 
leadership within the Wilderness Society had set the stage for benign treatment 
of northern Alaska. The Muries’ quiet but firm wisdom, carefully presented, 
did much to bring the vision to fruition. Public participation, both in the States 
and in Alaska, came to the fore and tellingly affected the outcome in favor 
of ecosystem preservation. It demonstrated genuine strength of preservation 
values in a region better known for aggressive resource exploitation. Timing of 
the issue, just ahead of the oil companies’ entry into the Arctic, enabled refuge 
advocates to overcome resistance from mining interests and Alaskan senators.
Yet the refuge’s proclamation left its environmental future in doubt. Most 
significant, the secretary of the interior could permit oil and gas drilling. Sport 
hunters or fishers, as well as subsistence users, could seek prey there. Hikers, 
river runners, bird watchers, photographers, and other sightseers might escalate 
their visits as economic boosters hoped. Scientists also wanted a presence on the 
land. At a 1961 symposium in Fairbanks, university biologist William Pruitt 
portrayed the refuge as a uniquely unspoiled ecosystem crucial for ecological 
studies, a “control area against which we can evaluate the efficiency of our land 
practices elsewhere in the Alaskan Arctic.” Anthropologist John M. Campbell 
pointed out the likelihood that early human migrants from Asia had lived in the 
region: “[N]owhere in the Americas is there a piece of ground that holds more 
promise for the eventual establishment of a complete Western Hemisphere 
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time-scale than the Arctic Slope,” especially the narrow coastal strip bordering 
the refuge. He cautioned that scientific expeditions could also damage the land: 
“Let us not spoil the thing that we have set out to save.” Olaus Murie, empha-
sizing the spiritual and psychological values of wilderness integrity, counseled 
that “we will be wise to go a little bit slower, to leave a few places on our con-
tinent undeveloped, with the fewest possible cabins and other structures built 
by government.” He added that “on our trips to the Wildlife Range we saw 
clearly that it was not a place for mass recreation.” Bureau of Sport Fisheries 
and Wildlife official Urban C. Nelson enumerated the groups hoping to make 
use of the refuge and advised, “It is not purely wilderness area. It is not a game 
sanctuary. It is a composite of the interests that are involved.”74
Alaska entered its modern oil era after the 1957 discovery on the Kenai 
Peninsula. A decade later came the strike at Prudhoe Bay and recurring at-
tempts to open the nearby Arctic Refuge to oil exploration. Once among the 
least-known parts of the nation, the region again drew national attention. 
Drilling for oil necessitated clarification of land ownership, precipitating the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 and the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980. A newly invigorated environ-
mental movement won guarantees of wildland protection in ANILCA. The act 
doubled the size of the renamed Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and classified 
nearly half of it as wilderness, in which only recreation and subsistence activi-
ties would be allowed. In 1983 the state relinquished a temporary selection of 
972,000 acres that became part of the refuge. Congress added 325,000 acres in 
1988, bringing the total to almost 19.3 million.75 Rivers and wildlife attracted 
visitors to the point where they had to be scheduled to avoid environmental 
and recreational degradation. On the Canadian side, in 1984 the government 
set aside the 3-million-acre Northern Yukon National Park (renamed Ivvavik) 
bordering the refuge on the east. As of 1995, 1-million-acre Vuntut National 
Park bordered Ivvavik on the south and the Arctic Refuge on the east.
Among the many compromises between protection and development in 
ANILCA, an assessment of oil potential would be made within the Arctic 
Refuge and drilling could proceed by permission of Congress.76 Oil compa-
nies wanted access, and Alaskans looked forward to more oil royalties. And 
global warming, in part a product of fossil fuel burning, threatened to further 
destabilize the Arctic ecosystem.77 Environmentalists and their opponents both 
adopted the refuge as a cause célèbre, and the struggle intensified as it contin-
ued into the 21st Century. The Arctic Refuge became the nation’s preeminent 
battleground in the debate over exploitation versus preservation, consumption 
versus sustainability, material production versus wilderness.
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froM tHE sEa ottEr to tHE arCtiC national WilDlifE ranGE, alasKa sErvED 
as a testing ground for natural resource policy. Cumulatively, the contests reg-
istered an evolution of environmental values from all-out exploitation to utili-
tarian conservation and examples of preservation. They also shaped conserva-
tion values both in Alaska and on a national scale. The nation’s environmental 
agenda moved closer to appreciation of Nature and a more holistic approach in 
relating to it.
Alaska stands out among American states and territories as by far the most 
recent to go through the frontier experience. It retained territory status for 
about 70 years beyond the “closing” of the frontier in the States, and settlers 
could homestead on federal land in Alaska for nearly 20 years after statehood. 
Remoteness, hardships, a low people-to-land ratio, and the myth of abundant 
natural resources tempted settlers and adventurers to energetically exploit the 
territory and obstruct conservation measures, especially those imposed from 
faraway Washington. Even the preservationist John Muir saw no danger of re-
source exhaustion. Conservation practices by Natives, to the extent that they 
18
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existed, exerted almost no influence on the dominant Euro-American culture. 
Pre-statehood Alaska, especially in earlier years, exhibited an array of primitive 
environmental values.
VALUES IN ALASKA LAND AND WILDLIFE 
MANAGEMENT
Environmental values, or prescriptions governing the relations of humans 
to the natural environment, can be seen as ranging along scales of maturity or 
advancement. With respect to land and wildlife policy, four aspects are crucial: 
primary goals, management objectives, information-gathering methods, and 
decision-making power. By their nature and effects, these value-laden elements 
determine what happens in practice. They express and create environmental 
values.
Primary Goals
Primary goals are the fundamental purposes or outcomes we seek. What 
essentially do we want the human-nonhuman relationship to be? Options span 
a scale from (a) the absence of any environmental protection to (b) selective spe-
cies protection to (c) ecosystem sustainability to (d) a holistic ideal of sustain-
able worldwide existence of humans and nonhumans. This scale parallels the 
spectrum ranging from uncontrolled exploitation to utilitarian conservation to 
preservation.
During the first half of the 1741–1867 Russian period, fur seekers pursued a 
goal of maximal and unrestricted acquisition of pelts, no matter what the impact 
on wildlife populations, ecosystems, or Native cultures. As of 1806 the Russian 
government made some headway in moving the goal forward to protection of 
selected species. After 1867 the basic goal of U.S. policy gradually changed from 
tolerance of unlimited exploitation to more farsighted purposes. In the whaling 
period and for most of their initial four decades of control, Americans vigorously 
engaged in poorly regulated and unsustainable taking of wildlife. No safeguards 
existed for the whales until after pelagic whaling had all but ceased in Alaska, 
and much the same applied to the sea otter, sea lion, and walrus. The federal 
government sought to conserve the fur seal as a valuable commercial resource. 
Prodded by nature societies and outdoor sporting clubs like Boone and Crockett 
and the Camp Fire Club, the government attempted to protect selected species 
through sea mammal treaties and the game laws of 1902–1925. Similarly, the 
Alaska Game Commission tried to conserve specific mammals and birds as a 
meat and fur supply for Alaskans. For the most part, large predators did not 
rank among the favored. Although hampered by the fishing industry’s influ-
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ence in Congress, federal fisheries agents attempted to conserve salmon runs. 
On the whole, management of Alaskan wildlife made a successful transition to 
utilitarian conservation. Nearly all species recovered from the depredations of 
the whaling and Gold Rush eras, in part as a result of government efforts.
Land reserves in Alaska directly or indirectly advanced ecosystem sustain-
ability. Utilitarian conservation of wildlife, scientific curiosities, and tourist at-
tractions may have been the main motives, but the reserves incorporated ele-
ments of the preservation ethic. Rooseveltian conservation policies inhibited 
immediate exploitation of timber, coal, and oil. The Tongass and Chugach 
national forests incidentally and temporarily shielded extensive terrain from 
fragmentation and degradation. Land designations in the form of national 
parks and monuments explicitly recognized elements of ecosystem sustainabil-
ity. Thanks in large part to the work of Bob Marshall and Olaus and Margaret 
Murie, the setting aside of the Arctic National Wildlife Range represented an 
open commitment to ecosystem preservation. But not until the Wilderness Act 
of 1964 and the Alaska Lands Act of 1980 did national policy endorse the pres-
ervation principle on a grand scale.
Aboriginal Alaskans saw themselves as integral elements of a natural sys-
tem, but few Alaska Natives incorporated traditional conservation practices 
into their 20th-Century lifestyles. Had they done so, they would have received 
little recognition prior to the emergence of modern environmentalism in the 
1960s and 1970s. Muir, Marshall, and the Muries envisioned elements of a 
holistic relationship of humans to the nonhuman environment, well ahead of 
their time. But none of them systematically explicated their views of the proper 
role of humans. They wrote more for popular audiences than for academic 
publications. Moreover, they had urgent political work to do and might have 
weakened their influence by insisting, for example, that humans had no right 
to arbitrarily destroy ecosystems and their inhabitants. They generated more 
momentum toward their goals through less direct appeals and arguments for 
species or ecosystem sustainability.
Management Objectives
Resource management objectives are the shorter-term purposes of wild-
life and land managers. They range from (a) unregulated, random exploitation 
to (b) sustainable consumptive use by humans (utilitarian conservation) to (c) 
nonconsumptive (scientific, recreational, aesthetic, spiritual) use by humans to 
(d) nonhuman (individual, species, or ecosystem) rights. Like the primary goals, 
they advance from (a) to (d) along the scale from exploitation to preservation.
Closely tied to the overarching goals, management objectives evolved simi-
larly. Russia’s government shifted the aim of fur-seeking activity from uncon-
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trolled exploitation to utilitarianism or sustainable use of species. American 
administration featured weak efforts to realize sustainability, slowly improving 
in effectiveness over the near-century leading up to statehood. The reindeer 
experiment represented a rare, if doomed, attempt to incorporate the well-being 
of Natives into sustainable use objectives. Had it succeeded according to its 
broadest conception, however, it would have massively undermined ecosystem 
sustainability. Bob Marshall’s Arctic park proposal envisioned Alaska Natives 
and whites living at subsistence levels, a concept partly realized in the post-
statehood period through subsistence land use policies.
Nature groups preferred utilitarian objectives to unregulated exploitation, 
and outdoor sporting groups, trappers, and guides backed regulation as neces-
sary for a continuing game and fur supply. The Bureau of Biological Survey 
and the Alaska Game Commission concentrated on sustainable use of desirable 
(primarily ungulate and valuable furbearer) species, an objective that seemed to 
warrant predator control. As an official management objective, utilitarian sus-
tainable use occupied a dominant position throughout the 20th Century.
Some policy went to the next step and sought nonconsumptive uses, most 
notably the aesthetic and spiritual valuation of the grizzly bear, Mt. McKinley 
Park, Katmai, Glacier Bay, and the Arctic Refuge. Scientific and recreational 
benefits also helped justify the parklands. Arguments based on spiritual values, 
however, did not generate strong responses from government and the public, 
at least not in Alaska. Yet their impact is difficult to measure. Muir, Marshall, 
and Olaus and Margaret Murie appeared to gain stature as they promulgated 
such views.
Much higher barriers confronted the notion that wild creatures should 
not be mere “resources” for use by humans but that they are worthy in and 
of themselves. This idea came naturally to pre-contact Alaska Natives. But to 
Euro-Americans it had intolerable implications. It implied that nonhumans 
held rights that would comprehensively restrict human behavior toward them. 
The idea would also challenge the comforting belief that humans are morally 
superior, the rightful owners of Earth. Despite these formidable obstacles, argu-
ments in favor of nonhuman rights made some headway. Elliott and Hornaday 
won admiration in the press and public for their attacks on the injustice of the 
unnecessary killing of fur seals. Presumably their audiences valued the seals’ 
right to exist as a species. Many must have believed humans had no right to 
kill individual seals, especially for such trivial reasons as fashion. Even if they 
rejected the abstract principle of moral or legal rights for nonhumans, people’s 
visceral reaction to the clubbing of wide-eyed, innocent creatures implied a 
belief in a form of individual animal rights. But legal rights for wild as distinct 
from domestic animals had no standing in the society. And ecosystem rights as 
such lay even farther in the future.
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Grant, Hornaday, Holzworth, White, and others successfully defended 
the grizzly bears’ right to exist. But wildlife advocates usually found it easier 
to employ utilitarian arguments. Valuing wildlife species as useful to humans, 
whether for skins or spiritual benefits, appealed to most people’s self-indulgence 
and achieved much the same result as would legal rights for species. Predators, 
however, presented a different problem in that they appeared to force a choice 
between species. Believing that wolves, for example, threatened the well-being 
or even the existence of desired species such as Dall sheep, most people wanted 
to control or exterminate the wolves. Yet true belief in species rights required 
that the wolf be defended. During Alaska’s territorial period, only a few natural-
ists and scientists dared to do so. When they did, their arguments usually rested 
not on species rights but on the need to complete ecosystems or to ensure the 
strength and health of prey populations.
Information-Gathering Methods
Information-gathering methods are the cognitive and affective processes 
that tell managers what is happening and what needs to be done. They range 
from (a) pre-scientific biases to (b) judgment based on field experience to (c) 
ecological science to (d) a holistic approach combining natural and social sci-
ence, intuition, and aesthetic and spiritual perspectives. Generally, these too are 
correlates of the exploitation-preservation scale.
Human behavior is always linked, however consciously or rationally, to 
the apprehension of reality or “truth.” Means of truth-seeking both reflect and 
mold environmental values. In the absence of scientific information, people ex-
ploited resources according to tradition or narrow self-interest. Tradition in the 
form of some Native practices consciously or indirectly supported sustainable 
use. In the case of Athabaskan Indians at least, field observation attained the 
level of descriptive, if not ecological, science. Europeans and Euro-Americans 
lacked strong traditions that fostered conservation. Their self-centered behav-
ior, based largely on fear and greed, quickly exhausted resources and impaired 
ecosystems. Before wildlife management as a science got under way in the mid-
20th Century, governments had to rely on the common sense and integrity of 
field agents using primitive tools of observation and measurement. Fair-minded 
observers could often see a resource disappearing and realize that its absence 
might entail serious costs. Far short of creating an understanding of natural 
processes, field surveys nevertheless contributed building blocks for gradually 
improving science and for utilitarian conservation.
Russians valued science as a basis for resource management and employed 
the judgments of informed observers in conservation of the fur seal and sea ot-
ter. Under American rule, science usually took a back seat to greed in the case 
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of economically valuable resources (e.g., whales, walruses, sea otters, salmon, 
gold, oil, and many land mammals) and when the issue involved predators. 
International controversy brought science to the rescue of fur seals in the 1911 
Fur Seal Treaty. Policy makers misapplied science in the introduction of some 
species, such as foxes on bird-nesting islands. They ventured into realms beyond 
their capacity to evaluate in their attempts to pastoralize northern Alaska and 
Eskimo culture through the importation of reindeer. During the early decades 
of the 20th Century the intuitive judgments of wardens and other agents, rely-
ing largely on anecdotal evidence, helped determine management policy. As in 
the case of predator control and bounties, they often reflected personal biases or 
served the immediate interests of settlers, hunters, or politicians.
Through the 1920s to the 1950s the Bureau of Biological Survey and 
the Fish and Wildlife Service increasingly hired university-trained agents, but 
most of them promoted the bureau’s high-priority agenda of predator control. 
Science in the form of species population surveys assisted the Alaska Game 
Commission in wildlife management, but it came too late and too little to re-
form predator control policy before statehood. Newly emerging ecological sci-
ence helped the National Park Service retain its goal of ecosystem sustainability 
in Mt. McKinley Park and other units. Ecological science laid a foundation for 
improved salmon management. It took years or even decades to alter the prac-
tices of field managers, especially in such an emotionally loaded matter as wolf 
control. Moreover, the mechanistic orientation of ecological science hampered 
its ability to understand the complexity of ecosystems, the more so when tak-
ing human actions into account. A more complete understanding of the place 
of humans in the environment called for integrated application of natural sci-
ences, social sciences, and humanities.
More holistic perspectives characterized the behavior of some pre-contact 
Alaska Natives, especially Athabaskans. Holism informed the writings of a few 
Euro-Americans including Muir, Marshall, and Adolph, Olaus, and Margaret 
Murie. All of these people incorporated intuition, aesthetics, and spiritual or 
psychological values in their philosophies, and Marshall applied elements of 
economics and sociology as well. To an extent, holism won tangible expression 
in the preservation of large tracts of land and in the eventual alteration of preda-
tor control policy. A more systematic integration of natural and social sciences 
emerged in cooperative Alaska wildlife management programs in the late 20th 
Century.
Decision-Making Power
Decision-making power is the matter of who decides what will be done. 
It is basic to all politics and social justice. Within the context of natural re-
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source policy the options range from (a) anarchical scramble for resources to 
(b) government collusion with favored interest groups to (c) management by 
nonpolitical government resource experts to (d) shared stewardship through 
government and corporate accountability, public participation, and representa-
tion for nonhumans. These options also parallel and express the exploitation-
preservation value spectrum.
Participation in decision making is important for at least two reasons. First, 
it determines which humans benefit from a resource, sometimes making the 
difference between life and death. Tight Russian control of access to birds, fish, 
and mammals helped keep Aleut and Koniag subjects in a state of subjuga-
tion intended to further Russia’s aims in North America. The relative freedom 
enjoyed by Americans, excepting the Aleuts, resulted in a lawless assault on 
wildlife that served short-term individual economic purposes. As public access 
to government and information widened and commercially valuable resources 
showed signs of depletion, government intervened. Enhanced government con-
trol spread the benefits to more people over a longer time span.
Press and public involvement are usually necessary to avoid the appropria-
tion of publicly owned resources for the benefit of narrow interests, as dem-
onstrated in the fights over the fur seals and the Alaska coal lands. Nature and 
sporting groups, sometimes backed by elements of the national press, protected 
Mt. McKinley, Katmai, and Glacier Bay from damage by miners and other 
resource extractors. Alaska newspapers and citizen groups, on the other hand, 
typically worked to make public resources available to exploitative interests. 
Alaska Natives, almost entirely excluded from natural resource decision making 
and without an influential mass media voice, received less than their fair share 
of benefits under the law until after statehood.
Power to make management decisions is also a key determinant in the fate 
of the resource. Open availability of resources leads to rapid depletion, and 
excessive collusion between government and consumptive interest groups can 
do the same. Control by government experts, in the North American context, 
normally means long-term conservation of valued resources. But this can cause 
excessive damage to elements not favored, such as predators, or otherwise dis-
rupt ecosystems. Public involvement, if enlightened, can curb some of the envi-
ronmental abuses by both government officials and corporations.
Russia’s authoritarian government never aspired to involve its general public 
in decision making, although it sought to control the fur trade for national eco-
nomic benefit. Following a period of little or no regulation it appointed manag-
ers of the fur trade and discouraged uncoordinated profit seeking by individu-
als. Through the Russian-American Company, as much an arm of government 
as an interest group, it instituted utilitarian conservation rules. This approach 
worked best for fur seals because nearly all harvest occurred on land controlled 
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by Russia. Sea otters, spending much of their time in far-flung international 
waters and pursued by men from several nations, needed more protection than 
the Russian government could provide. Much the same applied to whales.
The U.S. government found it considerably more difficult to manage the 
behavior of its fractious and aggressively acquisitive citizens and struggled for 
decades to incorporate management of wildlife by experts. It failed to protect the 
sea otters and right whales until they had all but disappeared. Favoritism toward 
interest groups, notably the Alaska Commercial Company, inevitably emerged 
during the post–Civil War era of capitalism. But the ensuing Progressive Era 
set the stage for a political-environmental contest that brought the fur seals and 
sea otters firmly under government control. The press and attentive public also 
received a share in the decision making on fur seal management, although the 
Aleuts had little say in the matter until after statehood.
For better or worse, nature and hunting groups in the States and hunters 
and trappers in Alaska enjoyed strong influence in wildlife management. In an 
age of inordinate corporate power, such elite bodies as the Boone and Crockett 
Club had the best chance of persuading the national government to adopt con-
servation measures. Fortunately for resource sustainability, the elite nature and 
hunting groups worked primarily for conservation rather than consumptive ex-
ploitation. They advocated management by government experts as an improve-
ment over random exploitation and favoritism toward consumptive interests 
such as market hunters. The Alaska Game Commission incorporated public 
representation into its structure but disproportionately served the interests of 
white hunters, trappers, and guides.
Through such land reservations as the Tongass and Chugach national for-
ests, Theodore Roosevelt managed to curb random and monopolistic exploita-
tion of forests and coal. But in the case of gold mining and Kenai oil drilling 
in the 1950s, government seldom got beyond minimal oversight of rapacious 
treatment of the environment. In the case of Kenai oil, it displayed favoritism 
toward particular private interests.
Land designations, however, and to a lesser extent wildlife disputes, often 
involved the general public as meaningful participants in policy. Numerous 
groups had a voice in the formation of the McKinley and Glacier Bay parklands 
and the Arctic National Wildlife Range. Katmai’s designation flowed from ex-
traordinary political access on the part of the National Geographic Society, but 
the society sought a benevolent public purpose.
Advances in education, travel, and communications technology increased 
public awareness and participation after World War II. By the 1970s, national 
legislation encouraged citizen involvement in many aspects of resource manage-
ment through hearings, appeals, and lawsuits. Alaska Native user groups en-
gaged in cooperative management of specific wildlife species, including whales, 
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polar bears, and geese. Environmental management in Alaska evolved toward 
shared stewardship.
Environmental goals, management objectives, research methods, and par-
ticipation in policy evolved toward more enlightened treatment of Alaskan 
lands and wildlife over the two centuries before statehood (Table 18.1 attempts 
to quantify the environmental values manifested by the leaders and issues cov-
ered in this volume). Alaskan issues have contributed disproportionately to a 
national value shift. The territory’s remoteness encouraged excesses but also de-
terred human population growth and industrial development until more ma-
ture environmental values had evolved.
ALASKA’S IMPACT ON THE NATION
Pre-statehood Alaska disproportionately affected the evolution of American 
environmentalism, for several reasons. Most ecosystems in the States had been 
thoroughly disrupted by the eve of the 20th Century; Alaska’s had not. Federal 
ownership (Native claims aside) of nearly all the land, and a dearth of settlers, 
lent government officials and interested members of the public an opportunity 
to determine the disposal of a large and relatively unspoiled realm. Ensuing 
debates illuminated many aspects of environmental concern including re-
source management goals (as in land designations), objectives (as in game bag 
limits), research methods (as in McKinley Park wolf control), techniques (as 
in salmon production and predator control), and participants (as in coal and 
oil policy).
Alaska’s isolation and reputation for drama and grandeur, highly colored 
by the Gold Rush experience, attracted talented adventurers, hunters, scien-
tists, and government officials. Many attained prominent positions in govern-
ment and other realms of public affairs, advancing policy and public opinion 
up the scale of environmental responsibility. John Muir generated a wave of 
enthusiasm for the northern land and incorporated preservationist messages 
in his writing. His public stature enhanced his standing as an environmental 
thinker and activist, molding him into a prominent figure in the environmental 
movement. The Sierra Club he co-founded and led eventually became one of 
the most prominent environmental players nationwide and in Alaska. Henry 
W. Elliott, despite or because of his egotism and eccentricity, turned fur seal 
management into the first national and international debate on wildlife policy. 
Wealthy sport hunters such as Madison Grant and Charles Sheldon, initially 
devoted to conquest of wild beasts, went on to lead efforts to conserve them. 
For the many entranced by its wildlife and dismayed by what had happened 
in the States, Alaska tendered the possibility of large-scale species or ecosystem 
preservation.
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tablE 18.1. Environmental Values Expressed by Alaskan Issues and Leaders, 1741–1960
Primary goal
 A No protection 5 2 5 0 0 - - - ? 0 0 3 2 2 3 3 - 0 0
    B Selected species 3 5 2 0 5 5 2 3 ? 5 5 4 5 5 5 2 0 0 0
 C Eco-sustainability 1 1 0 4 3 4 4 4 ? 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 4 4 5
 D Holistic ideal 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Management objective
 A Unregulated 5 3 5 0 0 - - - ? 0 0 3 2 2 3 3 - 0 0
 B Sustainable use 0 5 2 2 5 2 1 1 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 2 3 5
 C Nonconsumptive use 1 1 0 5 2 5 5 5 4 1 2 3 2 1 0 0 5 5 5
 D Nonhuman rights 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Information-gathering method
 A Pre-science 5 5 5 ? 0 - - - 5 0 0 4 5 3 3 3 - 0 0
 B Field experience 3 5 2 3 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 3 5 5
 C Ecological science 1 2 0 2 1 3 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 2
 D Holistic 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3
Decision-making power
 A No control 5 2 5 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 - 0 0
 B Favored groups 2 3 1 0 3 1 2 1 ? 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 0
 C Government experts 2 4 2 3 5 5 5 4 ? 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5
 D Shared stewardship 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 ? 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 ? 1

































































































































































The territory also interested the public because it presented a stage on 
which pioneer fantasies could still be played out. A surviving facsimile of the 
Wild West, Alaska seemed to offer a chance, vicariously or viscerally, to return 
to the past. Coming under American control as the frontier began to disappear 
in the West, it fell into place as an extension of the frontier, perpetuating the 
notion of continual American expansion. This idea encouraged Americans to 
believe that Alaska could be openly exploited and to go there and seek their 
fortunes at the expense of the environment.
Alaska entered the nation’s environmental agenda not long before the 
Progressive Era, a backlash stemming in part from the destruction of natural 
resources by powerful economic interests. Resistance to acquisition of Alaska 
coal lands by the Morgan-Guggenheim Syndicate produced a classic muckrak-
ing morality play casting conservationists as heroes. Several prominent New 
York Progressive leaders, including George Bird Grinnell, Madison Grant, and 
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Theodore Roosevelt, gave high priority to protection of resources in Alaska. 
Through the Boone and Crockett Club, New York Zoological Society, and re-
lated organizations, they functioned within a network of elites that made nu-
merous and continuing contributions to safeguarding species and natural areas 
nationwide. Over time, their focus of concern moved from game species toward 
ecosystem sustainability and preservation.
Early cruise ship tours and the Harriman Expedition of 1899 illustrated 
Alaska’ attraction for the socially prominent, and the New York Times, probably 
the nation’s foremost newspaper, displayed an ongoing interest in Alaskan and 
natural resource issues. Grinnell, Grant, Charles Sheldon, William T. Hornaday, 
Charles H. Townsend, and, to some extent, Theodore Roosevelt operated out 
of New York. Bob Marshall, a firmly Progressive New Yorker, may have been 
responsible for protecting more wildland acreage than any other person save 
a few U.S. presidents. His achievements and legacy within the Wilderness 
Society strengthened the nation’s commitment to ecosystem sustainability. The 
New York and Washington elites, motivated in part by their fascination about 
Alaska, had an extraordinary impact on national policy toward its wildlife and 
wildlands.
The Progressive Era found expression in utilitarian conservation of wild-
life. Theodore Roosevelt’s ideal of efficient government management of natural 
resources permeated agency perspectives. Adopting an aggressively managerial 
attitude, the Bureau of Biological Survey (BBS) vigorously strove for protection 
of game species and for reserves. But the managerial bent included an obses-
sive desire to control predators that lasted far longer than could be justified by 
evidence. BBS agent Olaus Murie and his brother Adolph in the National Park 
Service, informed by their Alaska experiences, resisted the policy. Their writ-
ings, and the McKinley Park wolf controversy, hastened the decline of predator 
control nationwide.
Land disposal decisions in the territorial period, notably reservation of the 
popular Glacier Bay and to a lesser extent Katmai and Mt. McKinley, strength-
ened national commitment to principles of ecosystem preservation by their 
example. Robert F. Griggs and William S. Cooper enlisted numerous groups 
in the States in the campaigns for Katmai and Glacier Bay national monu-
ments. Designation of McKinley Park for mountain sheep, and such lands as 
the Kodiak brown bear and Kenai moose ranges facilitated by Ira Gabrielson, 
accomplished some of the same for species sustainability. The Arctic National 
Wildlife Range enhanced national interest in the nonconsumptive values of wil-
derness and lent force to the emerging environmental movement. Olaus Murie’s 
work in the Wilderness Society ultimately went far in shaping national wildland 
policy. He and his surviving wife, Margaret, grew into permanent symbols of 
Alaskan wilderness and the wisdom of cherishing it.
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Lack of population density and resources of interest to mining and log-
ging corporations made possible almost all of the major Alaska land preserva-
tion decisions. Yet regardless of the motives behind their selection, the national 
public valued their spectacular quality, which reinforced the prestige of the 
National Park and Fish and Wildlife services and the nation’s complex of wild 
parklands.
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN ALASKA
Evolution of environmental values among the Alaskan public lagged well 
behind that in the States. In the near-absence of opinion polls, uncertainty 
must exist regarding the balance of sentiments. Anecdotal evidence and the 
consistent behavior of the business community and territorial legislature sug-
gest that all-out appropriation of resources reigned as the dominant goal. To 
the extent that Native conservation practices existed, Euro-Americans ignored 
them. Governors and legislators perpetually badgered the federal government 
for control of natural resources, not granted the territory in the 1912 act. They 
accepted the federal government’s utilitarian objective of sustainability of eco-
nomically useful species such as salmon but resisted almost any moves toward 
nonconsumptive use goals (for such as the grizzly bear) and ecosystem sustain-
ability through federal reserves. They did not encounter public participation 
by local environmental groups; virtually none existed in Alaska before statehood. 
They did not respond to scientific evidence questioning the viability of the 
bounty system and predator control in general. In sum, most pre-statehood 
Alaskans disdained almost every manifestation of advanced environmental 
thinking. The impetus for nearly all gains in environmental awareness and pol-
icy came from outside, or from federal agents and scholars in Alaska.
After statehood, stout resistance to environmental values persisted in the 
legislature and other elements of Alaskan society. Many business leaders, state 
politicians, and the congressional delegation perpetuated the frontier myths 
of unlimited natural resources and the need to reduce federal control. They 
brushed aside the fact that most of Alaska belonged to the nation, not to 
Alaskans for their consumptive use. On into the 21st Century they favored 
open exploitation of resources, tolerated some utilitarian conservation, and 
opposed nearly all forms of preservation. Environmental protection and envi-
ronmentalists represented, to them, barriers to economic development. They 
persisted in imagining that the land held enough resources to permit them in 
ever-swelling numbers to fashion comfortable middle-class lifestyles in perpetu-
ity. They ignored or denied the fact that the state’s economy rested on one or 
two nonrenewable natural resources and on subsidies, both controlled from the 
outside. Essentially residents of a welfare state, they preferred to fancy them-
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selves as rugged individualists. They refused to make preparations for a time 
when resources or subsidies might disappear. In essence, they rejected economic 
and environmental sustainability.
But seeds of change, planted earlier, sprouted. Some federal officials of the 
territorial period joined the Alaska Department of Fish and Game or remained 
in federal agencies overseeing Alaskan sea mammals, migratory birds, or federal 
lands. Their ecologically oriented training affected wildlife and land manage-
ment policy. Research broadened, and emphasis on bounties and predator con-
trol lessened. Rising income levels and improved access by air, sea, and highway 
brought multiplying numbers of visitors to Alaska. Tourism promoters includ-
ing the state encouraged the “last frontier” image of a romantic, free, relatively 
unspoiled holdover from the past. The image glamorized consumptive exploita-
tion and ignored conservation, at least until the advent of ecotourism later in 
the 20th Century. The new state drew increased attention from national media 
and environmental groups, creating pressure for greater environmental protec-
tion. The 1980 Alaska Lands Act demonstrated and reinforced national com-
mitment to values of wilderness and ecosystem preservation, shared by a strong 
minority of Alaskans.
Initiated by the Alaska Conservation Society, an effective environmental 
community sprang up in Alaska, composed of long-time residents, outsiders 
who moved to the state, and branch offices of national environmental organi-
zations. This coalition has significantly shaped state and national legislation, 
monitored compliance of companies and government agencies, and mounted 
numerous lawsuits in the service of environmental protection. The state leg-
islature passed a fair amount of environmentally protective legislation until it 
turned strongly conservative in the mid-1990s. Post-statehood Alaskan resource 
disputes such as Tongass logging and the Exxon Valdez oil spill caught the in-
terest of the American public and set precedents in national policy. As the re-
pository of the nation’s greatest store of wildlands, the state assumed a rising 
position on the nation’s environmental agenda. By degrees, the management of 
both federal and state natural resources in Alaska moved haltingly in the direc-
tion of advanced environmental values. Alaskan environmental controversies 
continued to be a causal force in the evolution of American environmental 
values.
Maturation of the environmental movement in the last quarter of the 20th 
Century did not signal the adoption of the most advanced principles by a ma-
jority of the national public or even by most environmentalists. It did embody 
a shift in opinion, public discourse, and management policy toward more ad-
vanced, preservationist values. Ecosystem sustainability is replacing the focus 
on favored species, and nonconsumptive uses are superseding the notion that 
the purpose of wild creatures is to be killed, skinned, and eaten by humans. 
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Scholarly inquiry has proliferated, and numerous citizen groups regularly par-
ticipate in policy making. Holistic perspectives have become part of the debate. 
Public opinion polls, legislation, media coverage, and other indicators leave no 
serious doubt that attitudes toward the environment have progressed both in 
the Lower 48 and in Alaska.
Nor can it necessarily be assumed that adoption of the most advanced (some 
would say extreme) environmental principles must be preferable to all compet-
ing values. Determination of what is best for a society or for Earth under given 
circumstances is a monumental undertaking, calling at minimum for generous 
applications of science and philosophy, tempered by discipline and compassion. 
Yet accumulating knowledge has moved thoughtful Alaskans, and the American 
body politic as a whole, several steps in the direction of environmentalism.
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